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STRATEGIC ISSUES FRIDAY,<br />

MARCH 1, <strong>2019</strong><br />

5<br />

As Tokyo rearms, what are the politics of military power in Japan?<br />

Photo: Mosiase<br />

The politics around Japan's military power<br />

catherine Putz<br />

How does Japan balance its avowedly pacifist<br />

constitution and its technologically sophisticated and<br />

growing Self-Defense Forces against rising regional<br />

threats? How do Japan's neighbors, South Korea and<br />

China, in particular, view the rearming of Japan? And<br />

while Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is labeled a<br />

right-wing nationalist, what do the Japanese people<br />

think about shifting security trends and the future of<br />

the island's defense?<br />

Sheila Smith, senior fellow for Japan studies at the<br />

Council on Foreign Relations and author of the<br />

upcoming book Japan Rearmed: The Politics of<br />

Military Power, offers answers to some of these<br />

questions. Smith emphasizes that in developing its<br />

military capabilities Japan is responding to a complex<br />

regional situation and an uncertain future.<br />

Early on, Japan's political leaders established that<br />

the right of self-defense was inherent in the UN<br />

Charter and thus Japan, too, would be able to develop<br />

the capability to defend itself. This was established in<br />

How far the Chinese mega-project BRI trekked so far. Photo: Collected<br />

Let's examine the<br />

progress of China's<br />

Belt and Road<br />

Prashanth Parameswaran<br />

With just a few weeks more to go<br />

until the next Belt and Road<br />

Initiative (BRI) summit China,<br />

expected in April, it is clear that the<br />

BRI continues to suffer some serious<br />

setbacks even as Beijing continues to<br />

try to lock in additional wins. Yet at<br />

the same time, as BRI continues to<br />

develop in the lead up to and after<br />

the upcoming summit, one should<br />

be wary of overestimating or<br />

misreading any sort of "pushback"<br />

against BRI. Among other things, an<br />

overly narrow focus on BRI<br />

"pushback" can distort the wide<br />

range of responses we have seen<br />

thus far from regional states;<br />

misread the motivations at play<br />

inherent in readjustments or<br />

reconsiderations countries may<br />

make along the way; and place the<br />

emphasis too much on just<br />

temporary pushbacks rather than<br />

the structural and strategic changes<br />

that need to be made to contend<br />

with how regional states can better<br />

manage the opportunities and<br />

challenges of economically engaging<br />

China.<br />

First, though the focus is often on<br />

BRI "pushback," that is in fact just<br />

one position within a range of very<br />

complex responses by countries<br />

ranging from support to opposition<br />

that vary on different counts<br />

including level of intensity.<br />

Emerging responses from countries<br />

like Japan, which has actively<br />

offered alternatives to China's BRI<br />

even as it engages with it; or<br />

Myanmar, where Beijing has<br />

worked tirelessly with the<br />

government in Naypyidaw to make<br />

progress on parts of the China-<br />

Myanmar Economic Corridor<br />

(CMEC) in spite of earlier concerns,<br />

offer cautionary notes about<br />

oversimplistically characterizing<br />

responses to such a large scale<br />

initiative that involves so many<br />

different players.<br />

This is an important point to keep<br />

in mind. A range of factors including<br />

BRI's still amorphous shape - where<br />

old projects are at times being<br />

grandfathered in to seem like new<br />

developments and commitments by<br />

countries can be in the form of<br />

rhetorical support and symbolic<br />

MOUs rather than substantive<br />

cooperation actually followed<br />

through - means that responses will<br />

tend to be more complex and<br />

nuanced than a simple "pushback"<br />

or "embrace." A myopic focus on just<br />

the more extreme manifestations of<br />

the pushback aspect can distort the<br />

region's response and underestimate<br />

the BRI's longer-term potential as a<br />

tool of Chinese statecraft.<br />

Second, to the extent that there is<br />

"pushback," the motivations for this<br />

subset of responses are often quite<br />

diverse, with some being more<br />

project-specific or domestic-focused<br />

rather than the geopolitical<br />

imperatives often attributed to<br />

them. There ought to be a clear<br />

distinction made, for instance,<br />

between<br />

project-specific<br />

readjustments from Pakistan with<br />

respect to the China-Pakistan<br />

Economic Corridor (CPEC);<br />

recalibration with a change in<br />

government in Malaysia following<br />

the perceived excesses under former<br />

Prime Minister Najib Razak; and the<br />

caution of a more strategic and<br />

lasting kind shown by Vietnam<br />

which continues to keep BRI at a<br />

distance.<br />

The differences in motivations<br />

here, to the extent they can be<br />

discerned, is important. In addition<br />

to more correctly representing the<br />

myriad drivers behind why certain<br />

the Diet committee that reviewed the draft of the U.S.<br />

Occupation authorities, and so the postwar debate that<br />

followed after Japan regained sovereignty in 1952 was<br />

how to interpret what was necessary for self-defense.<br />

Diet debate over the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) law in<br />

