Issue No 198 2015

Recommendations

Info

Notes 1 This is an edited and updated version of a speech delivered as ‘The Order of Australia Oration’ in Canberra on 20 July 2015, available at 2 G.E. Smith and T.H. Pear, Shell Shock and Its Lessons, Manchester University Press: Manchester, 1917. 3 M. Larsson, ‘Unsung Healers: Anzacs and their family caregivers’, Memento [National Archives of Australia], Issue 38, 2010, pp. 13-5. 4 M. Larsson, Shattered Anzacs: living with the scars of war, University of NSW Press: Sydney, 2009. 5 The reported figures were 1286 and 395 respectively. 6 Smith and Pear, Shell Shock and Its Lessons. 7 Smith and Pear, Shell Shock and Its Lessons, Chapter 1. 8 Smith and Pear, Shell Shock and Its Lessons, Chapter 1. 9 Smith and Pear, Shell Shock and Its Lessons, Chapter 4. 10 See, for example, Erica Goode, ‘When Soldiers Snap’, New York Times [website], 7 November 2009, available at accessed 12 August 2015. 11 A. McFarlane, ‘One Hundred Years of Lessons about the Impact of War on Mental Health: two steps forward, one step back’, Australasian Psychiatry, 3 June 2015. 12 R. Grinker and J. Spiegel, Men Under Stress, Blakiston: Philadelphia, 1945. 13 T. Wilkins, ‘Lacking in Moral Fibre’, Defence of the Realm [blog], 2 May 2015, available at accessed 12 August 2015. 14 See, for example, ‘Australia and the Vietnam War’, Department of Veterans’ Affairs [website], available at accessed 12 August 2015. 15 K. Muir, ‘The Predisposition Theory, Human Rights and Australian Psychiatric Casualties of War’, Australian Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2007, pp. 198-215. 16 A. McFarlane and D. Forbes, ‘The Journey from Moral Inferiority to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder’, The Medical Journal of Australia, Vol. 202, No. 7, 2015, pp. 348-9, available at accessed 12 August 2015. 17 P.M. Clarke, R. Gregor and J.A. Salomon, ‘Long-Term Disability Associated with War-Related Experience among Vietnam Veterans: retrospective cohort study’, Medical Care, Vol. 53, No. 5, May 2015, pp. 401-8, abstract available at accessed 12 August 2015. 18 A.C. McFarlane, S.E. Hodson, M. Van Hooff and C. Davies, Mental Health in the Australian Defence Force: 2010 ADF mental health and wellbeing study: Full report, Department of Defence: Canberra, 2011, available at accessed 12 August 2015. 19 Department of Defence, ‘ADF ARRTS Program’, Department of Defence [website], available at accessed 12 August 2015. 20 Department of Defence, ‘The Long Way Home: rehabilitation through the arts’, Department of Defence [website], available at accessed 12 August 2015. 21 Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA), ‘Transition and Wellbeing Research Programme’, DVA [website], available at accessed 12 August 2015; also Department of Defence, ‘Mental Health Research and Evaluation’, Department of Defence [website], available at accessed 12 August 2015. 10
A Warning from the Crimea: hybrid warfare and the challenge for the ADF 1 Captain Nicholas Barber, Australian Army Introduction Russia’s annexation of Crimea was like a magician sawing a woman in half: mysterious, orchestrated and cunning. President Putin’s illusion began on 20 February 2014, after several months of protests threatening the government of then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, and culminated in the pro- Kremlin leader fleeing Kiev for Moscow. As opposition protestors seized control of the Ukrainian Parliament and voted for a new direction for Ukraine, Putin led his audience through tales of misinformation, diverting their attention away from the realities of the magic box at the centre of his act. The audience watched in awe as ‘volunteers’ from the crowd—referred to by many as ‘little green men’— helped the young lady clamber into Putin’s magic Crimean box. 2 Some in the audience began to question if the ‘little green men’ were indeed Putin’s associates—in fact, online commentators observed that they appeared to be elite Russian Special Forces, Spetsnaz, with their identifying insignia removed. 3 Yet Putin denied he knew the men or had tampered with the Crimean box. In the darkness of 27 February 2014, the audience observed the ‘little green men’ saw the Crimean box in two—securing key government infrastructure in Simferopol on one side, and isolating Ukrainian military bases on the other. 4 Amazingly, the young lady remained alive. As quickly as she was sawn apart, she was soon back together—but oddly, she had replaced her Ukrainian legs for Russian ones. The audience was shocked. Some believed Putin’s magic; some knew all along it was a trick; and some were Putin’s cronies paid to lead the applause. In the fragile situation, Ukraine and NATO did not respond militarily to Russia’s actions. Weeks later, Putin would acknowledge that he had indeed supported the ‘little green men’. 