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moral utterances as such, and that they therefore presented what was inessentials a correct account of the former as though it were an account of thelatter (MacIntyre 1981:17).This marked the scheme of moral decline, first with regard to a claim to evaluativemoral theory and practical genuine objectives and impersonal standards. Thesestandards, so it was skilfully argued, would provide rational justification for particularpolicies, actions and judgments. Secondly, and independent of the first point, wereunsuccessful attempts to maintain objectivity and the impersonal moral judgments insupport of the inevitable continuous breakdown of any rational justifications. Thirdly,the theory of emotivism “secured wide implicit acceptance” and “recognition inpractice” although the theory’s purported “objectivity and impersonality” could notclaim similar popularity. Despite MacIntyre’s objections, to the deficiency of thisemotivist scheme, a deficiency that was explicit to any moral philosopher, the theorywas neither deserted, nor its misleading language abandoned. MacIntyre remarks:it is important to note how often in widely different modern philosophicalcontexts something very like emotivism’s attempted reduction of morality topersonal preference continually recurs in the writings of those who do notthink of themselves as emotivists (MacIntyre 1981:19).It was this unrecognised philosophical power of emotivism that gave theory a culturaldynamism and as such,Emotivism has become embodied in our culture. Of course in saying this Iam not merely contending that morality is not what it once was, but also andmore importantly that what once was morality has to some large degreedisappeared – and that this marks a degeneration, a grave cultural loss(MacIntyre 1981:21).From this tentative conclusion, MacIntyre marks out two objectives which constitutehis task. The first is to identify and describe the lost morality of the past and evaluateits claims to objectivity and authority; and the second one is to make good his claimabout the specific character of the modern age. To achieve these, MacIntyre turns tothe social content and social contexts in which emotivism (and indeed any otherphilosophy) flourishes.161