08-03-2019
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STRATEGIC ISSUES FRIDAY,<br />
MARCH 1, <strong>2019</strong><br />
5<br />
As Tokyo rearms, what are the politics of military power in Japan?<br />
Photo: Mosiase<br />
The politics around Japan's military power<br />
catherine Putz<br />
How does Japan balance its avowedly pacifist<br />
constitution and its technologically sophisticated and<br />
growing Self-Defense Forces against rising regional<br />
threats? How do Japan's neighbors, South Korea and<br />
China, in particular, view the rearming of Japan? And<br />
while Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is labeled a<br />
right-wing nationalist, what do the Japanese people<br />
think about shifting security trends and the future of<br />
the island's defense?<br />
Sheila Smith, senior fellow for Japan studies at the<br />
Council on Foreign Relations and author of the<br />
upcoming book Japan Rearmed: The Politics of<br />
Military Power, offers answers to some of these<br />
questions. Smith emphasizes that in developing its<br />
military capabilities Japan is responding to a complex<br />
regional situation and an uncertain future.<br />
Early on, Japan's political leaders established that<br />
the right of self-defense was inherent in the UN<br />
Charter and thus Japan, too, would be able to develop<br />
the capability to defend itself. This was established in<br />
How far the Chinese mega-project BRI trekked so far. Photo: Collected<br />
Let's examine the<br />
progress of China's<br />
Belt and Road<br />
Prashanth Parameswaran<br />
With just a few weeks more to go<br />
until the next Belt and Road<br />
Initiative (BRI) summit China,<br />
expected in April, it is clear that the<br />
BRI continues to suffer some serious<br />
setbacks even as Beijing continues to<br />
try to lock in additional wins. Yet at<br />
the same time, as BRI continues to<br />
develop in the lead up to and after<br />
the upcoming summit, one should<br />
be wary of overestimating or<br />
misreading any sort of "pushback"<br />
against BRI. Among other things, an<br />
overly narrow focus on BRI<br />
"pushback" can distort the wide<br />
range of responses we have seen<br />
thus far from regional states;<br />
misread the motivations at play<br />
inherent in readjustments or<br />
reconsiderations countries may<br />
make along the way; and place the<br />
emphasis too much on just<br />
temporary pushbacks rather than<br />
the structural and strategic changes<br />
that need to be made to contend<br />
with how regional states can better<br />
manage the opportunities and<br />
challenges of economically engaging<br />
China.<br />
First, though the focus is often on<br />
BRI "pushback," that is in fact just<br />
one position within a range of very<br />
complex responses by countries<br />
ranging from support to opposition<br />
that vary on different counts<br />
including level of intensity.<br />
Emerging responses from countries<br />
like Japan, which has actively<br />
offered alternatives to China's BRI<br />
even as it engages with it; or<br />
Myanmar, where Beijing has<br />
worked tirelessly with the<br />
government in Naypyidaw to make<br />
progress on parts of the China-<br />
Myanmar Economic Corridor<br />
(CMEC) in spite of earlier concerns,<br />
offer cautionary notes about<br />
oversimplistically characterizing<br />
responses to such a large scale<br />
initiative that involves so many<br />
different players.<br />
This is an important point to keep<br />
in mind. A range of factors including<br />
BRI's still amorphous shape - where<br />
old projects are at times being<br />
grandfathered in to seem like new<br />
developments and commitments by<br />
countries can be in the form of<br />
rhetorical support and symbolic<br />
MOUs rather than substantive<br />
cooperation actually followed<br />
through - means that responses will<br />
tend to be more complex and<br />
nuanced than a simple "pushback"<br />
or "embrace." A myopic focus on just<br />
the more extreme manifestations of<br />
the pushback aspect can distort the<br />
region's response and underestimate<br />
the BRI's longer-term potential as a<br />
tool of Chinese statecraft.<br />
Second, to the extent that there is<br />
"pushback," the motivations for this<br />
subset of responses are often quite<br />
diverse, with some being more<br />
project-specific or domestic-focused<br />
rather than the geopolitical<br />
imperatives often attributed to<br />
them. There ought to be a clear<br />
distinction made, for instance,<br />
between<br />
project-specific<br />
readjustments from Pakistan with<br />
respect to the China-Pakistan<br />
Economic Corridor (CPEC);<br />
recalibration with a change in<br />
government in Malaysia following<br />
the perceived excesses under former<br />
Prime Minister Najib Razak; and the<br />
caution of a more strategic and<br />
lasting kind shown by Vietnam<br />
which continues to keep BRI at a<br />
distance.<br />
The differences in motivations<br />
here, to the extent they can be<br />
discerned, is important. In addition<br />
to more correctly representing the<br />
myriad drivers behind why certain<br />
