Brazil Annual Review - 2020

BRAZIL ANNUAL 

REVIEW 2020

Author | Transparency International - Brazil 

Researchers | Maria Dominguez, Vinicius Reis 

Reviewers | Bruno Brandão 

Traduction | Damian Platt 

Graphic Designer | Rafael Regatieri 

Every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. All information was 

believed to be correct as of January 2021. Nevertheless, Transparency International Brazil cannot accept 

responsibility for the consequences of its use for other purposes or in other contexts. 

2021 Transparency International - Brazil. Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under CC BY-ND 4.0 

DE. Quotation permitted. Please contact Transparency International - Brazil – brasil@br.transparency.org – regarding 

derivatives requests. 

www.transparenciainternacional.org.br 

02 

Transparency International - Brazil

Annual Review Brazil 2020 

03

TABLE OF 

CONTENTS 

10 

Federal 

Government 

Political 

interference 

Charges against 

the President’s son 

A supposed end 

to corruption 

New 

anticorruption 

plan 

Economic 

regulations 

Environment policies’ 

dismantling 

19 

National 

Congress 

Special committees 

to modify the law 

Relevant votes 

Controversial 

run for leadership 

in Congress 

24 

Judiciary 

Setbacks fighting 

corruption 

“Fake News” Inquiry 

New appointee 

for the Supreme Court 

Favorable decisions 

to Mr. Bolsonaro’s 

circle 

Corruption 

investigation 

into judges 

04 


BRAZIL ANNUAL REVIEW 2020 

31 

Public 

Prosecutor’s 

Office 

Undue interference 

Dismantle of taskforces 

38 

Civil 

society 

and the 

press 

Setbacks 

in access to 

information 

Threats to the 

press and 

civil society 

Attacks on 

Transparency 

International 

- Brazil 

43 48 

COVID-19 

pandemic 

Investigations 

into fraud and 

corruption 

schemes 

Index of 

transparency 

in public 

procurement 

Social 

participation 

at a loss 

2020 

local 

elections 

Gain in diversity, 

corruption 

debate absent 

Hacking episode 


05

SUMMARY 

The year 2020 saw little progress and many setbacks for the fight against corruption in Brazil. Among the 

most serious were a loss of independence for, and increasing political interference with, fundamental bodies 

such as the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Federal Police. 

Minister of Justice Sérgio Moro’s resignation, and the serious accusations he directed at Presi-dent Jair 

Bolsonaro, and other high profile episodes, including investigations targeting Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, have 

heightened concerns about the use of state structures for the personal benefit of a political elite. 

Another major setback in fighting corruption resulted from political and institutional pressure lead-ing to 

the dismantling of the Carwash and Greenfield prosecutorial taskforces. The year ended with uncertainty 

regarding the continuity of the taskforce model, an innovation that, with leniency agreements and plea bargains, 

has created crucial conditions for the advancement of investiga-tions into grand corruption schemes in the 

country. Rather than improving on, and correcting problems with, this largely successful model, the interests 

of individuals aiming to stop the anti-corruption fight have prevailed. 

The COVID-19 pandemic has also impacted the fight against corruption. Brazil, like many other countries, 

relaxed procurement rules in order to respond quickly to the need for emergency ex-penditure. Countless 

corruption cases have shown their most perverse consequences in the midst of a terrible humanitarian crisis. 

In Brazil, the lack of integrity of government officials, literally led to the theft of oxygen from the people. 

The pandemic also reduced public debate, and institutional and social control over official acts, due to delayed 

responses to the Access to Information Law, and remote sessions and special procedures in the Legislature, 

which further distanced society from public decisions. 

On a positive note, however, in 2020, there was strong, courageous mobilization by civil society to denounce 

and prevent even more serious setbacks, amid an authoritarian wave of attacks on NGOs and the press — 

enhanced by the president’s own hate speech. 

Local elections in November included almost no constructive debate on combating corruption. The PP party, with 

the highest number of politicians prosecuted by Operation Carwash, was the big winner. The election results, 

however, also pointed towards more diversity in local legislative bodies. There were more elected officials from 

minority and historically excluded groups — an essential step for the democratic fight against corruption. 

Finally, even in the midst of cascading bad news about corruption scandals associated to the pandemic, the 

glass can still be seen as half-full, since unveiling corruption schemes has only been possible due to a real 

improvement in Brazilian control bodies, at all levels. 

In 2020, President Jair Bolsonaro declared that corruption was a problem of the past. He was wrong. Corruption 

remains a systemic problem in Brazil, one that contaminates democracy and hinders the country’s socially just 

and sustainable development. Populist and authoritarian solu-tions are not the way forward for an upstanding 

country. We need laws, institutions and, above all, the participation of free, conscious and active citizens, in 

the fight for their rights. 

06 


Highlights 

POSITIVE & NEGATIVE 

Strong mobilization of 

Brazilian civil society 

Diversity gain in municipal 

elections 

Improvement of Brazilian 

control bodies’ capacity 

to act during COVID-19 

pandemic 

Development, by the Central 

Bank, of a new platform 

for online transfers and 

payments (PIX), expanding 

traceability of financial 

transactions 

Severe loss of independence for the Public Prosecutor’s Office 

and increased political interfer-ence with bodies such as the 

Federal Police and Brazilian intelligence system 

Dismantling of the Carwash and Greenfield taskforces without 

replacement by an appropriate alternative model 

Serious deficiencies in Federal Government transparency, both 

active and passive, mainly regar-ding essential information for 

fighting the COVID-19 pandemic 

Lack of significant anticorruption reforms supported by 

government and approved by Congress 

Absence of qualified debate and concrete anticorruption 

proposals in the 2020 municipal elec-tions; at the same 

time, a robust victory for candidates and parties involved in 

corruption schemes 

Special legislative procedures due to COVID-19 pandemic, 

weakening institutional and social con-trols and facilitating 

surreptitious legal amendments 

Multiple embezzlement scandals involving resources to combat 

the COVID-19 humanitarian crisis 

Increased authoritarianism and attacks against the press and 

NGOs responsible for social con-trols, with numerous and 

serious cases of harassment against journalists and activists, 

even committed by the president 


07

RECOMMENDATIONS 

To the Federal Government 

- Respect the independence and not exert political interference over institutions that control corruption, such as the 

Public Prosecutor’s Office, Federal Police, Federal Revenue Service, Office of the Comptroller General and Brazilian 

Financial Intelligence Unit (COAF); 

- Guarantee the strict legality and institutional control of the Brazilian intelligence system, so that it refrains from acting 

outside its attributions and competences, and to maintain it as a state institution; 

- Respect transparency principles in public administration and ensure strict compliance with relevant legislation on 

active and passive transparency; among others, the Access to Information Law; 

- Ensure full transparency of epidemiological, health, administrative and tax information in the context of the COVID-19 

pandemic, with special attention to procurement procedure and the distribution of vaccines and medical supplies; 

- Formulate and promote effective public policies and anticorruption reforms; 

- Fully respect the constitutional guarantees for free and safe engagement of the press and civil society organizations 

in their role of social control, refraining from harassing journalists and activists. 

To National Congress 

- Reorganize the special legislative proceedings established in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, in order that 

legislative processes can continue under safe conditions, but, at the same time, guarantee more adequate levels of 

deliberation, political control and social participation; 

- Discuss and approve anticorruption reforms, based on proposals from experts and Brazilian society gathered in the 

New Measures Against Corruption package; 

- Ensure the effectiveness of Ethics Councils to investigate and punish unethical, unseemly and illegal conduct by 

members of Congress; 

- Exercise effective institutional control over the appointment and subsequent conducts of judges in high courts and 

the prosecutor-general, as well as over presidential acts. 

