14-01-2021

Zhuhai Airshow 2018 featured the appearance of multiple J-20s.
Photo: Collected
J-20: the PLA's eye in the sky
RiCk Joe
The weeks leading up to January 11,
2011, marked a watershed episode for
PLA watching. After years of crossreferencing
enthusiast Chinese
language defense chatter, monitoring
the People's Liberation Army's
operational security (OPSEC), carefully
tracking rare semi-official and official
statements, and debates about realism
and ambition, the elusive fifth
generation fighter project known since
the mid-2000s variously as J-XX, J-13,
J-14, XXJ, finally emerged in blurry
poor-quality pictures at Chengdu
Aircraft Corporation's (CAC) factory
from late December 2010. It arrived
right on schedule.
As clearer pictures percolated from
Chinese-language defense boards to
the English language PLA watching
forums, and then onto aerospace and
defense blogs and mainstream
alphabet soup media outlets, the
finalized designation - J-20 - became
accepted and widely used. Finally, on
the aforementioned date, the first J-20
technology demonstrator conducted a
successful maiden flight, accompanied
by a J-10AS twin-seater chase plane.
In the years since then, including
recently, much has been said and
debated over the exact military and
strategic consequences of the
emergence of J-20 and the kind of
fighter it will be. Less spoken of is the
vindication and emergence of the
modern PLA watching grapevine and
methodology, whose open-source
collaboration and dissemination of
information was at the time able to
predict various key aspects of the
aircraft's characteristics, milestones,
and parameters, months or in many
cases years before they were conveyed
by traditional defense media or opensource
government and military
publications.
Big ticket PLA projects prior to the J-
20 - such as the J-10 fourth generation
fighter, 054/A frigates, 052B/C
destroyers, and KJ-2000 AEW&C - all
enjoyed their own lengthy period of
speculation and analysis prior to their
unveiling, but the limited number of
stealth fighter types in the mid-2000s
up to J-20's maiden flight put the
methodology of PLA watching to the
test, which it ultimately passed with
flying colors. It is not an exaggeration to
say that since the J-20, the predictions
and anticipation for various big ticket
PLA projects that have emerged - the
052D and 055 destroyers, Y-20
strategic transport, FC-31 5th
generation demonstrator, 002 and 003
aircraft carriers, 075 amphibious
assault ship, among many others - as
well as, various projects to emerge in
the near future - the FC-31 derived
carrier-borne fifth generation fighter,
H-20 stealth bomber, and next
generation surface combatants - would
not have been taken seriously had the
years of lead up to J-20 not so
accurately predicted aspects of the
aircraft, from configuration to role to
expected arrival period. It is in this
context that the first decade of the J-
20's development, entry into service,
and maturation will be discussed and
reflected upon, and the prospects for its
second decade be considered. It is
interesting to examine, in retrospect,
how much of the initial Englishlanguage
media reaction to J-20's
emergence remains unchanged today.
Initial, incorrect estimates of the J-
20's length have proven to be the
biggest mistake (pun perhaps slightly
intended), placing it at a gargantuan
22-23 meters long. In subsequent
years, many comparative analyses of
the aircraft revised its length down to
about 20.8 meters (still a large fighter
providing significant internal volume),
but far from the 23-meter estimates
initially circulated. Alas, the effect
lingers, for in successive years and even
to now, the most popular descriptions
of the aircraft's role portray it as a
dedicated interceptor or a dedicated
striker, both no doubt initially
informed by incorrect overestimates of
the aircraft's size (and by extension,
overestimates of its range as well as
weapons bay dimensions).
Notwithstanding the consistent
earliest Chinese-language defense
rumors and subsequent official AVIC
confirmation of the J-20's role, it
appears that in the foreseeable future J-
20 will largely be seen by the media as
an interceptor or a strike aircraft rather
than an air superiority fighter (perhaps
until the PLA Air Force feels
comfortable enough to allow the
aircraft to demonstrate more of its
flight envelope or until the aircraft
receives engines with thrust vectoring
and conducts a Pugachev's Cobra at the
Zhuhai Air Show).
THuRsdAY, JAnuARY 14, 2021
5
Are militaries planning for an
autonomous revolution?
JACob PARAkilAs
It's a constant theme of defense
technology coverage, including this
column: autonomy will fundamentally
change the dynamics of warfare.
Smaller, faster computers, and the
ability to split sensing and processing
between different nodes, open all kinds
of novel possibilities for weapons and
warfare. And parallel technologies like
more efficient batteries and smaller,
more effective sensors make it possible
to endow ever smaller and cheaper
systems with the ability to navigate the
world and act within it.
And yet, true autonomy remains an
extremely hard problem. Machines are
much better than humans at certain
subsets of tasks: storing large amounts
of information, for instance, or
accessing specific parts of those
memories on command and patternmatching.
But the nimbleness of
human minds and their facility with
problem-solving have yet to be
duplicated in artificial form. And that
doesn't account for the security
elements; an autonomous system is
inherently no safer from infiltration or
sabotage than our notably insecure
existing computer systems.
