CounterFact Issue 10

2 • COUNTERFACT

INSIDE
ISSUE 10
PUBLISHER
One Small Step Games
EDITOR
Jon Compton
CONTENT EDITOR
Ty Bomba
CONTRIBUTING EDITORS
Paulo Vicente dos Santos Alves, Raymond
E. Bell Jr., Jim Bloom, Arnold Blumberg, Jon
Cecil, Andrew Hind, Maciej Jonasz, J.E. &
H.W. Kaufmann, Timothy J. Kutta, Jonathan
Lupton, Roger Mason, Christopher Miskimon,
Ravi Rikhye, Javier Romero, Carl O. Schuster,
Philip Sharp, William Stroock, Brian Train,
Allyn Vannoy & Gil Villahermosa
DESIGNER
Lisé Patterson
MAPS
Larry Hoffman
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Operation Pincher: Stalin’s Drive in the Middle East,
1948-49 – What If?
by Ty Bomba
Turkey vs. Bulgaria: A Potential Near-Future Conflict
by Maciej Jonasz
Hussite Wagon Warfare: Tanks Prefigured?
by Jim Bloom
India’s Maritime Strategy
by Carl O. Schuster
Compare & Contrast: Germany’s Panzer 38(t) vs. the
USSR’s BT-7
by Gilberto Villahermosa
Infographic: Z-Day
by Allyn Vannoy and Jay Karamales
Visit the CounterFact Magazine Facebook page,
where each week we post at least one original
article—totally free to Facebook users.
ABOUT THE COVER
An artist’s concept of one of
Stalin’s heavy tanks on the attack
in 1949.
COUNTERFACT • 3

Operation
Pincher:
Photo Credit: Pixabay & background Created by BiZkettE1/Freepik
4 • COUNTERFACT

By Ty Bomba
Stalin’s Drive in the Middle East,
What If?
Communist Perspectives
Immediately after the end of World War II, Stalin’s
strategic outlook was centered on the idea of holding
secure what had just been won in the struggle
against Nazi Germany. He codified that thinking
in a lengthy memo he wrote early in 1947 titled: “The
Plan for the Active Defense of the Territory of the Soviet
Union.”
In it, he forecast that, were a new war to begin, it
would do so via an Anglo-Allied attack into the Central
European lands recently occupied by the Soviets. In turn,
the Red Army’s initial mission would then be to defeat
that aggression before it could advance far enough east to
reach the Russian Motherland proper. The overall goal
was to be “securing the invulnerability of the boundaries
established by international agreement after World War
II.”
Since he still didn’t have an atomic bomb, his further
thinking centered around defeating the US nuclear
monopoly by deploying Soviet conventional strength
on the ground. He therefore ordered the smaller
postwar Red Army to be made more combat efficient
via full motorization. (During World
War II, the Red Army had still had to
employ 3.5 million horses to meet its
transport needs.) The mechanization
program was mostly completed
by 1949.
COUNTERFACT • 5

YUGOSLAVIA
Yugoslavs
GREECE
ROMANIA
BULGARIA
Bulgarians 15 Div
10 Div
8 Div
2 Div
Istanbul
6 Div
15 Div
20 Div
3 Div
2 Div
Black Sea
TURKEY
US/UK Estimate of Soviet Mid-East Attack Plan
1948-49
1 Div
9 Div
Soviet Limits of Advance
D + 45
D + 90
D + 120
USSR
10 Div
5 Div
Tabriz 3 Div
Mioneh
Baku
Caspian
Sea
Mosul
Zenjan
Tehran
CRETE
Mediterranean Sea
2 Div Quantity of Soviet Divisions
Trunk Railroads
Main Oilfields
Potential US Heavy Bomber Bases
LIBYA Possible Soviet Airborne Mersa Matruh Attacks
Soviet Invasion Routes
CYPRUS
EGYPT
Tripoli
LEBANON
Haifa
ISRAEL
Suez
Photo Credit: Freepik & Event and exhibition at the Foreign Ministry
marking the 70th anniversary of the Axis powers’ declaration of war on Greece.
www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/ts25102010_KL1951.htm
JORDAN
SYRIA
SAUDI
ARABIA
Baghdad
Kirkuk
IRAQ
Ahwaz
Bander
Basra Shar
in that tnati
nation’s scivil lw
war
in
1948.
IRAN
300 Miles
500 Km
MAP DESIGNED BY L. HOFFMAN
Despite the greater
access to Kremlin
records granted historians
since the implosion
of the USSR, no
document has as yet
emerged telling exactly
when Stalin moved
from that doctrine of
strategic defense to one
of strategic offense. Even
so, though it remains impossible
to distinguish exactly
when he crossed that line, we
know that sometime in 1948 he
had made the switch in his thinking.
The evidence for that comes from
his split with – and damning ideological
condemnation of – Yugoslav communist
dictator Josef Broz Tito in March
of that year. The long-offered explanation for
their mutual alienation was that it had come
about due to Stalin’s jealously of the alternative
approach to socialization presented by the smaller
6 • COUNTERFACT

country’s dictator. As such, the blame later offered by
historians was kept centered on the Soviet dictator’s
well known ego and belief in his own unique mission
in history in regard to the final unfolding of communist
dominance of the planet. More recently, though,
as documents from the former Yugoslav government
have become available, we know that interpretation
is, if not completely false, only a part of the story.
The main reason the break came about was due to
Tito’s desire to set up Yugoslavia as the regional hegemon
of the Balkans. More particularly, he saw the
then burgeoning Greek Civil War as the means to do
that. He pleaded, if Stalin would only give logistical
support for Yugoslav and Albanian forces to intervene
there, a quick and complete communist victory could
be won.
Stalin disagreed, though not on principle, but due
to the fact he was then in the process of fully consolidating
his own control over what he judged to be
more strategically valuable territory to the north of
the Balkans in Europe – namely Czechoslovakia and
Poland – and in the Far East, via the communist victory
then looming in China’s civil war. He felt certain
any open communist invasion into Greece would
bring swift retaliation by the British and Americans,
who had strong aero-naval forces on hand close by in
the Mediterranean.
It therefore was best, he maintained, to let the
communist momentum building on those more
important fronts carry forward the socialist bloc to
the proper moment for launching a larger war directly
against the two main opponents: the US and UK. Of
course, for Tito, the Balkan peninsula was the crucial
front.
Since Tito was unwilling to back off from that idea,
Stalin clothed the resultant split in ideological wrappings.
In turn, Tito had to give up launching his proposed
invasion of Greece, since he had no confidence
in its success minus at least Soviet logistical support.
Had Stalin been somewhat less egotistical, or had
he merely had a different opinion of Euro-Asian strategic
geography, we could’ve had a Third World War
that began in the Balkans, and that was then likely
to have quickly expanded from there into southwest
Asia. That expansion would’ve taken place for two
reasons.
First, given the range of the US bomber force at
the time, the only places from which the Americans
COUNTERFACT • 7

could’ve dependably delivered their “air atomic”
offensive against the industrial vitals of the USSR –
then still mostly in and just east of the Urals, after
having been moved there to keep them out of German
hands during the previous war – would’ve been
from British bases on Cyprus, Crete and at Suez.
Second, America – which had been the powerhouse
oil exporter for the whole Anglo-Allied war
effort during World War II – was passing peak production.
That meant the oilfields of the Mid-East
would’ve been crucial to any major new war effort by
those nations. Those oilfields, in turn (see map), were
almost totally undefended, and they lay much closer
to the Red Army’s start lines than they did to any concomitant
centers of Anglo-Allied power. Their early
seizure in any new World War could’ve been crippling
to the Allies’ capabilities.
“Sandown” was the codename for the initial 1948
British plan to defend the Mid-East against a feared
communist invasion that might stretch across a front
from the Albanian coast to Iran. The British planners
concluded that, on its own, the UK couldn’t hope
to hold off such an attack for long. Since the only
armies within that entire region that could be expected
to be at least somewhat combat effective against
the Soviets were those of Turkey and the nascent
Jewish state of Israel, the essential ally again had to be
the US.
The lure in that regard – in those pre-NATO times
– was to be the US need for bomber bases in range
of the strategic centers of gravity of the USSR. That
meant the aforementioned Mediterranean islands or
the base complex at the Suez Canal.
Though US Air Force generals viewed the Mediterranean
and Middle East as the crucial staging area
from which to begin their strategic counteroffensive
against the USSR, that assessment wasn’t shared
by those running the US Army. The army generals
viewed that theater in the same way they had during
World War II: a diversion from the main one in
northwest Europe. Since it was the army that would
be called on to provide the ground force necessary to
secure the Mediterranean and Middle East bases the
air force wanted, it was the older service’s viewpoint
that counted most.
Sandown was therefore initially drawn up by the
British with four possible defense lines, each nearer
Photo Credit: Freepik & Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-178-1536-18A / Schütte / CC-BY-SA 3.0
8 • COUNTERFACT

than the one before it to the crucial Suez and island
nexus. The line ultimately to have been taken up
would’ve depended on how much involvement could
be gotten from the Americans, and how quickly it
would be deployed, if the Soviets attacked.
From the US military’s perspective, though there
was general agreement the strategic bombing campaign
of World War II hadn’t been decisive in bringing
about the defeat of Germany, the advent of the
atomic bomb seemed to finally provide the weapon
needed to win wars solely from the air. Beyond
theory, in light of all the above, there was no other
practical strategy available for the US other than what
the air force termed an “air atomic” offensive.
In sum, at various times some 20 to 30 Soviet cities
– picked for their industrial or administrative importance
– were listed for bomber-delivered annihilation
during any new world war’s first weeks. By 1948 those
plans had gone through 18 major iterations, along
with variants within each of them. They began with
“Totality” in August 1945, which was Gen. Eisenhower’s
quickly produced, almost memo-like, response to
President Truman’s call for such a plan of operations
in case one were needed.
Pincher, begun in March 1946, went on to be
adapted into a series of global “strategic studies,”
which expanded and kept bifurcating, eventually
subsuming even the British Sandown plan when the
two powers resumed joint war planning in 1948.
“Pincher” referred to the overall strategy of “pinching
off” Soviet advances and capabilities.
Conclusion
At the end of World War II the Soviet Union had
some 12.7 million personnel under arms, with the
Red Army fielding approximately 477 division-equivalents
supported by about 35,500 combat aircraft. By
the end of 1947, the agricultural and industrial labor
requirements for postwar reconstruction had allowed
for only 4.4 million of those personnel to be kept in
service along with about 24,000 aircraft. Meanwhile,
however, the Anglo-Allied militaries declined from
their wartime highs into an even smaller force.
If World War III had begun during 1948-49, then,
it’s difficult to evaluate which side would’ve won.
At the conventional level, it’s possible the Soviets
could’ve achieved the overrunning of Western Europe
and Southwest Asia that Allied planners feared. At
the same time, though, if those Soviet advances didn’t
break overall Allied morale, thereby allowing time
for the US “air atomic” strategic counteroffensive
to be carried out, it’s difficult to imagine how the
Soviets could’ve held up against that kind of destruction.
It would most likely have been a close-run thing
for both sides, with its final outcome dependent on
which side kept up its morale – and therefore its determination
to go on fighting – the longest. CF
SELECTED SOURCES
Ely, Col. Louis R. The Red Army Today. Harrisburg, PA:
Military Service Publishing Co., 1949.
Evangelista, Matthew A. “Stalin’s Postwar Army
Reappraised,” International Security, Vol. 7, No. 3
(Winter, 1982-83), pp. 110-138.
Gentile, Gian P. “Planning for Preventive War, 1945-
1950,” Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 2000, pp. 68-74.
Jeronim, Perovic. The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment
in Light of New Evidence. University of Zurich: Zurich
Open Repository and Archive, 2007. Available as a free
online download.
Herken, Gregg. The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb
in the Cold War, 1945-1950. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1980.
Mastny, Vojtech, Sven G. Holtsmark & Andreas Wenger.
War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat
Perceptions in the East and West. New York: Routledge,
2006.
Ross, Steven T. American War Plans, 1945-1950:
Strategies for Defeating the Soviet Union. Portland, OR:
Frank Cass, 1996.
Zabecki, Maj. Gen. David T., ed. Blueprints for Battle:
Planning for War in Central Europe, 1948-1968.
Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2012.
COUNTERFACT • 9

TURKEY
VS.
BULGARIA
Photo Credit: Background texture Designed by Kjpargeter / Freepik
10 • COUNTERFACT

A POTENTIAL NEAR-FUTURE CONFLICT
by Maciej Jonasz
The history of Turkish-Bulgarian bilateral relations isn’t a pleasant
one. The Turks completed their conquest of Bulgaria late in the 14 th
century, beginning a half-millennium of brutal occupation. While
little is mentioned about that chapter of European history when colonialism
or imperialism is discussed, what the Bulgarians experienced was as
bad as anything inflicted on other colonized peoples anywhere on the planet.
In fact, in many ways, Turkish colonialism was far worse than the average.
The Turkish occupation began with the extermination of the upper strata
of Bulgaria’s society, which left only what the Turks referred to as the “cattle.”
The land and its residents were then distributed among Turkish lords and, in
addition to working for them and paying the non-Muslim head tax, the Bulgarians
had to hand over a quota of children each year for indoctrination to
become fanatical Muslim warriors – the infamous Janissaries.
In addition to the suffering purposefully inflicted by the Turks, the Bulgarians
were also saddled with the same socioeconomic system that set in place
stagnation all across the Ottoman Empire while the rest of Europe saw steady
progress. While that same Ottoman stagnation set the conditions for their
eventual fall, it also meant, when Bulgarian independence was finally achieved,
they were far behind the rest of Europe. Some of its modern-day economic ills
can still be traced back to that bleak heritage.
The occupation ended in 1878 when, after a bloody two-year campaign, the
Russians liberated Bulgaria. At first, due to Western unease and uncertainty
over exactly how the Ottoman retreat from Europe was to be handled, Bulgaria
was officially granted only autonomy within that empire, but in 1908 it status
was finally turned into full independence.
As one legacy of the Turkish imperial presence, eight percent of Bulgaria’s
population still consists of citizens of that ethnicity. That demographic fact
could become a flashpoint for conflict anytime a fully Islamist regime in Ankara
wanted to make it so.
With a population just over 80 million and a large and well armed military,
Turkey is the Balkan region’s powerhouse. Bulgaria, with fewer than 8 million
citizens and a military that’s not only small but also armed with outdated weapons,
is at the other end of that regional power scale.
The Bulgarians field a fully professional army of 16,000 personnel who are
grouped into one special forces and two mechanized brigades. Thanks to the
COUNTERFACT • 11

