ENSURING STRONG SEA SERVICES FOR A MARITIME NATION

ENSURING
STRONG SEA
SERVICES FOR
A MARITIME
NATION
2 0 1 7 – 2 0 1 8 M A R I T I M E P O L I C Y
NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

The Navy League of the United States
believes that we must always ensure
that our armed forces are ready to fight
and win our nation’s wars, deter those
who would seek to engage us and secure
access to the global commons to preserve
freedom of navigation.
2017–2018 MARITIME POLICY
NAVY LEAGUE OF
THE UNITED STATES
THE NAVY LEAGUE’S MARITIME POLICY
STATEMENT IS PRODUCED BY THE
ORGANIZATION’S MARITIME POLICY
COMMITTEE. THE ANALYSES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS THEREIN ARE DERIVED
FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES, INCLUDING THE
EXPERTISE AND DECADES OF EXPERIENCE OF
OUR MEMBERS, OPEN-SOURCE MATERIALS
AND PUBLIC INFORMATION FROM THE
SEAGOING SERVICES. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED
IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE THOSE OF THE NAVY
LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES AND DO NOT
NECESSARILY REFLECT THE OFFICIAL VIEWS OF
THE U.S. NAVY, MARINE CORPS, COAST GUARD
OR MARITIME ADMINISTRATION.
NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES
U.S. COAST GUARD

THE NEED FOR STRONG
MARITIME FORCES
The United States is irrevocably tied to the
ocean and its international and domestic
waterways militarily, economically and politically.
Since its founding, America’s prosperity
has relied on freedom of the seas. The world
looks very different today, but keeping conflict
far from our shores and maintaining sea lanes
free and open to commerce remain the underlying
reason for the United States’ prosperity.
America’s sea services must be supported and
adequately funded if the United States is to
continue to reap the benefits of international
trade, upon which the American economy rests.
The Navy League must remain at the forefront
of public debate to warn of the dangers that
budget cuts and unstable funding pose to our
military capability.
The world has seen rapid geopolitical change in the past
few years. China continues to quickly rise as a military
and economic power, while showing a concerning desire
to exert sovereign claims in international waters contrary
to all international law. China has built numerous
artificial islands in international and disputed waters by
dredging reefs and building airfields and other explicitly
military assets on these islands. These structures have
no legitimate place in international law and are a direct
provocation to China’s neighbors. The United States is
making a good-faith effort toward peaceful cooperation
as China enters great-power status, but the country continues
to use diplomatic and economic tools to block U.S.
physical and political access.
Since the 2008 invasion of Georgia, Russia controversially
annexed parts of Ukraine in 2014 and conducted military
operations in Syria, even launching advanced long-range
cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea. Some have even
accused Russia of conducting airstrikes on humanitarian
workers and U.S. intelligence operatives. The Russian Navy
has invested significant resources into new, capable multipurpose
nuclear attack submarines. Both Russia and China
have been developing layered defensive and offensive
systems that, when acting in concert, could significantly
constrain U.S. operations during a potential conflict.
North Korea has continued developing its nuclear and
ballistic-missile programs despite universal international
condemnation. Pyongyang’s growing nuclear capabilities
make the country’s bombastic and threatening rhetoric
far more disconcerting.
The Islamic State group, al-Qaida and other transnational
groups continue to threaten regional stability, our troops
and our homeland through terrorist attacks.
Iran has harassed commerce and U.S. Navy vessels in
the Strait of Hormuz, often showing reckless disregard
for international standards and basic safety. Its naval
forces — consisting of many small attack boats and
mines — pack significant asymmetric offensive capability
that can wreak havoc in one of the most vital oil transit
locations in the world.
Meanwhile, technology is rapidly advancing and opening
new methods of attack. Cyber is quickly developing as a
new domain of warfare. American businesses and political
parties have been the victims of brazen cyber attacks,
often with personal and classified data being compromised.
New advances in autonomous vehicles and platforms make
them more easily available to potential adversaries.
Climate change, regional instability caused by natural
disasters, increased need for relief assets and mass
migrations of people will continue to present new
2017-2018 MARITIME POLICY 1

their designed service lives due to high operating tempos
during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, making them
more expensive to maintain.
Carrier battlegroups are having to extend their deployments,
leaving less time for training, maintenance and
crew time at home with their families.
The Coast Guard is responsible for protecting our shores
and saving lives every day, and yet we have allowed
the average age of the Coast Guard fleet to significantly
exceed 40 years, with most medium-endurance cutters
more than 50 years old.
An MH-60S Seahawk helicopter assigned to the Dusty Dogs of Helicopter
Sea Combat Squadron 7 delivers cargo to the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D.
Eisenhower during a vertical replenishment Nov. 11, 2016, in the Arabian
Gulf. The ship and its Carrier Strike Group were supporting Operation
Inherent Resolve, maritime security operations and theater security cooperation
efforts in the U.S. Fifth Fleet area of operations.
challenges. Transnational threats like drug smuggling and
human trafficking also must be thwarted.
The past few years have shown that even with an extensive
list of threats, new and unexpected ones will appear
in the near future. The United States must be prepared to
face them.
During this confluence of dramatic political and technological
change, the United States military is facing
numerous internal challenges. Uncertain funding levels
stemming from the Budget Control Act of 2011, a cycle of
recurring continuing resolutions and the lingering shadow
of sequestration continue to place great stress on our
operating forces and their ability to maintain readiness.
At a time when the sea services need breathing space to
recapitalize their forces, there is not enough funding to
adequately and simultaneously maintain current assets
and procure new, much-needed platforms.
The Navy League believes that if adequate funding is
not provided to support the sea services, American naval
forces will be trapped in a cycle of decay from which they
will be unable to escape. Without adequate, steady and
predictable investment, the United States will be less
secure and more vulnerable to threats. The wise path is to
invest in our sea services now for a more secure future.
The capability demand from our combatant commanders
consistently outpaces the ability of forces to
respond. Marine Corps aircraft are being worked past
U.S. NAVY
Our entire logistical structure in time of war is put upon
our civilian Merchant Mariners, and the number of U.S.-
flag ships has decreased alarmingly in recent years. Many
of these civilian ships also are aging without any planned
replacement. The shipbuilding and repair industrial
base must be preserved, but without steady, predictable
work, these shipyards will significantly downsize and the
United States will find itself unable to scale up or surge as
needed.
Our forces cannot operate continuously without replacement.
The fact that the capabilities of the sea services
are in such high demand speak to their usefulness. Every
platform must be replaced eventually, and many of our
current assets need to be replaced soon.
Without appropriate funding levels, we cannot procure
new platforms, vehicles and equipment without
underfunding current operations. If Congress does not
provide adequate funds, our military can continue to
expect extended deployments, deferred maintenance, less
training, less time with family and more stress, and the
American people will be less secure.
The Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and U.S.-flag
Merchant Marine must:
n Maintain the world’s finest maritime force.
n Execute needed recapitalization programs without
placing more operating, maintenance and training
constraints on current forces.
n Make tough budget decisions.
n Preserve the quality of the all-volunteer force and take
care of our Sailors, Marines, Coast Guard men and
women, and civilian mariners.
n Be forward deployed as America’s first response to
crises around the world.
2
NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

STRATEGIES FOR ACTION
It is imperative that the United States maintain naval
forces that can sustain our national commitment to global
maritime security. The biggest impediment to maintaining
that force is the lack of a fully funded, achievable shipbuilding
program that produces the right quantity and
quality of ships, with the right capabilities, for the right
price, in economically affordable numbers over the next 25
years for all of our sea services. A shipbuilding plan must
be defined and agreed upon by the Navy, the Department
of Defense (DoD), Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), the Department of Transportation (DOT), Congress
and the administration, and must be executed now. This
plan must support the industrial base and ensure we have
the capability to surge shipbuilding when needed.
Sea service leaders have difficult decisions ahead. The
Navy League, recognizing these challenges and the
potential reductions they would impose on our worldwide
commitment of ship deployments, recommends
funding the Department of the Navy to at least $170 billion
per year. Funding for the Department of the Navy’s
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN), account should
be increased by $3 billion to $5 billion over the current
needed level of $21 billion to adjust for the Navy’s new
Force Structure Assessment goals, and increased for
inflation each year. A force level of at least 355 ships is
necessary to meet our nation’s global security challenges.
This nation also needs a Coast Guard fleet that matches
the service’s program of record and the Department of
Homeland Security’s Coast Guard Mission Needs Statement,
with the Acquisition, Construction & Improvements (AC&I)
budget line funded with at least $2 billion per year.
Without a sufficient number of ships and the dollars to
operate them, we cannot maintain the desired forward
presence. That forward presence and readiness to assist
is one of the major contributors to America’s standing as
a world power for good. Forward presence is extremely
important for humanitarian assistance, conventional deterrence
and warfighting readiness. The readiness of these
forward-deployed forces is the benchmark of our success.
We must maintain our forces globally deployed to be ready
to assist our friends and dissuade potential enemies.
The forward presence of our sea services signals the
United States’ resolve to protect American interests, promote
global prosperity and defend freedom of navigation.
Our presence gives the president options to keep conflict
far from our shores. This includes homeporting units in
places like Guam, Japan, Spain and Singapore. By 2020,
the Navy expects to have 120 ships that routinely operate
forward, a significant increase over 97 in 2014.
Partnership with our allies promotes stability and
strengthens our relationships, decreasing the likelihood
of war. The firing key cannot be our only tactic, and our
partnerships promote peace, deter conflict and enable us
to respond to aggression with coalitions instead of alone.
Our partnerships signal U.S. resolve, and the visible exercises
that we conduct with our allies remind potential
enemies of our capabilities, so that they reconsider any
tendency to challenge the United States at sea.
We are stronger with our allies — in Europe, Asia and the
Pacific, the Middle East, Africa, the Western Hemisphere,
and in the Arctic and Antarctic. Engagement with our
allies is taking many forms, from foreign observers who
are embarking onboard Coast Guard cutters, to allied
staffs embarking on our Carrier Strike Groups, to large
multinational exercises like Rim of the Pacific, UNITAS
and Africa Partnership Station.
These exercises can lead to real-world operations. The
648-foot roll-on/roll-off and container ship MV Cape
Ray’s involvement in the neutralization of Syrian chemical
weapons at sea in 2014 is a good example of how military
and civilian personnel, especially our Merchant Mariners,
came together to accomplish a difficult and sensitive mission
in an environment where there were U.S., allied and
U.N. equities involved.
Our partnerships and presence give us strategic agility
and responsiveness. The support provided to Haiti following
Hurricane Matthew in 2016 is but one example
of the tremendous value of our maritime forces being
forward deployed. Within hours, Coast Guard personnel,
Marines and Sailors were on the scene to survey the
damage and identify the response requirements on behalf
of Joint Task Force Matthew. Helicopters provided search
and rescue and medical evacuation options, and the
flight decks, well decks and connectors aboard Navy and
Marine Corps ships and Coast Guard cutters provided the
self-deploying, self-sustaining means to deliver effective
humanitarian assistance.
Maintaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear strategic
deterrence capability to deter adversaries and guarantee
the defense of the United States and our allies is the most
important DoD mission. As confirmed in the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review, the ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN)
Force provides the most survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear
triad. SSBNs will be responsible for approximately 70 percent
of deployed warheads under the 2011 Treaty Between
the United States of America and the Russian Federation
on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, also known as the New START
Treaty. The current Ohio-class SSBN Force is reaching the
end of its operational life. Conceived in the 1960s, designed
2017-2018 MARITIME POLICY 3

