iv)An unequivocal act approach requires the act to unambiguouslybear its criminal intent <strong>on</strong> its face.2.08 The first three approaches impose liability at different pointsal<strong>on</strong>g the range between beginning to act <strong>on</strong> an intenti<strong>on</strong> to commit a crimeand completing that crime; the proximate act lying somewhere in betweenthe first and last acts. The unequivocal act approach differs in that it is notrange-based. Rather, it expects the act to have an intrinsic quality. Theunequivocal act approach is perhaps best understood as motivated by ac<strong>on</strong>cern to have an actus reus of attempt that c<strong>on</strong>firms the mens rea. Thus, itis said that under the unequivocal act approach the primary purpose ofhaving an “act” requirement is evidential. The act c<strong>on</strong>firms that the mind isindeed a guilty <strong>on</strong>e. The first three approaches are mutually exclusive in thatit would be incoherent to combine the first and last act approaches with eachother. Nor would it make sense to combine either the first or last actapproaches with the proximate act approach. But the unequivocal actapproach can coherently be combined with any <strong>on</strong>e of the others.(b)(i)Actus reus of attempt in IrelandProximity theory in Ireland2.09 In The People (Attorney General) v Sullivan 7 the Supreme Courtheld that the defendant could rightly be tried for attempting to obtain m<strong>on</strong>eyby false pretences. The defendant was a midwife who was c<strong>on</strong>tracted to bepaid a basic salary for attending 25 births in a year. For additi<strong>on</strong>al birthsbey<strong>on</strong>d 25 she would get additi<strong>on</strong>al pay. She had submitted some reports offictitious births. There was no evidence whether she had reached orexceeded the 25 mark. Accordingly, the Court assumed, in her favour, shehad not. The questi<strong>on</strong> was whether she had d<strong>on</strong>e enough at this point(having submitted just three false reports) to be guilty of an attempt giventhat she would in the end receive the extra pay <strong>on</strong>ly if her reported caseswithin the c<strong>on</strong>tract year exceeded 25? Were her acti<strong>on</strong>s attempt rather thanmere preparati<strong>on</strong>? In answering yes, the Court held that each and every falseclaim submitted was “sufficiently proximate” to committing the substantiveoffence in order to c<strong>on</strong>stitute the physical element of attempt. 82.10 This decisi<strong>on</strong> is seen as a straightforward applicati<strong>on</strong> of proximitytheory, 9 which holds that the act d<strong>on</strong>e towards the target offence must beclose to completi<strong>on</strong> of the target offence in order to be a criminal attempt.Indeed, Walsh J, speaking for the Supreme Court in Sullivan, stated what he789[1964] IR 169.Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the c<strong>on</strong>clusi<strong>on</strong> of Teevan J in the High Court.Charlet<strong>on</strong>, McDermott and Bolger Criminal <strong>Law</strong> (Butterworths 1999) at 274.23
called “the proximity rule” to decide the case, quoting Parke B in R vEaglet<strong>on</strong> as expressing this rule in the negative form:“acts remotely leading towards the commissi<strong>on</strong> of the offence arenot to be c<strong>on</strong>sidered as attempts to commit it, but actsimmediately c<strong>on</strong>nected with it are” 102.11 An act “immediately c<strong>on</strong>nected with” the commissi<strong>on</strong> of anoffence could reas<strong>on</strong>ably be c<strong>on</strong>sidered not just a proximate act, but actuallya last act. Of course, the passage quoted above does not say that <strong>on</strong>ly actsimmediately with commissi<strong>on</strong> are attempts; it can be read as illustrating theproximity rule by stating how last acts most certainly qualify as attemptsunder the proximity rule. This is Walsh J‟s reading of Eaglet<strong>on</strong>. However,Eaglet<strong>on</strong> has been read by other courts, and by commentators, as setting outa last act test. 11 The last act reading has much plausibility when Parke B‟sjudgment is quoted more expansively than the Supreme Court in Sullivandid. The passage above c<strong>on</strong>tinues:“if, in this case, … any further step <strong>on</strong> the part of the defendanthad been necessary to obtain payment … we should have thoughtthat the obtaining credit would not have been sufficientlyproximate to the obtaining the m<strong>on</strong>ey. But … no other act <strong>on</strong> thepart of the defendant would have been required. It was the lastact, depending <strong>on</strong> himself, towards the payment of the m<strong>on</strong>ey, andtherefore it ought to be c<strong>on</strong>sidered as an attempt.” 122.12 The <strong>Law</strong> Commissi<strong>on</strong> for England and Wales suggest this passagewas “probably not intended to be a statement of law to be applied in allcases.” 13 Whatever the exact intenti<strong>on</strong> behind it, this passage reveals theratio of Eaglet<strong>on</strong>: an attempt is committed when the defendant hasperformed the last act needed <strong>on</strong> his part to bring about the substantiveoffence. The word “proximate” is used, but it is used in a quite restrictivesense. 