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Dukes, for example, raised several claims in a postconviction petition following his directappeal, including: (1) the accomplice’s guilty plea testimony was admitted improperly, (2) trialcounsel conceded his guilt during closing argument. Dukes, 621 N.W.2d at 251-252. Thepostconviction ruled that both claims were Knaffla-barred because they were not raised in thedirect appeal. Id. at 251-252, 255. On appeal, the Supreme Court held the first issue wasKnaffla-barred because “the legal basis for this claim was available at the time of Dukes’ directappeal.” Id. at 251. That is, no evidentiary hearing was required for the court to decide the issueon appeal. Id. The second issue was not Knaffla-barred, however, because the court could notmake a decision on the merits of the claim without considering testimony from Dukes and histrial attorney. Id. at 255.Likewise, in Robinson v. State, 567 N.W.2d 491 (Minn. 1997), Robinson raised a numberof claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Most of the claims were Knaffla-barredbecause they could have been decided “by an appellate court on direct appeal based on the briefsand trial court transcript, without any additional fact-finding.” Id. at 495. Robinson’s claim thattrial counsel failed to communicate two plea offers was not Knaffla-barred because to evaluatethe claim the court would need to hear from the defendant, the trial attorney, and any otherpotential witness who might have knowledge of conversations between the defendant and hisattorney. Id. The Court concluded, “for this reason, an ineffective assistance of counsel claimsuch as this is properly raised in a petition for post-conviction relief, even though it was knownat the time of direct appeal.”Olson’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel might have been known at thetime of direct appeal, but they could not be raised on direct appeal because the claims require