U.S. NAVY
The Gold Crew of the Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine USS Kentucky transits the Hood Canal in Puget Sound, Wash., as the boat returns home to Naval
Base Kitsap-Bangor Sept. 28, 2016, following a routine strategic deterrent patrol. Kentucky is one of eight ballistic-missile submarines stationed at the base.
in the 1970s and commissioned between 1984 and 1997,
these submarines already have seen a service-life extension
from 30 to an unprecedented 42 years. A phased
replacement program must continue to be a priority to
ensure continuity of the operational force, ultimately
resulting in a new, 12-boat Columbia-class SSBN Force.
The replacement of these dedicated, uniquely configured
strategic submarines occurs roughly every half century,
creating a procurement requirement outside of the Navy’s
phased ship construction program geared to support
“normal” fleet operations. The Columbia class, formerly
known as the Ohio Replacement Program, is saving development
costs by applying existing submarine equipment
(Trident II missiles, Ohio- and Virginia-class components)
to the design. Additionally, the U.S. and U.K. Royal
navies are developing a common missile compartment for
their respective new SSBN platforms under a cost-sharing
agreement between our two nations.
Nevertheless, the relatively high cost of these unique,
critical SSBNs and the phasing and duration of the total
force construction effort creates an unrealistic and unaffordable
funding requirement for incorporation into
the existing Navy budget. Accordingly, the Navy League
most strongly recommends the Columbia class be funded
outside the existing Navy SCN account and protected
from budget cuts in recognition of the unique national,
strategic mission of these platforms and to prevent the
significant, unavoidable impact and disruption to Navy
ship construction programs and the conventional ship
construction industry. The fiscal 2015 National Defense
Authorization Act created such an account — the National
Sea-based Strategic Deterrent Fund — and it must be
funded by congressional appropriators.
The sustained, forward-deployed presence of the U.S. Navy,
Marine Corps, Coast Guard and U.S.-flag Merchant Marine
ships in the South China Sea, Arabian Gulf, Indian Ocean
and Northeast Asia strengthens our partnerships, ensures
access to sea lanes and promotes engagement with friends
and competitors alike. The combined influence of our
nation’s diplomacy and the presence of these forward-deployed
maritime forces help prevent heightened tensions
from escalating into conflict. Maritime forces usually are
the first to respond because they are forward, they are
ready and they are versatile. The power and potential of a
forward-deployed naval force ready and able to respond
within hours instead of days is unparalleled.
As our military and intelligence officers have testified
before Congress, we are facing a return to great-power
competition. Investments by other countries, notably
China and Russia, in their own navies should push the
United States to invest in its sea services to maintain its
naval advantage.
4
NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

THE SEA SERVICES TEAM
Preventing future conflict, providing partnership
and presence around the globe are the
cornerstones of a national security strategy
that underpins a healthy global economy
upon which the United States depends. As we
face a new global security environment, it is
imperative that we maintain a strong naval
presence that convinces potential adversaries
— and reassures our friends — that the United
States sea services team is forward deployed,
acting as an ever-present deterrent to conflict
in peaceful times, and can — with our global
partners — prevail across the full spectrum of
conflict if deterrence fails. For that, we need
hulls in the water and boots on deck, globally
deployed and ready to act. Today, we risk
abdicating those global responsibilities and
abandoning our leadership role for friends and
allies around the world if we do not make significant
investments in our sea services.
The sea services team — the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps,
Coast Guard and U.S.-flag Merchant Marine — provides
the National Command Authority and our Combatant
Commanders (CCDRs) with their only forcible-entry
option that can operate independently of other countries.
Positioning resources at sea enables maritime forces to
respond rapidly and decisively — with a unique and effective
mix of capabilities — at sea and ashore.
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) is
arguably the mission conducted the most frequently
by our maritime forces. It allows our sea services to
be present globally, without infringement on foreign
governments or their shores. It is a mission that has
endeared us to countries around the globe. We signal U.S.
resolve as we work to help friends and allies during times
of crises and promote global prosperity.
The maritime services are “where it matters, when it
matters” — especially when it comes to HADR, offering
resources, care and compassion to alleviate human suffering.
Our global presence allows us to help; it is the right
thing to do. This is a mission ideally suited to a maritime
force, be it a Carrier Battle Group, Amphibious Ready
Group or Maritime Prepositioning Squadron. They have
the transportation, the medical equipment, the people, the
communications, the engineering capability — in short,
everything required when disaster strikes — inherent in
their makeup. It demonstrates that the United States sea
services are there to help.
As with the aid rendered to Haiti in the wake of Hurricane
Matthew, our maritime forces have been there to assist
others in times of crisis. When a disaster strikes this year,
and in years to come, the United States must have the
resources in place to be able to respond. The American
role as a friend to those in need is crucial to our success
in building coalitions and relationships around the world,
promoting peace among nations.
The U.S. sea services must be ready to respond to any crisis,
be it from Mother Nature or man-made, but chronic
underfunding and overextension amid fiscal and political
pressures are bringing them to a breaking point.
Continuing to do more with less is unacceptable.
THE LAW OF THE SEA
As the nation’s foremost citizens’ organization committed
to preserving U.S. security through strong sea services,
the Navy League of the United States strongly supports
U.S. accession to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea. We urge the U.S. Senate to give its immediate advice
and consent to this important treaty.
2017-2018 MARITIME POLICY 5

Joining the Convention would reinforce and codify the
freedom-of-navigation rights on which U.S. naval forces
depend every day for operational mobility, such as unrestricted
passage through critical international straits and
freedom to operate in the exclusive economic zones that
cover nearly 40 percent of the world’s oceans. In addition,
the Convention provides a firm foundation for maritime
counterterrorism, counterproliferation and law enforcement
operations. Unfortunately, as long as the United States
remains outside the Convention, our critical mari time activities
must find legal support in a complicated combination
of older, less advantageous treaties, as well as “customary
international law,” which is unwritten, easily distorted and
potentially changed by those who do not share our interests.
Neither the old treaties nor customary law provides a
permanent and reliable basis for resisting claims of
coastal states who wish to extend their sovereignty over
areas and activities crucial to U.S. maritime security. The
Convention provides the firmest possible legal foundation
for U.S. operations.
The Navy League has examined these objections
carefully and believes they do not withstand scrutiny.
Indeed, the Law of the Sea Convention has been
analyzed and studied for years and has received the
unwavering and carefully considered support of the
nation’s military leadership, as reaffirmed in congressional
testimony by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) Adm. John M. Richardson, Commandant of
the Coast Guard Adm. Paul F. Zukunft and Pacific
Commander Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., and former secretaries
of state. Likewise, the Convention continues to
have the overwhelming support of business, diplomatic,
environmental and bipartisan political leaders.
The Navy League believes it is long past time for the
United States, as the world’s premier maritime nation, to
reassert its leadership and secure the substantial benefits
of a Convention the United States proposed and helped
create more than 40 years ago. The United States should
join the Law of the Sea Convention immediately.
In addition to obvious military and law enforcement
benefits, U.S. membership in the Convention will provide
clear, internationally recognized legal rights to
offshore resources that will benefit our economy for
years to come. By joining the Convention, the United
States will gain an extension of our continental shelf and
secure sovereign rights over hundreds of thousands of
additional square miles in the Gulf of Mexico, along the
Pacific coast and in the Arctic.
The Convention also would allow the U.S. government to
sponsor American companies as they mine critical rareearth
minerals in the international deep seabed beyond the
U.S. extended continental shelf. In addition, the Convention
would protect U.S. companies’ rights to lay, maintain and
repair the undersea cables vital to global communications
and data transmissions. Regrettably, until the United States
gains the legal certainty that accompanies Convention
accession, U.S. industry will be unwilling and unable to
make the investments necessary to realize the vast offshore
opportunities waiting beyond current U.S. jurisdiction.
In 1982, the U.S. correctly refused to sign the Convention
out of concern for its provisions on deep seabed mining,
technology transfer and revenue sharing. These flaws
were convincingly corrected in 1994. In the intervening
years, opponents of the Convention have continued to
raise objections to U.S. accession, including concerns that
U.S. military operations will be subject to control by international
tribunals, that U.S. companies will be forced to
surrender profits and sophisticated technology to terrorist
organizations, and that the United States will give up sovereignty
to the United Nations.
U.S. NAVY
The Military Sealift Command fleet replenishment oiler USNS John
Ericsson, right, and the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock
USS New Orleans transit the Strait of Hormuz June, 26, 2016. The U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which the United States is not a
signatory, codifies the freedom-of-navigation rights on which U.S. naval
forces depend for operational mobility.
6
NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

THE U.S. NAVY
The enduring mission of the Navy is to maintain,
train and equip combat-ready naval
forces capable of winning wars, deterring
aggression and maintaining freedom of the
seas. The Navy must continue what it does
best — ensure unencumbered access to the
global maritime commons. This strategy puts
even greater pressure on our shrinking naval
forces and underscores their vital contributions
to global security and economic prosperity.
The sea service leaders in 2015 renewed their
commitment and revised a cooperative strategy
first rolled out in 2013. The “Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward,
Engaged, Ready” states, our naval forces
must be able to provide All Domain Access,
Deterrence, Sea Control, Power Projection and
Maritime Security.
Adm. Richardson is leading our Navy at a time when
demand for credible, flexible and scalable naval forces,
trained in multiple missions, continues to grow even
as resources and funding dwindle. In his “A Design for
Maintaining Maritime Superiority,” released in January
2016, the CNO outlines four major global forces that are
changing the environment in which the Navy operates.
The first is increased traffic on the oceans, seas and
waterways. Thanks to the increasing connectedness of the
global economy, opening trade routes in the Arctic and
undersea access, the maritime system is increasingly
congested, competitive and crowded.
Secondly, the ease of global information sharing increases
connections and lowers barriers to participate in the
global system. Third, increasing rates of technological
change and progress, including information technologies,
robotics and additive manufacturing/3-D printing will
change the system.
The budget environment is described in the CNO’s
document as another “force that shapes our security
environment.” Continued significant budget reductions
will have far-reaching and irreversible effects
on our Navy’s ability to carry out its maritime security
missions. The Navy’s new Force Structure Assessment
demonstrates the need for an increased fleet to meet its
fundamental missions.
The CNO is committed to ensuring that our Navy remains
the most dominant, ready and influential naval force,
globally and across all naval missions. However, U.S.
leadership on the seas increasingly will be challenged
by an emerging Chinese fleet that is growing and gaining
blue-water capabilities. Today, our Navy is stretched
beyond the capability to support all global commitments
and requirements. Further budget-driven strategic reductions
will make it impossible for the Navy to meet its
global security commitments.
Being “ready to fight and win today and tomorrow” is
largely dependent upon our number of highly capable,
fully ready-for-tasking Navy ships — hulls in the water.
Rebuilding the fleet to at least 355 ships (from a current
fleet of 276 ships), properly balanced to deliver the full
range of combat capabilities required by the CCDRs, is a
national imperative.
Without adequate Operations and Maintenance funding
to support the required training and ship and aircraft
maintenance for our current fleet, the nation will begin
to field a hollow force that cannot meet national security
demands or commitments. Ships, submarines, aircraft
and weapon systems must be maintained. Without the
ability to operate and maintain our fleet, we will continue
down a path that leads to the abandonment of the world’s
sea lanes to other nations who do not share our national
commitment to democratic principles and a free-trade
economy. The cascading effects of accumulated readiness
reductions increase in a nonlinear fashion.
The risks to the long-term health of the force are “owned”
by the service chiefs. It is their responsibility to ensure
that we do not hollow out the force. Hollowness does not
happen overnight. It is the result of inadequate resourcing
over multiple years, combined with a force stretched thin
over 16 years of war and today’s security environment of
simultaneous crises around the world. It is a recipe for
mission failure with unacceptable losses in the future. To
avoid hollowing out the force, everything must be on the
table during budget discussions. Maintaining outdated
and duplicative commands and unwanted infrastructure
throughout the DoD is wasteful and strategically unsound.
That money is needed elsewhere.
The Navy League of the United States fully endorses the
CNO’s four “Lines of Effort” outlined in “A Design for
Maintaining Maritime Superiority.”These lines of effort
are inextricably linked and must be considered together to
get a sense of the total effort:
2017-2018 MARITIME POLICY 7