Photo Credit: US Army Reserve / Sgt. 1st Class Brian Hamilton
Cadets from the Turkish Military Academy react to direct contact during
the 2016 Sandhurst competition.
professionalization of the armed forces, numerous
deployments on peacekeeping operations abroad, as
well as participating in NATO exercises, the quality
of those soldiers is rated high. In addition, as the
military consists almost exclusively of ethnic Bulgarians,
it’s a cohesive force whose personnel would be
fully motivated to fight for their country in the face of
Turkish aggression.
While the personnel are of good quality, their
equipment isn’t. Armored vehicles are largely of Cold
War vintage and, even at that, they’re not numerous.
For example, there are fewer than 300 infantry fighting
vehicles, mainly old BMP-1 and BMP-23 models.
Another big weakness is the lack of a serious tank
force. Once Bulgaria had almost 2,000 T-54/55 and
T-72 main battle tanks, but nearly all those have been
decommissioned and put into storage. Currently only
about 20 T-72s remain fully operable and in active
service. While the ones in storage could theoretically
be brought back into service, the soldiers needed to
operate them would also have to be trained. That
means, in any suddenly erupting war, the tanks in
storage could only see service as replacements for
those lost in combat. There likely
wouldn’t be sufficient time to use them
to expand the armored force.
Facing the Bulgarians would be a
Turkish Army of 350,000 personnel,
who are grouped into one motorized
infantry and two mechanized divisions,
along with 16 separate mechanized brigades,
eight separate motorized infantry
brigades, a dozen separate armored
brigades and four separate commando
brigades.
The Turks field a force of well over
2,000 main battle tanks. That includes
349 fully modern German-made Leopard
2 models. The rest have been kept
sufficiently up to date to ensure they
remain at least minimally combat ready.
Turkish mechanized infantry would
ride into combat in a mix of US-made M113s, Turkish-made
ACV-15s and Russian-made BTR-60PBs and
BTR-80s, for a total of almost 5,000 infantry fighting
vehicles. Whereas only the ACV-15s boast armament
larger than a machinegun (a 25mm cannon) the overall
size of the Turkish tank force means their infantry
are unlikely to be left without support when dealing
with enemy armor.
In the air, the disparity between the two countries
is even greater than on the ground. With only
about 50 combat aircraft of all types, the Bulgarian
Air Force wouldn’t be capable of providing effective
air support in any large-scale conventional war. Not
only tiny, the air force is saddled with obsolete Cold
War-era aircraft that are becoming more and more
difficult just to keep in the air.In comparison, the
Turks can put over 400 combat jets into the air. Most
of them are F-16C/D models, along with three dozen
upgraded F-4E Phantoms, which is an older but still
capable machine. In addition to those fixed-wing
aircraft, the Turks have over 50 attack helicopters – a
mix of US-made AH-1 Cobras and domestically produced
T-129s.
At sea the balance of forces isn’t any more favorable
for the Bulgarians, even though their navy is in
a better condition than their air force. The core of
their surface combatant force consists of three former-
Belgian Wielingen-class frigates. Though those are
1970s vintage warships, they underwent an upgrade
12 • COUNTERFACT

Shumen
Hwy A2
Varna
Sofia
Hwy A4
Veliko Tarnovo
Sliven
Hwy A1
Burgas
Black
Sea
Plovdiv
Haskovo
Istanbul
BULGARIA
Option 1: Northern Amphibious Attack
Option 2: Southern Amphibious Attack
Option 3: Overland Attack Left
Option 4: Overland Attack Right
Xanthi
Main Attacks
Supporting Attacks
0 25 50 75 100
0 50
Miles
Km
100 150
Edirne
Rte 7
Kirklareli
TURKEY
Corlu
Sea of
Marmara
Turkish Strategic Options
in 2004. Other than those three frigates, Bulgarian
warships are all un-modernized Cold War-era
designs and not up to today’s standards. In fact, the
navy’s one Soviet-built frigate, and all three of its
corvettes, are likely not combat capable. Bulgaria’s
last submarine was retired from service in 2011.
Like with the rest of the Bulgarian armed forces,
the navy has transitioned to an all-professional force
and its personnel have participated in numerous
NATO exercises. It one truly notable asset is its
special forces element.
Another asset that warrants mention, and that
would likely be the only one that could be operationally
effective against the Turks, are the 10 minewarfare
vessels. In the face of what would be almost
certain Turkish supremacy on the water and in the
air, they wouldn’t last long, but they could potentially
lay minefields that would impede enemy operations
in Bulgaria’s coastal waters.
Facing the Bulgarian Navy at sea would be a Turkish
force that dwarfs it in both numbers and capabilities.
Whereas its inventory includes a number of
outdated warships, the Turkish Navy also has plenty
of modern designs – both surface and sub-surface –
thanks to what’s been a steady pace of procurement.
An important element of the Turkish Navy would be
Turkish Army vehicles
the collapse of the
solution process in July
2015.
its force of 55 amphibious landing craft, giving it a
sealift capacity sufficient to land all of their marine
brigade at one time.
Overall, the Turkish military advantage is overwhelming
in every important numeric category. Even
Photo Credit: US Wikimedia Commons / Mahmut Bozarslan
COUNTERFACT • 13

subtracting forces Turkey requires to deal with Kurdish
insurgents, maintain security on their border
with Syria, and those deployed in occupied northern
Cyprus facing the Greeks, the odds against the Bulgarians
are still massive.
Terrain
A look at the topographic map of Bulgaria shows
the country is broken into four distinct regions which
run east-west, essentially looking on a map like nothing
so much as layers of a cake. In the north there’s a
strip of flat land along the Danube. At about 40 to 90
miles wide, that river valley stretches all the way from
the Black Sea coast in the east to the Serb border on
the west.
Parallel to that valley on the south are the Balkan
Mountains, which are about 30 miles across northsouth
and that also run east-west from the sea to
Serbia. While not exactly alpine in ruggedness, they
remain a significant obstacle to military operations as
they have only a limited road network and are heavily
wooded. All movement through them would be kept
channeled into a few narrow passes.
South of the mountains, there’s another strip of
flat ground. It extends from the sea two-thirds of the
way across the country.
The strip of land along the Turkish border also
consists of rough terrain and makes up the final
strategic layer. Though not really mountainous, that
Strandzha region is hilly and forested enough to impede
mechanized operations. The main access route
through that rough terrain is Highway A4 in the west
Route 7 in the center. The A4 in the west would
make a good main supply route, while the Route 7
corridor is narrow and passes through a more heavily
forested region, which would make it easier to block
by the defenders.
Bulgaria’s capital, Sofia, is in the west of the country
close to the Serb border. It’s in a valley within the
Balkan Mountains, and it can only be accessed via
14 • COUNTERFACT

BULGARIA VS. TURKEY
QUANTITATIVE COMPARISONS
BULGARIA
TURKEY
7.1 Million
Population
80.8 Million
33,150
350,000
19,500
Reserves
360,565
Photo Credit: US Army / Staff Sgt. Matthew Keeler
Main Battle Tanks
531* 2,446
Other Armored Vehicles
1,103 9,031
600 2,398
Bulgarian mechanized infantry on winter maneuvers.
narrow passes. The country’s second-largest city, Plovdiv,
lies exposed on the southern plain. Two other
important locales would be Burgas and Varna on the
coast, as the control of their port facilities – especially
at Varna – would make it easier for the Turks to push
forward supplies.
An important fact about Bulgaria’s population is
the large number of ethnic Turks within it. At eight
20 207
Ground Attack Aircraft
32 207
* Fully operable = 20
COUNTERFACT • 15

Marine Corps Gen.
Joseph Dunford Jr., left,
chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, speaks with Gen. Hulusi Akar of
the Turkish army, center, and Gen. Valery Gerasimov
of the Russian army in Antalya, Turkey, March 6, 2017. The three
chiefs of defense are discussing their nations’ operations in
northern Syria.
percent they still form a sizable minority, even though
a large number of them have recently begun moving
back to Turkey to take advantage of their parent
country’s better economy and labor market.
In the war being hypothesized here, some portion
of Bulgaria’s Turks could be expected to support the
invading forces as a “Fifth Column.” Even without
resorting to arms, their employment as guides and
informers would render the Turkish military valuable
service. If armed, they could intercept Bulgarian supply
columns behind the front line.
A more recent factor, which could also be used by
the Turks to advantage, is the mass of other Islamic
migrants heading to Europe. Currently held back at
the Bulgarian border, they could be allowed to move
freely once that border was breached. A wave of such
migrants, bussed into occupied parts of Bulgaria
by the Turks, could then continue to walk north,
thereby adding further strain on Bulgarian defensive
operations. That would be especially true if the Turks
armed them, or if they helped themselves to weapons
abandoned on the battlefield. After all, those migrants
are overwhelmingly fighting-age men who, as
the crime statistics now coming out of Europe indicate,
aren’t generally averse to violence.
Not only would the movement of thousands of
migrants force the Bulgarians to divert resources
to stopping them, their very presence could set in
motion a flow of ethnic-Bulgarian refugees. Those
two groups would likely clash with each other, in
a savage war within a war, thereby adding further
strain on the overall Bulgarian defense.
International Reaction
Bulgaria’s most likely allies in a conflict with
the Turks would be Serbia and Romania, who
also have a bitter history of dealing with Ottoman
imperialism. Sadly for the Bulgarians, neither of
those nations, alone or together, has the combat
power – especially in the air – to match the Turks.
Bulgaria’s other neighbor, Greece, is stronger and,
in some ways, might be considered evenly matched
against the Turks, and they would also be positioned
on the invaders’ strategic flank during any such war.
At the same time, though, the decision to support the
Bulgarians could be difficult for the Greeks. Their
many islands near the Turkish coast would be vulnerable
to quick seizure, and their common mainland
border is narrow enough the Turks could protect it
without ending their thrust into Bulgaria.
Further afield are other eastern European countries
that also share a history of Turkish invasion, and that
therefore might summon the political will to move
to help stop a new one. All of them, however, with
the exception of Poland, have only limited military
strength, and they would likely only have the combat
power needed to stop the Turks without an ability to
actually throw them back. Even if all those countries
entered the war on the Bulgarian side, they would be
hard pressed to muster the strength necessary to liberate
any occupied territory.
Western European nations don’t have much of a
military edge over the Turks, either. As things stand,
after a quarter-century of reductions in their defense
budgets, their armed forces are no longer anywhere
near what they used to be. The strongest of them -
Britain, France and Germany – have air forces smaller
than Turkey’s (albeit better equipped), and they can
muster only a total of 244 combat ready main battle
tanks.
16 • COUNTERFACT

There is also the political question of any of those
countries showing willingness to risk the heavy casualties
a clash with Turkey would entail, or even to
go against a Muslim country in defense of a Christian
one. Given their own growing and increasingly
separatist Muslim populations, such an intervention
would carry the risk of an outright break in their
already deteriorating security situations at home.
Of the world’s two largest powers, the US is the
one that could stop and roll back a Turkish invasion
with relative ease. At the same time, though,
America’s hands would be tied by the existence of
the USAF base at Incirlik in Turkey. That facility’s
personnel and their dependents would potentially
become hostages as soon as US intervention was
threatened.
Lastly there is Russia. Though it has a long way to
go to match the US in military strength, the Russian
armed forces have made considerable progress in
recent years. That progress is likely sufficient to stop
and throw back the Turks, though not nearly as fast
or as thoroughly as could the US.
More importantly, though, Russia has demonstrated
the political will to deploy its armed forces
into combat in order to serve their own strategic
interests. If Bulgaria’s turning away from NATO to
enter into Russia’s sphere of influence was on the
table, as it almost certainly would be, that might be
enough of a gain for Putin to order his forces into
action.
With two overland avenues of approach and an
amphibious one available to the Turks, their options
are three – left, center and right.
The left option would see their main advance
along Highway A4 to Plovdiv and then on to Sofia
from there. The advantage of that approach would
be its potential speed. It’s not only the shortest
route to Sofia; Highway A4 also provides the easiest
route on which to push forces and supplies into the
fight. At the same time, though, and for those same
reasons, that route would certainly be defended by
Bulgaria’s best units. Operations there would likely
be immediately costly in terms of casualties and
equipment wastage.
BULGARIA TURKEY
25 445
Transport Helicopters
24 475
Attack Helicopters
— 54
Submarines
— 12
4 16
Corvettes
3 10
Patrol Boats
— 34
Mine Warfare Craft
10 11
Merchant Marine Vessels
80 1,285
COUNTERFACT • 17

Photo Credit: US Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Nesha Humes
Bulgarian paratroopers wait to load two Super Hercules C-130Js and an
Alenia C-27J Spartan during Exercise Thracian Spring 17 over Plovdiv
Regional Airport, Bulgaria, March 15, 2017.
The center option would see an advance along
Route 7 and then, once the Turks reached east-west
Highway A1, they would turn left toward Plovdiv
and Sofia. The terrain there is more difficult, as the
forested hills would channel their advance into a
series of potential kill zones. Further, Highway A1
doesn’t have the same capacity to handle traffic as
Highway A4. Again, though, for those same reasons,
the Bulgarians wouldn’t defend that approach with
their best.
The Turks’ third option would be to conduct an
envelopment of Bulgaria’s landward defenses by
executing an amphibious operation on the Black Sea
coast. Neither the Bulgarian Navy nor Air Force have
the assets to stop such an operation, or even to inflict
much in the way of losses on the Turks. Nor could
the ground force defeat it once the Turkish marines
set up a secure beachhead.
The Bulgarians have only enough combat power
to defend the two dry land routes into their country
from the south and not much more. As Turkish
diverisonary attacks in the south would still likely be
sufficient to keep some significant portion
of the Bulgarian Army busy there, the road
to Sofia from the beachhead would be
largely open.
As the Turks have sufficient assets for
only one amphibious landing, they would
need to choose between one at Burgas in
the south or one at Varna farther north.
Both locations have beaches perfect for
landing troops, and both have airports
that can be used to ferry in reinforcements
and supplies and to evacuate casualties.
An advantage for landing at Burgas is
the fact the A1 highway that begins there,
runs all the way to Sofia, allowing for
rapid movement of troops and supplies. In
contrast, the A2 highway, which starts in
Varna, goes west for less than a 70 miles,
which would mean the rest of that advance
would have to be made along regular two-lane
roads.
The Burgas option has the disadvantage
that, if the Bulgarians were to pull back their
forces holding the border area south of there, they
would be able to block the A1. If a landing took place
at Varna, on the other hand, no withdrawal in the
south would likely be able to bring troops into position
to block it in a timely way.
The Bulgarians have two options: defend forward
or in depth. A forward defense would see both their
army brigades blocking the land routes into the country
from the south, using the rough terrain near the
border to form a series of successive defensive positions.
The intent would be to prevent the Turks from
capturing significant Bulgarian territory before some
kind of outside intervention halted the invasion.
Politically, that’s the best option, as it would force
the Turks to fight hard from the moment they crossed
the border. If outside intervention came fast enough,
the invaders would capture only a small piece of the
country, and that would also bring the least harm
to Bulgaria’s civilian population. At the same time,
speedily mounting Turkish casualties might lead to
opposition to the war at home.
18 • COUNTERFACT

