The Colombian Peace Agreement (EN)

violence – and through other means, and speculations regarding the ongoing negotiations
between the government and the ELN (National Liberation Army – the second
largest guerrilla group in Colombia) along with the political deadlock resulting from
the 2014 elections and exacerbated by the campaign that led to the referendum.
FARC unity
The FARC leadership “made adjustments to its 30-person negotiating team at different
points, most notably inviting members from the Southern Bloc, which helped to
dispel rumors that this large unit, believed to be heavily involved in drug trafficking,
was not represented at” – and hence not supportive of – “the peace talks”. 99 Nevertheless,
a source of great concern has been “whether the FARC negotiating team
represents and speaks for the various FARC forces dispersed around Colombia. In
other words, can the FARC negotiating team ‘deliver’ the decentralized organization
or at least most of the FARC fronts? Reportedly, the FARC is divided into seven regional
blocs made up of 67 fighting fronts. Many fronts are deeply involved in illicit
businesses, such as drug trafficking and illegal mining, and may not willingly give
up these profitable ventures”. 100 “The talks may reveal a possible generational divide
within the FARC. The older ideological members may be loyal to the Secretariat that
is represented in Havana, while other younger and mid-level members may have only
known life in the jungle or remote rural areas financed by drug profits or other illegal
activities”. 101 This could have been a dangerous combination: Colombian conflict
analysis centers had identified a few fronts occupying areas neighboring Panama and
Venezuela as the most newly-formed, more actively involved in drug trafficking and
with alleged links to transnational criminal network, hence most likely to oppose the
deal. “Various commentators have speculated about which FARC fronts will turn in
their arms and demobilize, and which may demobilize but return to illicit activities
afterward (much like the Bacrim) or never accept the demobilization terms in the first
place”. 102 On July 6 th , the 1 st Front had announced it would not demobilize as part of a
peace deal with the Colombian government. The unit is one of the biggest and most
important within the FARC, and has justified its refusal with ideological motives. Local
newspapers, citing military intelligence sources, stated the unit has 100 armed men
and a further 300 militia members, and has reportedly been responsible for violating
unilateral FARC ceasefires in the past. 103
As set by the agenda agreed upon during the signature of the deal, the FARC has
convened a National Conference of the Guerrillas, the tenth (and probably last) of
such conferences but surely the most important one, since it has certified the end
of the FARC as an armed organization and the birth of the group as a political party.
The congress has also served as a mechanism of approval of the agreements by the
FARC base, like an internal plebiscite, and has gathered some 600 commanders from
all ranks from September 17 th to September 23 rd . 104 In this venue, the leadership has
confirmed its control over the different fronts, the event has registered significant
enthusiasm and a visible shift from previous editions. 105 At issue were estimates of the
percentage of FARC troops that would demobilize if peace accords were approved.
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