n Strengthen naval power at and from the sea:
“Maintain a fleet that is trained and ready to operate
and fight decisively — from the deep ocean to the
littorals, from the sea floor to space, and in the information
domain. Align our organization to best support
generating operational excellence.”
n Achieve high-velocity learning at every level: “Apply
the best concepts, techniques and technologies to accelerate
learning as individuals,teams and organizations.
Clearly know the objective and the theoretical limitsof
performance — set aspirational goals. Begin problem
definition by studying history — do not relearn old lessons.
Start by seeing what you can accomplish without
additional resources. During execution, conduct routine
and rigorous self-assessment. Adapt processes to be
inherently receptive to innovation and creativity.”
n Strengthen our Navy team for the future: “We are one
Navy Team — comprised of a diverse mix of active
duty and reserve Sailors, Navy Civilians, and our families
— with a history of service, sacrifice and success.
We will build on this history to create a climate of
operational excellence that will keep us ready to prevail
in all future challenges.”
n Expand and strengthen our network of partners:
“Deepen operational relationships with other services,
agencies, industry, allies and partners — who operate
with the Navy to support our shared interests.”
SHIPBUILDING
The nation’s capability to build naval ships is very tenuous
due to a lack of stability and unpredictable demand.
Due to this environment, second- and third-tier suppliers
have diminished to sole domestic sources and
commercial-capable suppliers reluctant to bid on unique
naval demands. Without strong commitments, our shipyards
will face a long path to recover the industrial
capability to rebuild an offensive naval force. We are at
a historical tipping point. Without full-service shipyards
and a supporting supplier base, the future of a credible
naval force is illusionary.
The U.S. Navy is composed of a vast array of sea-based
offensive and defensive national capabilities. Absent a
robust industrial base of designers, planners, welders,
pipefitters and electricians, those national capabilities
cannot be sustained.
The U.S. maritime industry includes metal recyclers,
principally located in Louisiana and Texas, who employ
thousands of American workers to recycle vessels to U.S.
environmental and safety standards. The recycled metal
is used by the U.S. steel industry and export markets. The
money gained from the sale of obsolete government vessels
funds maritime heritage grant programs and state
maritime school initiatives.
The Navy League strongly supports increasing the SCN
line to $24 billion to $26 billion to meet this shipbuilding
goal. The Navy League also supports fully funding
the Columbia-class submarine program throughout the
budgeting process to include special legislation to work
around continuing resolutions and sequestration, if
necessary.
Inclusive in the required ship inventory of at least 355 are
not less than:
n 12 aircraft carriers — Delivering CVN 78(Gerald R. Ford)
to bridge the gap caused by the decommissioning of
USS Enterprise (CVN 65), continuing construction of
CVN 79 (John F. Kennedy) and procurement of long-lead
items for CVN 80 (Enterprise). It is vitally important
to maintain the currently scheduled refueling of the
Nimitz-class carriers that are essential elements of a
shipbuilding strategy that ensures our persistent forward
presence well into the future.
n 56 Small Surface Combatants (SSCs)/littoral combat
ships (LCSs) — Delivering the currently contracted
number of LCSs, along with the rapid fleet introduction
of the long-delayed combat modules, is a critical
element of the Navy’s future force structure. In addition,
the back-fit of cost-effective and proven lethality
and survivability enhancements developed through
the SSC program will deliver much-needed capability
improvements to these platforms. The recent initiation
of an SSC program is strongly supported. These ships
will take full advantage of investments in the LCS and
incorporate lethality and survivability upgrades that
will make the SSC a cost-effective, multimission addition
to the Navy’s future force.
n 66 attack submarines (SSNs) — In an environment
with the growing threat of layered, offensive and
defensive precision missile systems, our submarine
force’s asymmetric stealth advantage and immunity
from missile attack enables success for the entire Joint
Force. Sustaining the gold-standard Virginia-class
acquisition program — to include procurement of two
Virginia-class SSNs per year through fiscal 2025 and
the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) starting no later
than fiscal 2019, with the first hull of the Block V and
later builds — is vital to the sustainment of this critical
capability. This strategy minimizes both the depth and
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NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

U.S. NAVY
Aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman transits the Elizabeth River on Aug. 25, 2016, from its homeport at Naval Station Norfolk, Va., to Norfolk Naval Shipyard.
Truman entered a Planned Incremental Availability at the shipyard for maintenance and refurbishment of shipboard systems to prepare for future operations.
duration of the SSN shortfall below the current requirement
of 48, and with the VPM, the loss of undersea
payload volume in the post-guided-missile submarine
(SSGN) era. It also improves payload distribution across
the force, which will complicate adversary planning.
n 14 Ohio-class/12 Columbia-class SSBNs and their
Trident II D5 ballistic nuclear missiles — The nuclear
triad of strategic bombers, ICBMs and sub-launched
ballistic missiles has provided the United States with
the strategic deterrence that has prevented global
war for more than 50 years. The most survivable leg
of the triad, the SSBN, provides 70 percent of the
deployed nuclear warheads under the New START
Treaty. Today’s 14 Ohio-class SSBNs are scheduled to
be replaced by 12 Columbia SSBNs. This program has
been shifted to the right and all options in further
delaying design and construction of the Navy’s top
shipbuilding priority have been exhausted.
For the Navy to meet its strategic deterrence
mission, the first replacement SSBN must be on patrol
in fiscal 2031 and the 12 Columbia SSBNs must be
fully funded and delivered on schedule. Understanding
that the cost for this national imperative is high, the
Navy is driving program costs down to minimize the
impact on other shipbuilding programs. The Navy
League welcomes the fiscal 2015 National Defense
Authorization Act’s creation of a National Sea-Based
Strategic Deterrence Fund as a special repository to
pay for the Ohio Replacement Program. Given the
national mission of the SSBN, the infrequent need for
recapitalization and the tremendous return on investment,
we strongly encourage top-line relief for the
Columbia. This is consistent with historical funding of
previous SSBN classes.
n 38 amphibious ships — Our forward-deployed
amphibious warships, with a full complement of
Marines embarked, are an essential element of our
maritime security capability. The requirement to
enable either a two-Marine Expeditionary Brigade
(MEB) amphibious assault, or two one-MEB assaults
remains valid and is an essential element of maintaining
maritime superiority. Thirty-eight ships also would
provide forward-deployed amphibious warships in a
one-to-three deployment rotation, and allow needed
Navy-Marine Corps training to units other than those
preparing for deployment.
2017-2018 MARITIME POLICY 9

n 104 large surface combatants — Continuing construction
of new Arleigh Burke-class destroyers as well as
the modernization of the Navy’s cruiser and destroyer
inventory will ensure the sustainment of the landattack,
fleet air, missile-defense and anti-ballistic
missile capabilities.
n 33 Combat Logistics Force ships — Construction of the
17 John Lewis-class oilers beginning in 2016 to replace
the 15 Henry J. Kaiser-class oilers and two Supplyclass
Fast Combat Support Ships is essential
to ensure the combatant forces are capable of longendurance,
forward-deployed missions without having
to replenish at distant, vulnerable shore bases.
n 21 Maritime Preposition Ships — The plan is to grow
from 14 Maritime Preposition Ships in two Squadrons
to 21 total ships in three geographically dispersed
Maritime Preposition Squadrons of seven ships each.
Our forward-based maritime preposition squadrons
with their civilian mariner and military force protection
detachments are critical to the nation’s global humanitarian
disaster and crisis response capabilities.
As stated in “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready,” “A smaller force,
driven by additional budget cuts or sequestration, would
require us to make hard choices. We would be forced
to execute this maritime strategy at increased levels of
risk for some missions and functions, decrease forward
presence, and reduce our footprint in some geographic
regions. Such cuts would also limit our warfighting
advantages. Specifically, in the event of a return to
sequestration levels of funding, Navy surge-ready Carrier
Strike Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups available for
crises and contingencies would be insufficient to meet
requirements, and the Navy’s ability to maintain appropriate
forward presence would be placed at risk.”
The Navy League recommends continuing to grow the fleet.
AIRCRAFT AND WEAPON SYSTEMS
Essential to the combat strength of our fleet is the naval
aviation capability provided by a minimum of 12 carrier
air wings, a fully integrated maritime patrol inventory,
a modernized fleet helicopter force and complementary
unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). Key to that capability
is the timely introduction of the F-35C Lightning II joint
strike fighter to our carriers and the continued upgrade
of the fleet’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and the F/A-18C
multirole strike fighters. The multiyear procurement of
the E/A-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft and the
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye airborne warning and control
aircraft should continue until the current programs of
record are complete. Funding for F/A-18 depot work and
spares needs to increase to support an increase in aviation
readiness. Full support for the procurement of the P-8A
Poseidon long-range anti-submarine warfare, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, the Triton
Broad Area Maritime Support UAS and the Carrier Based
Aerial Refueling System will ensure our maritime patrol
supremacy well into the future.
Included in the Navy’s aviation inventory should be:
An F-35C Lightning II carrier variant, assigned to the Salty Dogs of Air Test
and Evaluation Squadron 23, performs a fly-over above the flight deck of
the aircraft carrier USS George Washington in the Atlantic Ocean Aug. 16,
2016. The F-35C is expected to be fleet operational in 2018.
U.S. NAVY
n 260 F-35C Lighting IIs for the Navy — The F-35
program is designed to field transformational strike
aircraft for the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force
that include next-generation sensors and weapons
systems, stealth characteristics and a high level of
commonality among versions. The F-35C is designed
for carrier options and will be a single-pilot strike
fighter powered by the world’s most powerful fighter
engine, with a multipurpose radar and internal bay
for a low-observable cross-section and to carry precision
weapons.
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NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