Even so, this option is risky from a military standpoint
and could lead to disaster. That is, given the
Turks’ crushing superiority, the Bulgarians wouldn’t
be able to hold any positions near the border for
long. The attackers would punch through, and the
Bulgarians would be forced to withdraw under a hail
of bombs, rockets and missiles from above. That
could deal them such a blow they would be unable
to mount effective resistance anywhere else in the
country, and the Turks might then complete their
conquest with ease. Only if foreign intervention came
before the border defense collapsed, or at least before
the inevitable retreat from it could be turned into a
rout, would this option stand a chance of success.
The second option, defending in depth, is militarily
the better one. Here the Bulgarians would pull
back into the Balkan mountains to make their stand.
Taking advantage of that good defensive terrain, they
could hold ground much longer and inflict heavy
losses on the attackers. Even in this case, however,
the Turks could advance by using vertical envelopment
via helicopter assaults and paradrops. Still, this
option wouldn’t only cost the Turks more time and
blood, the longer the campaign lasted, the greater the
chance of foreign intervention.
On the other hand, this option could be a political
disaster in that at least a third of the country would
speedily come under occupation. Then, if the Turks
repeated what they did on Cyprus – ethnic cleansing
and the bringing in of settlers – the Bulgarians could
see some large portion of their country partitioned
out from under them. That might be the “lesser
evil,” though, as the same could happen to the whole
country if the forward defense was chosen but then
collapsed before foreign intervention stopped the
invaders.
In the end, the Bulgarians’ choice would depend
on their estimate of long foreign intervention would
take to make itself felt. If quickly, then forward
defense would have to be the choice; if slowly, then
defense in depth.
Overall, the disparity of forces between Turkey and
Bulgaria – not only in quantity, but also in quality –
is so large any conflict between the two would be decisively
one sided. It would be a conflict the Bulgarians
couldn’t win on their own and, at best under present
conditions, they could only hope for a Cyprus-style
cease-fire and partition of their territory. That would
likely be the first step in the subsequent destruction
of independent Bulgaria.
The Bulgarians’ salvation in case of war can only
come in the form of foreign intervention – either
military or political. The strength of the Turkish
armed forces means a military one would require not
only a lot of combat power, but also the acceptance
of potentially heavy losses by the intervening nations.
They would also face the risk of socio-political turmoil
at home from their own Islamic populations.
That would likely require more political will than any
potential interventionist countries possess. CF
COUNTERFACT • 19

20 • COUNTERFACT

By Ty Bomba
Operation
Pincher:
Photo Credit: Pixabay & background Created by BiZkettE1/Freepik
Stalin’s Drive in the Middle East,
1948-49
What If?
COUNTERFACT RULES • 1

CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Components
3.0 Set Up & Hex Control
4.0 How to Win
5.0 Turn Sequence
6.0 Airpower
7.0 Stacking
8.0 Supply
9.0 Reinforcements
10.0 Movement
11.0 Combat
12.0 Atomic Attacks & US Prestige
CREDITS
Design & Development: Ty Bomba
Playtesting: Grant Cardwell, Milton Duncan, Sanders and
Isaiah Elliott, Christopher Perello & Sherman Tutweiler
Map Graphics: Ania B. Ziolkowska
Counters & Production: Jon Compton
Layout: Lisé Patterson
1.2 Scales.
Each hexagon on the map represents 60 miles (97 kilometers)
from side to opposite side. Communist units of maneuver
are Soviet and satellite-nation armies (plus super-elite Guards
Airborne divisions) along with Allied armies, corps, divisions,
brigades and regiments. There are no US units on-scene at the
start of play, but army “regimental combat teams” and Marine
Corps regiments and a brigade rush in as reinforcements. Air
power is abstracted, with counters and rules showing the effects
of one side or the other gaining temporary air superiority over
portions of the map.
1.3 Definitions.
If a rule is said to apply to “Communist units,” that means it
applies to all the units of that side (see 2.5). If a rule is said to
apply only to “Soviet” units, it applies to all the subset of Communist
units bearing the “SU,” “8G” or “15G” abbreviations
(for “Soviet Union,” 8 th Guards Airborne Corps” and “15 th
Guards Airborne Corps,” respectively). If a rule is said to apply
to “Allied units,” that means it applies to all the units of that
side, regardless of their nationalities (see 2.6). If a rule applies
only to some further national or unit-type subset of Communist
or Allied units, that will be specifically stated.
Old Hands Note. No reps, no ZOC. (If you don’t know what
that means, you’re not an old hand, but don’t worry about it.)
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Operation Pincher: Stalin’s Drive In the Middle
East, 1949 – What If?
(OP) is an alternative history wargame that allows two players
investigate the strategic parameters that would’ve been in place
in southeastern Europe and the Middle East had Stalin attacked
there at that time, most likely in conjunction with a drive into
Western Europe. His goal in starting such a southern drive
would’ve been to blitz to the oilfields and Allied base areas in
North Africa and the upper Persian Gulf. That would’ve effectively
broken the geostrategic back of the British Commonwealth
of Nations, disrupted Europe’s oil supply, and delayed the US
from being able to mount an atomic bombardment campaign
into the USSR. The scenario is based on the actual “Pincher”
series of defensive plans drawn up in the Pentagon from 1946
through 1949.
2.0 COMPONENTS
2.1 Components.
The components to a complete game of OP include these rules,
the mapsheet and the sheet of 176 die-cut counters (which are
also referred to as “units” and “unit-counters”). Players must
provide a standard six-sided die to resolve combat and other
probabilistic events in the game.
2.2 Map.
The Game Map illustrates the militarily significant terrain
found around the eastern Mediterranean littoral in 1949 when
portrayed at this scale. A hexagonal (“hex”) grid is printed over
the map to regulate the placement and movement of units across
it, much like in Chess and Checkers. A unit is considered to
be in only one hex at any one time. Every hex on the map has
a unique four-digit identification number printed within it.
They’re provided to help find exact locations more quickly and
to allow for the recording of unit positions if a game has to be
taken down before it can be completed. For example, the city of
Cairo is in hex 1810.
2 • COUNTERFACT CT
RULES

Design Note. On the game map, it looks as if the Israelis had
managed to gain and maintain control of both the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip during their first war with the Arabs. Rather
than have to write special rules to handle those two initially
split-controlled hexes, I decided to assume that, the moment
this hypothesized war first began, the Israelis would’ve indeed
reacted by taking those two areas.
2.3 Unit-Counters.
Most of the counters represent combat formations; others are
provided as informational markers and memory aids. After
reading through these rules at least once, carefully punch out the
counters. Using a nail clipper (or an emery board or purposedesigned
counter-clipping device) to remove the nub-like “dog
ears” from their corners will facilitate the units’ easy handling
and stacking during play and will also demonstrate to your opponents
your samurai-like determination and discipline.
2.4 Sample Combat Unit.
Each combat unit-counter displays several pieces of information:
nationality, specific historic identification, unit type and size and
combat strengths.
Historical
Identity
Attack
Factor
Unit Size
Defense
Factor
Unit Type
Nationality
(color scheme)
BACK
(reduced)
Allied Side
British (UK) units – black on tan
Hellenic (Greek) unit – white on black
Iranian & Arab units – white on leaf-green
Israeli units – black on sky blue
US Army units – black on olive drab
US Marine Corps units – white on olive drab
Turkish Units – black on gray
2.6 Historical Identification & Abbreviations.
All units are given their specific identities by the numbers or
names used to designate those formations during this period.
Those abbreviations are defined as follows.
APA – Albanian People’s Army
BPA – Bulgarian People’s Army
DAG – Democratic Army of Greece (Greek Commies)
EA – Egyptian Army
G – Guards
HA – Hellenic Army
IIA – Iranian Imperial Army
Is – Israeli
JA – Jordanian Army
LA – Lebanese Army
MC – Mechanized Corps (Yugoslavian)
SA – Syrian Army
Sh – Shock
SU – Soviet Union
T – Turkey
UK – United Kingdom
US – United States
USMC – United States Marine Corps
Yu – Yugoslavia
2.5 Nationality.
A unit’s nationality, and therefore the side it’s on, is shown by
its color scheme and a two-letter abbreviation.
Communist Side
Soviet Airborne units – white on red
All Other Soviet units – black on red
Yugoslavian units – black on orange
Bulgarian units – black on yellow
Albanian & Greek communist (DAG) units – black on white
2.7 Unit Sizes.
Units’ organizational sizes, from largest down to smallest, are
shown using the following symbols. If a unit’s size symbol is
bracketed, that means its an ad hoc formation, put together solely
for this campaign, rather than being one regularly carried on the
table of organization of its army.
XXXX – army
XXX – corps
XX – division
X – brigade
III – regiment or “regimental combat team” if bracketed
COUNTERFACT CT RULES •
3

2.8 Unit Types.
The following symbols in each counter’s unit-type box distinguish
the various combat arms employed here.
2.12 Marker Counters.
The uses of the following counters are explained at the appropriate
points throughout the rest of the rules.
Armor/Tank
Shock
• Hex Control Markers
(see 3.8 & section 4.0)
Infantry or Combined Arms
Mechanized
Paratroop
• Soviet Guards Airborne Corps Designators
(see 3.5)
2.9 Combat Factors.
Attack and defense factors are the measures of each unit’s ability
to conduct those types of combat operations. Their specific uses
are explained in section 11.0.
• Soviet Victory Point Markers
(see sections 4.0)
• Game Turn Marker (see section 5.0)
2.10 Movement Factor.
This number – which isn’t actually printed on the counters – is
a measure of a unit’s ability to move across the hex grid printed
over the map. Units pay varied movement costs to enter different
hexes, depending on the terrain in each and, in some cases,
the moving unit’s type. Every unit’s movement factor is four
during first movement phases and two during second movement
phases. See sections 5.0 and 10.0 for details.
• Allied & Communist Airpower Markers
(see section 6.0)
2.11 Step Strength.
All ground units in the game have one or two “strength steps,”
which are also simply called “steps.” That’s an arbitrary term
used to express the ability of a unit to absorb a certain amount
of combat losses before ceasing to be an effective formation (a
measure of its “robustness” in current US Army jargon). Those
units with combat factors printed on only one side of their
counters are “one-step” units; those with printing on both sides
of their counters are “two-step” units. If a two-step unit suffers a
one-step loss, it’s flipped over so its one-step side (with the lower
combat factors) shows. If a one-step unit, or a two-stepper that’s
already been “reduced,” suffers a step loss, it’s removed from the
map (“eliminated”) and placed into a “dead pile” off to the side.
No fully eliminated unit is ever returned to play, at any level of
step strength, for the remainder of the game.
• Allied & Communist Aerial Supply Markers
(see 8.16)
• Atomic Blast Markers
(see section 12.0)
4 • COUNTERFACT CT
RULES

3.0 SET UP & HEX CONTROL
3.1 In General.
The players should first decide which of the two sides each will
control. One player commands the Communist forces while the
other commands the Allied forces. After determining sides, the
players should each take the units under his own command (see
2.5) and sort them onto and around the maps according to the
instructions below. Note that stacking rules apply during set up
(see section 7.0). Set up using the step-by-step sequence given
below.
3.2 US Reinforcements & Aerial Supply Marker.
The Allied player should set aside, within easy reach off to the
side of the maps, his side’s aerial supply marker along with the
four USMC units. He should then take all the US Army regimental
combat teams and place them into a large-mouth opaque
container (such as a cereal bowl or coffee mug), Those US Army
and Marine Corps units form the Allied reinforcement pool,
meaning they will only enter play on the map after the game has
already begun. Note there are no other reinforcements for the
Allied side.
3.3 Allied On-Map Set Up.
The Allied player next sets up the HA unit anywhere in mainland
Greece, all the Turkish units anywhere in that country, the
IIA unit anywhere in Iran, the EA unit in Cairo, the Is, JA, LA
and SA units anywhere in their respective countries and, finally,
the UK units in Suez (1910) and/or Port Said hexes (1811).
3.4 Communist Set Up.
The Communist player should begin his side’s set up by setting
off to the side, within easy reach, all seven of the Soviet
guards airborne divisions and his side’s aerial supply marker.
He should then place the Albanian, Yugoslavian and Bulgarian
units anywhere in their respective countries. He also sets up
the DAG unit anywhere in Yugoslavia. He should next place all
Soviet armies, along with the 8G and 15G Corps markers, into a
second large-mouth opaque container, and then blindly (meaning
without looking) pulls 14 of those counters. The ones not
pulled are out of play and should be put back into their storage
container. Further in regard to Soviet unit set up, see rule 10.22.
If one of the counters the Communist player pulled during
the step above was the 8 th Guards Airborne Corps marker, he
should add the 7 th , 76 th and 98 th Guards Airborne Divisions to
the armies he pulled from the container. He should then put
away that corps marker as it has no further function during
play. If one of the counters the Communist player pulled during
the step above was the 15 th Guards Airborne Corps marker, he
should add the 103 rd , 104 th , 105 th and 106 th Guards Airborne
Divisions to the armies he pulled from the container. He should
then put away that corps marker as it has no further function
during play. It’s possible the Communist player will get one,
both or neither of the airborne corps. For further details on
those divisions’ entry into play on the map, see 5.8, 6.5, 8.16,
8.17, 9.2, 9.4 and 11.23
3.6 Soviet Armies Set Up.
All the Soviet armies drawn by that player as given above in 3.4
are now set up by that player in any hexes in the USSR and/or
Bulgaria.
3.7 Marker Deployment.
Put the Turn marker in the “1” box of the Turn Track printed
on the mapsheet. Put the “x10” and “x1” markers into the “0”
box of the Communist Victory Points Track. Put an Atomic
Blast marker into the “0” (zero) box of the US Atomic Attacks
This Turn Track. Put the Hex Control and Atomic Blast markers
into any easily reached pile off to the side of the map. That
completes set up.
3.8 Hex Control.
The idea of “hex control” — which side “owns” which hexes
at any given instant — is important for purposes of judging
victory (see section 4.0). At the start of play the Communist
side controls all hexes in the USSR, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and
Albania; the Allied side controls all others. The control status
of a hex switches from one side to the other whenever a ground
unit from the other side enters it. Control switching is immediate,
and may occur and reoccur in the same hexes any number
of times during play. Hex control markers are provided for use
on the board to help keep track of which hexes are controlled by
which side in areas where the deployment of actual units doesn’t
make that clear.
3.5 Soviet Airborne Reinforcements.
The only reinforcement units mandated as such on the Communist
side are (possibly) the seven Soviet Airborne Divisions.
COUNTERFACT CT RULES •
5

