PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN
20161025_HedgeClippers_ReportPR_v3-3
20161025_HedgeClippers_ReportPR_v3-3
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<strong>THE</strong> SANTANDER-LED GDB AGGRESSIVELY<br />
PURSUES QUESTIONABLE C<strong>OF</strong>INA BONDS TO<br />
MAINTAIN PUERTO RICO’S CREDIT RATINGS<br />
With his team in place at the GDB, Garcia moved swiftly to reassure the bond market. In order to<br />
maintain Puerto Rico’s credit ratings, Garcia relied on issuance of a new category of municipal debt,<br />
secured by regressive Puerto Rican sales and use tax receipts. These “safe” bonds, known by their<br />
Spanish language acronym, C<strong>OF</strong>INA, were issued mainly to refund outstanding interest and principal<br />
on previously issued government debt, and also provide deficit financing for the Commonwealth. 29<br />
The legality of C<strong>OF</strong>INA as a separate governmental structure with a dedicated revenue stream to<br />
exclusively to pay bondholders has never been determined by a court, although it is the subject of an<br />
ongoing federal lawsuit between rival groups of C<strong>OF</strong>INA and General Obligation (GO) bondholders. 30<br />
Fortuño then had a law passed in January 2009 that doubled the amount of sales tax revenue<br />
set aside for C<strong>OF</strong>INA bonds, enabling the Garcia’s GDB to issue more debt underwritten by<br />
Santander and other banks. Law 7, passed in March 2009, permitted the Treasury Secretary<br />
to refinance debt without considering whether it would actually save Puerto Rico money. 31<br />
Mass protests in Puerto Rico over layoffs and Public Law 7.<br />
11