P1security-Attacking GRX v2.pptx

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As an operator: Protecting " your GRX connection • Filter smartly your GGSN • Beware of spaghetti tunnel (i.e. tunnel in a tunnel, tunnel chainings, ...) • Hard, even impossible to predict routing and filtering results (GTP + GRE + MPLS + VLAN + Filtering + Routing + Load Balancing + HA + Multihoming) • You need to TEST ! • You are responsible of all entries on GRX through your GRX interconnection!
Go massive • “A tube in a tube in a tube” • With many access network technologies • Very difficult to get right in order to protect • Automation is key!
Page 1 and 2: Attacking GRX Attacking The GPRS Ro
Page 3 and 4: GPRS uses cases • APN • interne
Page 5 and 6: 2G • IP was new in telco • Bill
Page 7 and 8: 3G • UMTS • No open source hw r
Page 9 and 10: Buy second-hand ! • Second hand h
Page 11 and 12: GPRS hacking from the air • RFC19
Page 13 and 14: GPRS current (recognized) major iss
Page 15 and 16: Here comes GRX • Your national ne
Page 17 and 18: GRX technologies • GTP - GPRS Tun
Page 19 and 20: GPRS Dialogue
Page 21 and 22: And from inside? • From a GPRS se
Page 23 and 24: Triple play, four way • GPRS APNs
Page 25 and 26: Inside the GRX • From DNS leaks t
Page 27 and 28: GTP basics • From SGSN (client)
Page 29 and 30: GTP in GTP attack • Free Internet
Page 31 and 32: GTP Tunnel disconnection " DoS atta
Page 33 and 34: GRX Subscriber Information Leak •
Page 35 and 36: GGSN DoS attack • Another magic p
Page 37: A tube in a tube in a tube • Air
Page 41 and 42: Here comes India • Admitedly some
Page 43 and 44: Questions? • Now! • Or join us

P1security-Attacking GRX v2.pptx

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