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The Fouchet Plan De Gaulle’s Intergovernmental Design for Europe

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>Fouchet</strong> <strong>Plan</strong><br />

of making progress in time <strong>for</strong> the second meeting of heads of government, due<br />

to be held in Bonn during the early summer.<br />

During these initial discussions, the German, Italian and Luxembourg<br />

governments proved broadly, if cautiously, supportive of the French<br />

démarche, with Belgium remaining neutral. <strong>The</strong>y could agree that regular<br />

summit meetings of heads of government should act as the focal point of closer<br />

<strong>for</strong>eign-policy and defence cooperation, so long as the existing, separate role of<br />

the Community institutions was not threatened and the position of NATO was<br />

not jeopardised. From the start, however, the government of the Netherlands<br />

reiterated the strong opposition it had expressed at the Paris summit. <strong>The</strong><br />

Dutch representative, with the full backing of <strong>for</strong>eign minister Joseph Luns,<br />

argued that any moves towards closer <strong>for</strong>eign-policy cooperation within<br />

<strong>Europe</strong> should, as a matter of principle, be firmly rooted in existing<br />

Community structures, and would also need to be underpinned by a clear and<br />

unequivocal commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. <strong>The</strong> best guarantee of the<br />

latter would be <strong>for</strong> negotiations to await British membership of the<br />

Community, an application <strong>for</strong> which seemed imminent. For the Dutch,<br />

building ‘political <strong>Europe</strong>’ in any <strong>for</strong>m was less important than sustaining US<br />

leadership of <strong>Europe</strong>, which might be threatened by the emergence of a<br />

separate <strong>Europe</strong>an identity in external affairs. 30<br />

30 See Vanke, op cit, pp97-99. On the institutional front, at least, the Dutch position was somewhat<br />

ironic, given that Britain had traditionally found intergovernmental, rather than supranational,<br />

structures of <strong>Europe</strong>an cooperation much more appealing, from the Council of <strong>Europe</strong> through to<br />

EFTA. It was not at all clear that London regarded the Dutch insistence on conventional EC-based<br />

decision-making in the <strong>for</strong>eign-policy and defence field as at all preferable to the Gaullist notion of<br />

loosely cooperating nation states.<br />

On the defence front, the Dutch argued that a pan-<strong>Europe</strong>an organisation already existed<br />

in the <strong>for</strong>m of the Western <strong>Europe</strong>an Union (WEU). This had the advantages of including the United<br />

Kingdom, having a membership congruent with NATO, and holding ministerial meetings which<br />

rendered an important component of the French proposals redundant. However, since most other<br />

member states recognised the WEU to be largely moribund, there were few takers among the<br />

Netherlands’ partners <strong>for</strong> their arguments on this front.<br />

In <strong>Europe</strong>an Foreign Policy Cooperation: Interpreting the Institutional <strong>De</strong>bates from<br />

<strong>Fouchet</strong> to the Single <strong>Europe</strong>an Act, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Durham, 1992, Kevin<br />

24

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