4.0 HOW TO WIN
4.1 In General, the Communist player is generally on the
offensive, trying to win by driving into Allied territory as fast as
possible and in such a way as to bring about the conquest of as
much of the map as possible. The Allied player wins by preventing
the Communist player from having fulfilled that side’s victory
conditions as judged at the conclusion of Turn 8.
4.2 When to Check for Victory.
The various kinds of victory are generally only checked during
Phase IV of Game Turn 8. Of course, the game may also end at
any time if either player assesses the situation to be hopeless and
therefore capitulates unconditionally to the other player.
4.4 Winning on Points.
If the Soviet player didn’t have either guards airborne corps in
his order of battle, at the end of Turn 8 he’s considered to have
won the game if he has 30 or more VP at that time. If the Soviet
player had either one of the guards airborne corps in his order
of battle, at the end of Turn 8 he’s considered to have won the
game if he has 40 or more VP at that time. If the Soviet player
had both guards airborne corps in his order of battle, at the end
of Turn 8 he’s considered to have won the game if he has 50 or
more VP at that time.
4.5 Allied Victory.
The Allied player wins the game if, at the end of Turn 8, the
Communist player hasn’t fulfilled that side’s victory conditions
as given above.
4.3 Communist Victory Points.
The Communist player earns victory points (VP) for controlling
various kinds of hexes according to the list below. At the start
of play he has zero VP; keep a running total of them, recording
each change immediately as it happens. Note the Communist
player will have fewer than zero VP and the Allied player never
earns VP. Also note the status of a hex in regard to supply and
having been nuked has no bearing on its yield of VP.
• Istanbul = 10 VP
• Jerusalem = 10 VP
• Every other city in mainland Europe and Asia = 1
VP
• Every other major city in mainland Europe and Asia
= 2 VP
• Every oilfield = 3 VP
• Every Libyan, Egyptian or island city or major city =
5 VP
• Variable VP due to US atomic attacks (see section
12.0)
Design Note. If hex contains both a city and an oilfield, it has
the VP value of both combined.
Historical Note. The cities in the final category above are worth
so much more than the others on the map because it was from
bases in North Africa and on the Mediterranean islands the
USAF was to later launch the (atomic) strategic air campaign
that would ultimately win the war for the Allies.
Design Note. All the cities and major cities have been deliberately
omitted from the Communist home areas on the map.
That way, though Allied units are allowed to potentially move
into and through those countries, there’s no VP advantage for
doing so. That’s because, all the Pincher series plans were totally
defensive in nature; the US and its allies were not logistically or
strategically prepared to go on the offensive at the grand strategic
level in this theater at this time. Their objective would’ve been to
defeat the Communist attack, not start one of their own.
5.0 TURN SEQUENCE
5.1 In General.
Every game turn of OP is divided into two “player turns,” one
Communist and one “Allied.” That full sequence makes up one
“game turn,” of which there are a maximum of eight in an entire
match. The Communist Player Turn is the first player turn in
every game turn. Every action taken by a player must be carried
out during the appropriate part of the sequence outlined below.
Once a player has finished a particular phase, or a specific activity
within a phase, he may not go back to perform some forgotten
action or redo a poorly executed one unless his opponent
graciously permits it.
5.2 Turn Sequence.
The game turn sequence is given below in outline. The rest of
the rules are organized, as much as possible, to explain things in
the order they’re encountered as you go through this sequence
in each game turn.
6 • COUNTERFACT CT
RULES

Turn Sequence Outline
I. Airpower Phase
II. Soviet Player Turn
A. Soviet First Movement Phase
B. Soviet First Combat Phase
C. Soviet Second Combat or Second Movement Phase
III. Allied Player Turn
A. Allied First Movement Phase
B. Allied First Combat Phase
C. Allied Second Combat or Second Movement Phase
D. US Reinforcement Phase
IV. Administrative Phase
5.3 Second Movement or Combat Phase.
At the start of Phase II.C. in every Communist Player Turn, and
at the start of Phase III.C. in every Allied Player Turn, the player
taking his turn must declare whether he will finish it with a second
movement phase or a second combat phase. That decision
is always up to each commander. No matter what phase choice a
player makes, all his units are bound by that decision.
5.4 Second Movement Phase MF Reduction.
All the normal movement rules given in section 10.0 pertain in
second movement phases with the following special restriction:
all units only have movement factors of two rather than the four
of first movement phases.
5.5 Second Combat Phase Odds Shift Penalty.
All the normal combat rules given in section 11.0 pertain in
second combat phases, but with added restriction that all attacks
suffer a one-column-left odds reduction (in addition to all other
applicable odds shifts).
5.6 Ending a Game Turn.
Game Turns 1 through 8 are completed when each one’s Phase
IV is concluded. At those times move forward by one box the
Game Turn marker on the Game Turn Track printed on the
mapsheet.
5.8 Communist Reinforcements.
The only Communist reinforcements available are the Soviet
guards airborne divisions that may have been included in that
side’s order of battle as given in 3.5, and which are entered into
play during any of that side’s movement phases (first or second).
See 5.8, 6.5, 8.16, 8.17, 9.2, 9.4 and 11.23 for more details on
both Soviet and US airborne entries and special combat rules in
that regard.
5.9 Administrative Phases.
During these phases, the players should cooperate to clean up
around the map, moving and adjusting markers as necessary to
prepare for the start of the new turn.
6.0 AIRPOWER
6.1 In General.
At the start of the Airpower Phases of Turns 2 through 8, both
players openly a die. The side getting the higher total has “air
superiority” for that turn all across map (reroll ties). If you had
air superiority the turn prior, add one to your roll this turn; however,
that addition may never be greater than one no matter how
on many previous turns you may have had air superiority. Subtract
the lower rolled total from higher roll total: the winning
player gets that many airpower markers (one through five). He
immediately places all those markers as described below. Note
there will never be a turn in which both players have airpower
markers deployed on the map at the same time. Also note the
Soviet player will automatically always get a +1 modifier to his air
superiority die roll on Turn 2.
6.2 Turn 1 Communist Air Superiority.
On Turn 1, due to the factor of strategic surprise, the Communist
player is guaranteed to have air superiority that turn. Only
he rolls an airpower die that turn. That result is the number of
Airpower Markers he deploys that turn. (If he rolls a six, he still
only gets five markers.)
5.7 US Overseas Reinforcement Phases.
See 10.4 for details on this phase. It is the method by which US
Army reinforcements enter play on the map after having come
from overseas. Note that this phase is skipped during Game
Turn 1.
6.3 Placement.
Available airpower markers may be placed in any hexes on the
map. Friendly and enemy ground unit presence has no bearing
on this. Note, though, no more than one marker may be placed
in any one hex. All available markers must be deployed.
COUNTERFACT CT RULES •
7

6.4 Range.
Every airpower marker on the map effects the hex in which it’s
placed and all six of the immediately surrounding hexes. That’s
termed its “range.” If the ranges of two or more friendly airpower
markers overlap, there are no additive effects because of it.
6.5 Airpower’s Effect on Enemy Movement.
For an enemy unit or stack to make a regular move into a hex
that’s in range of one or more of your airpower markers, it must
pay an extra movement point (MP) to do so for each such hex
entered, for both in-hex and hexside costs. Your own airpower
markers have no effect on the movement of your own forces.
Note that enemy airpower presence in a hex doesn’t absolutely
prohibit your units making regular moves into and/or through
such hexes; it merely makes it more expensive in terms of movement
point expenditures. Also note neither player may make
paratroop airdrops in range of an enemy airpower marker.
6.6 Airpower & Combat.
If you make an attack into a hex that’s in range of one or more
of your airpower markers, your attack gains a one-column
rightward shift (cumulative with all other applicable bonus
and penalty shifts). Conversely, if an enemy attack is launched
against one of your forces, and that defending force is in range
of one or more of your airpower markers, that defense benefits
from a one-column leftward shift (cumulative with all other applicable
bonus and shifts). Those shifts never amount to more
than one column per battle, no matter how many markers are
in range. Also note these shifts are applicable in both first and
second combat phases.
6.7 Soviet Airpower & US Atomic Attacks.
No US atomic attack may take place within range of one or
more Soviet airpower markers. Note that doesn’t mean Soviet air
superiority on any given turns work to prevent any US atomic attacks;
it only does so within the range of the individual markers
deployed on the map.
6.8 Airpower Marker Retrieval.
Deployed airpower markers remain on the map until the Administrative
Phase of each turn, at which time they’re retrieved for
use again in the next turn. Airpower markers are never subject
to elimination; all the markers are always available for use as
described above.
7.0 STACKING
7.1 In General.
Stacking is the term used to describe the piling of more than
one friendly unit in the same hex at the same time. Opposing
grounds units will generally never stack together; generally only
friendly units stack together. See 11.23 and 11.24 for the exceptions.
7.2
The stacking rules are in effect for both sides during set up and
all through every phase of every turn. You therefore need to be
careful in regard to the order in which you move your units;
otherwise, moves made carelessly early in your movement phases
may work to jam you up later in those phases. If, at the end of
any phase, any hexes are found to be over-stacked, the player
owning the units in those hexes must eliminate enough excess
units there, of his choice, so as to bring the hexes into compliance
with the stacking rules.
7.3 Stacking Limit.
The stacking limit for both sides is a maximum of seven units.
Note that for stacking purposes step and combat strength and
have no bearing; however, each (XXXX) army and corps (XXX)
sized formation counts as “two units” for stacking purposes.
7.4
None of the markers pictured in rule 2.12 have any stacking
value, and they may be placed in any hexes according to the rules
for their respective uses.
7.5
Both players are always free to examine all stacks on the map
and the map sheets, both friendly and enemy.
7.6 Stacking Order.
The top-down/bottom-up order in which units in a hex are piled
together has no significance.
7.7 International & Inter-Service Stacking is allowed for
both sides, but only within the strictures of rule 10.19. US Army
and USMC units may stack together without any special considerations
coming into effect.
8 • COUNTERFACT CT
RULES

8.1 In General.
8.0 SUPPLY
In order for a unit to be able to move and fight at its full potential,
it must be in supply. Supply for movement is determined at
the moment a given unit begins to move and, once determined,
that status lasts all during a unit’s move. Supply for combat is
determined at the start of each individual battle for all the units
of both sides involved in that battle.
8.2 Tracing Supply Lines.
No counters are provided to represent the materiel consumed
by the combat units. Instead, that’s abstracted into the process
of supply line tracing (“tracing supply”). A unit has supply (“is
in supply”) if it can trace a path of contiguous hexes of any
length from a friendly “supply source hex” to its own location. A
unit without a valid supply line is said to be “out of supply” or
“OOS.”
8.3 Enemy Units & Supply Lines.
Supply paths may generally not be traced into enemy occupied
hexes. See 11.23 and 11.24 for the exceptions.
8.4 Terrain & Supply.
Within the strictures given in this section, the supply lines of
both sides may be traced into and through all kinds of terrain
except for all-sea hexes and hexsides, which is prohibited.
8.5 OOS Movement.
If a unit or stack is found to be OOS at the start of its move,
the movement factor of that force is halved for that phase. That
halving remains in effect throughout that movement phase even
if the moving force moves into a location where it would’ve been
judged to have had supply had it started its move there.
8.6 OOS Combat.
If an attack contains one or more units found to be OOS at
the start of that battle’s resolution, those OOS units have their
attack factor halved when that battle’s odds are calculated. If a
defending force is OOS at the start of that battle’s resolution,
those units have their defense factor halved when that battle’s
odds are calculated. In both those cases, when halving round
up all remainders. If more than one unit in a given battle is to
be halved, add together the combat factors of all such units and
them perform just one halving and rounding.
8.7 Indefinite OOS.
No unit is ever reduced in step strength or fully eliminated
simply for being OOS. Units of both sides may remain OOS
indefinitely.
8.8 Willful OOS.
It’s permitted for both players to move units into hexes in which
they may or will become OOS.
8.9 Appropriate Supply Sources.
Units may only use supply sources appropriate to their own side
as described in the rules below.
8.10 International Supply Line Tracing is allowed. That
is, the supply lines of units of the various nationalities, both
friendly and enemy, may freely cross each another and my even
run through same hex paths.
8.11 Nuked Hexes.
On both maps, hexes containing an atomic attack marker may
still have supply lines traced into and out of them (but see 8.13
below).
8.12 Home Country Supply.
All units are always in supply for all purposes when in hexes of
their own country.
8.13 UK & US Supply Sources are all the friendly controlled
port (coastal city and coastal major city) hexes on the map. Note,
however, that once a port is nuked, it loses its supply providing
capacity for the rest of the game. Because of the mobility restrictions
on non-UK/US Allied units (see 10.19), all those other
nationalities will only make use of the home country supply rule
given above in 8.13
8.14 US/UK & SU Coastal Supply.
US/UK units in coastal hexes anywhere on the map are always
in supply while in those hexes. Similarly, Soviet (SU) units in
Black Sea coast hexes (3307 to 3316, inclusive) are always in supply
while in those hexes. That remains true regardless of whether
a coastal hex has been nuked, and it is equally true in the coastal
hexes of all the various oceans, seas and gulfs on the map.
8.15 Communist Supply Sources, which are potentially
available for use as needed by all the nationalities on that side
in the game, are all the friendly controlled all-land hexes on the
north map edge: 3300 to 3307 & 3316 to 3321, inclusive. Those
COUNTERFACT CT RULES •
9

