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Hack Everything…

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It sounds like an open and shut case, doesn’t it? There is only one problem. Almost every<br />

sentence in the above paragraph is false (kind of like the Vermont Power Grid story was<br />

false). But don’t take it from me. Here is a quote from security consultant Jeffrey Carr:<br />

“Problem #1: The IP address 176.31.112[.]10 used in the Bundestag breach as a<br />

Command and Control server has never been connected to the Russian intelligence<br />

services. In fact, Claudio Guarnieri, a highly regarded security researcher, whose<br />

technical analysis was referenced by Rid, stated that “no evidence allows to tie the<br />

attacks to governments of any particular country.”<br />

Problem #2: The Command & Control server (176.31.112.10) was using an outdated<br />

version of OpenSSL vulnerable to Heartbleed attacks. Heartbleed allows attackers to<br />

steal data including private keys, usernames, passwords and other sensitive information.<br />

The existence of a known security vulnerability that’s trivial to exploit opens the door to<br />

the possibility that the systems were used by one rogue group, and then infiltrated by a<br />

second rogue group, making attribution even more complicated.<br />

Problem #3: The BfV published a newsletter in January 2016 which assumes that the<br />

GRU and FSB are responsible because of technical indicators, not because of any<br />

classified finding; to wit: “It is assumed that both the Russian domestic intelligence<br />

service FSB and the military foreign intelligence service GRU run cyber operations.”<br />

https://medium.com/@jeffreycarr/can-facts-slow-the-dnc-breach-runaway-train-lets-try-<br />

14040ac68a55#.9o758bkf5<br />

But don’t take Jeffrey’s word for it. Let’s go to the source. This is the source document for<br />

the May 20 2015 German hack that was reported on June 19 2015 which thankfully was<br />

printed in English as my German is a little rusty. .<br />

https://netzpolitik.org/2015/digital-attack-on-german-parliament-investigative-report-onthe-hack-of-the-left-party-infrastructure-in-bundestag/<br />

Here is a quote from the report: “Attributes of one of the artifacts and intelligence<br />

gathered on the infrastructure operated by the attackers suggest that the attack was<br />

perpetrated by a state-sponsored group known as APT28. Previous work published by<br />

security vendor FireEye in October 2014 suggests the group might be of Russian origin.”<br />

So the author relies on the Fire Eye conclusion that APT 28 is Russian which in turn was<br />

based on the F Secure Report which in turn was based on easily changed time stamps.<br />

But it may be that the hacker of the German server was not Russian or American<br />

because the hacker made a very basic mistake. Here is the quote:<br />

“The Command & Control server (176.31.112.10) appears to be using an outdated<br />

version of OpenSSL and be vulnerable to Heartbleed attacks. The same C&C server<br />

might have been the subject of 3rd-party attacks due to this vulnerability.”<br />

Here is one more quote from the German report:<br />

“(German hack) Artifact #2 was compiled by the authors on April 22nd 2015, which<br />

suggests that the compromise may only have lasted a couple of weeks...Previous work<br />

by security vendor FireEye suggests the group might be of Russian origin, however no<br />

evidence allows us to tie the attacks to governments of any particular country.”<br />

<strong>Hack</strong> <strong>Everything…</strong> A Detailed Timeline of the DNC <strong>Hack</strong> Page 44

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