NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION In the ... - Kansas divorce

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submitted by an attorney to the district court for approval. The attorney signed thedivorce decree, without indicating that he represented either party. The district court laterdenied the wife's petition to set aside the divorce decree, rejecting the wife's argument therecord lacked sufficient documentation from which the judge could have determined thevalidity and justness of the separation agreement. We reversed, finding the district courthad not followed the guidance of K.S.A.2002 Supp. 60-1610(b)(3). 24 Kan.App.2d at 37,941 P.2d 385.Here, significant assets were omitted from Lula's DRA and the district court foundthe PSA "does not contain any facts of other criteria on which the Court could decide thatit provided for a fair, just and equitable division of the parties assets and liabilities."Without any supporting evidence of asset valuation, the trial judge nevertheless awardedthe property in the PSA. Kirk would support finding that Lula's motion should be grantedas the trial judge failed to review the PSA as required by K.S.A.2002 Supp. 60-1610(b)(3). See 24 Kan.App.2d at 37, 941 P.2d 385 (the record lacked evidence ordocumentation necessary to determine whether the agreement was fair, just, andequitable).The Kirk court further explained the absence of evidence to support a finding that theagreement is just and equitable constitutes "more than a technical defect." 24 Kan.App.2dat 35, 941 P.2d 385. Although a court has broad discretion in adjusting property rights,nonetheless, "[a]ction inconsistent with the limitations of judicial discretion amounts tomore than a 'technical defect." ' 24 Kan.App.2d at 36, 941 P.2d 385.Notably, the motion to set aside in Kirk was filed in less than 1 year, and the delay infiling was not raised as an issue. Conversely, Lula waited over 7 years to file her motionand Conley has raised Lula's delay in his defense.However, if Lula is correct that the original court's judgment is void, her failure tochallenge the judgment for more than 7 years does not prevent her from obtaining reliefunder 60-260(b)(4), as noted by the district court. Notwithstanding the language of 60-260(b), a void judgment is a nullity and may be vacated at any time. In re Marriage ofHampshire, 261 Kan. at 862, 934 P.2d 58.A judgment is void "only if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of thesubject matter or of the parties or if the court acted in a manner inconsistent with dueprocess. [Citations omitted.]" In re Marriage of Cline, 17 Kan.App.2d 230, 233, 840 P.2d1198 (1992). A court acts in a manner inconsistent with due process when fundamentalprocedural requirements are not satisfied, such as notice and opportunity to be heard. SeeState v. Wilkinson, 269 Kan. 603, 608, 9 P.3d 1 (2000).Lula does not argue that the district court lacked subject matter or personaljurisdiction. While Kirk suggests that a court's failure to abide by K.S.A. 60-1610(b)(3)and find a separation agreement to be valid, just, and equitable constitutes more thantechnical defect, or irregularity in the judgment, it does not indicate the instant judgmentis void because it violated Lula's right to due process. See Cline, 17 Kan.App.2d at 233,
840 P.2d 1198. Lula does not claim that she did not have knowledge of or opportunity toappear at any stage of the proceeding; in fact, she was the petitioner. She signed and filedall of the necessary documents, and the sole attorney represented her.In summary, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that K.S.A. 60-260(b)(4) did not provide adequate grounds to set aside the divorce decree. Substantialcompetent evidence supports the district court's finding the divorce court had personaland subject matter jurisdiction over the parties and that the court did not act in a mannerinconsistent with due process.THE PSALula contends in her brief that should this court agree the divorce decree whichincorporated the PSA is valid, we should nonetheless remand the PSA for interpretationand clarification of those provisions "pertaining to the division of debts, contribution toretirement accounts and management of the WRL and Nationwide funds."Lula filed her motion to set aside the journal entry of judgment and PSA 7 yearsafter the divorce decree was filed. After finding the journal entry and decree of divorcewere not void ab initio, the district court stated it did not have jurisdiction to modify thePSA, in spite of its noted deficiencies, because Lula did not file her 260(b) motion withina reasonable time.According to In re Marriage of Boldridge, 29 Kan.App.2d 581, 582, 29 P.3d 454,rev. denied 272 Kan. 1418 (2001), this court exercises de novo review of the questionwhether a trial court had jurisdiction to reopen a parties' property division, which waspart of the divorce decree. In Boldridge, the movant was unable to produce evidenceestablishing that property, in the form of a claim which later led to a substantial award,had been concealed at the time the divorce decree was entered. The court noted that thelawsuit was not even contemplated when the divorce was finalized. 29 Kan.App.2d at581-83, 29 P.3d 454. Based on those facts, the Boldridge court stated that "the passage of46 months from the time the divorce decree was filed to the time the motion was filed[was] an unreasonable period of time," leaving the court without jurisdiction to reopen adivorce decree and modify it. 29 Kan.App.2d at 583, 29 P.3d 454; see also In reMarriage of Bowers, 23 Kan.App.2d 641, 645-46, 933 P.2d 176 (1997) (noting that filinga 260[b][6] motion 4 years after the divorce decree is not a reasonable time absentextenuating circumstances).The Supreme Court has stated that what constitutes a reasonable delay under 60-260(b) "is a question left to the discretion of the trial court. The determination dependsupon the facts of each case, considering the interest in finality, the reasons for the delay,the ability of a litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and any prejudice to theparties." In re Marriage of Larson, 257 Kan. 456, Syl. 3, 894 P.2d 809 (1995).The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining Lula waited anunreasonable amount of time in filing her 260(b) motion. See Varney Business Services,
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION In the ... - Kansas divorce

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