hexes lose their supply-providing capacity while occupied by enemy
units, but they regain that capacity as soon as that condition
is overturned.
8.16 Aerial Supply.
A one hex aerial supply capacity is available to both sides. Either
player may place his side’s aerial supply marker(s) atop any one
of his side’s stacks anywhere on the map anytime during the
turn, provided only that the chosen hex isn’t in range of one or
more enemy airpower markers at that time. All friendly units in
that hex are considered fully supplied while the marker remains
in place. The marker remains in the chosen hex throughout the
remainder of that turn or until it becomes enemy controlled,
whichever comes first. An aerially supplied unit or stack moving
away from the chosen hex might therefore still run into supply
difficulties later in the turn, depending on the phase sequence.
The markers have no step or combat values of their own, but
neither can they ever be eliminated from play. Both are always
available for potential use every turn (but also see below).
8.17 Paratroop Air Assault Supply.
If a paratrooper unit or stack is making an airdrop, no matter if
it’s opposed or unopposed (see 5.8, 6.5, 8.16, 8.17, 9.2, 9.4 and
11.23) that uses its side’s aerial supply capacity for that turn.
8.18 USMC Amphibious Attack Supply.
If a USMC unit or stack is making an opposed amphibious landing
(see 11.24) that unit or force is in supply as an extension of
rule 8.14.
9.0 REINFORCEMENTS
9.1 In General.
Reinforcements are units of both sides that don’t start the game
already in play on the map; rather, they enter play after the war
has already begun. On the Allied side, the only reinforcements
are US units. On the Communist side, the only reinforcements
are the Soviet guards airborne divisions (provided they were
found to be in that side’s order of battle during set up, see 3.4
and 3.5).
9.2 Communist Airborne Reinforcements.
The seven guards airborne divisions constitute the only reinforcements
potentially available to the Communist side during
the game. During any turn the Communist player may decide
to enter one, some or all of those those divisions during any
portion of his first or second movement phase, provided only
that his aerial supply marker isn’t already on the map at that
time. He may pick as their entry location any land hex on the
map other than mountains or marshes or ones in range of any
Allied airpower marker (enemy ground unit occupation is OK).
On any given turn, there may not be more than one drop made.
That selection made, he places the divisions he’s selected into
the chosen hex. They remain there throughout the rest of the
game turn unless eliminated by Allied attack. During that turn
of entry they may neither move nor attack (however, see 11.23 -
Paratroop Air Assaults) but are automatically in aerial supply as
given in 8.17. After their turn of entry, they trace supply (or draw
aerial supply) and move like normal units.
9.3 US Army Reinforcement Arrivals.
Starting on Turn 2, during that turn’s and every subsequent
game turn’s Phase III.D, the Allied player should openly a die
and subtract one from that result. That result (zero through five)
is the number of units he then pulls blindly (without first looking)
from the US reinforcement pool created during set up according
to rule 3.2. The arriving units are generally immediately
placed in any functioning US/UK supply source hex (meaning
an un-nuked and friendly controlled ports) on the map. Also
note, since US reinforcement don’t enter during a movement
phase, it costs them nothing to be placed onto the map.
9.4 US Paratroop (Airborne) Arrivals may, at the Allied
player’s option, enter via airdrop. That is, when they become
available via 9.3 above, that player may enter them in generally
the same way the Soviet airborne are entered. That is, as soon
they become available, he may select any land hex on the map
other than mountains or marshes or ones in range of any Soviet
airpower marker (enemy ground unit occupation is OK). On any
given turn, there may not be more than one drop made. Note
these units would still be entering during the Phase III.D, not
during an Allied Movement Phase. Such units will afterward
need to trace supply normally or be provided aerial supply and
they would use up the Allied aerial supply capacity on the turn
of their airdrop. If this kind of entry isn’t made on their turn
of their initial availability, the Allied player must enter them as
regular ground reinforcements. If a chosen airdrop entry hex
contains any Communist unit(s) immediately resolve the resultant
air assault combat in that hex using the same procedure as
given in 11.23.
10 • COUNTERFACT CT
RULES

Historical Note. The restrictions on US paratroop entry given
above are meant to model the historic fact that, despite the Anglo-Allies
having been the first powers to ever organize a whole
“Airborne Army” in WW2, that combat arm had been allowed
to wither away in the years after 1945. On the Soviet side, their
high command had intensely studied the airborne operations
of WW2 that had been conducted on all sides, and they would
therefore have been better prepared in regard to deployment
timing and flexibility.
9.5 No US Army Delays.
No US Army reinforcement of any type may have its arrival
delayed to a later turn. Any US Army units not entered during
their turn of arrival are simply put back into the reinforcement
pool.
9.6 USMC Reinforcements.
The four USMC units in the counter-mix aren’t placed into the
pool of US Army reinforcements. Instead, starting during Phase
III.D. of Game Turn 3, they become available one per turn (chosen
deliberately by the US player). That means all four will have
become available by that phase in Game Turn 6. The Marines’
arrivals aren’t debited against the Allied player’s reinforcement
rolls for US Army units.
Unlike US Army reinforcements, the USMC units may be held
off-map indefinitely by the Allied player. He may choose to enter
them – singly, a few at a time, or as a unified group – as if they
were (non-paratroop) army reinforcements during Phase III.D.,
or he may bring them ashore via amphibious assault, either opposed
or unopposed, during any of his movement phases. For
details on that, see 10.20 and 11.24.
10.0 MOVEMENT
10.1
Every ground unit in the game has a movement factor of four
during their side’s first movement phases and two during their
side’s second movement phases. That’s the number of “movement
points” (also called “MP,” “movement factors” and “MF”)
available to the unit to use to move across the hex grid during
its side’s movement phases in each game turn. Units move from
hex to adjacent hex – no “skipping” of hexes is allowed – paying
varied costs to do so depending on the terrain in, and barriers
along the sides of, the hexes being entered. The movement of
each player’s ground units takes place only during his own player
turn’s movement phases and reinforcement entries.
10.2 Limits.
MP may not be accumulated from turn to turn or phase to
phase, nor may they be loaned or given from one unit or stack
to another. A player may potentially move all, some, or none of
his units in each of his movement phases throughout the game.
Moving units aren’t required to expend all their MP before stopping.
The movement of each unit or stack must be completed
before that of another is begun. A player may only change the
position of an already moved unit or stack if his opponent agrees
to allow it.
10.3 Minimum Movement Ability.
Every unit is generally guaranteed the ability to move at least one
hex during a friendly movement phase by expending all its MF
in order to do so at the very start of its move (no matter what
would otherwise be the exact numeric costs involved). Note,
however, that guarantee doesn’t allow units to enter hexes or
cross hexsides that are otherwise impassable.
10.4 Stack Movement.
To move together as a stack, units must begin a friendly movement
phase already stacked together in the same hex. Units
aren’t, however, required to move together simply because they
started a friendly movement phase in the same hex; such units
might be moved together, individually or in sub-stacks.
10.5 Splitting Stacks.
When moving a stack, you may halt it temporarily to allow a
unit or sub-stack to split off and move away on a separate course.
The units left behind in the original (or “parent”) stack may
then resume their own movement, even splitting off other units
if desired. Once you begin moving an entirely different parent
stack, or an individual unit that began in a different hex than
the currently moving parent stack, you may no longer resume
the movement of the earlier stack without your opponent’s
permission.
10.6 Terrain & Movement.
All terrain features on the map are classified into two broad categories:
natural and manmade. Both those categories are further
divided into different types (see below). There’s never more than
one type of natural terrain in any one hex, but more than one
type of manmade terrain may exist in the same hex.
10.7 Natural Terrain & Water Barriers.
There are the following types of natural terrain and hydrographic
features on the map: clear, mountain, marsh, river hexsides
and all-sea/lake/strait hexes and hexsides and Qattara Depres-
COUNTERFACT CT
RULES •
11

sion hexsides. The effects those various features have on the
movement of units are described below and are also summarized
on the Terrain Effects Chart (TEC) printed on the mapsheet for
quick reference during play.
10.16 Oilfields generate no movement costs on
their own; entry into oilfield hexes is determined
by the other terrain in their hex and any water barriers
around their hexsides.
10.8 Clear terrain is the “base” terrain of the
game; it’s devoid of any natural features that would
enhance defense or slow movement at this level of
operations. Each clear hex costs all ground units
one MP to enter. All city and major city hexes are considered to
otherwise be clear terrain.
10.9 Mountains.
Each mountain hex costs most units two MP to
enter.
10.17 Transport Line Movement.
The “transport line” hexes on the map represent
amalgamated representations of this region’s main
railroads and highways in 1949 (based on US Army
maps from that period). Therefore, as long as a moving unit
moves from one transport line hex to another transport line hex
by crossing a transport line hexside, that move only costs that
unit only one-half of a movement point. That is, all normal inhex
and hexside movement costs are suspended for units using
that kind of movement (but also see 12.6).
10.10 Marsh hexes cost two MP to enter.
10.11 River, Strait & Lake Hexsides.
These water barriers exist between hexes, along
the hexsides, rather than lying in-hex. Every such
hexside may generally be crossed by units by paying
one extra MP for that crossing. “Extra” means in
addition to whatever normal movement cost is
involved for the hex being entered. For all rules
purposes, the Dead Sea, Bahr al-Milh, Buhayrat
ath-Tharthar and Hawar al-Hammar (as well as
Lakes Van and Orumiyeh) are considered lakes
10.12 All-Sea hexes & Hexsides.
No movement or combat is generally allowed across
or into them, but see 10.20 below for the exception.
10.13 Qattara Depression hexsides may not be
crossed by any unit.
10.14 Manmade Terrain & Movement.
Manmade terrain exists in the following types:
cities, major cities, oilfields, transport lines and
border hexsides.
10.18 Cumulative Costs.
The total movement cost for entering any hex is always the sum
of all the applicable in-hex and hexside costs.
10.19 Multi-National Stack Movement & Geographic
Restrictions.
Within the nationally determined geographic restrictions given
below – and also printed on the mapsheet for quick reference
during play – international stacking and movement is allowed
without penalty for both sides. Note that SU, UK and US units
may potentially move anywhere on the map. Also note “Arab
units” are all Egyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese and Syrian units in
the counter-mix.
GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS
Nationalities
Albanian,
Bulgarian, Greek
Communist &
Yugoslavian
Arab, Greek,
Iranian, Israeli
& Turkish
Only Move & Fight In
Europe & Asiatic Turkey. May not
attack across the border hexsides
of Asiatic Turkey.
Anywhere in their own countries.
May attack, but not advance after
combat, across their respective
nation’s border hexsides.
10.15 Cities & Major Cities.
The cost for entering un-nuked city or major city
hexes is one MP for all units. Except for purposes
of adjudicating victory points (see section 4.0),
there are no functional differences between city
and major city hexes.
12 • COUNTERFACT CT
RULES

10.20 US/UK Sea Moves.
During each of that side’s first and second movement phases,
the Allied player may move-by-sea up to one full stack of US
and/or UK units. Each such move must begin and end in a
friendly controlled and un-nuked port. Units that make sea
moves may not move in any other way or attack that turn. That
latter condition remains in place no matter the phase sequence
being used that turn. Sea moves may not be made during Allied
Movement Phases in which a USMC amphibious landing is
made (see 9.6).
10.21 Paratroop Airdrops.
See 5.8, 6.5, 8.16, 8.17, 9.2, 9.4 and 11.23.
11.3 Multi-Hex Attacks.
An enemy occupied hex may be attacked in one battle by as
many of your units as you can bring to bear from one, some or
all the surrounding hexes; however, no more than one hex may
ever be the object of any one attack.
11.4 Indivisibility of Individual Units.
No single attacking unit may have its attack factor divided and
applied to more than one battle. Likewise, no defending unit
may have part of its defense factor attacked by one or a few
attackers while another part is attacked by others. No attacking
unit may attack more than once per combat phase, and no defending
unit may be attacked more than once per combat phase.
10.22 Soviet Black Sea Amphibious Move.
During the Communist set up (see 3.4) that player may place any
one Soviet (SU) combined arms army (with factors of 4-6/2-3)
in any unoccupied Turkish Black Sea coast hex from 3107 to
3217, inclusive. If that set up option isn’t taken, or it’s blocked
by there being one or more Turkish units in every one of those
hexes (unlikely), it may not be conducted later in the game.
11.0 COMBAT
11.1
Attacks take place between adjacent opposing units during the
combat phases in every player turn. Attacking is generally voluntary;
the mere fact of enemy unit adjacency doesn’t necessitate
your units launch attacks against those adjacent enemy units.
Both players are generally free to attack or not, as each chooses
on a case by case basis, during both of his own combat phases
in each turn throughout the game. (For the two exceptions, see
11.23 and 11.24 below.) The player whose combat phase it is, is
considered the “attacker,” and the other player is considered the
“defender,” no matter the general situation across the map.
11.2 Multiple Defenders in One Hex.
If there are two or more enemy units in a hex being attacked
by your units, you may only attack that stack as if it were one
combined defending unit.
11.5 Attack Sequencing.
There’s no arbitrary limit on the number of attacks each player
may resolve during his combat phases. The attacker need not declare
all his attacks beforehand, and he may resolve them in any
order he wishes, as long as the resolution of one is completed
before that of the next is begun.
11.6 Stacks Attacking & Defending.
It’s not necessary for all the units you have stacked in a given hex
to participate in the same attack. Some of the units in a stack
might attack into one hex while others attacked into some other
hex or simply didn’t attack at all. No defending unit may ever
refuse combat; all units in an attacked hex must participate in its
defense.
11.7 Combat Procedure.
Normally the attacking player should strive to have several times
more attack factors involved in a battle than the defender has
defense factors. Such battles are called “high odds” attacks. To
resolve such fights, the attacking player begins by calculating his
“odds.” Do that by adding together the attack factors of all the
attacking units involved in the battle; then add up the defense
factors of the enemy units defending in the battle. Divide the
defender-total into the attacker-total and round down any
remainder. For example, if 26 attack factors attack 7 defense
factors, the situation yields an odds ratio of 3:1 (“three to one”).
That is, 27÷7=3.71, which rounds down to 3. To turn that “3”
into a ratio, you must set a “1” next to it on the right. Thus “3”
becomes “3:1,” which corresponds to a column-heading on the
Combat Results Table (CRT) printed on the mapsheet.
COUNTERFACT CT
RULES •
13

