KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES

THE KREMLIN’S TROJAN HORSES
German newspaper, Tagesspiegel, in November 2014,
when Russian support for the war in Eastern Ukraine
was at a point of escalation. He wrote, referring to
Russia, “We are losing those people who always
looked toward the West…through sanctions, which are
perceived as punishment by Russian society; through
the rejection of a dialogue on the same eye level;
through the arrogance, with which we believe [that we]
hold better values; and through double standards.” 35
This statement represents a typical pattern of
communication from “Russia friendly” groups, the
so-called Putinversteher or Russlandversteher: their
rhetoric links the replication of allegations of Russian
propaganda with moral arguments embedded in
German historical guilt with regard to WW II and
typical German self-criticism.
The GRF has become a hinge between
Russlandverstehern and the political, social, and
economic mainstream. For example, it organized
several “Dialogue of Civilization” conferences in Berlin
with the former head of Russia’s railways, Alexander
Yakunin (one of the core representatives of an
aggressive and intolerant conservatism in Russian elite
circles). At the end of June 2016, a new think tank,
the Dialogue of Civilizations (DOC) Research Institute,
founded and funded by Yakunin, opened in Berlin. At
the opening events, a set of Kremlin friendly experts
(like former inspector general of the Bundeswehr,
Harald Kujat and the former diplomat Hans-Friedrich
von Ploetz) spoke; leading representatives of the GRF
also were present including Matthias Platzeck, the
head of the GRF. 36
ECONOMIC TIES
The Eastern Committee of the German economy
(OA) is the key lobby institution of the major German
companies active in Russia and Eastern Europe. The
lobby has actively argued against sanctions in the
context of the Ukraine crisis since their establishment
in 2014 and, more generally, for appeasement of
the Kremlin. Therewith, the OA distinguishes itself
from its mother organization, the Association of
German Industry (BDI), whose president Ulrich Grillo
supported Angela Merkel in arguing that the sanctions
are necessary. Despite the sanctions and the lack of
any compromise from the Russian side, the Eastern
Committee organized a trip to Moscow in April 2016,
in order to give representatives of leading German
companies the opportunity to meet with Putin and
hear arguments for the improvement of relations
through a common economic space and the lifting of
sanctions. 37 Even if it has lost influence in the last two
years, the OA continues to try to influence decision
makers to alter their position on Russia. It tries to play
a crucial role in leveraging the growing differences
between the SPD and Christian Democratic Union
(CDU, the party of Chancellor Merkel) on policy with
regard to Russia.
POLITICAL PARTIES
Traditionally, the German Social Democrats played
a central role in the conceptualization of Germany’s
Eastern and Russia policy. The Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt
and Egon Bahr, formulated in the 1960s, influenced
the post-Soviet German Russia policy fundamentally.
“Change through rapprochement” is a core formulation
of this policy, and also the logic behind the partnership
for modernization that was established under Foreign
Minister Steinmeier in 2008. This policy has failed
in light of the Ukraine conflict, which brought on an
identity crisis among SPD members. The success of the
New Ostpolitik, interpreted by many Social Democrats
as the precondition for German unification, raised
the expectation that a cooperative and integrative
Russia policy would finally lead to a democratic and
peaceful Russia. This long-standing foundational
principle of SPD (and German) foreign policy has
been proven wrong by the Putin regime. Peace and
stability in Europe, at the moment, is not possible
either with Russia or against it. While the SPD Foreign
Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier failed to improve
the situation, despite constant offers of dialogue with
the Kremlin, he had to find a balance between the
tradition of a cooperative Russia policy as demanded
by his party and the reality of Putin’s power politics.
Therefore, in a strategy speech in April 2016, he argued
for a “double dialogue” with Russia: “Dialogue about
common interests and areas of cooperation but at the
same time an honest dialogue about differences.” 38
In the past, it was primarily the older generation of
the SPD who argued for compromise with Russia
(e.g., former Chancellor and Putin confidant, Gerhard
Schröder, or the recently deceased former Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt). Today, however, a new generation
35 Martin Hoffmann, “Wir verlieren Russland,” der Tagesspiegel,
November 18, 2014, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/meinung/
plaedoyer-fuer-einen-neuanfang-der-beziehungen-wirverlieren-russland/10992794.html.
36 “Platzeck Was in a First Draft Of the Agenda For the Event
Named As a Speaker. DOC Research Institute Launch,” DOC
Research Institute, July 1, 2016, http://doc-research.org/de/
event/doc-research-institute-launch-3/.
37 “Встреча с представителями деловых кругов ермании,”
Президента России, April 11, 2016, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/51697.
38 “Rede von Außenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier beim
Egon-Bahr-Symposium,” Auswaertiges Amt, April 21, 2016,
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/
Reden/2016/160421_BM_EgonBahrSymposium.html.
16 ATLANTIC COUNCIL