the Diet committee that reviewed the draft of the U.S.<br />
Occupation authorities, and so the postwar debate that<br />
followed after Japan regained sovereignty in 1952 was<br />
how to interpret what was necessary for self-defense.<br />
Diet debate over the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) law in<br />
1954 became the first place this was deliberated, and<br />
many of the basic issues Japanese still consider were<br />
raised then. But over time, as the SDF developed the<br />
capability to take over territorial defense missions<br />
from U.S. forces, debate blossomed into what sorts of<br />
things should define the military capability of the SDF.<br />
Over time, these debates shifted focus from what kinds<br />
of weapons were acceptable to what kind of missions<br />
the SDF could perform, and then to the possibility of<br />
SDF participation in international coalitions in the<br />
post-Cold War era (such as UN Peacekeeping<br />
Operations and post-9/11 U.S. coalitions in the Indian<br />
Ocean and now in the South China Sea). I trace this<br />
trajectory of deliberations in Japan Rearmed to show<br />
just how far Japan has come in thinking about the<br />
utility of its military as a partner in regional and global<br />
security.<br />
countries are responding the way<br />
they do, they can also shed better<br />
light on the extent to which we can<br />
expect to see continuity and change<br />
in regional responses amid various<br />
developments, including shifting<br />
domestic politics as well as Beijing's<br />
own ongoing efforts to refashion<br />
some of its BRI projects in countries<br />
that can be expected to continue<br />
after the April summit.<br />
Third, though countries may push<br />
back against BRI itself for now, it is<br />
still unclear whether this will also<br />
lead them to make the necessary<br />
changes to better manage such<br />
issues in the future and also limiting<br />
their broader economic relationship<br />
with Beijing as some may hope or<br />
assume. Though experiences such as<br />
the "debt traps" epitomized by Sri<br />
Lanka's Hambantota Port or<br />
the"dual use" dilemma at play it<br />
places such as Cambodia have<br />
emerged as cautionary tales for<br />
governments related to BRI, in<br />
many cases governments are still<br />
grappling with how to address these<br />
challenges and debates and<br />
discussions about short-, medium-,<br />
and long-term steps. As they are<br />
doing so, they are also continuing to<br />
engage Beijing beyond the BRI,<br />
including through other initiatives<br />
that are more welcome relatively<br />
speaking such as the Asia<br />
Infrastructure Investment Bank<br />
(AIIB).<br />
This point warrants careful<br />
attention in the months and years<br />
ahead. For all the focus on China,<br />
the concerns at play within BRI are<br />
also the product of factors evident in<br />
the countries Beijing is operating in<br />
as well, including a lack of<br />
transparency and accountability<br />
with respect to how project<br />
decisions are made, the perceived<br />
lack of alternatives in advancing<br />
economic development including<br />
infrastructure, and ongoing<br />
conversations about how to manage<br />
the opportunities and challenges of<br />
economic engagement with Beijing,<br />
including in some cases restrictions<br />
in certain areas such as<br />
telecommunications. Until these<br />
structural issues are addressed,<br />
individual projects may come under<br />
scrutiny, but the systemic risks will<br />
continue to remain and are likely to<br />
manifest in different ways.<br />
All this is not to say that we ought<br />
to dismiss or underestimate the<br />
pushback we have seen with respect<br />
to BRI so far, which is real. The<br />
point, rather, is that we should avoid<br />
being carried away by headlines<br />
narrowly focused on "pushback"<br />
against the BRI and continue to pay<br />
attention to the complex decisions,<br />
motives, and longer-term<br />
adjustments being made by regional<br />
states as well as China in the<br />
initiative as well as in its wider<br />
economic engagement. That<br />
broader perspective can not only<br />
provide a better understanding of<br />
how countries respond to BRI, but<br />
also potentially help shape these<br />
very calculations over time. As we<br />
see the focus on BRI ramp up ahead<br />
of the next BRI summit in China,<br />
that is worth keeping in mind.<br />
Tension looms in South Asia<br />
sudha ramachandran<br />
On February 26, the Indian Air Force<br />
(IAF) carried out an aerial strike on a<br />
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) terror training<br />
camp in Balakot in Pakistan's Khyber-<br />
Pakhtunkhwa province. Unlike in<br />
September 2016, when Special Forces of<br />
the Indian Army carried out so-called<br />
surgical strikes on terrorist launch-pads<br />
near the Line of Control (LoC) in Pakistan<br />
Occupied Kashmir (POK) - the LoC is the<br />
de-facto line that divides the former<br />
princely state of Jammu and Kashmir<br />
(J&K) into POK and the Indian state of<br />