Self-driving cars offer a taste of the
difficulties involved. For the past two
decades, they have been hailed as the
next big thing in urban design,
personal mobility, automotive safety,
and even the fight against climate
change. Major tech and automotive
companies have raised and spent
billions of dollars on developing,
testing, and refining them. And yet, in
the real world, autonomous vehicles
have suffered one setback after
another to the point where companies
which have staked their strategies -
and huge amounts of financial capital -
on their near-term viability are
beginning to reconsider.
It might be argued that making
autonomous vehicles that operate in
civilian contexts with a lower accident
rate than their human-operated
counterparts is a fundamentally
different task compared to the security
or military operations that might be
entrusted to robots. But military
applications are likely to involve either
repetitive tasks in similarly complex
environments - say, supplying
deliveries - which would face many of
the same challenges, or unpredictable,
high-speed tasks in combat that would
require a high degree of adaptability
from the machine. In either case, there
is no reason why a higher failure rate
would be more acceptable to security
decision-makers than civilian
regulators.
So, what happens to the future of
military technology if our projections
of computerized autonomy more
broadly speaking turn out to be overly
optimistic? What happens if the doors
that seem to be opening right now lead
to dead ends, or long, winding
passageways with no obvious
destinations?
For one thing, it would force
militaries and defense establishments
to fundamentally reconsider their
long-lead-time procurement
strategies. Air forces that are being
reconfigured to address the growing
expense of tactical aircraft by
reinforcing their numbers with
cheaper, expendable drones might
need instead to find ways to procure
effective but cheaper crewed
alternatives if autonomous tech isn't
equal to the task of managing air
combat. And navies planning to turn
over the task of hunting enemy
submarines to extremely long-range
autonomous ships or submarines
might have to reinvest in the old
concept of simple, durable ships
designed for long-duration, low-speed
patrols if it turns out that autonomous
systems are inadequate at that task.
Autonomy has also been held out as
a means of developing weapons
systems which can exceed the limits
imposed by the fragility of the human
body. Fighter jets, for example, have
for decades been capable of maneuvers
5
so intense that they run the risk of
knocking out their pilots, a
consideration which would not apply if
the pilot were removed from the
equation. But the big bet behind the F-
35 - which is famously less
maneuverable than some of the planes
it's designed to replace - is that stealth,
sensor fusion, and better weapons
would allow it to fight in a more
effective way that didn't necessitate
close-quarters maneuverability.
Ironically, if military autonomous
technology fizzles, it might prove to be
a rare moment of convergence
between those who seek a ban on
autonomous weapons and those in the
defense-industrial and military futurist
communities who have been pushing
for their adoption. Systems which are
ineffective are likely to be both
ineffective and incapable of obeying
the laws of war, a combination which
would render them - for very different
The path to robust, reliable military autonomy is long and winding -
with a lot of potential dead ends.
Photo: Michael Cordedda
reasons - susceptible to being either
banned outright or widely shunned for
a combination of normative and
operational reasons.
Of course, the future of any given
technology is rarely as simple as "it
doesn't work." Autonomous systems
are already capable of some tasks and
are highly likely to add additional
relevant skill-sets as time goes by. But
by the same token, technology rarely
progresses in a straight line, and it
behooves military theorists to think
seriously about the ways technologies
could fail as well as succeed before
investing too much in them.
What if the Afghan peace process fails?
MARvin G. WeinbAuM
Prospects for a lasting, comprehensive agreement to end the
Afghan conflict, never very bright, seem increasingly dim.
Only after many months of wrangling over preliminary
issues are the opposing delegations in Doha now at the point
of addressing the multitude of tough decisions required to
shape a new political order.
It augurs badly for negotiations that the Taliban, whether
out of confidence in its strong bargaining position or from
core convictions, have thus far shown no inclination to
compromise on any issues of real substance. Against a
background of mounting violence, in refusing to entertain a
ceasefire the Taliban have also shown themselves to be in no
hurry to end the nation's bloodletting.
Most disconcerting, the talks have confirmed the wide gap
between the opposing sides in their visions of a future Afghan
state and society. The Taliban's participation in peace talks in
Doha seems not so much intended to chart Afghanistan's
future as aimed at keeping the U.S. in the February 2020
agreement that committed it to removing all troops from
Afghanistan by the end of this April. With American as well
as allied foreign forces gone, the Taliban could well be on a
path to political ascendance, if not by bullying at a
negotiating table then on the battlefield.
While mindful of the looming obstacles, most Afghans
along with much of the international community continue to
place their faith in the eventual success of the current peace
process. Understanding military victory over the Taliban to
be unachievable and repelled by the idea of unending
warfare, they have placed their faith in diplomacy. The hope
is that the Taliban, conscious of the difficulties in achieving
an outright military victory, will be ready to sign a political
deal once the group has extracted enough concessions.
Ultimately, the Taliban are conceived of as a transactional
actor. That ideology rather than pragmatism might dominate
Taliban thinking is conveniently dismissed.
Hardly surprisingly, then, little attention is given to what
might follow should the current peace talks prove fruitless.
Negotiations could very well drag on unproductively for
many more months, even extend to years, and at any point in
time collapse entirely. Despite the agonizingly slow progress,
both sides for their separate reasons appear for now hesitant
to quit the negotiations.