08 


To the Judiciary 

- Guarantee the effectiveness of the National Goals System of the National Council of Justice (CNJ) and the complete 

fulfillment of 2021 goals, in particular goal No. 4, which prioritizes the judgment of cases relating to crimes against 

public administration, administrative improbity and illicit electoral acts; 

- Improve the Supreme Court’s internal regulation and guarantee effective compliance, regulating the administration of 

deadlines, agendas and the predominance of collegiate decisions; 

- Ensure effective compliance with the “constitutional ceiling” (an imposed upper limit) for remuneration of judges, 

abolishing privileges; 

- Significantly improve correctional mechanisms for the conduct of judges; 

- Deliberate on the initial date for the statute of limitations for state capacity to enforce criminal sentences; 

- Reaffirm, in a Supreme Court plenary decision, consolidated jurisprudence on the restricted use of “privileged forum”. 

To the Public Prosecutor’s Office 

- Guarantee the independence of the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the fulfillment of its constitutional duty; 

- Guarantee the proper functioning of active taskforces; institutionalize and improve this model of joint action 

based on proposals, within the scope of the Superior Council of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, to regulate their 

constitution and functioning; 

- Increase the number of Special Action Groups to Combat Organized Crime (the GAECOs) in state branches of the 

Public Prosecutor’s Office and ensure adequate operating conditions, such as prosecutors’ exclusive dedication to 

investigations and a specialized support structure; 

- Establish a general data governance system to cease the systematic leakage of information and violation of the right 

to privacy in the context of investigations, ensure safe and adequate sharing of information between investigators and 

other national and international control institutions, and prevent violation of confidentiality for specific investigations. 


09

Photo: Alan Santos / PR 

section 01 

FEDERAL 

GOVERNMENT 

In 2020, President Jair Bolsonaro claimed there was no need for a grand corruption 

fighting operation like Carwash, because he ran a corruption free government. His 

declaration contrasts with several episodes that attested attempted political interference 

with control and enforcement bodies, the use of public agencies for personal or political 

reasons, and the weakening of institutions and mechanisms to fight corruption and 

other criminal activities. 

10 


POLITICAL 

INTERFERENCE 

The increase in political interference in federal bodies identified in 2019 1 was aggravated in the last year 

and became a central scar of President Jair Bolsonaro’s government. This trend led to the resignation of the 

minister of Justice, investigations against Mr. Bolsonaro himself and reports of a possible use of federal public 

agencies for the personal benefit of the Bolsonaro family. 

In April, the minister of Justice Sergio Moro, former judge of Operation Carwash, resigned after the president 

decided, against Mr. Moro’s will, to fire the Federal Police’s Director-General, Maurício Valeixo 2 . The episode 

followed a controversy, in the previous year, over changes in the corporation’s bureau in Rio de Janeiro, the 

political arena of the Bolsonaro clan. In 2019, Mr. Bolsonaro had pressured the corporation to anticipate the 

substitution of Rio’s bureau chief and to appoint a name of his choice — he succeeded in the first request, 

but not in the latter, as he faced strong internal resistance 3 . 

Mr. Moro left office publicly accusing President Bolsonaro of trying to interfere politically in the corporation with 

the aim of appointing a Director-General who he could call and request access to intelligence reports 4 . The 

incident turned into an ongoing inquiry authorized by the Supreme Court to investigate Mr. Moro’s accusations 

and potential crimes committed by the president 5 . 

After Mr. Moro’s resignation, President Bolsonaro tried to appoint Alexandre Ramagem, current head of the 

Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN), known for his proximity to the Bolsonaro family 6 , as the Federal Police’s 

new Director-General. The appointment was, however, quickly blocked by the Supreme Court due to a potential 

“non-compliance with the constitutional principles of impersonality, morality and public interest” 7 . President 

Bolsonaro then decided to appoint Mr. Rolando Alexandre de Souza as new head of the corporation. One of 

the new appointee’s first acts was to replace the corporation’s Rio de Janeiro bureau chief 8 . 

Another concern regarding political interference involved the Federal Revenue Service (Receita Federal, RFB), 

which has been labeled by President Bolsonaro as an institution that “disrupts” the country’s development 9 . In 

April, during a meeting with RFB’s Secretary-General and the parliamentarian son of an influential evangelical 

pastor, the president reportedly pressured the Federal Revenue Service to resolve millions of tax debts owed by 

churches in Brazil, a political group supportive of the president 10 . A few months later, after National Congress 

approved federal tax exemption for temples and pardoning of fines from previous debts with the RFB, President 

Bolsonaro declared his support for the non-taxation of temples, but said he had to veto the provision because 

of budgetary liability and the risk of facing an impeachment process 11 . 


11

CHARGES 

AGAINST THE 

PRESIDENT’S SON 

In November, President Jair Bolsonaro’s eldest son, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, was formally charged with 

embezzlement, money laundering and criminal organization for what has been called the “rachadinha” scheme 12 . 

According to prosecutors, during his mandate at Rio de Janeiro’s State Assembly, Mr. Flávio Bolsonaro headed 

a criminal organization that pocketed up to 90% of his office employee’s paychecks — some of them being 

no-show employees — and used the money for personal expenses 13 . 

The investigation into the “rachadinha” scheme started in 2018, after an intelligence report from the 

Brazilian Financial Intelligence Unit (COAF) showed atypical financial movement in the bank account of 

Mr. Fabrício Queiroz, a former aid to Mr. Flávio Bolsonaro in the State Assembly and a longtime friend of 

the president’s 14 . The investigation showed that, in 2016, Mr. Flávio Bolsonaro’s aide made repeated cash 

withdrawals preceded by cash deposits in the same amount in his bank account 15 . Prosecutors believe Mr. 

Queiroz, who was charged alongside his former boss, operated the ilegal scheme, being responsible for 

hiring employees and collecting their salaries 16 . 

COAF’s report also showed Mr. Queiroz made deposits totalizing R$ 24.000 (US$ 4.640) in the bank account 

of Mrs. Michelle Bolsonaro, now first lady 17 . At the time, Mr. Jair Bolsonaro declared Mr. Queiroz was paying 

back a personal debt reaching up to R$ 40.000 (US$ 7.730) 18 . Last August, however, it was reported that, 

from 2011 to 2016, Mr. Queiroz and his wife made 27 deposits in Mrs. Bolsonaro’s bank account, totalizing 

R$ 89.000 (US$ 17.200) 19 . 

In October, it was reported that President Bolsonaro convened Senator Flávio Bolsonaro’s defense lawyers, the 

Brazilian Intelligence Agency’s (ABIN) director and the head of the Institutional Security Office (GSI) at a meeting 

to discuss the defense team’s suspicion that the official intelligence report that supported the “rachadinha” 

investigations could have been produced based on information irregularly obtained by a group of employees of 

the Federal Revenue Service (Receita Federal, RFB) 20 . 

It was later reported that, after the meeting with the president, ABIN produced at least two reports with advice 

on how the senator could obtain official documents that should help neutralize the “rachadinha” case’s legal 

argument 21 . The reports also suggested firing three RFB employees, supposedly part of a criminal group linked 

to internal fraud. It was also reported that the instructions were sent, by WhatsApp, from Alexandre Ramagem, 

head of ABIN, to Senator Flávio Bolsonaro himself, and included informal elements raising suspicions the reports 

had been the work of a “parallel” political structure organized within ABIN 22 . 


12

A SUPPOSED END 

TO CORRUPTION 

In October, President Jair Bolsonaro declared he did not “want to end [Operation] Carwash. I have ended Carwash, 

because there is no more corruption in government” 23 . 

The claim was made six months after Justice Minister Sergio Moro resigned, accusing the president of trying to 

interfere politically with Federal Police, (see page 11) and in the midst of increasing pressure to dismantle the 

Carwash and Greenfield operations, two of the most important taskforces of prosecutors currently dealing with 

grand corruption schemes (see page 34). 

Just a week after President Bolsonaro’s declaration, an operation conducted by the Office of the Comptroller 

General and the Federal Police investigating embezzlement of COVID-19 pandemic fighting funds caught Senator 

Chico Rodrigues, then deputy government leader in the Senate, hiding R$ 33.150 (US$ 6.400), in cash, in his 

underpants 24 . Following the operation, videos and photos of Senator Rodrigues and President Bolsonaro were 

shared online, highlighting the proximity between the pair 25 . A day after the embarrassment, President Bolsonaro 

formalized departure of Mr. Rodrigues from deputy leadership in Senate, and said the operation showed his 

government’s commitment to fighting corruption 26 . 

