Bullet-Proof Credit Card Payment Processing Damon McCoy New York University

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Mapping out Dependencies Figure credit: Christian Kreibich 2
Merchant Banks (Late 2010) • Low diversity ◆ ◆ 3 banks cover 95% of spam Fewer banks willing to handle “high-risk” merchants • High switching cost ◆ ◆ St. Kitts & Nevis AGBank DnB NORD In-person account creation, due diligence, multiple days… Upfront capital, holdback forfeiture Levchenko, Pitsillidis, Chachra, Enright, Felegyhazi, Grier, Halvorson, Kanich, Kreibich, Liu, <strong>McCoy</strong>, Weaver, 3 Paxson, Voelker and Savage, Click Trajectories: End-to-End Analysis of the Spam Value Chain, Oakland 2011
Page 1: Bullet-Proof Credit Card Payment Pr
Page 5 and 6: Luxury Goods Payment Intervention
Page 7 and 8: Aside: Trace Purchasing • Can’t
Page 9 and 10: Compromised Websites 9
Page 11 and 12: Payment Gateways 11
Page 13 and 14: Standard Fraud Detection 13
Page 15 and 16: Test Purchase Blocking • Blacklis
Page 17 and 18: Test Purchasing Results • 17 Mont
Page 19 and 20: Banks • 97% of accounts underwrit
Page 21: RealyPay Closed Down 21

Bullet-Proof Credit Card Payment Processing Damon McCoy New York University

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