14 Sullivan, strictly speaking, did not apply Eaglet<strong>on</strong>, for in Sullivan1011121314R v Eaglet<strong>on</strong> [1855] 6 Cox CC 559, 571; 169 ER 826, 835, quoted by Walsh J at[1964] IR 169, 195-196.McAuley and McCutche<strong>on</strong> Criminal Liability (Round Hall Press 2000) at 415. SeeLord Diplock in St<strong>on</strong>ehouse [1978] AC 55, 68. Note the suggesti<strong>on</strong> of the <strong>Law</strong>Commissi<strong>on</strong> for England and Wales that Lord Diplock should not be read as applyinga last act test – <strong>Law</strong> Commissi<strong>on</strong> for England and Wales <str<strong>on</strong>g>C<strong>on</strong>sultati<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Paper</str<strong>on</strong>g>C<strong>on</strong>spiracy and Attempts (CP No 183 2007) at paragraph 13.7.[1855] 6 Cox CC 559, 571; 169 ER 826, 835-836.<strong>Law</strong> Commissi<strong>on</strong> for England and Wales <str<strong>on</strong>g>C<strong>on</strong>sultati<strong>on</strong></str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Paper</str<strong>on</strong>g> C<strong>on</strong>spiracy andAttempts (CP No 183 2007) at paragraph 13.3.See discussi<strong>on</strong> of meaning of “proximate” in <strong>Law</strong> Commissi<strong>on</strong> for England andWales Report <strong>on</strong> Attempt, and Impossibility in Relati<strong>on</strong> to Attempt, C<strong>on</strong>spiracy andIncitement (No 102 1980) at paragraph 2.48.24
- Page 1: Consultation <stro
- Page 4 and 5: Law Reform CommissionTHE LAW REFORM
- Page 6 and 7: Law Reform CommissionLaw Reform Res
- Page 8 and 9: Law Reform CommissionContact Detail
- Page 10 and 11: TABLE OF CONTENTSTable of Legislati
- Page 12: TABLE OF LEGISLATIONAbortion Act 19
- Page 15 and 16: Lajoie v R [1974] SCR 399 CanLeigh
- Page 17 and 18: R v O‟Brien [1954] SCR 666 CanR v
- Page 20 and 21: INTRODUCTIONABackground to the proj
- Page 22 and 23: 5. Inchoate offences do not exist i
- Page 24 and 25: 11. Chapter 1 explores the nature o
- Page 26 and 27: CHAPTER 1INCHOATE LIABILITYAIntrodu
- Page 28 and 29: its pure relational form as an agre
- Page 30 and 31: D(1) LegalityCriminal law theory en
- Page 32 and 33: 1.16 Some textbook writers reverse
- Page 34 and 35: one resulted in conviction by the j
- Page 36 and 37: 1.30 Evident here is a principled r
- Page 38: excusatory defences 51legitimate de
- Page 41: codifying inchoate offences will be
- Page 45 and 46: Appeal, was because more than one i
- Page 47 and 48: accused for which she stood trial a
- Page 49 and 50: defendant had progressed well beyon
- Page 51 and 52: And it is costly to try - police an
- Page 53 and 54: and subsequently abolished in New Z
- Page 55 and 56: “proximate” was more like “ne
- Page 57 and 58: providing, bluntly, that attempting
- Page 59 and 60: unlawful entry of a structure, vehi
- Page 61 and 62: drafted by James Fitzjames Stephen,
- Page 63 and 64: 2.68 The Law Commission for England
- Page 65 and 66: crime; (2) an overt act toward the
- Page 67 and 68: (3) D commits an offence or an act
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- Page 71 and 72: activity. Purposive activity is int
- Page 73 and 74: a Working Party assisting the Law C
- Page 75 and 76: consequences/circumstances distinct
- Page 77 and 78: inchoate liability) because such pr
- Page 79 and 80: Oireachtas has sole law-making powe
- Page 81 and 82: either label could be applied to a
- Page 83 and 84: 2.135 Perhaps Walsh J, when imagini
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i) The would-be perpetrator had a c
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3CHAPTER 3CONSPIRACYAIntroduction3.
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two or more persons involving resol
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3.12 The People (Attorney General)
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the Brighton Conspiracy Case 37 sta
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Henchy J went on to state, obiter,
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conspiracy is exempt from liability
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Subsequently, in R v Anderson, 73 t
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(b)(i)Non-criminal unlawfulnessTort
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“[A]n agreement by two or more by
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decency, which has an ancillary inc
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where they will fall in.” The ice
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abolishing the latter but not the f
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G(a)Abandonment of a conspiracyThe
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4CHAPTER 4INCITEMENTAIntroduction4.
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approach to that of the common law.
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(v)Incitement need not be directed
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verbs used to describe a physical a
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4.23 It is noted that while the act
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direction. The analysis of criminal
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(iii)Inciting non-criminal conduct4
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encouragement or assistance will in
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Convention on Human Rights. 75 Inci
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conduct incited. This position was
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5CHAPTER 5PROVISIONAL RECOMMENDATIO
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(4) Impossible conspiracies5.21 The
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The Law Reform Commission is an ind