Rajs_2015_Tom_2

Nebojsa Randjelovic, Zeljko Lazic
The actions of Fonton, a Russian diplomat in Serbia, the public opinion and the views of some of distinguished
Serbs testify to it, however, that no option was excluded 12 , but that a well thought-out decision
to steer a middle course between wishes and the actual reality prevailed. What surrounded Serbia and what
people thought in Serbia proved that such a course was a realistic one.
The actions of Ilija Garsanin, while he was one of the most prominent political officials in Serbia, and
especially his contacts in France and his encounters with Napoleon III, provided new ways of safeguarding
the position of Serbia. 13 Seguirre, the French consul to Serbia, is known, however, to have pointed out that
should the Russo-Turkish agreements be rescinded because of the war, then the foundations of the public
law in Serbia would crumble down, and that that law could be annulled by the Sultan at any time. 14 The
reality, however, testified to the contrary. The autonomy of Serbia and its future were never questioned by
the European powers. The position of Serbia, which had been achieved by Serbia itself rather than simply
groundlessly granted to it by the great powers, could not that easily be endangered by a possible cessation
of effect of Russian guarantees or a unilateral act of the Sultan. That is what is put forward by The Memoire
on the Eastern Question submitted to the Prussian king Friedrich Wilhelm in the summer of 1854. The
Memoire says: It is not to be expected that the position Serbia has achieved could easily be established
everywhere in the Turkish empire, and especially not in the Turkish European provinces; all the more so as
Serbia has several times already reconfirmed its special status through the power of arms, so that that status
represents, to a degree, national independence 15 . This was also confirmed by the position of the official
France that opposed any changes to the position Serbia had achieved. 16 The Western powers supported
Serbia in its decision to be neutral. It could not count on any significant improvemnt of that position,
yet could be confident that the status it had achieved would be guaranteed internationally. And such a
standpoint assumed by the always calculating great powers was more than enough for Serbia.
As for Austria, there were many things at that time that indicated that it was precisely that country
that Serbia could expect trouble from. The attitude Austria had had towards Serbia for centuries, the way
it had treated Serbia before and after the crisis, clearly signalled something like that. A special means of
Austria’s exerting pressure on Serbia was interfereing with its internal affairs, epitomized in the actions of
Teodor Radosavljevic, the Austrian consul. 17 The amassing of troops on the border and the role of Austria
in the Crimean War posed an explicit threat to Serbia. There was, however, another side to Austria’s attitude
towards Serbia at the time. When Franz Joseph and Prince Alexander met in Zemun on July 4th 1852,
the Emperor expressed his gratitude to Serbia for the role it played in the events of 1848. 18 In addition,
Franz Joseph treated Serbia as an independent state. On no occasion in those negotiations did he make any
references to the Serbia’ being dependent on Turkey, nor did he consider his good relations with Serbia in
view of his relations with Turkey. He talked about the good relations of his government and the government
of Serbia, expressing his wish for the good understanding between the neighbours to develop further. 19 In
his contacts with foreign diplomats the Emperor of Austria made no effort to hide that it suited him at that
time for the state of affairs in the Balkans to remain unchanged. He is supposed to have said to Meyendorf,
a Russian diploomat in Vienna, that ‘the state of affairs in the East is one I find appropriate’. 20 What Austria
needed in the Russo-Turkish clash in order to maintain such a state was precisely the neutrality of Serbia.
That is why the official Vienna demanded from the Serbian government to ‘issue an unambiguous written
statement in which the Serbian government would pledge not to take a part in the Russo-Turkish war in any
conceivable way, and that it would also not use arms against Austria, nor against the suzerain, nor against
the protector state’. 21
Russia also found the neutrality of Serbia a favourable move. Naturally, what Russia preferred the most
with regard to the issue was for Serbia to openly back Russia and participate in the war on its side. Russia
had actually been setting a stage for such a development in Serbia by removing Garasanin from power,
by insisting that all the other political opponents of its policy be removed from power as well, by its other
diplomatic effors in Serbia and by preparing the Serbian public for its cause. 22 It seemed, however, that the
standpoint that Serbia should be neutral at the beginning of the conflict, had prevailed in the meantime. The
Russians indicated that by reassuring Serbia that it had best preserve the position it had achieved. Fonton
stated: ‘There is no need to be afraid of the Serbian army as long as the people are in peace. Russia’s wish
is for Serbia to remain in peace, and peace is something that both the Prince and the Praviteljstvo should
always make sure they maintain for the sake of their people ... Russia wants to preserve the present state of
12 Ibid., 156-157.
13 Pisma Ilije Garašanina Jovanu Marinoviću, knjiga prva, sredio St. Lovcevic, Beograd 1931, 26.
14 Ibid, 175.
15 L. Ranke, Srbija i Turska u XIX veku, Beograd 1892, 544.
16 Pisma Ilije Garašanina Jovanu Marinoviću, knjiga prva, p. 26.
17 Ibid., 136, 187.
18 Srbske novine 75/1852.
19 Ibid.
20 J. Ristić, 203.
21 Ibid., 134.
22 Pisma Ilije Garašanina Jovanu Marinoviću, knjiga prva, 121, 128.
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