11.8 Poor Odds Attacks.
Battles in which the attacking force has fewer combat factors
than the defender are called “poor odds attacks.” Procedures in
such situations are modified from what’s described above in that
here you divide the defender’s total by the attacker’s, round up
all remainders, and set the “1” on the left side of that result. For
example, if a force with 5 attack factors is attacking a force with
11 defense factors, it’s a poor odds attack. In that case, divide 11
by 5 (11÷5=2.2), and round up (2.2 becomes 3); then set a “1”
on the left of that “3,” yielding odds of 1:3 (“one to three”).
11.9 CRT Odds Limits.
Note the column headings on the CRT range from 1:2 to 6:1.
Final odds greater than 6:1 are resolved at 6:1. Odds less than
1:2 always receive automatic “2/0” results.
11.10 Odds Shifters.
Combat odds may be modified by the terrain in the defender’s
hex and around its perimeter, as well as by other factors described
below. All applicable odds shifters are cumulative in
their effects. That is, in every battle, all applicable shifts are applied
to get one final left or right shift. Leftward shifts favor the
defender; rightward shifts favor the attacker.
11.16 Combat Air Support.
If you conduct one or more attacks and/or defenses within one
or more of your airpower marker’s ranges, those combats get a
one-column odds shift in your side’s favor. That bonus is never
increased beyond one odds shift per battle, however, even if a
particular combat is in range of more than one marker.
11.17 Concentric Attack.
If a defending hex is attacked by units in opposite hexes, or by
units from three surrounding hexes with one hex between each
and the next attacker-occupied hex, or by units from more than
three hexes, that attack may be eligible to receive the “concentric
attack” one-column right odds shift bonus. The concentric shift
is never awarded for attacks into city or major city hexes (nuked
or not), but is otherwise always available when the attacking
units are positioned as described above.
11.18 Final Combat Resolution.
After all applicable odds shifts have been applied, the attacker
rolls a die and cross-indexes that result beneath that proper odds
ratio column to get a “combat result.” For example, a result of
“6” rolled for an attack made at 3:1 odds yields a combat result
of “2/1.”
11.11 Clear Terrain.
Units defending in clear terrain hexes devoid of all other terrain
features derive no benefit to their defense.
11.12 Mountains.
Units defending in mountain hexes receive a one-column-left
(1L) benefit on that account.
11.13 Marsh.
Units defending in marsh hexes derive no benefit to their
defense.
11.14 River, Straits & Lake Hexsides.
If all the attacking units in a battle are attacking across any
combination of these types of water barrier hexsides, that attack
suffers a one-column-left (1L) odds shift on that account.
11.15 Cities & Major Cities.
Shift the odds one column leftward (1L), and no concentric attack
bonus (see 11.17 below) is ever possible when attacking any
defenders in a city or major city.
11.19 Combat Results given in terms of steps lost by the
involved forces of one or both sides. The number printed to
the left of each result’s slash applies to the involved attacking
units; the number printed to the right of the slash applies to the
involved defending units. For example, a combat result of “1/2”
would mean the involved attacking force must lose a total of one
step, while the involved defending units must lose a total of two
steps. In each battle the defender must always completely absorb
his combat result before the attacker absorbs his. There is never
any carry over of a combat result from one battle into any other
battle or phase or turn. Any combat losses in excess of those
involved are ignored.
11.20 Apportioning Losses.
Within the strictures given above, both players are always free to
apportion his own side’s step losses among his involved attacking
or defending units as he sees fit.
11.21 Advance-After-Combat.
At the end of every attack, whenever the defender’s hex is left
empty of all units, the victorious surviving attacking units may
14 • COUNTERFACT CT
RULES

advance-after-combat into that hex. Stacking limitations must be
observed. Such advances aren’t part of normal movement; they
don’t cost any MP, but advancing units must still observe normal
terrain prohibitions. Advancing-after-combat is an option; it’s
never mandatory; however, the decision to advance must be
made immediately after the battle is resolved and before that of
another is begun. It’s not necessary for advancing attackers to
stack-full the newly won hex; the victorious player may send just
one or a few units. There’s never any defender advance-aftercombat;
victorious defenders and simply hold in place.
11.22 Multi-National Attacks & Defenses.
Within the strictures given in 10.19, multi-national attacks and
defense are permitted for both sides without any special considerations
or penalties or bonuses.
11.25 US 1st Marine Division is said to be deployed whenever
any three or four of the USMC units in the counter-mix
are in the same hex. Whenever that situation pertains, all Allied
defenses in that hex, and all Allied attacks including that hex
within the attacking force, gain a one-column-shift in favor of
the Allied side.
11.26 US/UK Coastal Combat Bonus.
Whenever US and/or UK units are defending in, or attacking
into, a coastal hex (which includes gulf hexes and hexsides), that
combat receives a one-column odds shift in favor of the US/UK
force. Also note the presence of other Allied nationalities in no
way serves to negate this bonus, as long as one or more involved
units is US or UK.
11.23 Paratroop Air Assaults.
If a US or SU paratroop drop is made into a hex containing one
or more enemy units, a special kind of in-hex battle must immediately
be fought there. Normal combat procedures are followed
except only in-hex terrain is taken into account and no units
from outside the airdrop hex may participate in the battle in
any way. If the drop is being made within the range of a friendly
airpower marker, those planes do contribute their combat bonus
to the paratroop attack. Further, at the end of the battle’s resolution,
if there are one or more surviving units on either side,
recalculate the odds and run another round of combat on that
basis. Keep that up until either all the landing paratroopers or
all the defenders have been annihilated. Further in this regard,
also see rules 5.8, 6.5, 8.16, 8.17, 9.2 and 9.4.
11.24 USMC Amphibious Landings.
If a USMC unit or stack is making an amphibious landing (see
9.6 & 10.20) into a hex containing one or more enemy units,
a special kind of in-hex battle must immediately be fought
there. Normal combat procedures are generally followed. If the
invasion is being made within the range of a friendly airpower
marker, those planes do contribute their combat bonus to the
Marines’ attack, and rules 11.25 and 11.26 below also pertain.
Further, at the end of the battle’s resolution, if there are one or
more surviving units on either side, recalculate the odds and
run another round of combat on that basis. Keep that up until
either all the landing Marines or all the defenders have been
annihilated.
12.0 ATOMIC ATTACKS &
US PRESTIGE
12.1 First Use.
On Turn 1, the Allied player may not make any atomic attacks.
On subsequent turns that stricture is no longer in effect, and he
may potentially make any number of such attacks.
12.2 Targeting Eligibility.
Any hex on the map may be attacked
atomically (“nuked”)
by the Allied player,
provided it’s not in
range of one or more
Communist airpower
markers at
the time.
Enemy
unit presence
isn’t needed in order to allow
for an attack to be made into
a hex. No off-map Communist
units may be nuked until they are in
play on the map.
12.3 Atomic Attack Timing.
Within the strictures given above, at any time during
any his own side’s movement
or combat phases,
COUNTERFACT CT
RULES •
15

the Allied player may pause his non-atomic activities and say: “I
will now conduct an atomic attack!”
12.4 Attack Resolution.
The Allied player should openly roll a die and then consult the
Atomic Attack Terrain DRM (Dice Roll Modifiers) Table to
get a final numeric result. The dice roll result is reduced by the
modifier given for the terrain type in the hex where the attack is
taking place. Note that the presence of one or more atomic blast
detonation markers in a hex that’s being nuked again in no way
affects which terrain line on the DRM Table is to be used for the
new attack.
12.5 Atomic Attack Results.
The final numeric result obtained using the process above is the
number of steps the Communist player must immediately eliminate
within the attacked hex. He’s free to eliminate and reduce
his involved units in any way he sees fit in order to satisfy the
overall step-loss requirement. It’s possible no step losses will be
required. Even so, all atomic attacks result in the disruption of
all the surviving units in the target hex. Show that by placing the
mushroom cloud marker atop such units, keeping it there until
that turn’s Administrative Phase, when it would be moved to a
position below the units and their disruption is ended. Disrupted
Communist units grant their attackers a 1R column shift.
12.7 US Prestige Loss.
Every turn, if/when the Allied player makes that side’s first
atomic attack, he must, immediately after resolving the attack
itself, openly roll another die. He halves that result, rounding
down any remainder to get a final result of zero through three
(which procedure is abbreviated as “1d6/2rd”). The Communist
player then adds that amount of VP to his total.
A second attack during the same turn requires another such
roll, but that time the halved result is rounded up if there’s any
remainder (“1d6/2ru”).
A third attack in a turn gets that same second-attack procedure,
but then a one is also added to it (“1d6/2ru+1).
Fourth and subsequent attacks in a turn get that same thirdattack
treatment, but then a two is added to it (“1d6/2ru+2”) .
Also note, in all attacks, if the target hex was until then an unnuked
city the Soviet player increases his rolled VP by another
one point, or by two in the case of major cities.
A table is printed on the map to keep track of the number of
atomic attacks made each turn.
12.6 Atomic Detonation Markers.
Within the strictures given above, there’s no limit on the
number of times any given hex may be nuked per turn or over
the course of an entire game. Each time a strike is made into a
hex, no matter the operational result, place a mushroom cloud
detonation (a.k.a. “blast”) marker there (see 2.11). If there are
one or more blast markers in a hex, the normal entry costs for
the in-hex terrain there are increased by one (total, no matter
how many markers are present). If one or more hexes become
multiply nuked, feel free to remove all the markers but one,
since the effects of each blast aren’t cumulative.
Copyright © 2019 One Small Step,
Bowie, MD

Hussite
Tanks Prefigured?
by Jim Bloom
Photo Credit: US wikimedia commons
Battle Of Lipany.
COUNTERFACT • 21

Some surveys of the background to the
development of modern armor doctrine
find precedents for the tank as far back as
Hyksos, Philistine and Egyptian chariots.
All that’s really just pop history, however, a patching
together synthetic parallels for dramatic effect.
The chariot was initially only a weapons carrier
for infantry – the British World War II Bren carrier
and the Humvee of Desert Storm fame come to mind
rather than Guderian’s panz er columns. Somewhat
later there was an effort to employ chariots to break
enemy infantry formations, but the elephant proved
more effective in that role until ways were devised to
defeat those temperamental beasts. More properly,
then, the battlefield innovations pioneered by legend-
The Hussite Wars
1419 – 36
Magdeburg
Kulmbach
MECKLENBURG
Havel
BRANDENBURG
Elbe
22 • COUNTERFACT
Saale
Leipzig
SAXONY
1430
Nuremberg
Regensburg
Eger
BAVARIA
Torgau
Dresden
Altenburg
Eger
Spree
Oder
Stettin
Bernau
Berlin
1427
Brandenburg
Frankfurt
Plauen
Tachau
Upper
Palatinate
Possessions of:
Luxemburgs
Habsburgs
Wettins
Hohenzollerns
Hussite core territory
Cottbus
Guben
Bautzen
Prague
BOHEMIA
Pilsen
Mies
Taus
Passau
LUSATIA
Saaz
Areas of most intense fighting
Main Battles
Main Axes of Advance
Aussig
Neumark
Lipan
Tabor
Danube
POMERANIA
Lauban
Gorlitz
Friedeburg
Deutschbrod
Zwettl Krems
Warta
Liegnitz
Breslau
Brieg
SILESIA
1427
Nachod
Koniggratz
Konitz
Brunn
Iglau
1427
MORAVIA
1425
AUSTRIA
1433
Vienna
March
Danzig
Dirschau
TEUTONIC KNIGHTS
Posen (Poznan)
POLAND
Neisse
1428
Pressburg
Schwetz
Thorn
ary Hussite warrior Jan Ziska in the early 15 th century
were at least somewhat relevant to the creation of
armored warfare than the foregoing examples, though
even that analogy is, as are most historical comparisons,
still not perfect.
That last caveat is true because there were several
notable pre-Ziska theoretical speculations as to the
employment of vehicle-mobile firepower. Even so,
they were fanciful musings on a concept of a force
multiplier rather than thought out practical blueprints
for their production and deployment. For
example, the often noted tank sketches of Leonardo
da Vinci are really no more precursors of the modern
tank than are the ancient near eastern chariots. They
were really only reveries about battlefield wish lists.
More recently, during the ascendancy of
the eminent Prussian military theorist Moltke
the Elder, there was another, generally overlooked,
effort to rely on the Hussite precedent
to solve modern battlefield problems. That is,
Vistula
Waag
HUNGARY
Komorn
Gleiwitz
0 50 Miles 100
150
0 50 100 150 200
Km
250
soon after the successful Prussian campaign
against the Danes in 1864, and just before the
Austro -Prussian Seven Weeks War, one Lt.
Col. Kammby took a stab at reviving the Hussite
system in his treatise, The Battlewagon: A
Historical Study with Observations on the Unique
Features and the Employment of the Battle wagon.
That essay was discussed in a long footnote by
the famous historian of warfare Hans Delbruck
in his classic work, History of the Art of
War, and it bears reexamination here.
Kammby believed a battlewagon of the
future could act as a combat arm, functioning
as a blend between cavalry and infantry. He
further imagined such vehicles could be used,
like cav alry, to bring shock action against the
enemy and break his formations.
That portion of Kammby’s idea was strikingly
similar to the tank concepts prevalent by
the late 1930s, but he also incorpo rated the
countervailing notion of the tank as a shield
and lead element for advancing infantry. He
wrote just before internal-combustion engine
propulsion became feasible, and he therefore
envisioned what was merely a more efficient
and agile application of the Hussites’ animaldrawn
vehicles.
Apart from Delbruck, however, no one
seems to have noticed the proposed new

possibility for the Hussite derivative. By the time
agricultural caterpillar tractors were being appraised
for possible military applications, around
1905, the Ziska episode was of obscure historical
interest only.
Hussite Baptism of Fire
The opening clash between their enemies and
the Hussites came at a time still early in the developmental
stage of the wagon-fort. The siege of
Prague occurred at a time when the devices were
still just an improvised expedient rather than a
deliberately planned system.
At the onset of the Papal call to arms against
them, the heretic Hussites instinctively went on
the defensive, seizing whatever fortified towns
and castles they could and throwing up earthwork
defenses wherever feasible. Such quantities of the
new handheld firearms as could be seized from
the armories of Czech nobles were dispersed
among the ranks of their peasant throng, who
were otherwise mostly armed with converted
agricultural imple ments and crossbows.
Ziska had appreciated the potential of the
wagon-fort tactic before the start of the Holy Roman
imperial drive to sup press the Czech rebellion.
Czech Units in had implemented the method
to a small extent during the reign of Venceslas IV, in
fighting which Ziska had taken part.
The only access route to Prague was through a relatively
open flank of the siege guarded by a spiny ridge
called Ziskov Hill. That was the Imperialists’ obvious
focal point for opera tions. Ziska, aware of the hill’s
crucial location, has tened to reinforce the existing
watchtower on its summit by throwing up two wooden
bulwarks and digging ramparts strengthened with
stones, all fronted by a ditch. Several field guns were
placed in back of the rampart, but the configuration
of the terrain didn’t allow the use of true wagon-forts.
The Imperialist operations around Prague were
marked by their inability to coordinate the efforts of
the various factions among their knights. Their offensives
tended to unravel whenever some units failed to
act in a timely way, either due to a lack of enthusiasm
or poor communications. Ziska’s men were even able
to take one of the surrounding enemy held castles
from its gar rison, though there again there was no
scope for employ ing wagon-forts.
Eberhard Windeck with Hans von Polenz and his forces overwhelming those of the Hussites
and their armoured carriages in a bloody battle (11 November 1429).
From this experience, however, what Ziska learned
was that a tightly knit and coordinated defense could
lure the inflexible chivalry to throw themselves recklessly
against devastating firepower. He also perceived
how cracks in the Imperialist coalition prevented
them from making anything beyond lackadaisical and
disjointed thrusts, rather than launching a coordinated
and all out onslaught that might’ve overturned the
Hussites ability to check a deter mined heavy cavalry
charge. Those lessons had impli cations for occasions
when wagon-forts could be used.
It’s reliably estimated Jan Trocnov was born into
a gentry family in 1359. His nom de guerre, “Ziska,”
meaning in Czech “One Eyed,” was given him after
he’d lost an eye in combat. His service as a squire
was notable enough to gain him an appointment as a
hunter for the court of Bohemia’s King Wenceslas. As
a leader of royal hunting parties, Ziska gained further
experi ence in fieldcraft and marksmanship that
served him well in later years.
Photo Credit: US wikimedia commons / Illustrator aus der Werkstatt von Diebold Lauber
COUNTERFACT • 23