Despite President Bolsonaro’s attempt to assert an end to fraudulent schemes in government, Brazil’s recent 

legal and institutional setbacks in fighting corruption 27 were presented, in October, by Transparency International 

Brazil, to the OECD Working Group on Bribery. Transparency International’s report was circulated to all national 

delegations and used by the OECD collegiate to make enquiries to the Brazilian delegation. Concern regarding 

anti-corruption practices could pose further obstacles to Brazil’s intention to join OECD. 

13 


NEW ANTICORRUPTION 

PLAN 

In December, federal government published an anticorruption plan with 

142 prospective actions aimed at improving structure, monitoring, training, 

practices, collaboration, legislation, infra-legal regulation and accountability 

across eleven bodies of the administration 28 . With goals scheduled for the 

next five years, federal government promises to move forward in complying 

with international recommendations for preventing and fighting corruption. 

Although some goals are presented in a generic way or do not seem to bring 

significant innovation to the current situation, the plan does present important 

policy proposals — either new ideas or policies whose implementation has 

been tried in the past without success. 

President Jair Bolsonaro’s government proposes, for instance, to write a bill, 

by March 2021, to regulate lobbying activity in Brazil, to address a serious 

legislative gap that has still not been dealt with by National Congress, despite 

decades of debate in society and government, and previous attempts to 

regulate the issue. Also linked to transparency in contacts between public 

and private actors, are proposals to simplify, standardize and monitor the 

publication of federal authorities’ agendas, something already stipulated by 

federal regulation 29 , but largely overlooked 30 . 

Government also plans to improve public procurement by studying the 

creation of a national system for public procurement that would aggregate 

purchases from federal, regional and local instances, and publish invoices 

for federal purchases on The Transparency Portal 31 , allowing for online 

consultation. These mechanisms could help increase price comparability 

and facilitate fraud monitoring. 

Another relevant measure in the plan is the drafting of a regulation, by the 

Office of the Comptroller General (CGU), to publish information regarding 

the execution of fiscal benefit policies, to allow for more transparency in a 

matter involving billionaire values. 


14

ECONOMIC 

REGULATIONS 

In January, Brazil’s Central Bank (BACEN) introduced new regulation to establish procedures and internal controls 

for financial institutions to prevent money laundering crimes (Circular 3.978/2020) 32 . The new policy brought 

improvements to the previous situation, such as including members of control bodies for the Judiciary and Public 

Prosecutor’s Office (CNJ and CNMP, respectively) as politically exposed persons (PEP), and adopting a (still timid) 

risk-based approach to preventing illegal activity. 

It fell short, however, of including relevant mechanisms to enhance anti-money laundering efforts even more. The 

regulation establishes the generic need for financial institutions to adopt procedures and internal controls regarding 

PEPs, but doesn’t specify explicit measures recommended by the Financial Action Task Force that apply to this 

sensitive group. The new policy could also further widen the definition of PEP to explicitly include family members 

and intimate associates of public agents — although Circular 3.978/2020 does include this extended group in 

obligatory monitoring that should be followed by financial institutions. 

In April, a new law came into force to change the voting procedures of the Administrative Council of Tax Appeals 

(Conselho Administrativo de Recursos Fiscais, CARF), a federal board linked to the Ministry of Economy and 

responsible for administrative review of appeals against Federal Revenue Service’s decisions 33 . 

The new law established that votes resulting in a draw should be decided in favor of the taxpayer rather than, as 

it used to be, by a fiscal representative. A tied vote would not be an uncommon outcome in this context, as the 

board is composed by equal numbers of representatives from the fiscal administration and taxpayers (appointed 

by the private sector) 34 . Therefore, changes introduced in April could have relevant impact. 

The Ministry of Economy tried to limit application of the new regulation by publishing an infra-legal norm 35 , but 

has already encountered legal resistance 36 . Changes introduced by the law raised concern among tax auditors, 

who believe the new procedure could impact the reporting of potential criminal behavior, such as corruption and 

money laundering, to competent authorities 37 . 

In September, a new R$ 200 (US$ 38) banknote entered circulation in the country. The new bill was an 

alleged response to an expected higher demand for cash after the government offered temporary financial 

aid payments of R$ 600 (US$ 116) due to COVID-19 pandemic — a policy directed, in part, at people who 

don’t have a bank accounts 38 . The government also raised the possibility Brazilians would prefer to hold cash 

at home during a social and economic crisis 39 . 

The release of the R$ 200 note was, however, abrupt and surprised specialists who had been advocating for BACEN 

restrictions on the use of the R$ 100 banknote, given that high-value banknotes facilitate criminal activity, such 

as corruption, tax evasion and money laundering 40 . The recently released banknote was found, among others, in 

the underpants of Senator Chico Rodrigues during the Federal Police operation that investigated embezzlement 

of COVID-19 money (see page 13) 41 . 

15 


Despite the brusque decision to adopt the R$ 200 bill, by December, reportedly, only a small fraction of the new 

banknotes circulated in the economy 42 . 

In November, Brazilian Central Bank launched a new system to make online transfers and pay for merchandise 

and services, called PIX. The platform has the potential to reduce cash payments (70% of all financial transfers 

estimated in the country 43 ) and increase the traceability of transfers, which could help prevent crimes such as 

corruption and money laundering. 

In the same month, a presidential decree (No. 10.540/2020) changed implementation of the Fiscal Responsibility 

Law, creating a temporary gap in the disclosure of budget information and a serious transparency issue at 

all levels of public administration 44 . The new rules will come into force only in 2023 and, in the meantime, 

budget administrators will be released from the obligation to update fiscal transparency systems. The twoyear 

gap coincides with the final years of the current state and federal executive terms. The Supreme Court 

is expected to rule on the decree 45 . 

ENVIRONMENT 

POLICIES’ DISMANTLING 

In April, during a closed ministerial meeting convened by President Jair Bolsonaro, the minister 

of Environment, Ricardo Salles, argued that the COVID-19 pandemic opened the opportunity for 

government to pass, at once and in large quantities, infra-legal changes to simplify regulation in 

the environmental sector and any other sector of interest of the administration 46 . Mr. Salles claimed 

press attention was almost exclusively oriented by the pandemic, and that therefore government 

should take advantage of the “peaceful moment” to avoid being held back by legal questioning. 

The minister’s declaration was revealed a month later, when the Supreme Court released a video 

of the meeting as part of the investigation into President Bolsonaro’s potential interference with 

the Federal Police (see page 11). 

The incident was a telling example of the current government’s intention to dismantle environmental 

policy and its lack of transparency, a trend illustrated by several episodes in the past year. 


16

In February, following a request made by timber sector entities, the federal environmental agency 

(IBAMA) eliminated the need for federal authorization to allow timber exports from certain Amazon 

species, contrary to internal technical advice 47 . Environmental organizations denounced the 

measure, saying it would favor exports of illegally sourced wood 48 . It is important to note that past 

control and enforcement operations have exposed fraud, corruption and money laundering linked 

to environmental crimes 49 . In November, pressured internally and abroad for his environmental 

deregulation, President Bolsonaro threatened to reveal which countries had been importing illegal 

timber from Brazil — a threat he did not fulfill 50 . 

In September, controversially 51 , the National Environmental Council (CONAMA), responsible for 

overseeing environmental policy, revoked two resolutions stipulating the protection and use of 

coastal ecosystems (mangrove and “restinga” areas) and areas surrounding artificial reservoirs, a 

third establishing parameters for licensing irrigation projects, and substituted a fourth resolution 

in order to authorize the burning of toxic waste in rotary kilns 52 . 

The changes approved by CONAMA were in response to a specific request from the productive 

sector 53 , and happened a little over a year after President Bolsonaro changed the council’s 

composition, increasing government participation and decreasing civil society members 54 . 