n 153 E/A-18G Growlers — This aircraft combines modern
advances in airborne electronic attack systems
and weapons with the unmatched tactical versatility,
advancements and capabilities of the Block II Super
Hornet.
n 75 E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes — The E-2D is designed
for modern threats and increased detection over blue
water, land and in the littorals. Its radar provides
advanced 360-degree coverage with mechanical and
electronic scanning capability for continuous detection
and tracking of targets, expanding maritime
domain awareness operations and sorting the dense
maritime picture.
n 117 P-8A Poseidons — The P-8A is capable of broadarea,
maritime and littoral operations.
In addition to investing in next-generation aircraft, the
Navy must ensure pilots are properly trained and aircraft
is properly maintained. There has been a disturbing
correlation of reduced budgets and increased aircraft accidents
in recent years, and the Navy League is concerned
that readiness is being reduced in this restricted budget
environment. Given the challenges of maritime aviation, it
is crucial that readiness be preserved.
Cutting-edge command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(C4ISR) is central to a naval strike group’s combat capabilities
and a critical force multiplier. An advanced C4ISR
capability is not just an enabler of more efficient and
effective operations, it also provides the information,
command and control (C2) and precision targeting so
essential to ultimate success.
The Navy is making significant advancements in new
weapons systems that, if funded, developed, tested, integrated
and fielded correctly, have the potential to be truly
revolutionary. Potential adversaries are investing in layered
defensive and offensive systems like anti-ship cruise
missiles (ASCMs) and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs),
which pose potential threats to the Navy’s surface fleet
and thus restrict operations. The Navy’s response, a
distributed lethality organizing concept, will boost the
surface fleet’s attack capability, but is more effective with
stronger ship-defense capabilities.
The Congressional Research Service outlined in its October
2016 report “Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Hypervelocity
Projectile: Backgrounds and Issues for Congress” the
greatest challenges to surface ship defensive systems:
depth of magazine and cost-exchange ratio. Depth of
magazine refers to the number of missiles a ship can
carry; if a ship runs out of ammunition during a conflict,
it must withdraw and reload before returning to battle.
Cost-exchange ratio compares how much it costs for the
United States to shoot down a missile versus the amount
it costs the adversary to build said missile. Unfavorable
cost ratios during extended conflict are not sustainable.
The Navy has three potential weapons that would solve
these problems: solid-state lasers (SSLs), the electromagnetic
railgun (EMRG) and the hypervelocity projectile
(HVP). The SSL, which heats through oncoming missiles or
small ships with a high-energy beam, has a low marginal
cost per shot, a deep magazine and fast engagement times,
and it could be used as a short-range defensive weapon.
It was tested in 2014 and now is onboard USS Ponce, the
Navy’s first Afloat Forward Staging Base (Interim), as an
operational system. We encourage further development to
field the SSL to counter ASCMs and ASBMs.
The EMRG is a launcher that uses electromagnetic pulses
instead of propellant to fire weapons and also could be
used to counter ASCMs and ASBMs and would improve
the Navy’s cost-exchange ratio. The projectile developed
for the EMRG — the HVP — also can be fired from existing
cannons. The HVP’s speed makes it effective against
some ASCMs, and its low cost improves the cost-exchange
ratio and reduces depth of magazine limitations.
All three programs need more development work to realize
the full potential of these new technologies, but the
potential value is significant for the Navy. We encourage
the Navy to continue to develop, test and integrate these
new technologies.
Continued investments in unmanned innovation, to
include unmanned undersea, surface and aerial vehicles,
are an essential element of sustained dominance. A family
of unmanned vehicles — from the Large Displacement
Unmanned Undersea Vehicle to torpedo tube and 3-inch
launcher payloads — will enable execution of higher-risk
missions with low unit costs while furthering the undersea
force’s reach.
The Navy League applauds the direction the Navy is taking
in cyber warfare and cyber security to promote assured C2,
electromagnetic maneuver warfare, cyber and integrated
fires. We must be ready to fight and win in contested and
denied environments by leveraging our superior technology.
The integration of all elements of cyber warfare
— from policy and requirements to research and development,
training, fielding and operations under the Navy
Cyber Command/Tenth Fleet — has established the Navy
as one of the nation’s critical resources in this complex
and rapidly evolving warfare discipline.
2017-2018 MARITIME POLICY 11

The Navy League of
the United States supports:
n Continued full funding of the highly successful SSN
building program at two ships per year, including fully
funding the Block V SSN VPM required to offset the
strike capability lost when the four SSGNs are decommissioned
between 2026 and 2028.
n Continued development, procurement and deployment
of the Navy portion of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System, including long-range surveillance and tracking
capability to queue ground-based intercept systems
and, ultimately, the ability to detect, track and engage
medium- and long-range ballistic missiles well distant
from the United States.
n The sea services’ maritime domain awareness effort,
which integrates national and global partner intelligence
resources and information systems to provide
the best intelligence picture of the world’s oceans.
n The Navy’s efforts to upgrade the quality and scope of
mine countermeasures capabilities and improve the
forward-deployed readiness of mine warfare forces.
n Increased attention to and funding for Navy and Coast
Guard operations in the polar regions to protect our
access to natural resources as well as preclude these
regions from becoming sanctuaries for potential adversaries.
Communications, logistics, ship and aircraft
modifications are essential for such operations.
n Increased emphasis on anti-submarine warfare, as our
skills in that arena have atrophied in the face of an
increasing threat.
n Adequate numbers of Navy amphibious ships and
sealift platforms to provide the expeditionary lift to
support present and future CCDR requirements.
n Continued funding for Combat Logistics Force assets,
including oiler/dry cargo ships; large, medium-speed
roll-on/roll-off ships; and new classes of sealift prepositioning
vessels, all of which will be employed in the
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Enhanced) squadrons.
n Realistic and sufficient operational training to ensure
the safe, combat-effective performance of our young
men and women, to include adequate flight hours and
steaming days as well as active sonar operations in any
ocean environment, pending conclusive evidence that
such operations are not harmful to marine mammals.
U.S. NAVY
The coastal patrol ship USS Tempest fires the Griffin Missile System for a
post-installation test fire for certification with Patrol Coastal Squadron 1
(PCRON 1) Feb. 1, 2016, in the Arabian Gulf. PCRON 1 was deployed to
the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations supporting maritime security operations
and theater security cooperation efforts.
n Capitalizing on the significant goodwill fostered by
cooperation with multiple countries in response to
piracy concerns.
n Procurement of sufficient weapons and munitions to
meet Operation Plan requirements, of which we are
woefully below. Additionally, there has been substantial
war-gaming support to justify a recommendation
that the Navy fund vertical-launch system rearming
capability at sea to allow combatants to remain on
station for longer periods of time.
n Increased funding in the respective Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation budget lines to realize
the full potential of SSLs, the EMRG and HVP.
n Recycling of U.S. government-owned ships in U.S. ship
metal recycling facilities to provide employment to
thousands of American workers and generate funds for
maritime heritage grant programs and state maritime
school initiatives.
n Investment in the next generation of warfighting
technology through sustained funding for the Office of
Naval Research.
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NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

THE U.S. MARINE CORPS
The Marine Corps remains America’s expeditionary
force in readiness. This amphibious
expeditionary role reflects the intent of the
82nd Congress in the early 1950s when it
directed, “The nation’s shock troops must be
the most ready when the nation is least ready
… to provide a balanced force in readiness for
a naval campaign and, at the same time, a
ground and air striking force ready to suppress
or contain international disturbances short of
large-scale war.” This prescient guidance on
a daily basis shapes the culture, organization,
training, equipment and priorities of
the Marine Corps and the Navy-Marine Corps
team. Everything the Marine Corps undertakes
must tangibly and visibly contribute to its
combat readiness and effectiveness.
Operating from expeditionary forward locations, amphibious
warships and alternative sea-based platforms,
Marines remain forward deployed around the world,
protecting not only our nation, but also supporting the
international order that underpins our prosperity and
security. In a world of brushfire instabilities, violent
extremism, nonstate threats and struggling sovereign
entities, Marines are needed to respond to unfolding crises
and support and defend U.S. interests.
The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is a unique,
scalable and flexible warfighting organization that
combines the presence and power-projection capabilities
of the entire naval force and leverages and applies
the power and capabilities of joint, allied and coalition
forces. In any crisis, contingency or major war, the
operational and combat synergy of the MAGTF and the
joint or allied expeditionary force is far more powerful
and effective than the simple sum of its unit elements.
Powerful maritime force combinations leverage their
control of the seas and littorals to influence the affairs of
populations ashore.
The Navy-Marine Corps amphibious team lives on the
seams, bringing air, sea and ground capabilities together
into one tightly knit tactical package. Marine forces are
designed for rapid crisis response, partnership building
and smaller-scale expeditionary interventions, but also
can scale up to larger forcible-entry operations from the
sea as the situation demands. Routinely, Marines operate
from austere expeditionary locations without the need
for a large footprint ashore, but with the ability to swiftly
move from one potential crisis area to another and back
to sea when temporary interventions ashore are complete.
They leverage their proximity to sources of conflict
to respond within hours or days, rather than weeks. The
MAGTF provides integrated cross-domain capabilities,
leveraging the sea as maneuver space, and the ability to
operate air and ground capabilities forward as a strategic
hedge against unpredicted crises. It is a microcosm of the
joint force, useful as an independent-maneuver element
for joint commanders, or as an early entry capability for
the larger joint force.
With integrated strike and long-range maneuver by air
or surface, the Navy-Marine Corps team acts as a first
responder for the joint force across a wide range of
scenarios. Control of the seas and littorals remains a fundamental
objective and pillar of strength for our mari time
nation and forces. The ethos and principles define the
identity of the Marine Corps and connect all Marines
— past, present and future — with who they are and
with what they do on behalf of the American people and
nation. The Marine Corps is light enough to move swiftly
to the source of trouble, but heavy enough to prevail
against most threats. Marines will maintain ready forces
today to answer the call, fight and win. The flexibility and
strategic mobility of the MAGTF make it ideal for creating
and exploiting access in uncertain or denied areas.
Modern amphibious concepts seek to achieve their broad
range of effects through dispersed-maneuver elements,
integrated fires and expeditionary logistics rather than
massed assault.
As the MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft completes fielding,
the game-changing nature of the aircraft already
has expanded MAGTF capabilities during both combat
and crisis-response operations. The capability of the
fifth-generation short-takeoff/vertical-landing F-35Bs
operating from amphibious flight decks or dispersed
expeditionary airfields will increase the organic capabilities
of the MAGTF and provide more options and greater
flexibility for joint planners and commanders. These two
unique Marine Corps platforms are informing and shaping
MAGTF combat development and will result in a far more
combat-ready and capable Marine Corps in the future.
Additionally, the Marine Corps’ response capabilities are
enhanced by two specialized Maritime Prepositioning
Ship squadrons. Originally designed for pier-side or nearshore
in-stream offload, this family of Military Sealift
2017-2018 MARITIME POLICY 13