Ziska left the king’s service to join one of the antiimperial
guerrilla bands forming across Bohemia. It
was during that period of shifting alliances, raid and
counter-raid among the factions, that Ziska’s tactical
prowess attracted the attention of the Moravian
nobleman John Sokol of Lamberg.
Sokol had observed the ease with which Ziska
related to both peasants and the gentry — in short,
he got on well with all those who had little to lose in
opposing the empire. He also noted how Ziska was
uncommonly skilled at quickly adapting his plans of
attack and defense to take advantage of topography.
Sokol sought and got Ziska’s participation in an
expedition he was organizing to assist the King of Poland
against the incursions of the Teutonic Knights.
Those knights had at first pushed east with a Christianizing
mission against the hea then Lithuanians.
During that phase, Wenceslas support ed the German
crusade. In turn, the German knights came to esteem
Czech soldiers as among the finest in Europe and
actively recruited among them.
After the Lithuanians accepted Christianity, Czech
support for the continued colonialism of the knights
there evaporated. In fact, most in Bohemia and Moravia
then came to be sympathetic to the struggle of
fellow Slavs against German invaders. Czech soldiers
rallied to the Polish-Lithuanian standards. Of the
fifty such banners flying on the battlefield of Grunwald/Tannenberg
on 15 July 1410, five denoted units
comprised of Bohemian and Moravian volunteers.
Ziska was present at that bat tle, but it’s not known for
certain if he stayed at the Polish king’s headquarters
or took a position in the line.
Ziska was in fact Sokol’s eager student throughout
that campaign. As such, he experienced the movement
of large bodies of troops in full-scale combat,
and he ob served for the first time the effects of
massed gunpowder wea pons. He immediately grasped
the limitations that new technology placed on armored
cavalry when they had to fight en trenched
forces. Ziska was also able to study the way both sides
used the cover of their supply trains when driven back
on their camps.
While Ziska’s military art was being forged on
foreign fields, his homeland raged with its own wave
of religious and nationalistic upheaval. By the time
of his return there in 1412, the preaching of Jan Hus
had in flamed many of his countrymen.
On his return from Poland, Ziska took up residence
near Prague, once again entering the ser vice of
the court of Wenceslas, but this time as a bodyguard.
Since the queen worshiped at the chapel where Hus
preached, Ziska soon struck up a relationship with
the heretical pastor. In fact, along with most of the
royal retinue, he soon became an ardent devotee.
After the papal summons for a crusade, the Hussites
coalesced into war parties around four captains.
Ziska led the most militant faction, initially with
Battle on Vitkov Hill.
Photo Credit: US wikimedia commons / Painter Adolf Liebscher
24 • COUNTERFACT

some 400 followers – and, equally important as it
turned out, they also had a dozen farm carts.
Hussite Offensives
The portrayal of Ziska’s methods as being totally
defen sive, both tactically and strategically, is a simplification.
A few contemporary chroniclers recorded
the wagon-fort system employed in deep raiding
forays. One of the more fanciful of them, Aeneas
Sylvius, an official in the Papal court, was particularly
interested in recording the astounding performance
of the Hussite armies.
In one of his descriptions, he wrote of their wagon
columns moving across an open field to engage formations
of knights as the latter were advancing to
attack. The Hussite column, according to Sylvius,
would cut the charg ing knights into isolated groups
by forming various letters of the alphabet, all directed
by the use of flag signals.
Elsewhere he mentions extended flying columns of
rush ing war carts firing their cannon broadside into
the flanks of surrounded Imperial forces. Though
that was surely an exag geration, Ziska’s warriors did
become imbued with a spirit of invincibility as their
victories mounted.
The loose ag glomerations of Imperial knights
tended to become unnerved merely upon hearing
the thunderous war anthems chanted from in side
the lumbering wagon trains. As early as 1423, Ziska
con ducted a bold experiment, leading an expedition
into Hun gary only to quickly bring it back when the
limitations of the wagon-fort system for the strategic
offensive manifested themselves.
The exaggerated drill-like precision in combat
attributed to the Hussites by Sylvius and his like
was surmised rather than observed. The Hungarian
expedition (along with others launched later into
other enemy heartlands; see the map) was only possible
because of the fearful reputation the Hussites
had already earned for themselves. The Germans,
Mor avians, Hungarians and others whose lands were
raided in that way didn’t challenge the plundering
processions of Bohemian wagon-forts for that same
reason. Had the Imperialists been bold and flexible
enough to attack the extended files of wagons while
they were moving through constricting terrain, the
vaunted wagon-fort system would’ve been literally
stopped in its tracks.
Conclusion
The complexity and precise calibration demand ed
by what amounted to the semi-mobile barricade-andcounterattack
system of the Hussite wagon-forts presupposed
a degree of dedication and steadfastness not
customarily associated with medieval armyies. Only
an inspired and talented leader the likes of Ziska,
along with the fanatic sense of duty and zeal of the
hymn-singing Hussite throngs, could’ve made it work.
It’s also significant the system was only effective
against an enemy armed and led like the plodding
and inflexible knight ly orders pitted against them.
Once opposed by a similarly constituted force, such
as at the fratricidal showdown at Lipany, results were
indecisive.
The wagon-fort system was later taken up briefly
by various German duchies in the latter half of the
15 th century. As field artillery became more mobile
and flexible, however, the wagon bulwarks turned
into-more of an impediment than a shelter. They had
completely fallen out of use by the time of the start of
the Thirty Years War in 1618.
We can therefore put aside the vision of the wagon-forts
as some kind of land battle fleet, armored
train or panzer prototype. If a modern analogy is
needed, then perhaps the Germans’ towed-into-place
anti- tank gun “Pakfront” of World War II is most
suitable. Similar to that German defensive method
used against the Soviet juggernaut in 1943-45, Ziska
employed what amounted to an anvil-and-hammer
tactical scheme. CF
The Hussite Wagenburg - an old sketch from the 15th century.
Photo Credit: US wikimedia commons / Illustrator Unkown
COUNTERFACT • 25

y Carl O. Schuster
Photo Credit: Indian Navy photo / http://indiannavy.nic.in
26 • COUNTERFACT

India’s economy and diplomatic clout have been growing steadily over
the last 15 years. With that growth has come a geographic expansion
of the country’s interests and concerns, reinforced by changes in the
strategic and security environment.
Russia has moved closer to China, and China’s expanding power and
more assertive geostrategic activities, particularly at sea, have combined with
maritime piracy and terrorist threats to change India’s national security
requirements.
Indian Navy flotilla of Western Fleet escort INS Vikramaditya (R33) and INS Viraat (R22) in the Arabian Sea.
COUNTERFACT • 27

India has responded by laying the foundation to
become a major diplomatic, economic and maritime
regional power. The country’s leadership envisions
maritime power as making a critical contribution to
India’s rise as a power. The navy’s role in that evolving
national security strategy has three major components:
protecting the nation’s strategic interests,
commerce and its relationships with its allies. In that
role, the navy is not just a protector of the seas but
also a visible arm of India’s diplomacy and expanding
overseas presence.
Officially released on 10 October 2015, the Indian
Navy’s strategy is titled: “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian
Maritime Security Strategy.” It reflects that service’s
response to the country’s economic growth, expanding
maritime trade, increased technological base and
the emerging diversity and strength of the threats
facing it.
With over 90 percent of India’s external trade volume
moving by sea, and its geographically expanding
economic interests, investments and markets dependent
on the maritime domain, maintaining oceanic
security and stability at ever greater distances from its
own coasts has become a vital strategic requirement.
Moreover, Asia’s growing economic strength has
shifted the world’s geo-strategic focus from a Euro-
Atlantic to an Indo-Pacific one. The Indian Navy
is therefore changing its operations and maritime
footprint to reflect that shift. India’s 21 st century
resurgence, if it is to continue, is seen as being inconvertibly
linked to secure global seas in general and
those of the Indian Ocean more particularly. India’s
ISRAEL
EGYPT
SUDAN
JORDAN
ERITREA
ETHIOPA
IRAQ
SAUDI
ARABIA
YEMEN
DJIBOUTI
U.A.E.
IRAN
OMAN
AFGH.
PAKISTAN
Gwadar Naval Base &
Surveillance Facilities
Mumbai
Karwar
Kochi
INDIA
NEPAL
SRI LANKA
BHU.
BANG.
Upgraded
MYANMAR
Port Facility
Chittagong
Port Facility
Visakhapatnam
Commercial Naval Base
Surveillance
Port Blair
Facility
Andaman Is.
Kra Canal
LAOS
THAILAND
VIETNAM
CAMBODIA
CHINA
Tropic of Cancer
Hainan Is.
Sanya
Submarine Base
Woody Is.
South China
Sea
SOMALIA
Maldives
Hambantota
MALAYSIA
KENYA
Seychelles
Equator
INDIAN OCEAN
Sumatra
Borneo
INDONESIA
TANZANIA
Diego Garcia
Java
MOZAMBIQUE
MADAGASCAR
Indian listening
stations
Mauritius
Tropic of Capricorn
Indian Facilities
Chinese Facilities (String of Pearls)
US Naval Base
2000 Km
1000 Miles
Sino-Indian Strategic Competition
in the Indian Ocean, 2019
28 • COUNTERFACT

leaders also see secure sea lines of communications
and freedom of navigation on the world ocean as essential
to the security of its citizens living and working
overseas. With all that in mind, the revised strategy
has increased focus on the following.
INS Vikramaditya in Baltic Sea during her trails in 2013.
• Increasing the safety and security of seaborne
trade and energy routes, especially in the Indian
Ocean Region (IOR).
• The crucial importance of maintaining freedom
of navigation and strengthening the international
legal regime at sea, particularly the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).
• The considerable value in undertaking cooperation
and coordination among various allied
navies to counter common threats at sea.
The new strategy contrasts with its 2007 predecessor,
which was titled “Freedom to Use the Sea’s:
India’s Maritime Strategy,” in three ways. First, it puts
a greater emphasis on multi-agency and international
security collaboration. Second, it defines an expanding
area of Indian interest as stretching all across the
IOR. Third, it calls for innovation and technological
cooperation between Indian industry and its military
in order to further the attainment of those first two
new goals.
In contrast, the earlier strategy focused almost
entirely on military operations on and over the sea
to ensure India’s freedom to use local sea lanes. It included
a call for some cooperation among the service
branches, but it emphasized sea control as the navy’s
primary mission across all levels of conflict.
There was little discussion of the actual means of
power projection in the 2007 strategy, nor were cyber
or netcentric operations even mentioned. The new
strategy emphasizes both.
Also, the earlier strategy contained little mention
of coastal and terrorist threats, since they hadn’t yet
manifested a maritime component. That changed
with the 2008 Mumbai attack, in which terrorists
infiltrated that city from the sea via a fishing vessel
they’d seized. As a result of that attack and the onset
of piracy in the Indian Ocean, the new strategy places
a greater emphasis on countering piracy and terrorism.
INS Vikramaditya in Baltic Sea during her trails in 2013.
Maritime security is more complex today than ever
before. It’s now perceived as being multi-dimensional,
meaning it emanates across the three dimensions of
the physical world into and through the electro-magnetic
spectrum an on to the cyber-dimension.
Even within just the traditional physical maritime
battlespace, security concerns have become diverse
and their strategic counters almost contradictory. For
example, non-state threats such as terrorism and piracy
typically employ “low tech” weapons and tactics,
hiding among innocent maritime activities to strike in
a fashion not unlike insurgents ashore. Patrolling can
deter such attacks while naval and coast guard units
are actually present, but as is often the case in fighting
guerrilla armies ashore, the enemy rarely strikes
when sufficient force is present to ensure their defeat.
Also, high-tech weapons are often ineffective
against such asymmetric opponents. Thus, countering
that kind of maritime threat requires differently
armed ships and a mixture of traditional and innovative
operations and tactics. Those kinds of operations
will differ significantly from countering a peer-state
maritime opponent who most likely is equipped with
high-tech sensors and weapons. Yet the nation’s mari-
Photo Credit: Indian Navy photo / http://indiannavy.nic.in
COUNTERFACT • 29

Photo Credit: National Archives at College Park / JO1 Todd Macdonald, USN
The India Navy, Delhi Class Destroyer, INS MYSORE (D 60) leads the way during the opening day of Exercise MALABAR 04,
conducted off the coast of India, in the Indian Ocean.
Hindustan Shipyard at Visakhapatnam, India. Where the INS
Arihant was built and where it will be launched.
Photo Credit: US Wikimedia Commons / Adityamadhav83
time security forces must be prepared to face both
kinds of opponents.
India is therefore both expanding and modernizing
all its naval components. It has bought and is
building newer and more capable aircraft carriers to
replace the aging ones that served the fleet for over
30 years. The naval air arm is also acquiring modern
aircraft to replace the Cold War-era platforms that
dominate its current inventory.
The submarine force is also benefitting from the
new national interest in naval forces. In addition to
receiving new units, it is also acquiring new weapons,
many developed in partnership with other countries.
For example, the BrahMos supersonic anti-ship cruise
missile (ASCM) was developed in partnership with
Russia and will be carried by aircraft, surface warships
and submarines. A land-based version is being supplied
to the army, and both versions are likely to be
sold to Vietnam to help that nation face the growing
Chinese threat in the South China Sea. Finally, India
is testing its first submarine launched ballistic missile,
adding a naval component to their strategic nuclear
forces.
30 • COUNTERFACT

