Rousseau_contrat-social

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Sovereign; that is to say, the larger the State, the more should the government be tightened, so that the number of the rulers diminish in proportion to the increase of that of the people. It should be added that I am here speaking of the relative strength of the government, and not of its rectitude: for, on the other hand, the more numerous the magistracy, the nearer the corporate will comes to the general will; while, under a single magistrate, the corporate will is, as I said, merely a particular will. Thus, what may be gained on one side is lost on the other, and the art of the legislator is to know how to fix the point at which the force and the will of the government, which are always in inverse proportion, meet in the relation that is most to the advantage of the State. 3. THE DIVISION OF GOVERNMENTS WE saw in the last chapter what causes the various kinds or forms of government to be distinguished according to the number of the members composing them: it remains in this to discover how the division is made. In the first place, the Sovereign may commit the charge of the government to the whole people or to the majority of the people, so that more citizens are magistrates than are mere private individuals. This form of government is called democracy. Or it may restrict the government to a small number, so that there are more private citizens than magistrates; and this is named aristocracy. Lastly, it may concentrate the whole government in the hands of a single magistrate from whom all others hold their power. This third form is the most usual, and is called monarchy, or royal government. It should be remarked that all these forms, or at least the first two, admit of degree, and even of very wide differences; for democracy may include the whole people, or may be restricted to half. Aristocracy, in its turn, may be restricted indefinitely from half the people down to the smallest possible number. Even royalty is susceptible of a measure 50
of distribution. Sparta always had two kings, as its constitution provided; and the Roman Empire saw as many as eight emperors at once, without it being possible to say that the Empire was split up. Thus there is a point at which each form of government passes into the next, and it becomes clear that, under three comprehensive denominations, government is really susceptible of as many diverse forms as the State has citizens. There are even more: for, as the government may also, in certain aspects, be subdivided into other parts, one administered in one fashion and one in another, the combination of the three forms may result in a multitude of mixed forms, each of which admits of multiplication by all the simple forms. There has been at all times much dispute concerning the best form of government, without consideration of the fact that each is in some cases the best, and in others the worst. If, in the different States, the number of supreme magistrates should be in inverse ratio to the number of citizens, it follows that, generally, democratic government suits small States, aristocratic government those of middle size, and monarchy great ones. This rule is immediately deducible from the principle laid down. But it is impossible to count the innumerable circumstances which may furnish exceptions. 4. DEMOCRACY HE who makes the law knows better than any one else how it should be executed and interpreted. It seems then impossible to have a better constitution than that in which the executive and legislative powers are united; but this very fact renders the government in certain respects inadequate, because things which should be distinguished are confounded, and the prince and the Sovereign, being the same person, form, so to speak, no more than a government without government. It is not good for him who makes the laws to execute them, or for the body of the people to turn its attention away from a general standpoint 51
Page 1 and 2: y Jean Jacques Rousseau THE SOCIAL
Page 3 and 4: THE most ancient of all societies,
Page 5 and 6: not of will -- at the most, an act
Page 7 and 8: indemnity is possible. Such a renun
Page 9 and 10: master, except to obey him as far a
Page 11 and 12: fundamental problem of which the So
Page 13 and 14: others, provided the contract is no
Page 15 and 16: distinguish natural liberty, which
Page 17 and 18: ulers of men than as masters of a c
Page 19 and 20: offers no opposition. In such a cas
Page 21 and 22: the general will; the latter consid
Page 23 and 24: guide us. Indeed, as soon as a ques
Page 25 and 26: fight battles at the peril of their
Page 27 and 28: leads. But I feel my heart protesti
Page 29 and 30: laws, no matter what the form of it
Page 31 and 32: into its constitution; it is an ind
Page 33 and 34: philosophy or the blind spirit of f
Page 35 and 36: constitution of a State to be at it
Page 37 and 38: 10. THE PEOPLE (continued) A BODY p
Page 39 and 40: for a man to bear; one which can do
Page 41 and 42: their influence, the constitution w
Page 43 and 44: We have seen that the legislative p
Page 45 and 46: When I say the relation increases,
Page 47 and 48: assemblies, councils, power and del
Page 49: and as the absolute force of the go
Page 53 and 54: But, for want of the necessary dist
Page 55 and 56: Sovereign each in his own departmen
Page 57 and 58: We found, on general grounds, that
Page 59 and 60: Everything conspires to take away f
Page 61 and 62: Simple government is better in itse
Page 63 and 64: labour, should remain desert and un
Page 65 and 66: clothes; where they clothe themselv
Page 67 and 68: citizens increase and multiply most
Page 69 and 70: SUCH is the natural and inevitable
Page 71 and 72: Macedonian and the Frankish, had si
Page 73 and 74: the body politic and the curb on th
Page 75 and 76: functions of the people, and that i
Page 77 and 78: It has been held that this act of e
Page 79 and 80: egular. It is impossible to set up
Page 81 and 82: BOOK IV 1. THAT THE GENERAL WILL IS
Page 83 and 84: 2. VOTING IT may be seen, from the
Page 85 and 86: still reside in the majority: when
Page 87 and 88: democracy is only an ideal. When ch
Page 89 and 90: divided into fifteen cantons. Subse
Page 91 and 92: included the rich, the last the poo
Page 93 and 94: a matter of policy. Thus, the comit
Page 95 and 96: and passed their plebiscita. The se
Page 97 and 98: 5. THE TRIBUNATE WHEN an exact prop
Page 99 and 100: space of time which circumstances s
Page 101 and 102:
Instead, the senate contented itsel
Page 103 and 104:
Romans, and still more by the Laced
Page 105 and 106:
Finally, when, along with their emp
Page 107 and 108:
particular, may also be divided int
Page 109 and 110:
does his duty, indeed, but does it
Page 111 and 112:
Sovereign’s business to take cogn
Page 113 and 114:
same Cato wrote to his son telling
Page 115 and 116:
otherwise his laws would not have b
Page 117 and 118:
flourished have been too much admir
Page 119 and 120:
history then confirms, instead of i
Page 121 and 122:
of sacrilege, and not the conquest
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Rousseau_contrat-social

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