The dismantling of Brazil’s environmental policy under the Bolsonaro administration is also evidenced 

by repeated federal budgetary reductions 55-56 and a decrease in the application of federal fines 57 . 

Environmental policy setbacks, however, have been accompanied by a reaction from civil society, 

political opposition parties and institutions responsible for legal checks and balances. In July, 

a group of twelve federal prosecutors went to court to demand the removal of the minister 

of Environment 58 . They accused Mr. Salles of administrative improbity for allegedly deliberate 

mechanisms to dismantle the country’s environmental protectio 59 . In September, the Supreme 

Court held a public hearing related to a lawsuit over governmental omission in use of the Climate 

Fund 60 , a resource to fight the climate emergency 61 . Further more, in November, after an audit, 

the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) concluded that eight military personnel appointed, by Mr. 

Salles, to senior positions in IBAMA did not meet the necessary qualification requirements for the 

function 62 . Finally, in December, the National Strategy to Combat Corruption and Money Laundering 

(ENCCLA), a network of federal and regional authorities included, in its annual planning for 2021, 

two actions aimed at fighting money laundering and corruption linked to illegal environmental 

activity, and improving gold production procedures to prevent money laundering 63 . 

17 


section 01 


OECD Working Group on Bribery inquired 

the Brazilian delegation about setbacks in 

fighting corruption 

Brazil’s Central Bank updated regulation 

for financial institutions to prevent money 

laundering crimes, although the new rule still 

falls short of international recommendations 

Central Bank releases platform for purchases 

and transfers that could facilitate traceability 

of financial transfers 

Intensification and qualification (better crosschecking 

and data analysis) in Federal Police 

operations against the diversion of resources 

destined to fight COVID-19 pandemic 

Civil society and institutional reaction to the 

dismantling of environmental policy 

Federal government’s anticorruption plan 

puts forward relevant policies to expand 

prevention and control 

Loss of independence and increased political 

interference with control institutions, such as 

the Federal Police, Tax Revenue Service and 

the Brazilian Intelligence Agency 

Possible use of federal agencies for the 

personal benefit of the president’s family 

Deputy leader of government in Senate 

caught hiding COVID-19 funds in his 

underpants 

A change in a federal tax appeals’ voting 

created risks of limited reporting of potential 

crimes to competent authorities 

Sudden release of a R$ 200 banknote can 

facilitate illicit transactions in cash 

Presidential decree has released public 

budget administrators from obligations to 

update fiscal transparency systems 

Dismantling of environmental policy, lack of 

transparency and social participation in the 

sector’s control bodies 


18

Photo: Ana Volpe / Agiencia Senado 

section 02 

NATIONAL 

CONGRESS 

In a year marked by reduced debate and activity due to the COVID-19 pandemic (see 

page 46), committees in the Chamber of Deputies discussed relevant changes to 

anti-corruption laws, such as money laundering and administrative improbity, raising 

concerns for potential setbacks to the fight against corruption. The year approached 

an end with an unconstitutional attempt to allow for the reelection of both presidents 

of Senate and Chamber of Deputies. 

19 


SPECIAL 

COMMITTEES TO 

MODIFY THE LAW 

In September, the Chamber of Deputies formed an expert committee to propose changes to the money 

laundering law 64 . Since its beginning, the committee attracted criticism for being composed of a great 

number of criminal lawyers 65 rather than government experts from Brazil’s Financial Intelligence Unit 

(COAF), the Federal Police and other relevant departments 66 , and for proposed changes that control 

and enforcement bodies believe could hamper the investigation and punishment of crimes. One of the 

changes discussed was to establish a list of antecedent crimes that would have to be linked to the money 

laundering crime 67 . This mechanism existed in Brazilian legislation up to 2012 and is perceived as a 

setback by the Federal Police 68 , COAF 69 and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, who argue that the current 

rule is aligned with FATF recommendations and that the change could delay and even make the pursuit 

of illicit resources impracticable. 

The ongoing committee is expected to offer its suggestions in 2021, and that much effort will be 

centered in changes to criminal categories and definitions rather than to prevention mechanisms, such 

as determining more financial resources to COAF, establishing a better definition of politically exposed 

persons (PEP) or the due diligence for obliged subjects. The committee’s proposal will then be subjected 

to analysis and voting by National Congress’, a process in which significant changes can be expected. 

In November, another committee of experts presented a preliminary draft bill for establishing personal data 

protection related to public safety, prosecution and investigations into criminal offenses to the Chamber of 

Deputies 70 . In principle, the law’s intention is to complement Brazil’s general data protection law that came 

into force in September, but which refrained from dealing with public security, criminal investigations and 

national defense 71 , and to establish necessary guidelines to prevent the misuse of personal data. As in 

the case of the money laundering committee, however, control bodies strongly criticized the commission’s 

proposal. The Public Prosecutor’s Office assessed that the preliminary draft imposed disproportionate 

restrictions on investigations and could seriously affect the activity of investigating and enforcement 

bodies across the country 72 . Police authorities also protested against the proposal, saying it would create 

unnecessary bureaucracy that could delay access to data, stand against current legislation regulating 

access to information in investigations and, finally, establish a hostile environment for cooperation with 

criminal prevention and repression 73 . 

This matter is complex. It is imperative to balance the solution for the serious and systemic problem of 

data management in Brazilian control bodies, which frequently leads to information leaks and violations 

of fundamental privacy rights, with the need to preserve the inter-institutional sharing of information — 

crucial for investigations into grand corruption schemes and other organized crime. 


20

The Chamber of Deputies is also considering a controversial change to administrative improbity legislation, 

this time discussed and elaborated in a special commission of deputies 74 . The proposed changes have 

again raised questions and complaints from public authorities. Prosecutors have declared that the bill 

could mean a step backwards from combating corruption, by only considering administrative improbity acts 

that necessarily involve illicit enrichment or losses to public resources, and by requiring proof that legal 

representatives of companies involved in wrongdoings were aware their acts represented administrative 

improbity 75 , among other concerns. 

The intention to update the 1992 law is legitimate. There is criticism that the current legislation is 

outdated and lacks specificity and efficiency, diverting efforts from grand investigations that could have 

a real impact on corruption 76 . It has also allowed, over the years, for injustices against public employees 

working within dysfunctional public administration who have been unduly sanctioned based on abusive 

interpretation of the law. 

The original bill, based on discussions by an expert committee, led to welcome adaptations of the current 

law to include modern features, such as compensation for non-property damages, automatic disqualification 

from public office, and possibilities for settlements between the state and penalized individuals. However, 

the bill’s current rapporteur, representative Carlos Zarattini, substantially altered the original bill and 

reversed its objectives, giving amnesty to corrupt practices, without proper debate. 

RELEVANT VOTES 

In February, the Chamber of Deputies voted to reject a Supreme Court decision to temporarily remove 

representative José Wilson Santiago from office 77 . Mr. Santiago had been charged, in December 2019, for 

corruption and criminal organization following an investigation into the diversion of public resources for fighting 

droughts in the Northeast of Brazil 78 . 

In July and August, the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, respectively, passed a bill originally intended to direct more 

resources towards the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic 79 . The bill, however, included a controversial amendment 

granting temples exemption from a federal tax and the pardoning of fines with the Federal Revenue Service. Federal 

debts owed by churches had mobilized President Jair Bolsonaro, who reportedly pressured the Federal Revenue Service 

to find a solution to help this important group of political supporters (see page 11). 

During 2020, after COVID-19 arrived in Brazil, both the Chamber of Deputies and Senate adapted their structure 

and functioning to facilitate remote activity. This situation reduced tradicional spaces for accountability, social 

debate and participation (see page 46). In addition, there was a delay in the analysis of important proposals. 

Under this scenario, the analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Bill (PEC) 199/19, to allow imprisonment 

after second instance decisions, has been delayed 80 . 