But Taliban reluctance could quickly vanish should a Biden
administration declare its intention to retain a residual
counterterrorism troop presence in the country beyond
April. A Taliban spokesman has publicly stated that anything
less than a full U.S. withdrawal is a dealbreaker. And with the
level of violence in the country continuing to rise, the Kabul
government may soon find it politically too costly to remain
in the talks. Regardless of the reason, should negotiations
break down, the reactions among a disillusioned Afghan
public, a disunited political elite, and sorely disappointed
international community could well determine the future of
the Ashraf Ghani government and of Afghanistan's Islamic
Republic.
In the wake of failed peace negotiations, the government
can be expected to express its confidence in the country's
ability to soldier on. It would insist that the Afghan National
Security and Defense Forces (ANSDF) are capable of
defending the state, even in the face of almost certain
increased Taliban attacks of greater scope and intensity.
Afghan forces have for some time conducted ground
Afghan families gather at the graves of their relatives.
operations independently and have slowly grown an air force
instrumental in keeping major population centers out of the
hands of militants. But even with uninterrupted American
financial assistance to the ANSDF, the departure of most or
all foreign troops and private contractors, and especially the
loss of U.S. tactical air support, will test the Afghan military's
mettle and morale. It could serve as a strong accelerant to an
already high rate of military desertions that then leads to an
unraveling of the Afghan security forces. The transfer by
deserters of their equipment and training to various militias
countrywide could ignite a messy, more destructive civil war.
The collapse of peace talks may result in furthering disunity
among Afghan political elites. Divided along ethnic and
regional lines, they have had separate ideas on how and
toward what end peace talks should be conducted. Several of
the leading militia-wielding powerbrokers can be expected to
renew threats to mount their own military offensives against
the Taliban. Among opposition politicians, many will assign
blame for the breakdown of negotiations on obstructions
deliberately created by the president and his political allies.
The uneasy truce between Ghani and his veteran rival
Abdullah Abdullah is likely to dissolve. Some politicians may
follow the lead of former insurgent leader Gulbuddin
Photo: Rahmat Gul
Hekmatyar in reaching out to the Taliban to explore how
their interests could be protected under an interim
government or restored emirate.
Grassroots pressure on Kabul to continue to press for peace
will probably mount. As happened in the 1990s, large
numbers of war-weary Afghans, faced with the prospect of an
unending conflict, may be prepared to settle for almost any
outcome promising to bring an end to fighting. Other
Afghans, fearing expanding violence and the looming
possibility of Taliban rule, will lay plans to flee the country. A
rapidly deteriorating or collapsed economy as in the 1990s
could mean that millions of employed Afghans would lose
their ability to earn a living. Without a modern economy.
, the most skilled and educated would be among the first
wave of refugees. Foreign aid donors and international aid
agencies and NGOs would find it increasingly difficult to
maintain their programs and in leaving add to the severity of
an economic contraction and people's hardships.
In an Afghanistan under Taliban sway, respect for popular
will as expressed through democratic institutions would have
no place. The republic's elected officials and representative
institutions would be replaced by a righteous leader and a
council of clerics seeking guidance exclusively from Islamic
principles. Tolerance of media and other freedoms of
expression would similarly disappear, as is presaged by the
recent targeted killings of many journalists and public
figures. Predictably, the strict cultural prohibitions enforced
during the 1990s would be reinstituted. Women's
educational rights and other impressive achievements
marking the last 19 years could be enjoyed only at the
sufferance of local mullahs and their interpretation of
Shariah. The Taliban's often repeated promises to create an
inclusive Islamic society may suggest a new openness but
only to those willing to accept its terms.
With the prospect of a Taliban-dominated regime in Kabul,
groups and individuals having ties to the republican
government would have reason to fear for their personal
safety. The Taliban have made known their intention to hold
accountable those who have helped sustain the Ghani
government. Shiite Hazaras and other minority
communities, remembering the ethnic cleansing in the
1990s, are particularly apprehensive. Hazara as well as many
Tajik and Uzbek commanders could be expected to block
Taliban advances into areas under their control, making
difficult any future Taliban attempts to consolidate power
nationally. A chaotic Afghanistan filled with contested and
ungoverned space could become hospitable ground for the
operations of terrorist groups like al-Qaida and Islamic State-
Khorasan, or regional groups.
A near consensus among regional states on the desirability
of a political solution for Afghanistan can be expected to
dissolve together with faded peace prospects. The
neighboring countries are likely to move toward reviving the
hedging strategies that in the 1990s embroiled them in the
Afghan conflict through proxies. Pakistan's involvement with
its favored Taliban factions may become more transparent.
Some like Russia and Iran, anxious to block the export of
Taliban influence beyond Afghanistan's borders, may look to
strengthen ties to past ethnic proxies or try to buy off the
Taliban with promises of assistance. With foreign troops
exited and a Kabul government hard-pressed, India may be
less hesitant to provide military assistance. Worsening Sino-
Indian relations and the strengthening of the China-Pakistan
nexus could turn Afghanistan into a battleground where
India is pitted against China and Pakistan.