HACKING IoT A Case Study on Baby Monitor Exposures and Vulnerabilities
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02<br />
NO EASY FIXES<br />
With traditi<strong>on</strong>al computers, we underst<strong>and</strong><br />
that access c<strong>on</strong>trols are required<br />
in order to satisfy basic security requirements.<br />
We also know that these c<strong>on</strong> trols<br />
will c<strong>on</strong>tain bugs, or may simply be<br />
rendered obsolete in the face of a novel<br />
new attack. Such circumstances are<br />
inevitable, <strong>and</strong> require a c<strong>on</strong>figurati<strong>on</strong><br />
change, a patch, or an entirely new<br />
design.<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>IoT</str<strong>on</strong>g> devices, unlike traditi<strong>on</strong>al computers,<br />
often lack a reas<strong>on</strong>able update<br />
<strong>and</strong> upgrade path <strong>on</strong>ce the devices<br />
leave the manufacturer’s warehouse.<br />
Despite the fact that the network is<br />
what makes the Internet of Things so<br />
interesting <strong>and</strong> useful, that network is<br />
rarely, if ever, used to deliver patches<br />
in a safe <strong>and</strong> reas<strong>on</strong>ably secure way.<br />
The absence of a fast, reliable, <strong>and</strong><br />
safe patch pipeline is a serious <strong>and</strong><br />
<strong>on</strong>going deployment failure for the<br />
<str<strong>on</strong>g>IoT</str<strong>on</strong>g>. A sub-<strong>on</strong>e hundred dollar video<br />
baby m<strong>on</strong>itor, a five hundred dollar<br />
smart ph<strong>on</strong>e, a thirty-five thous<strong>and</strong><br />
dollar c<strong>on</strong>nected car, <strong>and</strong> a four<br />
hundred milli<strong>on</strong> dollar jet airliner are<br />
all difficult to patch, even when vulnerabilities<br />
are identified, known, <strong>and</strong> a fix<br />
is in h<strong>and</strong>. This situati<strong>on</strong> is due to a<br />
c<strong>on</strong>fluence of factors, ranging from the<br />
design of these devices, through the<br />
regulatory envir<strong>on</strong>ment (or lack<br />
thereof) in which these comp<strong>on</strong>ents<br />
<strong>and</strong> devices exist. Today, a comm<strong>on</strong>ly<br />
accepted (or truly acceptable) way to<br />
effect a rapid rollout of patches simply<br />
does not exist.<br />
Unpatchable devices are coming<br />
<strong>on</strong>line at an unprecedented rate, <strong>and</strong><br />
represent a tsunami of unsecurableafter-the-fact<br />
devices. According to<br />
a 2014 Gartner report 3 , the <str<strong>on</strong>g>IoT</str<strong>on</strong>g> space<br />
will be crowded with over 25 billi<strong>on</strong><br />
devices in five years, by 2020. The<br />
devices being built <strong>and</strong> shipped today<br />
are establishing the status quo of how<br />
these Things will be designed, assembled,<br />
commoditized, <strong>and</strong> supported,<br />
so we must take the opportunity, now,<br />
to both learn the details of the supply<br />
chain that goes into producing <strong>and</strong><br />
shipping <str<strong>on</strong>g>IoT</str<strong>on</strong>g> devices, the vulnerabilities<br />
<strong>and</strong> exposures most comm<strong>on</strong> to these<br />
computers in disguise, <strong>and</strong> how we can<br />
work across the entire manufacturing<br />
space to avoid an Internet-wide<br />
disaster caused by the presence of<br />
these devices <strong>on</strong> the nervous system<br />
of Planet Earth.<br />
Compounding these patching problems<br />
is the fact that the use of commodity,<br />
third-party hardware, software, <strong>and</strong><br />
cloud-based resources is prevalent in<br />
the <str<strong>on</strong>g>IoT</str<strong>on</strong>g> industry. While reusing off-theshelf<br />
technologies is critical in keeping<br />
costs of producti<strong>on</strong> low, it introduces an<br />
ambiguity of ownership for developing<br />
<strong>and</strong> deploying patches <strong>and</strong> other<br />
upgrades.<br />
If a vulnerability’s root cause is traced<br />
to a third-party software library, for<br />
example, the more correct fix would<br />
be to patch that library. However, this<br />
decisi<strong>on</strong> can lead to a “pass the buck”<br />
mentality for the vendors involved in<br />
the supply chain, ultimately delaying<br />
effective patching for the particular<br />
device in which the vulnerability was<br />
first discovered.<br />
This patchwork of comm<strong>on</strong> comp<strong>on</strong>ents<br />
leads to c<strong>on</strong>fusing amalgamati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
of interdependencies, <strong>and</strong> can leave<br />
end-users exposed while the details of<br />
remediating vulnerabilities are worked<br />
out between vendors.<br />
3 <br />
https://www.gartner.com/newsroom/<br />
id/2905717<br />
| Rapid7.com Hacking <str<strong>on</strong>g>IoT</str<strong>on</strong>g>: A <str<strong>on</strong>g>Case</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Study</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong> <strong>Baby</strong> M<strong>on</strong>itor <strong>Exposures</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Vulnerabilities</strong> 3