5 Regardless, the illusion was complete, Putin was still in control, and Russia was again the centre of global attention. The stunned audience simply asked—how did he do it? ‘Non-linear warfare’, ‘ambiguous warfare’ and ‘special war’ have all been labels applied to Russia’s method of seizing the Crimea and destabilising eastern Ukraine. 6 Another term is ‘hybrid warfare’, which has been described as a complex blend of conventional and unconventional warfare techniques, combined with firepower, deception, misinformation and cyber attacks. 7 Like its allies, Australia cannot ignore the challenges posed by hybrid warfare. Indeed, while it is unlikely that Australia will ever be engaged in combat against Russian military forces or their proxy fighters in Ukraine, the success of hybrid warfare may indicate that its application in other parts of the world, including the Asia-Pacific, is not far-fetched. This article aims to stimulate discussion as to whether Western militaries are appropriately structured to respond to hybrid warfare. It is divided into three components: the threat, the challenge, and Australia’s response. Firstly, the article defines the hybrid threat by use of a model that emphasises how hybrid warfare converges regular and irregular warfare methods. In examining the challenge, it contends that hybrid warfare effectively exploits vulnerabilities in Western political and military decision-making. The article concludes that the ADF should invest in its ability to understand complex operating environments and empower subordinates to seize opportunities and build tempo to counter hybrid modes of war. The threat Hybrid warfare, like all forms of war, is an instrument of policy and exhibits the characteristics of danger, uncertainty, friction and chance. Indeed, Williamson Murray and Peter Mansoor have already argued that hybrid warfare is ‘nothing new’. 8 Reflecting on the effectiveness of Hezbollah’s use of hybrid warfare 11
Page 1 and 2: Military Mental Health: from shell-
Page 3 and 4: Australian Defence Force JOURNAL IS
Page 5 and 6: FORTHCOMING SEMINARS AND CONFERENCE
Page 7 and 8: However, despite understanding the
Page 9 and 10: Australia failed our Vietnam vetera
Page 11: innovative rehabilitation and psych
Page 15 and 16: Economic pressure Underpinning all
Page 17 and 18: The challenge Over the past decade,
Page 19 and 20: y-product of this structure is that
Page 21 and 22: clear that smart humans alone canno
Page 23 and 24: 3 Peter Felstead and Georg Mader,
Page 25 and 26: Rebalancing What, Exactly? Analysin
Page 27 and 28: and a new future for Asia’. 28 Fi
Page 29 and 30: Peloponnesian War’, there is actu
Page 31 and 32: 25 Zheng Wang, ‘China’s Alterna
Page 33 and 34: The Case for an Offensive ADF Cyber
Page 35 and 36: military systems and offer an appre
Page 37 and 38: accountable and principled use of s
Page 39 and 40: 16 William J. Lynn III, ‘The Pent
Page 41 and 42: Thoughts on Generalship: lessons fr
Page 43 and 44: As I was the one who had convinced
Page 45 and 46: It took months of critical debate i
Page 47 and 48: Now, I could certainly find some ex
Page 49 and 50: Information operations—they are t
Page 51 and 52: Australia and Solomon Islands: what
Page 53 and 54: The result was an Australian Depart
Page 55 and 56: private militia, similar to that cr
Page 57 and 58: Notes 1 John Howard, ‘Solomon Isl
Page 59 and 60: 48 ‘40 new recruits in for traini
Page 61 and 62: are unable to afford the more conve
Page 63 and 64:
If we accept such environmental com
Page 65 and 66:
Push into simple/complicated behavi
Page 67 and 68:
The NEXUS operations have demonstra
Page 69 and 70:
15 Derived from ‘An interview wit
Page 71 and 72:
Abuse of Power and Institutional Vi
Page 73 and 74:
investigations resulted in the ADF
Page 75 and 76:
arracks-room discipline (for exampl
Page 77 and 78:
6 Bronwyn Grey, Australian Defence
Page 79 and 80:
Criteria to support the classificat
Page 81 and 82:
In addition to the direct benefits
Page 83 and 84:
9 ‘Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic’.
Page 85 and 86:
BOOK REVIEWS 21 st Century Sims: in
Page 87 and 88:
‘dishonourable’ Achilles. Kauri
Page 89 and 90:
In an American context, the issue o
Page 91 and 92:
that could be used wherever the Emp
Page 93 and 94:
would remove the human responsibili
Page 95:
READING LISTS Professional military
show all

Issue No 198 2015

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?