1954 became the first place this was deliberated, and<br />

many of the basic issues Japanese still consider were<br />

raised then. But over time, as the SDF developed the<br />

capability to take over territorial defense missions<br />

from U.S. forces, debate blossomed into what sorts of<br />

things should define the military capability of the SDF.<br />

Over time, these debates shifted focus from what kinds<br />

of weapons were acceptable to what kind of missions<br />

the SDF could perform, and then to the possibility of<br />

SDF participation in international coalitions in the<br />

post-Cold War era (such as UN Peacekeeping<br />

Operations and post-9/11 U.S. coalitions in the Indian<br />

Ocean and now in the South China Sea). I trace this<br />

trajectory of deliberations in Japan Rearmed to show<br />

just how far Japan has come in thinking about the<br />

utility of its military as a partner in regional and global<br />

security.<br />

countries are responding the way<br />

they do, they can also shed better<br />

light on the extent to which we can<br />

expect to see continuity and change<br />

in regional responses amid various<br />

developments, including shifting<br />

domestic politics as well as Beijing's<br />

own ongoing efforts to refashion<br />

some of its BRI projects in countries<br />

that can be expected to continue<br />

after the April summit.<br />

Third, though countries may push<br />

back against BRI itself for now, it is<br />

still unclear whether this will also<br />

lead them to make the necessary<br />

changes to better manage such<br />

issues in the future and also limiting<br />

their broader economic relationship<br />

with Beijing as some may hope or<br />

assume. Though experiences such as<br />

the "debt traps" epitomized by Sri<br />

Lanka's Hambantota Port or<br />

the"dual use" dilemma at play it<br />

places such as Cambodia have<br />

emerged as cautionary tales for<br />

governments related to BRI, in<br />

many cases governments are still<br />

grappling with how to address these<br />

challenges and debates and<br />

discussions about short-, medium-,<br />

and long-term steps. As they are<br />

doing so, they are also continuing to<br />

engage Beijing beyond the BRI,<br />

including through other initiatives<br />

that are more welcome relatively<br />

speaking such as the Asia<br />

Infrastructure Investment Bank<br />

(AIIB).<br />

This point warrants careful<br />

attention in the months and years<br />

ahead. For all the focus on China,<br />

the concerns at play within BRI are<br />

also the product of factors evident in<br />

the countries Beijing is operating in<br />

as well, including a lack of<br />

transparency and accountability<br />

with respect to how project<br />

decisions are made, the perceived<br />

lack of alternatives in advancing<br />

economic development including<br />

infrastructure, and ongoing<br />

conversations about how to manage<br />

the opportunities and challenges of<br />

economic engagement with Beijing,<br />

including in some cases restrictions<br />

in certain areas such as<br />

telecommunications. Until these<br />

structural issues are addressed,<br />

individual projects may come under<br />

scrutiny, but the systemic risks will<br />

continue to remain and are likely to<br />

manifest in different ways.<br />

All this is not to say that we ought<br />

to dismiss or underestimate the<br />

pushback we have seen with respect<br />

to BRI so far, which is real. The<br />

point, rather, is that we should avoid<br />

being carried away by headlines<br />

narrowly focused on "pushback"<br />

against the BRI and continue to pay<br />

attention to the complex decisions,<br />

motives, and longer-term<br />

adjustments being made by regional<br />

states as well as China in the<br />

initiative as well as in its wider<br />

economic engagement. That<br />

broader perspective can not only<br />

provide a better understanding of<br />

how countries respond to BRI, but<br />

also potentially help shape these<br />

very calculations over time. As we<br />

see the focus on BRI ramp up ahead<br />

of the next BRI summit in China,<br />

that is worth keeping in mind.<br />

Tension looms in South Asia<br />

sudha ramachandran<br />

On February 26, the Indian Air Force<br />

(IAF) carried out an aerial strike on a<br />

Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) terror training<br />

camp in Balakot in Pakistan's Khyber-<br />

Pakhtunkhwa province. Unlike in<br />

September 2016, when Special Forces of<br />