Ship/Aircraft Type
TODAY 2025
estimated
Ship/Aircraft Type
TODAY 2025
estimated
CTOL Aircraft Carrier 0 1
Ski Jump Aircraft Carrier 2 2
CG 0 1
DDG 10 15
FF/FFG 14 20
Corvette 23 24
PC 27 30
MSO 6 6
SSBN 0 1**
SSN 1* 2
SSB 0 1-2**
SS 14 14
LPD 1 3
LST 5 6
LSM 4 4
Mini-Submarines
AO/AOE 4 6
Naval Aircraft
Carrier Fighters:
MiG-29
AV-8 Harrier
Teja
Maritime Patrol/ASW:
Il-38
Tu-142
P-8i
Medium Range MPA
Do228
Follow-On
33
8
0
5
8
8
8
0
34
0
24
0
0
14
0
12
Amphibian SAR: US-2 0 12
UAVs/Mk-8 24 36-48
Carrier AWACS 0 4
Attack Helicopters 0 8***
AEW Helicopters: Ka-31 2 4
ASW Helicopters:
Ka-31
Ka-28
SH-70
SH-3 Sea King
Transport/SAR Helicopters:
Follow-On
H-3 Sea King
SA-319 Alouette
2
12
0
35
0
12***
8
Abbreivations
CTOL = Conventional Takeoff & Landing
CG = Guided Missile Cruiser
DDG = Guided Missile Destroyer
FF/FFG = Frigate/Guided Missile Frigate
PC = Patrol Craft (Coastal Patrol)
MSO = Oceangoing Minesweeper
SSBN = Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile
Submarine
SSB = Conventionally Powered Ballistic
Missile Submarine
SSN = Nuclear Powered Attack Submarine
SS = Conventionally Powered Attack
Submarine
LPD = Landing Platform Dock Ship
LST = Tank Landing Ship
LSM = Medium Landing Ship
Mini-Submarines = 2-4 Man Submarines
Used in Unconventional Warfare
AO/AOE = Fleet Logistics Support Ships
ASW = Anti-Submarine Warfare
SAR = Search and Rescue
AWACS = Airborne Warning and Control
System Aircraft
Notes
*Leased from Russia
**Costs Will Impact Choice of Ballistic Missile
Submarine Design & Propulsion.
***Used to Support Indian Maritime
Commando (US SEAL equivalent),
Amphibious Operations by the Marine
Brigade & General Fleet Logistics
14
4
18-24
0
12-24***
0-4
0
Photo Credit: Background vector created by Freepik
COUNTERFACT • 31

In theory, the called-for naval construction program
will provide a powerful fleet with significant
strategic and operational power projection capabilities
by 2025. Of course, like all such plans, India’s new
strategy faces many challenges to its stated goals.
India’s defense budget deliberations have always
difficult, and the country faces land-based threats
of immediate concern that also demand resources.
There are three ongoing insurgencies, while jihadist
terrorism poses a potential threat to the country and
its Hindu population. India also shares land borders
with two overtly hostile countries, China and Pakistan,
with the latter being the more immediate and
constant threat.
For example, Pakistan continues its clandestine
sponsorship of terrorist attacks in India, which triggered
an Indian retaliatory special forces raid on
29 September 2016. Near daily artillery exchanges
along the Kashmir line of control in the far north are
another constant reminder of the Pakistani threat.
Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons adds a
potentially catastrophic dimension to all that. Finally,
Pakistan’s ally China, against whom India fought a
war in 1960-62, maintains a significant military presence
along and near the Sino-Indian frontier.
The resources required to counter and deter those
threats will compete with the naval budget. Despite
those challenges, India will certainly expand its
navy and naval operations over the next decade, the
only question being what degree of success they will
achieve. CF
SOURCES
Defence Staff Writer. “India Set to Participate in
Multinational Exercise in the South China Sea,” India Times,
01 May 16.
Dhowan, Adm. R. K., Chief of Naval Staff. Ensuring Secure
Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy. Indian Navy
National Security Publication (NSP12), Ministry of Defence,
10 October 2015.
Go, Yamada. “As China Rises, India Asserts Itself,” Nikkei
Asian Review, 2 April 2015.
Mehta, Adm. Sureesh, Chief of Naval Staff. Indian Military
Doctrine Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence
(Navy), 2009 updated on 16 February 2016.
Patrick Cronin and Darshana Baruah, “The Modi Doctrine
for the Indo-Pacific Maritime Region,” The Diplomat, 2 Dec.
2014.
Rout, Hemant Kumr. “Maiden Test of Undersea K-4 Missile
From Arihant Submarine,” India Express, 09 April 2016.
32 • COUNTERFACT

COUNTERFACT • 33

Compare
& Contrast
Germany’s
The vast scope of Operation Barbarossa
has long obscured the fact the largest
tank battles in history took place from
June to August 1941 in the western
border districts of the Soviet Union, where more than
13,000 Red Army tanks clashed with 3,400 German
panzers. In less than three weeks of fighting, the
Soviets lost some 12,000 of those tanks versus the
Germans’ roughly 400.
At the end of six months, some 20,500 Red Army
tanks had been destroyed in further tank battles.
Many of those vehicles, more than 4,000 in all, were
BT-7 models from the 21 tanks corps of the Leningrad,
Baltic, Western, Odessa, Moscow, Kiev and
Kharkov Military Districts. More than 1,700 additional
BT-7s equipped five tank corps of the Central
Asian, Caucasus, Baikal and Far Eastern Military
Districts, which weren’t involved in the fighting.
Opposing them were 660 Panzer 38(t)s distributed
among five panzer divisions. (The “t” stands for “formerly
Czechoslovakian,” which in German is spelled
“Tschechoslowakei.”)
To compare the fighting abilities of both tanks and
their crews early on in the conflict, one engagement,
in which Brig. Gen. Hans Freiherr von Funck’s 7 th
Panzer Division clashed with the Col. Fedor Fedorov’s
5 th Tank Division, in the border region of East Prussia
and Lithuania on the Suwalki-Alytus-Vilnius axis,
during the first few days of the conflict, provides an
instructive overall example.
Organized into a panzer regiment and a motorized
infantry brigade with two motorized rifle regiments
34 • COUNTERFACT

y Gilberto Villahermosa
Panzer 38(t)
vs.
USSR’s BT-7
(along with support elements), Funck’s division,
battle hardened in France under Erwin Rommel the
year before, began with 265 combat vehicles. There
were: 53 Panzer IIs, 167 Panzer 38(t)s, seven Panzer
38(t) command tanks, 30 Panzer IVs and eight Panzer
III command tanks.
Fedorov’s division, which had participated in the
invasion of Poland and the Soviet occupation of Lithuania
in 1939, but lacked true combat experience,
was organized into two tank and one motorized rifle
regiment (with support elements). It entered combat
with 268 tanks and 76 armored cars, including: 170
BT-7s, 18 T-26 light tanks, 30 T-28 multi-turreted medium
tanks and 50 of the newly deployed T-34s.
Technically, the Red Army division outclassed its
German counterpart with 80 medium tanks (T-34s
and T-28s) versus only 30 medium Panzer IVs. The
Germans, however, seemingly possessed superiority in
light tanks over the Soviets, with 220 Panzer IIs and
Panzer 38(t)s arrayed against 188 BT-7s and T-26s.
Even so, when the Soviet armored cars – many carrying
the same 45mm gun found on the BT-7 and T-26
– are added to the equation, the Soviets can be seen
to have effectively outnumbered the Germans in light
armored fighting vehicles.
Seized from the Czechoslovakian military after the
bloodless takeover of that country in 1938, and used
primarily in the mechanization of the German horse
cavalry units, the Panzer 38(t)s took part in the invasions
of Poland in 1939 and France in 1940. After
the latter campaign it underwent modifications to
improve its combat performance and better integrate
COUNTERFACT • 35

Panzer 38T
it into German
service. Those upgrades primarily focused on increasing
armor protection, with emphasis on shielding the
four-man crew.
By the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, the
Panzer 38(t) had become a mainstay vehicle within
the German mechanized force, replacing the Panzer
III in many units and equipping five of the 17 panzer
divisions. In fact, they represented about 20 percent
of all the tanks (almost 700) taking part in opening of
the campaign against the Soviet Union.
Weighing 9.8 tons and equipped with a 37mm gun
and two 7.92mm machineguns, the Panzer 38(t) was
the only German tank of foreign origin to remain in
production for the duration of the war. It easily outclassed
both the German-designed Panzer I (equipped
only with machineguns) and Panzer II (armed with a
20mm cannon), which made up the bulk of the early
panzer force. It was also heavier and better armored
than those German contemporaries but, as was soon
discovered in Poland and France, the Panzer 38(t) was
still susceptible to Allied anti-tank artillery and antitank
rifles.
The BT-7 (“BT” stands for the Russian language
term for “Fast Tank”) had entered the Soviet inventory
in 1931 as a “cavalry” (reconnaissance) tank,
and it was a curious amalgamation of US and Soviet
technology. Initially based on an imported US model
design by Walter Christie, the follow-on Soviet variants
departed from that origin, particularly in terms
of armament.
The BT-7 saw its combat debut in 1937 in the
Spanish Civil War, and was also used against the Japanese
Army along the Mongolian frontier
in 1938-39. It participated in the Soviet invasion
of Poland in 1939 and the Winter War with
Finland that same year. By June 1941 more than
5,500 BT-7s had been built. (Sadly for the
Soviets, an estimated 70 percent
of their entire light tank park of
BT-7s and T-26s were down for
maintenance when the Germans
invaded.)
Weighing 13.8 tons and armed
with a 45mm gun and two 7.62mm
machineguns, the BT-7 wasn’t as well
armored as the Panzer 38(t). Though
faster than their enemy counterpart, its three-man
crew had their hands full in combat as compared to
the German vehicle’s four-man crew.
Technically, the two vehicles were fairly evenly
matched. The BT-7’s 45mm gun had better armor
penetration at 100 meters, while the Panzer 38(t)’s
37mm gun had better penetration at 500 meters.
Thus the Red Army tankers sought to close to within
100 meters before engaging, while their opponents
sought to engage from standoff distances beyond 100
meters. As the border battles would show, however,
tank warfare is actually much more than just a clash
between armor, firepower and mobility.
The two divisions started engaging on the first day
of Barbarossa, when a small detachment of BA-10
armored cars from 5 th Tank encountered elements of
7 th Panzer outside Alytus as the Germans lunged for
the two bridges across the Neman River in the northern
and southern parts of that town. The Germans
secured both bridges quickly, but the battle grew intensity
when they tried to cross and expand a bridgehead.
A T-34 knocked out a Panzer IV and a T-28
rammed and destroyed a Panzer 38(t) in the north,
while BT-7s firing from hull-down positions knocked
out six German tanks in the south.
Both sides fed more and more forces into the
battle, with the Soviet division launching BT-7s and
T-34s in unsupported and piecemeal counterattacks
all during the afternoon. Time after time, the German
tanks shot up the Soviet counter-attacks. In comparison
to the Germans, the Soviet tank crews didn’t
have good situational awareness, and they maneuvered
with no central direction. (Every German tank
carried a two-way radio, while only Soviet command
tanks – easily identifiable to German gunners due to
36 • COUNTERFACT

their outside antenna arrays – had them.)
The Red Army tanks were relentlessly picked off
by the German tanks and field guns. By the end of
the day, the Germans had put out of action 85 Soviet
tanks; though Soviet accounts suggest about half of
those losses were due to mechanical breakdown and
other mishaps. German sources listed their own losses
for the day at 11 tanks, including four Panzer IVs and
seven light tanks, mainly Panzer 38(t)s. Additional
vehicles were knocked out or damaged, but were then
recovered and repaired. Most damaged Soviet tanks
had to be abandoned as 5 th Tank Division withdrew
across the Neman River, leaving the battlefield under
German control.
Fighting between the 7 th Panzer and 5 th Tank Divisions
continued over the next several days as the
Germans advanced on Vilnius. By 24 June, when they
entered that city, all that remained of Fedorov’s division
was a battle group of 15 tanks, 20 armored cars
and nine artillery pieces. Nonetheless, even as the
Red Army continued to fall back, Fedorov continued
to counterattack whenever an opportunity presented
itself.
On 26 June, 7 th Panzer Division entered Minsk. On
that same day, all that remained of 5 th Tank Division
were three tanks and some 40 trucks. The division
had effectively ceased to exist, and its remnants were
ordered to break off and move east to Kaluga, a locale
then still far in the Soviet rear area. There they were
to be incorporated into a new tank division to be
incorporated into XIV Mechanized Corps.
The 7 th had also suffered heavily, forcing it to temporarily
disband one of its three panzer battalions in
order to use those vehicles to bring the other two up
to strength. Only about half of the original complement
Panzer 38(t) tanks were still functional, though
most of those losses were attributable to mechanical
breakdown rather than combat.
The victories of the German Panzer
38(t)s over their counterpart Soviet
BT-7s were largely due to broader issues
of tactical experience and preparedness,
and not to technical advantages or
disadvantages inherent in either vehicle.
At the strategic level, Stalin’s misguided
policy of not permitting the reinforcement of
the East Prussian-Lithuanian border area during the
first days of the war – in the hope some negotiated
settlement was still possible – further exacerbated a
host of other Red Army systemic problems.
Production of the Panzer 38(t) as a tank ended
in June 1942, because they had been rendered fully
obsolete by the appearance of the Soviet T-34 medium
and KV heavy tanks. Instead, production of
their chasses were switched to the turretless Marder
(Marten) tank destroyer, which mounted a 75mm
anti-tank gun. While not as versatile as a turreted
tank, the Marder had enough firepower to deal with
the emerging Soviet tank threat.
The BT-7 also became increasingly scarce after
1941, with only a few hundred remaining in the Red
Army’s inventory by the time of the spring and summer
battles of the next year. By the time of the Stalingrad
campaign in the autumn and winter of 1942-43,
there were hardly any BT-7s still in front line service.
By the end of the war there were only 299 of them in
all of European Russia, of which only 43 were operating,
mainly for training, with the remainder sitting in
repair facilities. CF
SELECTED SOURCES
Steven Zaloga. BT Fast Tank. The Red Army’s Cavalry Tank 1931-
1945. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2016.
Steven J. Zaloga. Panzer 38(t) vs. BT-7. Barbarossa 194. Oxford:
Osprey Publishing, 2017.
BT-7
COUNTERFACT • 37

38 • COUNTERFACT

COUNTERFACT • 39

40 • COUNTERFACT