21 


CONTROVERSIAL 

RUN FOR 

LEADERSHIP 

IN CONGRESS 

In December, the Supreme Court voted to bar the reelection of Rodrigo Maia and Davi Alcolumbre, respective 

presidents of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate 81 . Although Brazil’s Constitution clearly prohibits reelection 

of National Congress leadership in the same parliamentary term 82 , both Mr. Maia and Mr. Alcolumbre expected 

to receive an authorization from the judges in the Supreme Court to extend their tenure for a further two 

years in the elections scheduled for February 2021. This would be the first reelection of Mr. Alcolumbre as 

head of Senate. Mr. Maia, however, holds the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies since July 2016 83 . 

Despite being unconstitutional, in the days leading to the Supreme Court vote, it was expected for the 

maneuver to receive the blessing of the majority of judges. Mr. Alcolumbre and, especially, Mr. Maia, have 

been seen as important counterpoints to President Bolsonaro’s anti-democratic attacks against the Legislative 

and Judicial powers 84 . It was reported Mr. Bolsonaro did not object to the election in the Senate, but strongly 

opposed another term for Mr. Maia 85 . The reelection maneuver was, however, blocked after negative reaction 

from public opinion and pressure to maintain the original intention of 1988 Constitution. 


22

section 02 


After pressure from public opinion, the 

Supreme Court rejected unconstitutional 

reelection for the Chamber of Deputies and 

Senate presidents 

The modification of legislative processes, 

with no further analysis in committees and 

other limitations, hindered transparency, 

participation and accountability of 

legislative bodies 

Investigating and enforcement bodies 

are concerned that changes to legislation 

regarding money laundering, access to 

personal data and administrative improbity 

could hamper efforts to fight corruption 

23 


Photo: Dorivan Marinho / SCO / STF 

section 03 

JUDICIARY 

In the past year, efforts to curb corruption and electoral fraud encountered critical 

setbacks in the Supreme Court. President Jair Bolsonaro’s appointment of a new 

judge for the Court raised concerns regarding the appointee’s political independence, 

as the impact of this nomination will be decisive in grand corruption cases, involving 

individuals of great power. 


24

SETBACKS FIGHTING 

CORRUPTION 

In September 2020, Justice Antonio Dias Toffoli ended his 2-year term as president of the Supreme Court. In 

July, while responsible for decisions during the Court recess, Justice Toffoli granted the prosecutor-general 

a preliminary ruling ordering the sharing of the Operation Carwash taskforce database kept by the states, 

including confidential data, with the Public Prosecutor’s Office, in what was seen as a blow to prosecutorial 

autonomy (see page 35). The concern is that the move was yet another casuistic attempt at interference, 

guided by interests that were not institutional improvements, such as the creation of an adequate system for 

governance and sharing of information in the Public Prosecutor’s Office. The decision was later reversed by 

Justice Edson Fachin, rapporteur for the case 86-87 . 

In the same month, Justice Toffoli suspended a search warrant of Senator José Serra’s office, siding with Senate 

president, Davi Alcolumbre. The warrant had been determined by a first instance judge in the scope of an 

investigation into suspected electoral crime. Justice Toffoli, however, opined that the search request was too broad, 

and could potentially jeopardize the senator’s “privileged forum” and Supreme Court competence in the case 88 . 

,Justice Toffoli subsequently accepted a request from Rio de Janeiro governor, Wilson Witzel, targeted by 

investigations into corruption schemes in health contracts 89 , and ordered the state’s Legislative Assembly to 

destitute and recreate, under other parameters, a commission formed to discuss his impeachment process 90 . 

Justice Toffoli’s decision was reversed a month later 91 . 

Not long before leaving the Supreme Court presidency, Justice Toffoli opposed a previous decision by another 

court’s judge, siding with the prosecutor-general in favor of closing twelve inquiries based on a plea agreement 

made by former Rio de Janeiro state governor Sérgio Cabral with the Federal Police 92 . It was reported that, in his 

plea agreement, Mr. Cabral, convicted in several cases of corruption and money laundering, implicated authorities 

such as judges from the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) and ministers from the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU). 

Justice Toffoli was substituted by Justice Luiz Fux, who declared he would spare “no effort to strengthen the 

fight against corruption” and would not “admit any setback in tackling organized crime, money laundering 

and corruption” 93 . 

In October, the court approved a proposal from Justice Fux that criminal cases and inquiries should, again, be 

analyzed by the Court’s plenary. This was the procedure until 2014, when the judges decided that a Court’s 

chamber should oversee this type of case 94 . Operation Carwash cases were under 2º Chamber’s responsibility, 

and faced several overthrow, in the past months, in decisions by this collegiate 95 . The decision to move criminal 

cases back to plenary is, therefore, seen potentially to favor grand corruption investigations. It is, however, expected 

that certain appeals will still be subjected to the chamber’s evaluation, such as the case in which former Carwash 

judge Sérgio Moro is accused of partiality 96 . 

25 


“FAKE NEWS” 

INQUIRY 

In June 2020, the majority of judges in the Supreme Court ratified the legality 

and constitutionality of the “Fake News Inquiry” (INQ 4781), an ongoing 

investigation with highly controversial and allegedly unconstitutional features 97 . 

Justice Antonio Dias Toffoli opened the inquiry in 2019 to investigate alleged 

threats and fake news involving the Court and its members. 

Its generic object, however, allowed for a wider scope and controversial 

decisions, such as the suspension of auditing procedures by the Federal 

Revenue Service over politically exposed persons (reportedly involving Justice 

Gilmar Mendes and his wife, in addition to Justice Toffoli’s wife, in preliminary 

investigation 98 ), censoring of a news story that described an alleged mention 

to Justice Toffoli in a plea agreement signed under the Carwash taskforce 99 , 

and a reported attempt to determine whether Court judges were under scrutiny 

by Carwash taskforce 100 . 

Despite ratification of the inquiry, Justice Edson Fachin, rapporteur of the case, 

argued for the need to establish stricter parameters for the investigation 101 . 

In May, one month before Supreme Court endorsed the inquiry, the Public 

Prosecutor’s Office asked for suspension of the investigation after supporters 

of President Jair Bolsonaro were targeted. (see page 33). 


26

NEW APPOINTEE FOR 

THE SUPREME COURT 

In October, President Jair Bolsonaro appointed a new judge for the Supreme Court, after the retirement of Justice 

Celso de Mello. Justice Mello was recognized as a moderate judge with a strong stance in fighting corruption and 

the defense of democratic institutions 102 . WIth his first opportunity to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court, President 

Bolsonaro chose judge Kassio Nunes Marques. 

Quickly approved by the Senate, Justice Nunes Marques was an unanticipated candidate supported by congressmen 

from the “centrão” 103 . The “centrão” is a powerful center-right political bloc in National Congress, known to 

support incumbent governments in exchange for political nominations and shares of public resources distributed 

discretionarily by government. Several members of the informal political group are under investigation for corruption, 

money laundering, administrative improbity and other matters 104 . It has also been reported that Justice Nunes 

Marques’s appointment was endorsed by President Bolsonaro’s eldest son, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro 105 , charged 

for the “rachadinha” scheme. A pending case on whether Mr. Flávio Bolsonaro should be granted “privileged forum” 

was allocated to Justice Nunes Marques 106 (see page 28). 

In his first months in office, Justice Nunes Marques has repeatedly sided with President Bolsonaro or judges who 

tend to endorse defendants’ allegations in high profile cases 107 . In December, during the controversial discussion 

on whether to allow the unconstitutional reelection of Senate and Chamber of Deputies presidents (see page 22), 

the judge ended up isolated in favor of allowing the reelection of the Senate president, but barring the reelection of 

Chamber of Deputies’ president, a stance in line with Mr. Bolsonaro 108 . 

In the same month, Justice Marques Nunes granted a highly criticized preliminary ruling altering application of the Clean 

Record Law (Lei da Ficha Limpa), by which politicians convicted for crimes such as corruption and money laundering 

are deemed unelectable for eight years after serving time 109 . The judge’s interpretation, still to be confirmed by the 

Court’s plenary, would pave the way for shortening the ineligibility period for convicted politicians 110 . 