U.S. MARINE CORPS
A U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 refuels during Weapons and Tactics Instructor course
1-17 (WTI 1-17) Oct. 20, 2016, at Yuma, Ariz. WTI 1-17 is a seven-week training event that emphasizes operational integration of the six functions of
Marine Corps aviation in support of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force.
Command- (MSC-) owned and operated platforms continues
to be refined and upgraded so that Marine forces
and equipment can be tactically offloaded at sea, thereby
expanding the ability to project relief and influence, or
reinforce, combat power without dependence on secure
infrastructure. The Marine Corps continues to be closely
aligned and partnered with the Navy in their collective
efforts to restore relevant global U.S. maritime force capability
and capacity.
The Navy and Marine Corps amphibious expeditionary
team now is facing an emerging security environment
that seems perfectly aligned with their day-to-day naval
capabilities for crisis response, building partner capacity,
expeditionary access and disaster response. In larger contingencies,
amphibious expeditionary Marines still provide
an operational asymmetry from amphibious and other
sea-based platforms that forces would-be opponents to
defend across the range and depth of the region of conflict.
This multipurpose utility makes the Marines, and
Navy amphibious expeditionary warships and forces, a
compelling security investment in uncertain times.
MARINE CORPS STRATEGY 2016
Gen. Robert B. Neller, the 37th commandant of the Marine
Corps, has published a Fragmentary Order #1 to the
Commandant’s Planning Guidance and a Marine Corps
Service Strategy that provide guidance and a framework
for future force development that will ensure the service
remains ready, relevant and responsive within the future
operating environment and across the range of military
operations. The Marine Corps strategy provides guidance,
a 10-year outlook and defines the strategic ends to
organize, train and equip the force consistent with the
character of war in the first half of the 21st century. The
ways and means will be executed through three supporting
efforts: the Marine Corps Operating Concept; the
Marine Corps Force Management Plan, focused on force
generation and management over a near-term five-year
period; and the Marine Corps Enterprise Investment Plan,
which supports capability development.
The future of our nation rests on the ability of the Marine
Corps, as part of the Naval and Joint Force, to out-think
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NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

our foes, be disciplined and well trained, and develop and
field capabilities that ensure we can fight and win our
nation’s battles in any clime, place or contested space.
THE FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
The Marine Corps projects that over the next decade potential
adversaries will continue to observe and understand
U.S. warfighting advantages in open terrain and likely will
seek to challenge us in urban and other complex environments.
They will continue to focus on the asymmetric
advantage. Consequently, the integration of ISR, unmanned
systems, lethal long-range weapons and information operations
is the new reality in future warfare. Information
warfare, including cyber operations and open-source
information technology, will cut across all Marine Corps
warfighting functions. By leveraging advances in commercial
technologies, our enemies can now contest the Marines
at low cost with advanced systems. At the same time, the
use of improvised explosive devices and the practice of hiding
among the population will continue to complicate the
future battlefield engagement environment.
THE STRATEGIC ENDS
The U.S. Marine Corps Service Strategy 2016 outlines six
strategic ends that will guide future operational execution
and force development:
n Enhanced and integrated naval expeditionary capabilities:
The future MAGTF will be agile, adaptable and
expeditionary. The MAGTF, as a naval expeditionary
force, will have the skills, equipment and training
to fight across all domains in a variety of conditions
and meet a wide range of challenges from a variety of
adversaries.
n Integrated and codified relationships with the Navy,
Special Operations Forces and interagency community:
Because they are forward deployed, the Marine Corps,
Navy and Special Operations Forces play a unique role
in strengthening alliances, gaining assured access and
rapid action.
n Create and equip the 21st-century Marine: The 21stcentury
Marine must receive the best training and
equipment. Marine Corps culture must reward innovation,
intellectual curiosity and decision making, while
setting the highest standards for physical fitness. It
is the Marine Corps’ responsibility to ensure the best
technology is available to our Marines.
n Create the 21st-century MAGTF: The warfighting
concepts of the Marine Corps must focus on providing
a unique set of capabilities that “exploit gaps against
potential adversaries across the range of military
operations.”
n Exploit technology: The Marine Corps must invest in
and ensure it is using the most advanced technology
available. The service should take advantage of automation
and unmanned technologies to improve its
warfighting capability and potential.
n Recognize and prepare for threats in the urban littorals:
The Marine Corps should anticipate future
missions in urban littorals and develop technology,
strategies and tactics for this environment. ISR and
precision surface maneuvers must be prioritized for
low signature and to gain advantage.
THE WAY FORWARD: MARINE CORPS
OPERATING CONCEPT 2016
The Marine Corps Service Strategy 2016 states that
Marines must look to their training, concepts and strategy
documents to ensure they are able to adapt to new and
unprecedented challenges and threats.
The Marine Corps’ “Operating Concept: How an
Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century,”
referred to as the MOC, was unveiled by the commandant
in September 2016. It describes how the Marine Corps
will utilize its capabilities to fulfill its Title 10 mission
responsibilities. The document notes that the central
problem facing the Marine Corps as the nation’s force
in readiness is that “the Marine Corps is currently not
organized, trained and equipped to meet the demands of
a future operating environment characterized by complex
terrain, technology proliferation, information warfare, the
need to shield and exploit signatures, and an increasingly
non-permissive maritime domain.”
The MOC comes as the Marine Corps prepares for these
challenges while also facing peer-capable forces across
the range of military operations and, simultaneously,
across the domains of land, sea, air, space, cyberspace
and information. The MOC defines how the 21st-century
MAGTF will fight and win in that environment, reaffirming
the maritime and amphibious tradition of the Marine
Corps while operating jointly with other services.
The 21st century MAGTF will “conduct maneuver warfare
in the physical and cognitive dimensions of conflict
to generate and exploit psychological, technological,
2017-2018 MARITIME POLICY 15

U.S. MARINE CORPS
Lance Cpl. Zackary W. Rippin, infantry assaultman, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (3/5), operates a Weaponized Multi-Utility Tactical Transport
Vehicle during a company assault on Range 400 aboard the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, Calif., Nov. 7, 2016. Commandant
of the Marine Corps Gen. Robert B. Neller has designated 3/5 as the Marine Corps’ experimental force.
temporal and spatial advantages over the adversary.”
Avoiding linear, sequential and predictably phased
approaches to warfare, the MAGTF will seek to execute
missions simultaneously by operating at high tempo with
distributed and networked forces. The MAGTF in the
future will leverage the freedom of maneuver inherent in
naval amphibious warfare to achieve these operations.
The MOC presents five “critical tasks” that are essential for
the MAGTF to fight future adversaries: Integrate the naval
force to fight at and from the sea, evolve the MAGTF, operate
with resilience in a contested-network environment,
enhance the ability to maneuver in all domains and exploit
the competence of the individual Marine.
Of these five tasks, the MOC particularly emphasizes that
mission success in the future will continue to rely on the
ability of individual Marines to think quickly and act decisively
in chaotic situations.
The complexity of the future operating environment
demands that the Marine Corps continues to recruit and
retain men and women of character who are smart, fit
and resilient. The MOC also recognizes the importance of
providing opportunities for Marines to develop their skills
and knowledge through training, education, and a culture
that cultivates creativity and encourages initiative.
The Navy League of
the United States supports:
n Continued funding to maintain a minimum end strength
of at least 182,000 active-duty Marines and 38,500
Selective Marine Corps Reserves, which enable the Corps
to support the Defense Strategic Guidance and the full
mission spectrum around the globe. The Marine Corps
is currently assessing the size of the force and, as of the
publication of this document, may set new requirements.
n Full funding of costs associated with resetting, sustaining
and modernizing the Marine Corps to meet
current and future force structure, infrastructure,
training and readiness requirements.
n Acquisition of a total of 38 amphibious warships to
meet forward-presence, crisis-response and wartime
capability demands.
n Full operational status retention of two Maritime
Prepositioning Squadrons (MPSs) and associated
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NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

Expeditionary Transfer Docks (formerly called Mobile
Landing Platforms), and sufficient numbers of highand
low-water-speed connector craft. Acquisition and
full operating status funding for a third geographically
forward-based MPS squadron of seven ships for a total
of 21 MPS ships in three squadrons around the world.
n Acquisition of an affordable and capable Amphibious
Combat Vehicle to ensure Marines have the ability to
maneuver against increasingly capable adversaries,
and replace the aging and costly Assault Amphibious
Vehicle force.
n Continued acquisition of the F-35B to replace the
majority of capabilities found in the AV-8B, EA-6B
Prowlers and F/A-18 Hornets, along with the acquisition
of high-tech unmanned air and ground systems to
further enhance the flexibility, mobility and versatility
of Marine Corps forces.
n Development and acquisition of technologies and products
that provide distributed digital interoperability
and seamless information sharing among fourth- and
fifth-generation fighter and attack, rotary-wing and
tiltrotor aircraft, amphibious warships, alternative
sea-basing platforms and the entire MAGTF.
n Continued full-rate production of the MV-22 within
a Multi-Year III procurement profile to complete the
program of record and successfully meet the demand
signals of the CCDRs.
capability for the F-35B beyond the original vision for
the platform.
n Acquisition of two initial and four total C-40A aircraft
for C-9 replacement, recapitalization and stand-up of
the Marine Corps Reserve Operational Support Aircraft
mission.
n Acquisition of modern aviation C2 systems, such as
the Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar, Common Aviation
C2 System, Composite Tracking Network and a future
directed-energy weapons system. This family of systems
is designed to control the MAGTF’s airspace, serve
as the digital gateway between the Ground Combat
Element and Aviation Combat Element, and detect and
engage low-observable air threats.
n Continued acquisition of MAGTF fires improvements,
to include sufficient and affordable long-range,
precision naval surface fires capabilities, such as the
Long-Range Land Attack Projectile for joint crisis
response, contingency and forcible-entry operations.
n Expeditionary forces that ensure a forward presence
and the ability to execute unforeseen deployments
around the world with ready, relevant and capable
forces, supported by ISR assets that strengthen joint
and combined capabilities.
n An increase to two active-duty VMM MV-22 squadrons
for a total of 18 active and two Reserve component
medium-lift squadrons and an increase of the program
of record aircraft from 360 to 388.
n Recapitalization of Marine Corps aviation’s aging
platforms, with the continued procurement of UH-1Y
Venom and AH-1Z Viper helicopters, the acquisition
of the CH-53K King Stallion helicopter, along with the
full fielding of the KC-130J tanker, equipped with an
improved aerial refueling system in both the Marine
Corps active and Reserve components.
n Continued acquisition of the RQ-21 Blackjack UAS for
expeditionary land and embarked Amphibious Ready
Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit operations.
n Continued acquisition of the Intrepid Tiger II pod and
Block X upgrade for F/A-18, AV-8B and H-1 series aircraft
platforms to greatly expand the electronic warfare
communications and radar jamming capabilities of the
MAGTF, and acquisition of increased electronic warfare
U.S. NAVY
Maritime prepositioning force ship USNS GYSGT Fred W. Stockham and
Expeditionary Transfer Dock USNS Montford Point perform a “skin-to-skin”
maneuver March 13 off Pohang, South Korea. Montford Point acted as a
floating pier for a simulated offload.
2017-2018 MARITIME POLICY 17

