150 Part II The Era of Revolution and WarEFFECTS OF “THIRDREVOLUTION”2. More rapid industrialization, especially in heavy industry, was necessaryif the Soviet Union was to become a stronger military power. “If in10 years we do not cover the distance that other countries took 50 or100 years to traverse, we will be crushed,” Stalin warned.3. Marxist ideology based socialism on a developed industrial order, and thereforethe continued development of a Soviet socialist state was thought bymany to depend on the expansion of Soviet industry.4. Both the Five-Year Plan and collectivization would increase the control ofthe party over the economy and over the lives of Soviet citizens.5. If he now rejected the NEP approach, Stalin would at the same time discredithis remaining major political opponents, who had consistently supported it.With the inauguration in late 1928 of the first Five-Year Plan, the Soviet economytook on the characteristics that would mark it for the next six decades. Governmentofficials decided what should be produced in the Soviet Union and in whatquantity; consumers’ desires had relatively little effect. The government, followingparty orders as always, established target figures for the next five years, designedespecially to increase metal and chemical production, electricity and petroleum output,new factory construction, and other industrial growth. The government obtainedcapital for expansion in these areas by squeezing high indirect taxes from its population.The purchasing power of Soviet citizens declined, and few consumer goodswere available.At the end of 1932 the government claimed that it had already met the goalsof the first Five-Year Plan in a little over four years. Although it is impossible to besure of the exact figures, and haste in meeting production quotas often caused shoddyworkmanship, production did increase significantly in some areas. Most reliableestimates agree that iron and steel output went up at least 50 percent during the firstFive-Year Plan. The output of chemicals, machinery, equipment, fertilizers, petroleum,and electricity increased even more dramatically. New factories, industrial complexes,and cities sprang up, often located far in the interior, away from vulnerable borders.Although part of this industrial spurt flowed from genuine enthusiasm by someworkers for Stalin’s bold new plans, increased labor discipline and coercion alsohelped increase production.The record in agriculture was not as impressive. Russian peasants in 1933 producedless food than before collectivization, and the amount of livestock markedlydeclined. In addition, famine occurred in 1932–1933. The poor record was largelydue to the peasants’ resistance to collectivization and the government’s use of force.Stalin was determined to push most peasants into either collective farms or statefarms. In the collectives, peasants worked the land collectively, and, after meeting allother obligations, they divided what was left of their produce according to the percentagethey had earned by their work. On a state farm, on the other hand, workersreceived wages directly from the state.Both collective and state farms were unpopular with the peasants, and few werewilling to give up their old ways. Peasants slaughtered their animals rather than turnthem over to the collective farms. In response to such resistance, the government
Chapter 10 Russia’s <strong>Three</strong> <strong>Revolutions</strong>, <strong>1917–1932</strong> 151Some of the millions of Soviet peasants who were deported from villages during thecollectivization process.killed or sent to Siberia and other parts of the country millions of peasants, often toface premature deaths in forced labor camps. Stalin waged war especially on thosedesignated as “kulaks,” who were supposedly prosperous peasants guilty of hoarding.Actually, almost any peasant who was in trouble with the authorities was apt to beincluded in this category. No group suffered more than the Ukrainian peasants. Stalin’sfood policies in Ukraine, and to a lesser extent in other regions, led to millions ofadditional deaths during the famine of 1932–1933.Despite resistance, however, Stalin succeeded in forcing many peasants onto collectiveor state farms. He granted only one noteworthy concession, when he allowedcollectivized peasants to maintain small private garden plots and a few animals. Bythe end of the first Five-Year Plan, more than 60 percent of the cultivated land inRussia was under the control of collective farms and about 10 percent under statefarms. In subsequent years, the collectivization thrust continued, placing most ofthe remaining peasants and their produce effectively under the control of the partyand state. At a time when Soviet peasants were starving to death, the governmentforced them to turn over grain to government agencies, which used it to feed theexpanding cities, to add to grain reserves, and even to export. (See Chapter 16 for adiscussion of the U.S.S.R. in the middle and late 1930s.)SUMMARY AND THE INTERNATIONALSIGNIFICANCE OF RUSSIA’SREVOLUTIONSThe years <strong>1917–1932</strong> witnessed cataclysmic changes in Russian life. The three revolutionsculminating in Stalin’s revolution from above helped to greatly transform Russia.By 1932 it had changed from an overwhelmingly agrarian, religious, and traditionalempire with an autocratic government to a rapidly industrializing Marxist society. Itsofficial values were atheistic and revolutionary, and the Communist Party and Soviet
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