After being confirmed for the Supreme Court, Justice Nunes Marques joined the Court’s 2º Chamber 111 , responsible 

for crucial pending decisions linked to Operation Carwash, such as the one that will decide whether former Carwash 

judge Sérgio Moro acted with partiality when convicting former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva for corruption and 

money laundering 112 . The chamber is understood to be divided on this matter. Justice Nunes Marques’ opinion could 

be decisive and potentially impact the future of Operation Carwash. 

27 


FAVORABLE DECISIONS 

TO MR. BOLSONARO’S 

CIRCLE 

In May, as the COVID-19 pandemic spread through Brazil, Justice João Otávio de Noronha, then President of the 

Superior Court of Justice (STJ), sided with the Office of the Attorney General (AGU) to allow President Jair Bolsonaro 

not to publicly release the result of his COVID-19 test 113 . Justice Noronha’s ruling overturned two previous decisions 

ordering Mr. Bolsonaro to hand over results under the argument that transparency was fundamental for Brazilian 

society 114 . President Bolsonaro had been under pressure to release the results, which he guaranteed were negative, 

after several members of his entourage tested positive following a trip to the United States 115 . 

In July, Justice Noronha granted another controversial decision favoring the Bolsonaro clan. The judge allowed 

Fabrício Queiroz, a friend of the president’s and former aide to Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, arrested under the 

“rachadinha” investigations (see page 12), to be released under house arrest on account of COVID-19 risks and 

his fragile health 116 . The same benefit was extended to his wife, a fugitive from justice at that point, so that she 

could “take care of her husband” 117 — both decisions were later reversed. The press reported that, while granting 

the house arrest to the Queiroz family, Justice Noronha rejected similar requests by ordinary prisoners 118 . 

Months before the COVID-19 rulings, in April, President Bolsonaro had mentioned in a speech that Justice 

Noronha had been a case, for him, of “love at first sight” 119 . The judge is considered to be a strong candidate 

for a future Supreme Court seat. 

In June, another important decision benefited the Bolsonaro family. The president’s eldest son, Senator Flávio 

Bolsonaro, was granted “privileged forum” in the “rachadinha” case, meaning that he would be heard by a special 

instance of the Justice Tribunal of Rio de Janeiro rather than, as was expected, by a first instance judge. 


28

CORRUPTION 

INVESTIGATION 

INTO JUDGES 

In May, a special instance of the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) accepted charges of criminal organization 

and money laundering, presented by the Prosecutor’s Office, against seven judges from the Court of Justice 

of the state of Bahia allegedly involved in a scheme of selling decisions favoring illegal land ownership 120 . The 

charges are part of a Federal Police operation that started in 2019 (Faroeste) and developed throughout 2020 121 . 

29 


section 03 


Analysis of criminal cases and inquiries have 

returned to the Supreme Court plenary 

The Special Court of the Superior Court 

of Justice accepted charges of criminal 

organization and money laundering, 

presented by the Public Prosecutor’s 

Office, against seven judges from the Court 

of Justice of Bahia supposedly involved 

in a scheme of selling decisions favoring 

illegal land ownership 

Justice Antonio Dias Toffoli ended his 2-year 

term as president of the Supreme Court with 

several decisions that hindered investigations 

fighting corruption 

The Supreme Court ratified the “Fake News 

Inquiry”, a highly controversial investigation 

that violates basic constitutional principles 

and has surpassed its original motivation, 

interfering with anticorruption procedures 

and investigations 

New appointee to the Supreme Court, 

Justice Kassio Nunes Marques changed 

application of the Clean Record Law, 

shortening the period that convicted 

politicians are deemed unelectable 

Superior Court of Justice grants Fabrício 

Queiroz, longtime friend of President Jair 

Bolsonaro, house arrest due to the COVID-19 

pandemic while rejecting similar requests by 

ordinary prisoners 


30

Photo: Agência Brasil 

section 04 

PUBLIC 

PROSECUTOR’S 

OFFICE 

In the last year, the Public Prosecutor’s Office became a major source of concern 

due to a perceived political alignment of the prosecutor-general Augusto Aras with 

President Jair Bolsonaro and the dismantling of prosecutorial taskforces dedicated 

to grand corruption investigations such as Carwash and Greenfield. 

31 


UNDUE 

INTERFERENCE 

The appointment of Mr. Augusto Aras as prosecutor-general by President Jair Bolsonaro, in the second half of 2019, 

broke a key tradition that, since 2003, had been crucial in consolidating independence for the Public Prosecutor’s 

Office. Rather than choosing a name from a shortlist of candidates selected by an election process organized by 

the National Association of Federal Prosecutors (ANPR), President Bolsonaro picked a prosecutor who had not 

even competed in internal elections 122 . The Senate quickly confirmed Mr. Aras’ appointment 123 . 

Before Mr. Aras’ appointment, President Bolsonaro stressed that he would pick someone aligned with him 124 and 

his policies 125 . Mr. Bolsonaro’s declaration combined with the rejection of the ANPR’s shortlist generated concerns 

that the body’s autonomy is in jeopardy. 

Despite Mr. Aras’ repeated statements that he is fighting corruption 126 and that he maintains independence from 

the president 127 , conflicts provoked and choices made by his administration, in 2020, have indeed raised fears 

– about a loss of autonomy at the Public Prosecutor’s Office, excessive proximity to Mr. Bolsonaro and political 

use of the office to benefit allies and undermine adversaries 128 . This is an especially relevant concern considering 

the prosecutor-general is the only individual capable of investigating and criminally charging the president. 

Mr. Aras’ proximity to President Bolsonaro was perceived as unusual in his first months in office, due to frequent 

meetings with the president 129 . In May 2020, Mr. Bolsonaro praised what he saw as an “exceptional performance” 

by the prosecutor-general and declared Mr. Aras would be a strong candidate if a third vacancy opened in the 

Supreme Court during his mandate (only two judges were scheduled to retire during Mr. Bolsonaro’s first term) 130 . After 

the encouragement, in September, it was reported that Mr. Aras unsuccessfully mobilized allies to be appointed to 

the Supreme Court in replacement of Justice Celso de Mello, who retired in October 131 (see page 27). 

Decisions undertaken by Mr. Aras in the past year, systematically aligned to President Bolsonaro or his political 

inner circle 132 , have also raised concerns about a possible loss of political independence. According to reports, 

in his first year as prosecutor-general, Mr. Aras sided with government over 30 times while only once filling a 

constitutional lawsuit against President Bolsonaro 133 . 

In April, following the resignation of Justice Minister Sérgio Moro and his accusation that President Bolsonaro 

wanted to interfere with the Federal Police (see page 11), Mr. Aras asked the Supreme Court to open an inquiry 

into possible crimes committed by the president 134 . The prosecutor-general’s solicitation, however, included a call 

for an evaluation whether Mr. Moro was making slanderous claims or telling the truth. Mr. Aras also sided with 

government by asking the Supreme Court not to make public the entire video of the presidential meeting identified 

by Mr. Moro as proof of President’s Bolsonaro intention to interfere with the Federal Police, arguing it could be used 

politically in 2022 elections 135 . The recording was later almost entirely disclosed and revealed strong evidence 

that Mr. Bolsonaro had pressured the minister of Justice in an attempt to interfere with the leadership of the 

Federal Police and the corporation’s bureau in Rio de Janeiro 136 . The video also allowed public opinion to witness 


32

the minister of Environment’s attempt to use distraction caused by the COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity to 

pass infra-legal controversial reforms (see page 16), and the use of bad language by Mr. Bolsonaro to refer to the 

governors of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro 137 . 

In May 2020, Mr. Aras raised suspicions that he was benefiting President Bolsonaro’s allies when he reversed 

his opinion regarding the “Fake News Inquiry” (INQ 4781), a controversial investigation formally installed by the 

Supreme Court to investigate alleged threats and fake news directed at the Court and its members (see page 26). 