THE U.S. COAST GUARD
The Coast Guard’s Posture Statement for
the fiscal 2017 budget notes, “As the world’s
premier, multi-mission, maritime service
responsible for the safety, security, and stewardship
of the Nation’s waters, the United
States Coast Guard offers a unique and enduring
value proposition to the Department of
Homeland Security and the American public. At
all times a military service and a branch of the
U.S. Armed Forces, a federal law enforcement
agency, a regulatory body, a first responder,
and a member of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, the Coast Guard serves on the
front line for a Nation whose economic prosperity
and national security are inextricably
linked to vast maritime interests.”
To preserve these interests at home and abroad, the
Coast Guard must employ a broad range of authorities
and provide unique operational capabilities as best it can,
despite the shortfall in investment in people, ships, aircraft
and facilities.
Five areas of strategic focus continue to drive Coast Guard
operations and capital investments, and enable the service
to accomplish its daily missions as well as provide
surge capabilities during increasingly uncertain times:
The rise of transnational organized crime (TOC) networks;
the imperative for southern maritime border security;
increasing maritime commerce; emerging cyber risks; and
future challenges in the polar regions.
EVOLVING THREATS AND
CHALLENGES DRIVE STRATEGIES
The Coast Guard has promulgated foundational strategies
to address each of the five focus areas:
n The rise of TOC networks.
The challenge: TOC networks present criminal-terrorinsurgency
interdependencies that weaken regional governments
and threaten our national interests. A recent
U.N. Study on Global Homicide found that eight of the
top 10 national homicide rates were found in countries in
Central American and around the Caribbean.
The Coast Guard’s approach: Central to the Coast
Guard’s strategy is a unity-of-effort approach, leveraging
the capabilities across our government and those
of our international partners. Targeting and interdicting
these sophisticated networks requires a counternetwork
approach integrating robust cyber capabilities, actionable
intelligence and capable operational platforms.
n The imperative for southern border security.
The challenge: A significant threat to our national security,
our southern border covers 6 million square miles of ocean
and shoreline and offers the major avenue for illicit drug
and human trafficking, illegal migration and terrorism.
The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter James, the fifth National Security Cutter
(NSC) to enter service, is shown here transiting toward its home port of
Charleston, S.C., on Aug. 28, 2015. The NSC is the largest and most technologically
advanced class of cutters in the Coast Guard’s fleet.
U.S. COAST GUARD
The Coast Guard’s approach: As the lead federal agency
for maritime law enforcement, the Coast Guard plays
a lead role in the Southern Border and Approaches
Campaign Plan, including participating in three DHS
operational Joint Task Forces (JTFs). The service will
leverage a common intelligence picture and a targeted
presence to interdict threats far from our borders.
n Increasing maritime commerce.
The challenge: Adm. Zukunft’s “2015-2019 Strategic
Intent” notes that “the prosperity of our Nation is
inextricably linked to a safe and efficient Maritime
Transportation System (MTS). … [And] the increase
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in demand on the MTS to support the production and
transportation of oil and gas refined products and chemicals,
and manufactured goods will challenge the Coast
Guard’s capacity to ensure the [necessary] safety, security,
and environmental stewardship.”
The Coast Guard’s approach: By improving regulatory
frameworks, including those with regard to cyber security,
contingency plans and preparedness activities, and developing
workforce capacities and competencies to address
ever-increasing complexities, the Coast Guard will continue
to promote a safe, secure, efficient and resilient MTS.
n Emerging cyber risks.
The challenge: The dramatic growth of cyber technology
has spanned significant and numerous risks to Coast
Guard networks and systems as well as to our nation’s
critical maritime infrastructure and the MTS.
The Coast Guard’s approach: The Coast Guard is focused
on developing broader capabilities to ensure greater
operational effectiveness, defense of its networks and
protection of maritime cyber infrastructures in the private
and public sectors.
n Future challenges in the polar regions.
The challenge: The primary near-term risks are from
increasing maritime activity in the wake of diminishing ice
coverage. Daunting challenges to polar governance stem
from increased maritime traffic on previously unnavigable
routes, increased tourism and the associated demands
for greater Coast Guard intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
and response capabilities, and the geo-strategic
draw of extremely rich natural resources.
The Coast Guard’s approach: Our nation faces significant
risks in both polar regions due to the lack of icebreaking
capacity. And President Barack Obama’s call in 2015 to maintain
the capacity for year-round access will require renewed
icebreaking capabilities. While pursuing a unit of effort
approach in the near term with our international partners,
the Coast Guard also seeks to accelerate the acquisition of a
new heavy icebreaker and plan for additional icebreakers.
INADEQUATE RESOURCING
ELEVATES RISKS
These evolving threats the Coast Guard faces across its
broad mission set raise several strategic concerns that
need to be addressed in the coming budget years. In particular,
the Navy League is concerned about:
U.S. COAST GUARD
The Coast Guard Fast Response Cutter Joseph Tezanos conducts sea trials
off the coast of Key West, Fla., on July 19, 2016. Joseph Tezanos was commissioned
August 2016.
n Aging fleet and other capital assets. A substantial portion
of assets well beyond their intended service lives could
seriously degrade critical mission capabilities and put
personnel at undue risk. For example, a sizeable portion
of the Coast Guard’s cutter fleet is more than 40 years
old, with some medium-endurance cutters past the age of
50, and the Coast Guard’s information technology/intelligence
capabilities require updates and modernization.
n “Blended” retirement system. Just as the fleet is being
recapitalized, the revised personnel retirement system
may cause unintended consequences for both recruiting
and retention.
n The Coast Guard has a retirement accounting system
unlike that in the DoD and likely will have a
sizeable shortfall in fiscal 2018 to fully fund that
account. This is related to the changes in the military
retirement system taking effect on Jan. 1, 2018,
which is similar to a 401(k) plan where the service
matches part of a member’s contribution.
n The Navy League also is concerned that the new
revised retirement system could impact retention 10
to 15 years in the future, as experienced personnel opt
to leave the Coast Guard because they no longer will
have to wait for 20 years’ service to achieve retirement
benefits, possibly resulting in a hollow force.
n Invest in people. As the Coast Guard begins accepting
new cutters in new homeports, the men and women of
the Coast Guard will need more training and support.
Facilities like child development centers, healthcare
facilities and housing will be necessary in the new
homeports where the ships will be clustered.
2017-2018 MARITIME POLICY 19

U.S. COAST GUARD
An aviation survival technician is lowered from an MH-65 Dolphin helicopter during training near the North Head Light in Ilwaco, Wash., Nov. 10, 2016.
The training was part of the week-long Advanced Helicopter Rescue School.
n Cyber expertise. The MTS is encountering increased risk
from cyber-related threats, and personnel with cyber
experience are in very high demand for jobs outside
the Coast Guard. Estimates have shown there will be 40
million cyber-related jobs in the United States by 2020.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENABLE
SERVICE TO PROTECT AND DEFEND
To support the five strategic focus areas and address these
concerns in fiscal 2017, Coast Guard needs can be prioritized
into two general groups: the recapitalization of air
and surface assets and building workforce and mission
support capabilities. The Coast Guard must adequately
recapitalize aging air and surface assets, already decades
beyond their planned service life.
The Navy League recommends:
n An AC&I Budget of at least $2 billion a year to fully
fund the Coast Guard’s mission needs.
n At least $100 million for long-lead-time materials
for the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC). This is the Navy
League’s highest priority for the Coast Guard. It is
critical to secure sufficient funding to begin construction
of at least two OPCs per year, starting with $100
million for long-lead-time materials in fiscal 2017.
n Funding for at least six Fast Response Cutters (FRCs)
per year. Continued funding is needed to deliver at
least six new FRCs per year, which affords the optimum
delivery schedule to replace the obsolete 110-foot Patrol
Boats. The funding requested in fiscal 2017 for four
FRCs prolongs the recapitalization, requiring the Coast
Guard to overcome challenges associated with sustaining
legacy assets for longer periods of time.
n An increase to the FRC program of record by six
hulls to replace the aging 110-foot patrol boats in
Southwest Asia. Since 2003, the Coast Guard has
operated six 110-foot patrol boats in the Persian Gulf,
which have sustained an extraordinarily high operational
tempo. The hulls are well past their intended
operational life and are becoming prohibitively expensive
to maintain and operate.
n Fully funding acquisition activities in fiscal 2017 to
begin constructing heavy icebreakers in fiscal 2020. The
“2016 State of the Coast Guard” address noted that “the
[nation] has no insurance policy — no self-rescue capability
whatsoever — should the Polar Star and her nearly
40-year-old engineering plant suffer a … casualty and
become beset in the ice of Antarctica.”
The polar regions are critical strategic geographic
regions and the effects of a warming climate
are increasing access to our 200-mile Economic
Exclusion Zone (EEZ). The U.S. needs year-round
assured access to these strategic polar regions. Yet the
nation’s icebreaking capability has atrophied for years.
The Coast Guard’s High Latitude Study indicated the
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NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

need for three heavy and three medium icebreakers
for projected levels of human activity, and to meet
the nation’s needs. This also is consistent with the
Department of Homeland Security’s Mission Needs
Statement approved in 2013.
In addition, as a national security issue, the icebreakers
should be U.S.-built, and not leased. Federal
law requires a heavy investment to fund the entire
lease up front, if leased from allied nations.
n A parallel effort to reinvigorate polar aviation.
Icebreakers deploy with an air detachment aboard
to support operations as well as to provide a critical
search and rescue capability. With the degradation of
our nation’s icebreaking capabilities has come a parallel
decline in polar aviation capabilities.
n Multiyear funding. To maximize the efficiency of
this recapitalization effort, Congress should consider
multiyear procurements and block-buy programs for
cost savings.
To provide adequate mission support and workforce capacity,
old assets need more maintenance and new assets need
more training investment. Investments the Coast Guard
is making to recapitalize operational platforms must be
matched by a commensurate investment in people.
n Restoring and fully funding authorized Reserve force
levels. Since fiscal 2012, the Coast Guard Reserve,
the service’s only surge force, has experienced a 17.5
percent reduction in budgetary resources and the
reduction of 1,100 Selected Reserve and 118 full-time
support positions. These reductions result in increased
operational risk, reduced levels of readiness and put
undue pressure on operational commanders to take up
the resulting slack in management and oversight of
Reservists. The Navy League recommends Congress
at least maintain Coast Guard Reserve force levels
at 7,000.
n Recapitalizing shore infrastructure. Shore infrastructure,
which has been underfunded for decades, remains
a top unfunded priority. A $1.4 billion backlog of
improvements currently is being funded at only about
$30 million per year, for some infrastructure that is
already more than 100 years old. Additional funding is
needed now to avoid irreparable damage to facilities.
n Aviation and C4ISR/IT improvements. Continue
improvements, including:
n Support, including spare parts, for the HC-130J
long-range surveillance aircraft.
n Funding for C-27J spare parts, in addition to funding
for a C-27J simulator and continued activities of
the HC-27J Asset Project Office.
n Modernization and sustainment of the Coast Guard’s
fleet of HH-65 Dolphin helicopters, converting them
to MH-65 short-range recovery helicopters.
n Treating C4ISR/IT as capital assets and fund
accordingly.
n Investing in research, development, test & evaluation
(RDT&E) and innovation.
n RDT&E plays a crucial role in positioning the Coast
Guard for mission success both in the near term and
over the strategic planning horizon. RDT&E is a vital
element in Coast Guard decision making, ensuring
that the service maintains its readiness for existing
and future operational challenges, such as increased
activity in the Arctic, cyber security, technology
shifts, environmental incidents and natural disasters.
n Innovation is an emerging area among government
agencies, providing a means for leadership
to quickly use unconventional methods to address
gaps and challenges. The Coast Guard Innovation
Program seeks to create a culture of continuous
learning within the organization, where solutions
are shared rapidly across communities and geographic
areas. This “in-sourcing” of ideas provides
vital employee engagement and collaboration,
strengthening programs, requirements development
and the resolution of service challenges.
n Investing in an agile and technically proficient
workforce to meet emerging demands of maritime
commerce. Improvements should include:
n Acquisition of enterprise systems that support a
data-driven marine safety mission.
n Investment in marine infrastructure to improve
mariner situational awareness, including upgrades
to sensors, electronic aids-to-navigation and
marine infrastructure support units such as river
tenders and domestic icebreakers.
n An increase in the number of contingency planners
and MTS Response Unit personnel.
n Growing a workforce with specialized skills and
training to meet the ever-increasing complexity of
technology used by the maritime industry while striving
to reduce shipping’s environmental footprint.
2017-2018 MARITIME POLICY 21

