<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> v. <strong>Miller</strong>, 08-0580/ARAmendment, <strong>the</strong> Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubtevery element <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> charged <strong>of</strong>fense” (citing In re Winship, 397U.S. at 364)). In contrast, <strong>the</strong> above cited language fromFoster and its progeny is at odds with <strong>the</strong>se principles. To <strong>the</strong>extent those cases support <strong>the</strong> proposition that clauses 1 and 2<strong>of</strong> Article 134, UCMJ, are per se included in every enumerated<strong>of</strong>fense, <strong>the</strong>y are overruled.Article 134, UCMJ, is not an <strong>of</strong>fense necessarily includedin Article 95, UCMJ. 6Consequently, <strong>the</strong> CCA was not authorizedto affirm a finding <strong>of</strong> guilt to a simple disorder under Article134, UCMJ. See <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> v. Riley, 50 M.J. 410, 415(C.A.A.F. 1999) (“An appellate court may not affirm an included<strong>of</strong>fense on ‘a <strong>the</strong>ory not presented to <strong>the</strong>’ trier <strong>of</strong> fact.”(quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236)).The decision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> Army <strong>Court</strong> <strong>of</strong> Criminal<strong>Appeals</strong> is reversed. The finding <strong>of</strong> guilty <strong>of</strong> Charge III and6 Our opinion in Medina also noted that when comparing <strong>the</strong>elements <strong>of</strong> two <strong>of</strong>fenses reveals that one <strong>of</strong>fense is notnecessarily a lesser included <strong>of</strong>fense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong>requirement <strong>of</strong> notice to an accused may be met if <strong>the</strong> chargesheet “make[s] <strong>the</strong> accused aware <strong>of</strong> any alternative <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong>guilt.” Medina, 66 M.J. at 27; see also MCM pt. IV, para.3.b.(1) (“The notice requirement may also be met, depending on<strong>the</strong> allegations in <strong>the</strong> specification, even though an included<strong>of</strong>fense requires pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> an element not required in <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fensecharged.”). In this case, <strong>the</strong> charged <strong>of</strong>fense as presented to<strong>the</strong> members did not reference <strong>the</strong> elements <strong>of</strong> prejudice to goodorder or service discrediting conduct such that <strong>the</strong>specification would have put Appellant on notice <strong>of</strong> Article 134,UCMJ, as a lesser included <strong>of</strong>fense.10
<strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> v. <strong>Miller</strong>, 08-0580/ARits specification are set aside and Charge III is dismissed.The sentence is set aside and <strong>the</strong> case remanded to <strong>the</strong> <strong>United</strong><strong>States</strong> Army <strong>Court</strong> <strong>of</strong> Criminal <strong>Appeals</strong> <strong>for</strong> sentence reassessmentor to order a rehearing on sentence.11