In 2019, soon after taking office, Mr. Aras had changed the Prosecutor’s Office previous stance regarding the 

inquiry, arguing in favour of the investigation and his office’s participation in the case 138 . However, in May, after a 

Federal Police operation targeted President Bolsonaro’s supporters 139 , Mr. Aras declared surprise at the decision to 

go ahead with the operation despite his opinion to the contrary, asking the Supreme Court to suspend the inquiry 

pending further analysis of the investigation’s limits 140 . 

At two moments, in August 141 and September 142 , the Prosecutor’s Office petitioned the Supreme Court regarding 

complaints questioning the “privileged forum” granted to Senator Flávio Bolsonaro at the level of the Rio de Janeiro 

Justice Tribunal , a rule that has allowed the president’s eldest son’s case (the so called “rachadinha” scheme, see 

page 28) to be heard by a special instance of the Court rather than by a first instance judge. The senator’s case 

was expected to be heard by the first instance judge, in line with the current interpretation of “privileged forum” 

used in Brazilian courts 143 . 

In September, the Prosecutor’s Office made an astonishing change of course regarding a corruption investigation 

into representative Arthur Lira, a political leader of the “centrão”, the informal political bloc in National Congress 

that, throughout the year of 2020, provided crucial support for President Bolsonaro. By December, Mr. Lira was the 

president’s choice for heading the Chamber of Deputies 144 (see page 22). In June, Mr. Lira had been charged by the 

Prosecutor’s Office in a detailed lawsuit presented to the Supreme Court. Three months later, the same institution 

awkwardly called for the charges to be dropped, arguing that involvement of the representative was unclear 145 . 

In June, reports stated that prosecutor Lindôra Maria Araújo, a close ally of Mr. Aras and coordinator of the 

Prosecutor’s Office Carwash working group, had tried to interfere with the Rio de Janeiro’s Carwash taskforce 

in order to to unfreeze a Swiss bank account owned by the family of a businessman convicted for corruption 

in Rio’s public transport system 146 . According to the press, Ms. Araújo insisted on the unfreeze, arguing that 

the account was linked to the businessman’s father, who hadn’t been charged for any crime, stating that she 

knew the family and intended to make a deal with the clan. The taskforce perceived the move as an undue 

attempt to interfere with their autonomy. 

On the other hand, several 2020 episodes raised concern about politically driven investigations 147 . In April, the 

Public Prosecutor’s Office asked its decentralized offices in the states to report all information they received 

regarding potential investigations into state governors, a move seen internally as highly unusual 148 . The concerns 

were partly driven by the fact that, at that moment, President Bolsonaro was in permanent conflict with state 

governors who defended harsher measures against COVID-19 pandemic 149 and criticized his government for 

failures 150 in leading the health crisis 151 . In May, Federal Police searched the official residence of Rio de Janeiro’s 

governor, Wilson Witzel, as part of an investigation into alleged diversion of COVID-19 funds 152 . A day before the 

police’s operation, representative Carla Zambelli, an important ally for Mr. Bolsonaro, declared that, following the 

resignation of Minister of Justice Sérgio Moro (see page 11), that stalled investigations by Federal Police into 

state governors regarding COVID-19 would now procede 153 . Mr. Witzel, a former ally of President Bolsonaro turned 

adversary, readily claimed he was the target of political persecution 154 . In August, Mr. Witzel, against whom there 

seems to be solid evidence, was temporarily removed from office 155 . 

33 


In 2020, Mr. Aras also opposed a plea agreement made by the Federal Police with former Rio de Janeiro governor 

Sérgio Cabral, convicted several times under Operation Carwash. When President of the Supreme Court, Justice 

Antonio Dias Toffoli granted Mr. Aras a request to close 12 inquires based on Mr. Cabral’s agreement that had 

previously been authorized by another Supreme Court judge 156 (see page 25). The move was seen as unusual 

and raised concerns due to the fact that Mr. Cabral had reportedly implicated authorities from the Superior Court 

of Justice (STJ), the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) and congressmen 157 . 

Foto: Divulgação Polícia Federal 

Another sensitive issue regarding the prosecutor-general’s administration have been his clashes with Operation 

Carwash, a stance that brings him close to a group of politicians, judges and lawyers highly critical of the way the 

grand corruption investigation was conducted. At the same time, there have been questionings whether his Carwash 

confrontation undermines former minister of Justice and Carwash judge, Sérgio Moro, a potential adversary to 

President Bolsonaro in the 2022 elections. 

DISMANTLE 

OF TASKFORCES 

A principal setback regarding Mr. Augusto Aras’ tenure in the Public Prosecutor’s Office has been his confrontation 

with taskforces which have been investigating, in the past years, corruption schemes involving high profile politicians 

and public and private companies. In the past months, these clashes have occurred both internally and publicly, 

and have involved administrative and judicial measures, political mobilization and public statements. 

The taskforces were an innovation in the country’s law enforcement system that, from 2014, allowed prosecutors 

to work in temporary teams exclusively dedicated to investigating grand corruption schemes. Leniency agreements 

and plea bargains became common mechanisms used by the taskforces involved in Operations Carwash (originally 

focused in schemes between state oil company Petrobras and Brazil’s biggest contractors) and Greenfield (launched 

to investigate fraud in pension funds from state owned companies). Both operations untangled complex corruption 

schemes involving prominent figures in Brazilian politics. An internal evaluation of these taskforces alongside 

other workgroups created after 2014 highlighted, in April last year, the “significant relevance of the work in the 

taskforce model for the achievement of more effective results” in the Public Prosecutor’s Office, despite a general 

lack of structure and support 158 . 

Mr. Aras’ administration has, however, put the taskforce model under strain. 2020 came to an end with great 

uncertainty regarding the continuation of Carwash and Greenfield taskforces and their investigations. 


34

In December 2020, after much speculation, the Public Prosecutor’s Office authorized the renewal of activities for 

Carwash taskforces in Curitiba (until October 2021) and Rio de Janeiro (until the end of January 2021) 159 . São 

Paulo’s taskforce, in charge of investigations into major infrastructure projects in the state 160 , was discontinued in 

September, after seven prosecutors announced their departure from the group due to incompatibilities with the 

new incumbent prosecutor and what they saw as obstacles to fulfilling their job 161 . 190 ongoing investigations 162 

were left under the responsibility of the incumbent prosecutor or were redistributed. 

Numerous episodes, throughout 2020, already demonstrated the current administration’s animosity towards 

Carwash taskforces. In June, Curitiba’s taskforce formally complained about an inspection by Ms. Lindôra Maria 

Araújo, appointed a few months before as the new coordinator of the Public Prosecutor’s Office Carwash working 

group, after the resignation of the previous coordinator, reportedly for disagreements with Mr. Aras’ administration 

and complaints of interference 163 . During June’s inspection, Ms. Araújo attempted to gain access to information, 

procedures and the group’s database, including confidential information, without official request or justification 164 . 

In July, Mr. Aras’ administration won a Supreme Court preliminary ruling determining the transfer of all Carwash 

taskforces’ decentralized databases to the Public Prosecutors’ Office in order to evaluate the existence of 

investigations into officials protected by “privileged forum” 165 (see page 25). Signed during the Court’s recess by 

its then president, Justice Antonio Dias Toffoli, the ruling was reversed a month later by Justice Edson Fachin, 

rapporteur of the case 166 . However conflicts around Carwash databases continued. 

In November, Inspector General and Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, Ms. Elizeta de 

Paiva Ramos, ordered the hand over of Curitiba’s taskforce database, as part of an internal procedure to evaluate 

potential irregularities in Ms. Araújo’s June inspection, and also regarding the taskforce 167 . In theory, neither Mr. 

Aras nor Ms. Araújo should have access to the information obtained by the Inspector General. 

In 2020, Mr. Aras also criticized Operation Carwash taskforces. In July, during an online debate with lawyers, 

the prosecutor-general argued that it was time to “correct directions”, to put an end to the “lavajatismo” (a 

term used by those who criticize what they see as excesses of the operation) and that a “box of secrets” 

cannot exist inside the Public Prosecutor’s Office 168 . 