THE U.S.-FLAG
MERCHANT MARINE
The National Security Directive on Sealift states,
“Sealift is essential both to executing this
country’s defense strategy and to maintaining
a wartime economy. … The United States’
national sealift objective is to ensure that
sufficient military and civil maritime resources
will be available to meet defense deployments
and essential economic requirements in support
of our national security strategy. … The
U.S.-owned commercial ocean carrier industry,
to the extent it is capable, will be relied upon
to provide sealift in peace, crisis and war. This
capability will be augmented during crisis and
war by reserve fleets comprised of ships with
national defense features that are not available
in sufficient numbers or types in the active
U.S.-owned commercial industry.”
This sealift capacity is dependent on having a sufficiently
large oceangoing U.S.-flag fleet operating in foreign and
domestic trades with an adequate pool of skilled U.S. Mer -
chant Mariners to crew each commercial and governmentowned
reserve sealift vessel. Although promulgated in
1989, this policy remains relevant today. However, there
are now serious challenges to meeting its objectives.
Commercial U.S.-flag vessels engaged in international
trade, and the Navy’s and Maritime Administration’s
(MARAD’s) reserve sealift fleets, are under economic and
fiscal pressures that are impacting their long-term ability
to surge and support our naval forces in a crisis.
While the domestic (Jones Act) component of the U.S.-
flag fleet is stabilizing because of recent recapitalization
of ships in the Hawaii and Puerto Rico trades, and the
new tankers being added to transport shale oil, the number
of non-Jones Act U.S. vessels in international trade
has declined by nearly 25 percent, from 106 to 78, over
the last four years. This is primarily the result of a 50
percent decline in government-impelled cargo revenue
since 2012 due to reduced military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and legislation that reduced cargo preference
requirements for food aid and challenges related to
uniform implementation of cargo preference across federal
activities.
Additionally, the deactivation of Maritime Prepositioning
Squadron One and the reduction of Army prepositioning
ships reduced the number of seagoing billets. These losses
of “blue-water” U.S.-flag vessels since January 2010
have resulted in a loss of more than 2,800 mariner jobs.
MARAD assesses that we no longer can crew all U.S.-flag
commercial and government reserve sealift vessels for a
sustained period of more than six months. Additionally,
budget sequestration and continuing resolutions negatively
impact the funding provided to support U.S.-flag
vessels operating in international trade and the readiness
of the federal government reserve sealift fleets.
Although funding for the 60-ship Maritime Security
Program (MSP) and other MARAD initiatives has been
mostly restored through budget compromises over the
last four years, future years’ funding is uncertain due to
continuing resolutions and the Budget Control Act funding
caps that return in 2018. Funding for MARAD’s Ready
Reserve Force (RRF) of 46 vessels and MSC’s 15 reduced
operating status vessels has been declining, and even
greater reductions after fiscal 2017 are likely if sequestration
is reimposed, much like those proposed for 2014
before the budget compromise. This could reduce reserve
sealift readiness and capacity below levels that would
fully meet the CCDRs’ operations plans for major deployment
of ground forces, which call for 95 percent of unit
equipment and sustaining supplies to be moved by strategic
sealift. Reduced funding will decrease the number
of mariners employed on these vessels, and without adequate
sealift and sealift manning, mission capability will
be compromised.
Another issue with the RRF is the advanced age of most
of its vessels, now averaging more than 41 years. Without
substantial increases to future shipbuilding budgets,
the Navy will not have sufficient construction funds to
recapitalize these ships during the next decade, when
they reach the end of their expected service lives. While
some of these ships can have their lives extended five or
10 years, they eventually will need to be replaced. One
alternative recently explored by the Navy was the option
of supporting the development of coastwise services of
dual-use vessels (commercial ships with military utility).
These commercial ships would alleviate congestion, road
wear and pollution along the I-5/I-95/I-10 corridors in
peacetime by carrying domestic 53-foot tractor trailers/
boxes along these American Marine Highways, while also
being quickly available to support a major deployment of
military equipment through participation in the Voluntary
Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) program. This program,
in which all MSP vessels and at least 50 percent
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NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

of the Jones Act fleet participate, fulfills the intent of the
National Sealift policy that commercial ships have priority
in meeting sealift requirements.
Beyond the availability of sealift shipping, the training
of U.S. mariners is a critical issue. Even though the
number of ships has been declining, the demographics of
the Merchant Mariners crewing them and the demands
of the offshore oil and inland waterway industries have
resulted in a robust demand for graduates of the U.S.
Merchant Marine Academy, the six state maritime academies
and industry training schools. Fewer training billets
afloat and aging training ships at the state maritime
academies are making it increasingly difficult to provide
these new entrants the required sea time to meet the
increased licensing and certification requirements when
the International Maritime Organization Standards for
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping go into effect on
Jan. 1, 2017. The academies need five new training vessels,
the first delivered by 2020, that will prepare them for
their role in the maritime community.
The Navy League of
the United States supports:
n The Jones Act. Vessels in domestic waterborne trade
are required to be owned by U.S. citizens, built in
the United States, U.S. flagged and crewed by U.S.
mariners. The Jones Act keeps American shipping
companies, shipyards, mariners and thousands of
people working. Since it provides for the majority of
oceangoing ships under the U.S. flag, any weakening
of the Jones Act would weaken national and economic
security by diminishing the seafaring and shipbuilding
industrial bases. Additionally, eliminating the Jones
Act would create an enormous and costly burden on
the Coast Guard and Customs and Boarder Protection
to ensure foreign mariners are properly vetted at
hundreds of inland waterway locations to preclude
homeland security incidents.
n The Maritime Security Program. The 60-vessel MSP,
authorized through fiscal 2025, provides the foundation
to support the U.S. commercial fleet operating in the
international trade and an economically viable U.S.-flag
Merchant Marine for national defense and economic
security. Sustaining the MSP fleet component of VISA
for future surge and sustainment operations requires
full, long-term funding for program stability, including
continued exemption from sequestration, even during
continuing resolutions. Additionally, to help compensate
for further reductions in military and other preference
cargoes and ensure continued economic viability,
Congress has authorized increasing the payment closer
to the full extra cost of U.S.-flag operation, estimated
to be between $5 million and $7 million annually.
Congress now needs to appropriate at least $5 million
per year per ship ($300 million total) to keep these
ships under the U.S. flag since ship operators cannot
sustain losses indefinitely. This is critical since the MSP
fleet makes up 80 percent of the total U.S.-flag commercial
fleet in foreign trade, with only about a dozen
other ships supported only by preference cargoes.
n A National Maritime Transportation Strategy. This
is MARAD’s initiative to develop a national strategy
focusing on cargo, readiness, infrastructure and
advocacy that will recommend legislation, regulatory
and policy changes to reverse the decline in the U.S.
Merchant Marine, especially the U.S.-flag fleet operating
in international trade and to support the wider
U.S. maritime industry, from shipbuilding to port
infrastructure.
n Funding for the RRF and MSC’s reduced operating
service fleets. This must be sufficient to ensure these
fleets match CCDR readiness and capacity requirements
to rapidly deploy ground forces in support of a major
contingency.
n U.S. cargo-preference laws. These laws include the
DoD, other government agencies and foreign aid
preference cargoes. Full compliance by government
agencies and shippers needs to be enforced through
rulemaking or new legislation to ensure the long-term
sustainability of the U.S.-flag fleet. Restoration of the
requirement that 75 percent of the Food-for-Peace cargoes
be carried on U.S.-flag ships is strongly supported
to increase the number of U.S.-flag ships and the mariners
needed to operate them. Additionally, restoring
the full loan guarantee authorities of the Export-
Import Bank is critical for the economic survival of
several U.S.-flag ships in foreign commerce as projects
financed by the bank are shipped under the U.S. flag.
n Export of a percentage of liquefied natural gas and
crude oil on U.S.-built, U.S.-flag ships. This will help
stem the decline of U.S. shipping in foreign trade and
provide additional work for U.S. shipyards.
n Budgetary and legislative measures that preclude
capital and operations-related changes in the application
of U.S. tax laws. This is to counter IRS advice that
land components of intermodal transport activities do
not qualify as “qualified shipping activities” under the
Tonnage Tax law, and that MSP payments are subject
to regular corporate rates of taxation, which could
seriously impact the cost to operate vessels under the
U.S. flag, jeopardizing their economic viability.
2017-2018 MARITIME POLICY 23

U.S. NAVY
A Merchant Mariner aboard the fast sealift ship SS Capella takes a reading on gauges in the engine room as the ship was underway in the Pacific Sept. 30,
2016, to conduct a 120-hour turbo activation. The U.S. Transportation Command conducts turbo activation to measure personnel and material readiness
of the selected Ready Reserve Force. Capella, more than 40 years old, still is among the fastest cargo ships in the world.
n The repeal of current Internal Revenue Code language.
This is so Capital Construction Fund deposits and
earnings are treated the same way for purposes of the
corporate alternative minimum tax, as they are under
the regular corporate income tax, helping to expand
U.S. shipping by making the financing of U.S. ship
construction less expensive.
n The maritime academies. Full funding, at authorized
levels, is needed to meet the operational and maintenance
requirements and capital improvements at the
U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and federal assistance
at the six state maritime academies for the Student
Incentive Program.
n Training ships. Recapitalization of five trainings ships
for the state maritime academies, through the National
Security Multi-mission Vessel (NSMV) Program, to
be initiated by fiscal 2017, as the current fleet begins
to reach or exceed economic service life in 2020.
Initial funding of $50 million in fiscal 2017, followed
by funding for one ship a year, will ensure the longterm
capacity to train licensed mariners to serve the
nation’s maritime requirements.
n A strong strategic sealift officer component in the
U.S. Navy Reserve. This would ensure that critical
skills and experience are retained to support Navy and
sealift transportation and to provide a backup pool of
licensed mariners.
n A robust Military-to-Mariner program. This would
facilitate the transition of former Army, Navy and Coast
Guard Sailors/Mariners to certificated/licensed Merchant
Mariner positions to help address projected shortfalls.
n World War II Mariners. Legislation for the Department
of Veterans Affairs to treat Merchant Marine veterans
of World War II as they do all other veterans.
n Dual-use vessels. The Navy and MARAD should
actively work to operationalize the concept of the
dual-use vessel on America’s Marine Highways for
recapitalizing the RRF, or to propose another viable
alternative, by developing and implementing legislative
and policy changes for enactment in fiscal 2017.
n Considering consolidation of all MARAD program
authorizations in the NDAA and appropriations in the
Defense Appropriation Bill. This would ensure that
MARAD’s programs are properly funded to meet national
security requirements, including Title XI, NSMV, R&D,
etc. The current arrangement results in a fragmented
program execution and insufficient resources.
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THE MARINE
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
The U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS)
consists of waterways, ports and their intermodal
connections, vessels and vehicles. The
more than 40,000 American-built, Americancrewed
vessels operating in domestic maritime
transportation contribute more than $100
billion per year to the U.S. economy. These
vessels move more than 1 billion tons of
cargo annually and create 500,000 direct jobs.
Additionally, annual taxes generated by the
domestic fleet top $11.5 billion.
As one of the world’s trade leaders, the United States
requires a technologically advanced, secure, efficient and
environmentally sound MTS. Our economic prosperity is
dependent on international trade, of which more than 99
percent of overseas trade, by weight (excluding Canada and
Mexico), moves by water. Roughly $2 trillion of trade flows
through U.S. ports. Trade flowing through the nation’s
ports and waterways is expected to increase substantially
by 2030, creating greater congestion on overburdened land,
port, water, passenger and freight delivery systems. Only a
truly seamless, integrated, multimodal transportation system
with an expanded America’s Marine Highway (AMH)
system as part of the National Freight Strategic Plan and
associated National Maritime Transportation Strategy will
meet the nation’s growing needs.
The Navy League of
the United States supports:
n Incorporating marine highway corridors, connectors
and state freight systems as part of the National
Freight Strategic Plan to improve infrastructure and
developing AMH vessels to expand the use of waterways
for freight and passengers.
n MARAD’s “green” programs, with resources to promote
sustainability throughout the MTS, including
research and technology in areas such as ballast water,
port and vessel emissions, alternate fuels and energy
management.
n An exemption from the Harbor Maintenance Tax for
waterborne cargo that is transshipped or shipped
between U.S. ports. This is a double tax on imports
because taxes also are paid when imports first land in
the United States, and it is a significant disincentive
for increased domestic waterborne transport.
n Additional resources for the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers’ dredging and new construction projects,
such as a second Poe-sized lock on the Great Lakes,
and for the U.S. Coast Guard to upgrade aids to navigation
in river and harbor channels that connect U.S.
ports to the world. The Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund
(HMTF), resourced from the Harbor Maintenance Tax
(fees of about $1.7 billion a year), was intended to pay
for the construction and maintenance of harbor and
navigation channels and aids when it was developed in
1986. While recent legislation has authorized increasing
expenditures to 100 percent of funds received in the
HMTF over the next eight years, recent appropriations
and budget submissions have not always met targets.
Appropriation of the full authorization is mandatory
since there are billions of dollars in project backlogs,
including urgent investments to accommodate the
larger ships using the expanded Panama Canal.
n Use of the Inland Waterway Trust Fund to repair/replace
aging infrastructure on the inland waterway system.
The system is capable of carrying huge additional
amounts of freight and petroleum products at a fraction
of the cost of other modes of transport. Any increased
revenue generated for this fund needs to be invested
in reducing the billions of dollars in backlogged maintenance
to upgrade/replace much of the obsolete and
unreliable river lock-and-dam infrastructure.
n Increased investment in maritime research and development
on par with other modes of transportation.
n Funding for the Title XI Federal Ship Financing
Program to support recapitalization of Jones Act
tonnage and new capacity to meet the AMH shipping
needs. There are several hundred million dollars in
pending and expected applications for new vessel construction
in U.S. shipyards that cannot be fully funded.
At least $30 million is needed now, followed by about
$30 million in annual appropriations to keep up with
the expected demand.
n Priority access to terminals, vessel berths and staging
areas at the 17 commercial strategic ports for
military cargo that support the short-notice military
surge deployments under the National Port Readiness
Network.
2017-2018 MARITIME POLICY 25

