Replacing Highly Enriched Uranium in Naval Reactors

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Replacing Highly Enriched Uranium in Naval Reactors Key Findings Significant issues that became apparent during this study were: • The deficiencies of the U.S. Navy’s reports to Congress in 1995 and 2014. • The scale of the hazards and concerns resulting from the proliferation of naval nuclear submarine programs including: –– The NPT “loophole” that allows for un-safeguarded non-weapons use of HEU, and –– The leasing or even potential outright sales of nuclear vessels fueled with HEU. • Whether the U.S. Navy’s use of life-of-the-ship HEU cores, although economically attractive, is in reality a potential long-term problem. Has the Navy pushed its HEU cores into an unknown and potentially dangerous area, departing from its usual conservative approach to embark on an arguably non-conservative venture beyond what is reasonably knowable about fuel materials properties— potentially resulting in costly retrofits that would have significant operational and economic consequences? Recommendations These issues resulted in a series of recommendations as follows: • Because the Navy’s 2014 report has proved to be deficient in a number of ways, Congress should request that the Navy prepare a new report that includes true updates, including cost revisions, on at least the subjects considered in the 1995 report. • Congress should request a complete set of briefings on the advanced fuel concept obliquely referred to by the Navy in its 2014 report and its affect on use of LEU fueled reactors. • Congress, perhaps working in conjunction with one of the national academies, should support a study by non- Navy, or Navy contractor, experts on the issue of LEU conversion. Such a study would have to have access to all Navy and Navy-contractor material on these issues. • Congress and/or the Navy should consider how information could be exchanged with the French on their experiences with LEU use in submarines. It should be noted that there is some precedent for such an exchange given our early-program exchanges with the United Kingdom, which included the exchange of design information and access to facilities. • It is quite possible that the Navy’s 1995 and 2014 Reports to Congress do not disclose all of the concerns that the Navy would raise if it were to feel more threatened by the reality of an order to convert to LEU use. Congress would probably be reluctant to force LEU use if there is any argument that a shift to LEU would have a significant negative effect on the Navy’s operational capability. Therefore Congress should ask for an expanded assessment of the tactical impacts vis-à-vis potential threats that would be anticipated if the Navy were to unilaterally shift to LEU use. • The issue of whether the fuel elements for the Navy’s life-of-the-ship cores, which are now only in the early portion of their service life, have been adequately tested should be addressed. This issue should be reanalyzed by the Navy and the results of the Navy’s analysis should be reviewed by an independent panel of experts who have access to all the Navy’s tests and studies. • The issue of the long-term health of the Navy’s nuclear propulsion program, including its R&D program, needs to be reviewed. Is the country heading into a “graying” area of decline like that experienced by the nuclear weapons complex? Are vital skills, methods, etc., such as refueling technologies, being lost? If so, what can or should be done to address these issues that should be considered at a national level? • The nuclear propulsion infrastructure should similarly be examined to determine if funding is sufficient for future needs—particularly if LEU design and use were to be undertaken. NTI Paper 4 www.nti.org
Replacing Highly Enriched Uranium in Naval Reactors • The issue of using LEU fuel for the Ohio-class replacement SSBNs should be revisited. Although timing may be critical, the size of the hull of the SSBN should allow for LEU life-of-the-ship cores. • A study should be undertaken to fully explore the political ramifications of continued military HEU use on the prospects for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and any potential feedback to the non-weapons military exemption of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty from the continued use of HEU. • A study should be undertaken to explore whether there could be an international agreement, perhaps reminiscent of the naval construction limitation treaties of the post-WWI period, to eliminate the use of HEU in naval propulsion reactors. Could an agreement be reached that would be verifiable? NTI Paper 5 www.nti.org
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Replacing Highly Enriched Uranium in Naval Reactors

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