J&K - this time IAF jets went far into<br />
Pakistani airspace to destroy one of JeM's<br />
main training camps.<br />
Tuesday's strikes are the first to be<br />
launched deep into Pakistan territory since<br />
the 1971 India-Pakistan War. Even during<br />
the 1999 confrontation at Kargil, Indian<br />
fighter jets did not cross the LoC. The IAF's<br />
assault on the Balakot camp is therefore<br />
significant.<br />
An assault on JeM training camps was<br />
expected. Less than two weeks ago, a<br />
suicide bombing by JeM in Pulwama in<br />
J&K claimed the lives of more than 40<br />
paramilitary personnel. The attack<br />
triggered a wave of anger and outrage<br />
across India, with many calling on India's<br />
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led<br />
government to give Pakistan a "befitting<br />
response." Prime Minister Narendra Modi<br />
has also been promising to avenge the<br />
death of the security forces at Pulwama.<br />
With Indians scheduled to vote in<br />
general elections in April and May, the<br />
BJP, a right-wing party which espouses a<br />
muscular nationalism, was under pressure<br />
to respond militarily. The IAF strikes on<br />
the JeM training camp was the result.<br />
Pakistan-based JeM is labeled a terrorist<br />
group in India and India has been trying to<br />
get the United Nations Security Council to<br />
blacklist JeM's founder-leader, Masood<br />
Azhar. However, it hasn't succeeded in this<br />
endeavor, with China blocking its efforts.<br />
Between 1994 and 1999, Azhar was<br />
jailed in India for his terrorist activities in<br />
the Kashmir Valley. Then in December<br />
1999, India freed him in exchange for the<br />
safe return of passengers on board a<br />
hijacked Indian Airlines aircraft.<br />
In Pakistan, Azhar founded JeM with<br />
generous support from Pakistan's Inter-<br />
Services Intelligence (ISI) and since then<br />
the group has moved from strength to<br />
strength and carried out several attacks in<br />
India, including an attack on the Indian<br />
Parliament in December 2001 - an<br />
incident that brought India and Pakistan<br />
to the brink of war in 2002 - and on an IAF<br />
base at Pathankot in January 2016.<br />
Tuesday's IAF airstrike is reported to<br />
have destroyed a JeM training camp where<br />
hundreds of terrorists were staying.<br />
Among those reportedly killed in the strike<br />
was Azhar's brother-in-law, Yousuf Azhar,<br />
who masterminded the 1999 airplane<br />
hijacking. India claims that the air strikes<br />
eliminated a significant number of JeM<br />
fighters. But what has it achieved beyond<br />
that?<br />
The strikes delivered a "robust" message,<br />
an editorial in The Hindu, an influential<br />
English daily said. Certainly, the strike<br />
signaled to Pakistan that India will not<br />
hesitate to use force if it continues to<br />
support terrorist attacks targeting India.<br />
By targeting a terrorist camp, India has<br />
indicated also that it "doesn't want to go<br />
beyond [destroying Pakistan's] terror<br />
infrastructure," security analyst Uday<br />
Bhaskar has observed.<br />
However, Tuesday's strikes "are unlikely<br />
to have any enduring impact on the long<br />
term trajectory of Pakistan-backed<br />
terrorism," Ajai Sahni, counter-terrorism<br />
expert and Executive Director of the<br />
Institute for Conflict Management in New<br />
Delhi, told The Diplomat.<br />
The 2016 surgical strike did not reduce<br />
terrorist attacks in India. Rather it resulted<br />
in "an escalation of terrorism in J&K and<br />
increased firing" by Pakistan along the<br />
LoC, which resulted in scores of Indian<br />
soldiers and civilians losing their lives.<br />
It did serve the BJP's agenda well,<br />
however, Sahni says. And "Surgical Strikes<br />
2.0," as India's recent strikes are being<br />
referred to "can be expected to do precisely<br />
this," he added. The strikes are likely to<br />
Supporters wait for the start of a campaign rally of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun<br />
Sen's Cambodian People's Party in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Photo: Heng Sinith<br />
provide a shot in the arm to the BJP's<br />
electoral chances in the upcoming general<br />
elections. "In the immediate future, the<br />
impact [of the strikes] will probably be<br />
escalatory," Sahni said, adding that the<br />
Pakistani leadership is under pressure "as<br />
great as the pressure" that the Modi<br />
government was under to respond to the<br />
Pulwama attack. Pakistan's leadership is<br />
under pressure to respond to India's air<br />
strikes "immediately and visibly."<br />
In the coming days, Pakistan can be<br />
expected to further escalate cross-border<br />
firing and carry out terror attacks in J&K as<br />
well as other parts of India, Sahni said. The<br />
conflict is already escalating.<br />
Can Australia boom with a proactive<br />
immigration policy?<br />
Grant wyeth<br />
In recent decades the conventional<br />
narrative of global population has been<br />
one of continued growth and the stresses<br />
that this will place on the planet's<br />
resources. This narrative has been<br />