n Efforts to develop a national capacity for the MTS to
recover from major disruptions to ensure the continuity
of key maritime activities. This should include
the maintenance of a robust U.S. salvage vessel and oil
spill recovery capability to ensure expeditious clearing
of vital channels and harbors.
n Increased share of grants for funding intermodal and
freight-related maritime projects from provisions
in the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act
and in the Transportation Investment Generating
Economic Recovery Act. These grants, and the credit
assistance provided through DOT’s Transportation
Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act program,
can help improve the movement of freight through
ports and reduce congestion.
PERSONNEL POLICIES
As the high demand for sea services support
across the globe continues at an extraordinarily
high level, inadequate budgets,
continuing budget resolutions and sequestration
jeopardize the readiness of our maritime
forces. Our Navy personnel often are deploying
for up to nine months away from their homeport.
Marines are deploying at a rate that far
exceeds the 1:3 deploy-to-dwell ratio that
is needed to keep them highly effective. The
demands on Coast Guard personnel continue
at a high pace since 9/11. The number of
Merchant Mariners available to man our MSP
and Federal Reserve Sealift ships in time of
war continue to fall short of what is required.
Not only do much of the services’ equipment require repair
and replacement, but we also must continue to attract,
train and retain intelligent, highly motivated and capable
men and women. An all-volunteer force that continues
as the premier fighting force in the world must not see
its leaders repeat history by ignoring the needs of our
warfighters. Our warfighters must receive adequate pay
raises in accordance with the 2003 law that ties military
pay raises to private-sector growth; high-quality support
infrastructure, such as housing, commissary and exchange
availability; and modern office and classroom facilities.
Additionally, we must recognize the deleterious effects of
reduced training time and resources, as well as extended
deployment periods and reduced dwell time for our service
men and women. These effects are exacerbated by
continuing resolutions and sequestration. Recruiting and
retention are dependent on compensation, health-care
benefits, retirement and quality of life to attract and retain
dedicated and qualified professionals, while training and
education are mandatory for operational readiness.
Navy manning should be set at 321,000 personnel if the
Navy is to fight and win in major combat operations as
well as succeed in irregular warfare, humanitarian assistance
and disaster response. Additionally, ship deployment
schedules should not exceed the nominal six-month cycle,
with sufficient downtime and training periods provided
before the next deployment cycle to assure the effectiveness
of our Sailors when sailing in harm’s way.
The Marine Corps’ active-duty end strength is a minimum
of 182,000, and a Selective Marine Corps Reserve
end strength of at least 38,500 is critical to ensure that the
Marines are able to reshape the post-drawdown force such
that it remains fully capable, with a 1:2 deploy-to-dwell
ratio and a goal of a 1:3 ratio, and is ready to respond when
called across the range of military operations.
The Coast Guard is a critical component of our country’s
national defense capability. Since 9/11, Coast Guard
manning has fallen short of what is required to support
the mission-rich environment into which the service has
been thrust. The Coast Guard must have sufficient personnel
resources so it can safely and proficiently execute
these evolving missions, while maintaining its core competencies.
The Coast Guard manning should be set and
maintained at 42,069 military personnel.
The national imperative to correctly size the maritime
forces and avoid a weakened force after more than a
decade of war requires the will of the American people,
the presi dent and Congress to commit the necessary
resources. Reducing the number of personnel and continued
reductions in providing for their basic needs, force
recapitalization and operations, while expecting to recruit
as well as retain the men and women in the sea services,
is not consistent with this national imperative of having a
strong sea service force at the tip of the spear. Sea service
personnel are not being recognized for their extreme value
to this nation.
Our men and women in uniform make up the finest fighting
force in the world. It is critical that the next generation
of Sailors, Marines, Coast Guard men and women, and
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NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

Merchant Mariners be prepared to face the challenges ahead
and excel as leaders. Supporting youth programs such as
the Naval Sea Cadet Corps, Navy League Cadet Corps, Young
Marines and Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps is an
investment in our nation’s future. There must be a concerted
effort to achieve excellence in all areas of educating
and training America’s youth, particularly in the areas of
science, technology, engineering and math (STEM).
The Navy League of
the United States supports:
n Recruiting and retention policies that ensure adequate
personnel for the current and future operational tempo
to support the war on terrorism and natural/man-made
disaster response, while ensuring the readiness to fight
and win in a major combat operation.
n Authorized end strength for the Navy of 321,000
active-duty personnel.
n Authorized end strength for the Coast Guard of 42,069
active-duty personnel.
n Authorized end strength for the Marines of a minimum
of 182,000 active-duty personnel.
n Unencumbered training, including being provided the
material and equipment necessary to accomplish the
training necessary to meet the demands of full-scale
combat and irregular warfare.
n Sufficient funding for education and training of
Merchant Mariners to ensure an adequate pool of
skilled personnel for the commercial maritime industry
and military strategic sealift activities.
n Adequate funding to properly maintain and improve
the shore infrastructure to support current and future
missions.
n Continuing care for our wounded warriors throughout
the duration of their physical and/or psychological
infirmity. The nation’s responsibility to those who are
wounded in its service does not end when the emergent,
or secondary, medical support is completed.
Many, if not most, of our wounded veterans will bear
the scars of their wounds — mentally and physically —
for the rest of their lives. The Marine Corps’ Wounded
Warrior Regiment and the Navy’s Safe Harbor Program
provide the type of assistance our wounded/injured
Marines, Sailors and Coast Guard men and women need
to recover from the trauma of war. The Navy League
endorses full support of these programs.
U.S. NAVY
Petty Officer 1st Class Martin Wright, assigned to Navy Reserve Fleet
Combat Camera Pacific (FCCP), uses a saw to cut rebar during FCCP’s
Winter Quick Shot Nov. 15, 2016, in Azusa, Calif. Quick Shot is a biannual
exercise that provides live-fire and scenario-based training to combined
joint combat camera assets.
n TRICARE programs that ensure the continued medical
care promised to our warriors and their families.
n Programs for educating and motivating America’s youth
to achieve the highest standards of personal excellence,
moral integrity, patriotism and mental and physical fitness.
Among the top priorities in this area is increased
support for the U.S. Naval Sea Cadet Corps, as well as
the Navy Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), the
Navy and Marine Corps Junior ROTC, Young Marines
and maritime-related high school programs.
n Military Officers Association of America legislative
efforts for the services to preclude another hollowedout
force like the United States experienced in the
1980s and ’90s.
n Providing incentives for Navy active-duty/ Selected
Reserve health-care professionals and nuclear-trained
professionals to join or remain in the service.
2017-2018 MARITIME POLICY 27

U.S. NAVY
Sailors and Marines man the rails aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Makin Island as it departs Naval Base San Diego Oct. 14, 2016, for a Western
Pacific deployment. Makin Island, the flagship of the Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group, deployed with the embarked 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit
in support of the Navy’s maritime strategy in the U.S. Third, Fifth and Seventh Fleet areas of responsibility.
CONCLUSION
The Navy League is committed to educating
the senior leadership in the executive and
legislative branches of the U.S. government,
the media and the American people about
the critical importance of the Navy, Marine
Corps, Coast Guard and U.S.-flag Merchant
Marine as they protect our national interests
throughout the world. The combination of
partnership and presence are keys to our success
in the future.
Our National Defense Strategy must be designed around
the threats we face today, and the uncertain world in
which we live. We believe strongly that letting budget
drive strategy is a mistake when considering how our
economic prosperity and national security are inextricably
tied to free and open access to the seas. The risks are
undeniable if we do not fund the sea services at a level
that enables the nation to sustain the readiness of our
operating forces. Most importantly, we must have the
appropriate number of ships to accomplish the myriad
missions that our naval forces are called on to perform.
We must not break faith with the men and women who
have sworn an oath to protect and defend our nation. To
preserve the quality of the all-volunteer force and not
break faith with the nation’s volunteers, we must give
them the tools they need to be successful.
The Navy League of the United States believes that we
must always ensure our armed forces are ready to fight
and win our nation’s wars, deter those who would seek
to engage us and secure access to the global commons to
preserve freedom of navigation. Our recommendations are
made to ensure we have the very best sea services in the
world. As President Theodore Roosevelt, at whose encouragement
the Navy League was founded in 1902, once said,
“The Navy is the surest guarantor of peace which this
country possesses.”
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NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

NAVY LEAGUE MISSION
The Navy League of the United States is a nonprofit
organization dedicated to educating our citizens about
the importance of sea power to U.S. national security
and to supporting the men and women of the U.S.
Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and U.S.-flag
Merchant Marine and their families.

2 0 1 7 – 2 0 1 8 M A R I T I M E P O L I C Y
NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES
2300 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 200
Arlington, VA 22201-5424
703-528-1775
703-528-2333 (FAX)
www.navyleague.org