the Indian Army carried out so-called<br />

surgical strikes on terrorist launch-pads<br />

near the Line of Control (LoC) in Pakistan<br />

Occupied Kashmir (POK) - the LoC is the<br />

de-facto line that divides the former<br />

princely state of Jammu and Kashmir<br />

(J&K) into POK and the Indian state of<br />

J&K - this time IAF jets went far into<br />

Pakistani airspace to destroy one of JeM's<br />

main training camps.<br />

Tuesday's strikes are the first to be<br />

launched deep into Pakistan territory since<br />

the 1971 India-Pakistan War. Even during<br />

the 1999 confrontation at Kargil, Indian<br />

fighter jets did not cross the LoC. The IAF's<br />

assault on the Balakot camp is therefore<br />

significant.<br />

An assault on JeM training camps was<br />

expected. Less than two weeks ago, a<br />

suicide bombing by JeM in Pulwama in<br />

J&K claimed the lives of more than 40<br />

paramilitary personnel. The attack<br />

triggered a wave of anger and outrage<br />

across India, with many calling on India's<br />

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led<br />

government to give Pakistan a "befitting<br />

response." Prime Minister Narendra Modi<br />

has also been promising to avenge the<br />

death of the security forces at Pulwama.<br />

With Indians scheduled to vote in<br />

general elections in April and May, the<br />

BJP, a right-wing party which espouses a<br />

muscular nationalism, was under pressure<br />

to respond militarily. The IAF strikes on<br />

the JeM training camp was the result.<br />

Pakistan-based JeM is labeled a terrorist<br />

group in India and India has been trying to<br />

get the United Nations Security Council to<br />

blacklist JeM's founder-leader, Masood<br />

Azhar. However, it hasn't succeeded in this<br />

endeavor, with China blocking its efforts.<br />

Between 1994 and 1999, Azhar was<br />

jailed in India for his terrorist activities in<br />

the Kashmir Valley. Then in December<br />

1999, India freed him in exchange for the<br />

safe return of passengers on board a<br />

hijacked Indian Airlines aircraft.<br />

In Pakistan, Azhar founded JeM with<br />

generous support from Pakistan's Inter-<br />

Services Intelligence (ISI) and since then<br />

the group has moved from strength to<br />

strength and carried out several attacks in<br />

India, including an attack on the Indian<br />

Parliament in December 2001 - an<br />

incident that brought India and Pakistan<br />

to the brink of war in 2002 - and on an IAF<br />

base at Pathankot in January 2016.<br />

Tuesday's IAF airstrike is reported to<br />

have destroyed a JeM training camp where<br />

hundreds of terrorists were staying.<br />

Among those reportedly killed in the strike<br />

was Azhar's brother-in-law, Yousuf Azhar,<br />

who masterminded the 1999 airplane<br />

hijacking. India claims that the air strikes<br />

eliminated a significant number of JeM<br />

fighters. But what has it achieved beyond<br />

that?<br />

The strikes delivered a "robust" message,<br />

an editorial in The Hindu, an influential<br />

English daily said. Certainly, the strike<br />

signaled to Pakistan that India will not<br />

hesitate to use force if it continues to<br />

support terrorist attacks targeting India.<br />

By targeting a terrorist camp, India has<br />

indicated also that it "doesn't want to go<br />

beyond [destroying Pakistan's] terror<br />

infrastructure," security analyst Uday<br />

Bhaskar has observed.<br />

However, Tuesday's strikes "are unlikely<br />

to have any enduring impact on the long<br />

term trajectory of Pakistan-backed<br />

terrorism," Ajai Sahni, counter-terrorism<br />

expert and Executive Director of the<br />

Institute for Conflict Management in New<br />

Delhi, told The Diplomat.<br />

The 2016 surgical strike did not reduce<br />

terrorist attacks in India. Rather it resulted<br />

in "an escalation of terrorism in J&K and<br />

increased firing" by Pakistan along the<br />

LoC, which resulted in scores of Indian<br />

soldiers and civilians losing their lives.<br />

It did serve the BJP's agenda well,<br />

however, Sahni says. And "Surgical Strikes<br />

2.0," as India's recent strikes are being<br />

referred to "can be expected to do precisely<br />

this," he added. The strikes are likely to<br />

Supporters wait for the start of a campaign rally of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun<br />

Sen's Cambodian People's Party in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Photo: Heng Sinith<br />

