the evolution of post-penetration rape law - Stetson University ...

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File: Davis.343.GALLEY(7) Created on: 6/2/2005 9:33 AM Last Printed: 7/7/2005 2:54 PM738 Stetson Law Review [Vol. 34revoked-consent scenario for the first time, 65 and evidence theneed for state legislatures to codify their states’ stance on postpenetrationrape.1. State v. RobinsonIn 1985, the year that the Vela court decided that postpenetrationrape was not a legal possibility, 66 the Supreme JudicialCourt of Maine came to the opposite conclusion in State v.Robinson. 67 The victim testified that the defendant showed up ather door, claiming that he had run out of gasoline and asking touse her telephone. 68 He entered the victim’s house and engaged ina struggle during which he forced the victim to have sexual intercourse.69 The defendant testified that the victim and he engagedin consensual sexual intercourse and that, during the act, the victimstated, “I guess I don’t want to do this anymore.” 70 The defendantstopped, put on his clothes, and left. 71 At trial, the jury askedthe judge, “[I]f two people began consenting to an act, then oneperson says no and the other continues—is that rape?” 72 Thejudge answered in the affirmative, adding that the critical elementof post-penetration rape is “continuation under compulsion.”73The Robinson Court found that the trial court’s instructionwas correct, based on the legislative intent expressed in theMaine Criminal Code 74 and on common-sense principles. 75 The65. E.g. Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1070 (stating that a review of precedent with "dubiouspertinence" left the court to resolve the revoked-consent issue based on its own best judgment).66. 218 Cal. Rptr. at 165.67. 496 A.2d 1067, 1071 (Me. 1985). The Robinson and Vela decisions came out at thesame time; therefore, neither court had the opportunity to examine the other’s analysis. In1985, the only revoked-consent rape cases were Way and Battle. Due to the minimal authorityavailable at the time, it is likely that the Robinson Court would have taken Velainto account in its analysis, and vice versa. See McLellan, supra n. 7, at 792 n. 74 (mentioningthe likelihood that Vela and Robinson would reciprocally consider the other if theyhad not been decided at the same time).68. Robinson, 496 A.2d at 1069.69. Id.70. Id.71. Id.72. Id.73. Id. (emphasis in original).74. Id.
File: Davis.343.GALLEY(7) Created on: 6/2/2005 9:33 AM Last Printed: 7/7/2005 2:54 PM2005] Post-penetration Rape 739relevant Criminal Code rape elements in that case included “‘sexualintercourse’ by the defendant . . . in circumstances by whichthat other person submits to the sexual intercourse as a result ofcompulsion applied by the defendant.” 76 Robinson noted that themajority of rape cases focused on the initial penetration of thefemale’s body and found that the rape is complete upon initialpenetration, “however slight.” 77 The Robinson Court declined tofocus on the moment of initial penetration, instead finding thatcontinued penetration after initial penetration was still factuallysexual intercourse. 78 For that reason, the Court found that continuedsexual intercourse fell within the statutory language,which stated only that intercourse was required. 79 The Court thenturned to “[p]ractical, common sense considerations” in rejectingthe defendant’s contention that initial penetration without consentis the only way rape may occur. 80 The defendant’s argumentimplied that a post-penetration rape claim would be contingent onwhether the victim, after revoking consent, could succeed “at leastmomentarily in displacing the male sex organ.” 81 If the victimcould accomplish that displacement, any subsequent penetrationwithout her consent could be rape. 82 The Court rejected the defendant’sargument as counterintuitive because, “it hardly makessense to protect from a rape prosecution the party whose compulsionthrough physical force or threat of serious bodily harm is sooverwhelming that there is no possible withdrawal, howeverbrief.” 83 However, the Court emphasized that the mere revocation75. Id. at 1070–1071.76. Id. at 1069. The element that did not apply to Robinson was the marital rape exemption.Id. For a discussion of the marital rape exemption as an eliminated part of rapelaw, consult infra notes 138–140 and accompanying text.77. 496 A.2d at 1069–1070 n. 2 (citing State v. Croteau, 184 A.2d 683, 684 (Me. 1962)(quoting King v. Commw., 183 S.E. 187, 189 (Va. 1936))); e.g. Vela, 218 Cal. Rptr at 164(stating that initial penetration is “the crucial point” to complete the crime of rape).78. 496 A.2d at 1069–1070. The Robinson Court also declined to find Way persuasive,noting that the Way Court cited no authority in its holding and failed to examine whetherthe facts of the case met the rape element of “force or threat of force.” Id. at 1070 (quotingjury instructions).79. Id. at 1069 (reviewing 17-A Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 252(1)(B) (1983)).80. Id. at 1070.81. Id. at 1071.82. Id.83. Id. Some rape victims ‘“freeze’ and ‘become helpless from panic and numbingfear,’” while others “do what they were taught to do as girls—to remain passive in the faceof a rapist . . . .” Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law §33.04[B][2][a], 580–581
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