facilitated by consistent studies from the<br />
United Nations that predict that the<br />
world's population will rise from its<br />
present 7.7 billion to 11.2 billion by 2100.<br />
However a new book by the Globe and<br />
Mail's writer-at-large, John Ibbitson,<br />
and social researcher Darrell Brooker<br />
has questioned this narrative and the<br />
UN modeling that produced its global<br />
population boom forecasts. Instead, they<br />
argue, the world's population will top out<br />
just before reaching 9 billion people,<br />
before beginning to decline.<br />
The book - Empty Planet: The Shock of<br />
Global Population Decline - argues that<br />
the UN's model for predicting birthrates<br />
is too conservative, focusing only on the<br />
traditional factors of fertility, mobility,<br />
and mortality. These are factors have<br />
worked well for forecasts in the past, but<br />
fail to account for current trends that are<br />
producing a significant decline in birth<br />
rates worldwide.<br />
Brooker and Ibbitson argue that the<br />
UN is missing two current revolutions<br />
that are taking place across the world.<br />
The first is the rapid rise of urbanization,<br />
both in developed and developing<br />
countries. Life in urban areas is<br />
becoming increasingly advantageous<br />
and this phenomenon is exponential.<br />
The more people move to urban areas<br />
the more advantageous it is for others to<br />
do likewise. This has a considerable<br />
effect on population - in rural areas<br />
children are an important extra set of<br />
hands, but in urban areas children are<br />
more an extra mouth to feed, therefore<br />
reducing the incentive to have too many.<br />
The other phenomenon (which is<br />
facilitated by the first) is the increase in<br />
female education and female social<br />
power. In the book, the authors note that<br />
everywhere they visited for their<br />
research - whether it was wealthy<br />
Western cities, poor rural areas, or<br />
urban slums in developing countries -<br />
when they asked women how many<br />
children they would prefer to have if<br />
given the choice, the response was<br />
overwhelmingly only one or two. And<br />
across the world the ability for women to<br />
make this choice for themselves is<br />
becoming a new (and long overdue)<br />
social norm. This phenomenon is not<br />
only driven by access to formal<br />
education, but the informal education<br />
derived from urban social networks and<br />
the now ubiquitous access to<br />
smartphones that provide insights and<br />
aspirations for women beyond their local<br />
environments.<br />
Confirming the authors' thesis, a<br />
report by medical journal The Lancet<br />
from November 2018 (a study published<br />
after their book was written) has<br />
demonstrated that there is now a<br />
significant decline in global birth rates.<br />
While the UN's recent data for India<br />
states that it has a current birth rate of<br />
2.4 children per woman, The Lancet<br />
puts India's birth rate at 2.1. For a<br />
population the size of India that<br />
discrepancy is a considerable number of<br />
people (or lack thereof). India is now at<br />
the replacement level, and is joined there<br />
by other large countries such as<br />
Bangladesh, Iran, Brazil, and the<br />
Philippines. These countries are<br />
predicted to soon move to being below<br />
replacement level, which is where most<br />
of the developed countries in the West<br />
find themselves. Most significantly, this<br />
is also where China finds itself. The<br />
authors predict China could halve its<br />
population by the end of the century,<br />
becoming older and smaller before it<br />
reaches the wealth of the West, with<br />
considerable geopolitical ramifications.<br />
If the analysis of the book proves<br />
correct, then this presents an enormous<br />
opportunity for an immigrant accepting<br />
country like Australia. With Europe<br />
turning inward, and the United States<br />
potentially doing the same, the number<br />
of countries that are actively seeking to<br />
enhance their numbers through<br />
immigration are actually very few.<br />
Rather than see its relative power<br />
decline in relation to more populous<br />
countries in its neighborhood as has<br />
been predicted, Australia should be able<br />
to enhance its current economic,<br />
defense, and cultural capabilities to<br />
either preserve its influence, or even<br />
considerably increase it - as long as it is<br />
able to maintain (or boost) its current<br />
levels of immigration, and generate<br />
public acceptance of its migration<br />
program.<br />
Yet unlike a comparable country<br />
such as Canada, Australia doesn't<br />
have a strong public narrative<br />
advocating and explaining the<br />
benefits of immigration. The political<br />
class simply enacted a policy of<br />
substantial rates of immigration and<br />
then sat back and hoped that the<br />
public would adjust on its own.<br />
A declining global population will make the maintenance of Australia's immigration program the<br />
country's primary strategic asset.<br />
Photo : Jamie Davies