provide a shot in the arm to the BJP's<br />

electoral chances in the upcoming general<br />

elections. "In the immediate future, the<br />

impact [of the strikes] will probably be<br />

escalatory," Sahni said, adding that the<br />

Pakistani leadership is under pressure "as<br />

great as the pressure" that the Modi<br />

government was under to respond to the<br />

Pulwama attack. Pakistan's leadership is<br />

under pressure to respond to India's air<br />

strikes "immediately and visibly."<br />

In the coming days, Pakistan can be<br />

expected to further escalate cross-border<br />

firing and carry out terror attacks in J&K as<br />

well as other parts of India, Sahni said. The<br />

conflict is already escalating.<br />

Can Australia boom with a proactive<br />

immigration policy?<br />

Grant wyeth<br />

In recent decades the conventional<br />

narrative of global population has been<br />

one of continued growth and the stresses<br />

that this will place on the planet's<br />

resources. This narrative has been<br />

facilitated by consistent studies from the<br />

United Nations that predict that the<br />

world's population will rise from its<br />

present 7.7 billion to 11.2 billion by 2100.<br />

However a new book by the Globe and<br />

Mail's writer-at-large, John Ibbitson,<br />

and social researcher Darrell Brooker<br />

has questioned this narrative and the<br />

UN modeling that produced its global<br />

population boom forecasts. Instead, they<br />

argue, the world's population will top out<br />

just before reaching 9 billion people,<br />

before beginning to decline.<br />

The book - Empty Planet: The Shock of<br />

Global Population Decline - argues that<br />

the UN's model for predicting birthrates<br />

is too conservative, focusing only on the<br />

traditional factors of fertility, mobility,<br />

and mortality. These are factors have<br />

worked well for forecasts in the past, but<br />

fail to account for current trends that are<br />

producing a significant decline in birth<br />

rates worldwide.<br />

Brooker and Ibbitson argue that the<br />

UN is missing two current revolutions<br />

that are taking place across the world.<br />

The first is the rapid rise of urbanization,<br />

both in developed and developing<br />

countries. Life in urban areas is<br />

becoming increasingly advantageous<br />

and this phenomenon is exponential.<br />

The more people move to urban areas<br />

the more advantageous it is for others to<br />

do likewise. This has a considerable<br />

effect on population - in rural areas<br />

children are an important extra set of<br />

hands, but in urban areas children are<br />

more an extra mouth to feed, therefore<br />

reducing the incentive to have too many.<br />

The other phenomenon (which is<br />

facilitated by the first) is the increase in<br />

female education and female social<br />

power. In the book, the authors note that<br />

everywhere they visited for their<br />

research - whether it was wealthy<br />

Western cities, poor rural areas, or<br />

urban slums in developing countries -<br />

when they asked women how many<br />

children they would prefer to have if<br />

given the choice, the response was<br />

overwhelmingly only one or two. And<br />

across the world the ability for women to<br />

make this choice for themselves is<br />

becoming a new (and long overdue)<br />

social norm. This phenomenon is not<br />

only driven by access to formal<br />

education, but the informal education<br />

derived from urban social networks and<br />

the now ubiquitous access to<br />

smartphones that provide insights and<br />

aspirations for women beyond their local<br />

environments.<br />

Confirming the authors' thesis, a<br />

report by medical journal The Lancet<br />

from November 2018 (a study published<br />

after their book was written) has<br />

demonstrated that there is now a<br />

significant decline in global birth rates.<br />

While the UN's recent data for India<br />

states that it has a current birth rate of<br />

2.4 children per woman, The Lancet<br />

puts India's birth rate at 2.1. For a<br />

population the size of India that<br />

discrepancy is a considerable number of<br />

people (or lack thereof). India is now at<br />

the replacement level, and is joined there<br />

by other large countries such as<br />

Bangladesh, Iran, Brazil, and the<br />

Philippines. These countries are<br />

predicted to soon move to being below<br />

replacement level, which is where most<br />

of the developed countries in the West<br />

find themselves. Most significantly, this<br />

is also where China finds itself. The<br />

authors predict China could halve its<br />

population by the end of the century,<br />

becoming older and smaller before it<br />

reaches the wealth of the West, with<br />

considerable geopolitical ramifications.<br />

If the analysis of the book proves<br />

correct, then this presents an enormous<br />

opportunity for an immigrant accepting<br />

country like Australia. With Europe<br />

turning inward, and the United States<br />

potentially doing the same, the number<br />

of countries that are actively seeking to<br />

enhance their numbers through<br />

immigration are actually very few.<br />

Rather than see its relative power<br />

decline in relation to more populous<br />

countries in its neighborhood as has<br />

been predicted, Australia should be able<br />

to enhance its current economic,<br />

defense, and cultural capabilities to<br />

either preserve its influence, or even<br />

considerably increase it - as long as it is<br />

able to maintain (or boost) its current<br />

levels of immigration, and generate<br />

public acceptance of its migration<br />

program.<br />

Yet unlike a comparable country<br />

such as Canada, Australia doesn't<br />

have a strong public narrative<br />

advocating and explaining the<br />

benefits of immigration. The political<br />

class simply enacted a policy of<br />

substantial rates of immigration and<br />

then sat back and hoped that the<br />

public would adjust on its own.<br />

A declining global population will make the maintenance of Australia's immigration program the<br />

country's primary strategic asset.<br />

Photo : Jamie Davies

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