When questioned by peers about his declarations, during a meeting of the Superior Counsel of the Public Prosecutor’s 

Office, Mr. Aras demonstrated an authoritarian attitude and tried to censor criticism 169 . The episode revealed the 

serious internal crisis faced by the office. 

Alongside Carwash, the Operation Greenfield taskforce also suffered setbacks. Throughout the year, the working 

group had to deal with a sequence of short term renewals by the Public Prosecutor’s Office central administration, 

rather than a longer operating extension to allow the taskforce to organize its investigations 170 . 

Despite requesting reinforcements to help the growing investigation, the taskforce lost exclusivity for its prosecutors’, 

forcing them to return to their original postings in other cities and accumulate Operation Greenfield to the other 

demands for local investigations. In September, arguing that the taskforce lacked the support and structure to 

achieve its objectives, the taskforce coordinator, Anselmo Lopes, resigned 171 . 

In November, an internal consultation to appoint new prosecutors to Greenfield taskforce took place 172 . It was, 

however, considered too broad and with no guarantees that the necessary structure and support would be given 

by Mr. Aras’ administration. After a single candidate presented himself, Mr. Aras appointed Mr. Celso Três as new 

coordinator of Greenfield taskforce 173 . In the past, Mr. Três had openly criticized what he saw as “distortions” 

35 


produced by Operation Carwash 174 . In December, two more prosecutors left the Greenfield taskforce 175 . 2020 

ended with the working group’s investigations paralyzed 176 and the taskforce without a renewal 177 . 

In September, the Greenfield taskforce declared responsibility for 48 ongoing criminal investigations, with 24 

other cases still pending, involving 435 suspects and financial movement amounting to R$ 3 trillion (US$ 581 

billion) 178 . In a memo sent to the Public Prosecutor’s Office administration, the new Greenfield coordinator declared 

he wasn’t up to “working too much” and suggested what he saw as viable pathways for the operation: transfer of 

investigations to the Federal Police, a “production line” of settlements and redistribution of cases not directly linked 

to losses from pension funds 179 . Prosecutors saw Mr. Três’ proposal as a way to terminate the Greenfield taskforce. 

Mr. Aras’ administration has indicated the intention to replace the taskforce model by the GAECOs (Special Action 

Group to Combat Organized Crime), a structure that has existed for more than twenty years in state prosecutors’ 

offices. In 2020, the first five GAECOs were created in the Public Prosecutor’s Office, in Minas Gerais, Paraíba, 

Paraná, Amazonas and Pará. The creation of this structure must be celebrated, since it institutionalizes the work of 

prosecutors against organized crime. Federal GAECOs, however, still lack crucial elements, such as the exclusivity 

of prosecutors involved in its investigations and a specialized support structure for investigations, a formula that 

has already been tested and considered effective in major investigations. 

The GAECOs are also not necessarily a replacement for the taskforce model, as these special action groups 

are quite suitable for investigations related to enduring criminal organizations, such as those dedicated to drug 

trafficking. The taskforce model, on the other hand, already proved to have the necessary flexibility for investigating 

grand corruption schemes or other complex cases that would not necessarily be absorbed by the structures of the 

GAECOs, such as major disasters as the ones in Mariana and Brumadinho. GAECOs and taskforces can coexist, 

as long as they are well equipped and regulated. 

The taskforce model, combined with recent legal reforms that established cooperation and leniency instruments 

between defendants and investigators, were a helpful innovation that allowed for the investigation of grand corruption 

schemes to unfold. The model, as well as information management by the Prosecutor’s Office, could and should 

be improved. In fact, there are already proposals to improve the model’s regulation, pending evaluation by the 

Superior Council of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. 

Despite Rio de Janeiro and Curitiba’s taskforce recent renewal, there are concerns among prosecutors that the 

model will, indeed, be terminated, with redistribution of cases or their incorporation into new structures. There are 

indications that much of what ensured the success of taskforces so far — such as the prosecutor’s exclusivity to 

cases, joint work and a support structure for investigations — could come to an end 180 . 

By attacking the taskforce credibility and undermining their capacity to investigate without offering an adequate 

replacement model, Mr. Aras reinforces the perception that he runs a political and authoritarian administration that 

threatens the constitutional autonomy granted to prosecutors, with harmful consequences to corruption investigations. 


36

section 04 


The creation of the GAECOs under the 

Public Prosecutor’s Office, advancing the 

institutionalization of investigations on 

criminal organizations; federal GAECOs, 

however, still lack necessary conditions 

to allow for complex and in-depth 

investigations, and do not necessarily 

replace the task force model 

Loss of independence for the Public 

Prosecutor’s Office and increasing 

interference with the institution 

Pressure from the Public Prosecutor’s 

Office to access specific investigations 

databases, instead of conducting 

institutional reform to address the 

institution’s inadequate information 

governance system 

Aggravating internal divisions and 

displays of authoritarian behavior by the 

prosecutor-general Augusto Aras 

Dismantling of taskforces of prosecutors 

linked to Operations Carwash and 

Greenfield, hampering investigations into 

grand corruption schemes and without 

replacing them with an institutional model 

suitable for fighting macro corruption 

37 


Photo: Isac Nóbrega / PR 

section 05 

CIVIL SOCIETY 

AND 

THE PRESS 

In the past year, the Access to Information Law has been challenged 

by attempts to suspend deadlines for responses during the COVID-19 

pandemic, and by repeated delays and denials of information at national 

and subnational levels. At the same time, President Jair Bolsonaro has 

frequently attacked journalists and NGOs. 


38

SETBACKS IN 

ACCESS TO 

INFORMATION 

In 2020, challenges to application of the Access to Information Law, a crucial improvement that has allowed for 

increased transparency in Brazil’s public administration, became evident. 

In March, when COVID-19 arrived in Brazil, President Bolsonaro published a Provisional Measure (an act with the 

effect of a law and temporarily validity) suspending deadlines for response to requests made under the mentioned 

law in specific situations involving public authorities quarantined, working remotely or directly involved in fighting 

the pandemic 181 . The suspension was reversed 182 a month later by the Supreme Court. 

In June, the Office of the Comptroller General (CGU) reversed its previous position in order to deny access, requested 

through the the Access to Information Law, to legal opinions provided by public lawyers concerning the presidential 

decision to sanction or veto laws 183 . 

Under the questionable argument of attorney-client privilege, the legal opinions were, in practice, considered secret 

and, thus, not provided via freedom of information requests, an argument previously applied by the Office of the 

Attorney General (AGU), in 2017 and 2018, during President Michel Temer’s government. However, considering 

legal opinions often contain more than just legal arguments, this is also an impediment to understanding the policy 

decision-making process. Reportedly, CGU technical experts were against June’s decision 184 . 

In parallel to barriers imposed by the federal government, in the past year, local governments 185 and specific federal 

institutions 186 have delayed, rejected with poor arguments or simply ignored requests made through the law. 

39 


THREATS TO 

THE PRESS AND 

CIVIL SOCIETY 

Under pressure for his repeated diminishing of COVID-19 pandemic, for investigations that targeted his political 

inner circle and for controversial positions upheld by his government, President Jair Bolsonaro maintained 

public attacks against the press and civil society organizations throughout 2020. 

The most serious episode concerning the press occurred in August, after Mr. Bolsonaro was questioned about a 

series of alleged deposits made in the bank account of his wife, the First Lady Michelle Bolsonaro, by Fabrício 

Queiroz, personal friend of the president and former aide to his son Flávio, investigated in the “rachadinha” 

scheme (see page 12). Asked about the deposits by a journalist, President Bolsonaro replied he’d like “to 

punch” the reporter “in the mouth” 187 . The following day, Mr. Bolsonaro continued his attacks on the press. 

During an official engagement, the president used an expletive to imply that fearful journalists would be less 

likely to survive COVID-19 than someone like him 188 . 

In the past months, Mr. Bolsonaro also targeted NGOs working in environmental protection. In September, 

while discussing environmental policies, the president compared NGOs working in the Amazon to a “cancer” 

he cannot “kill” 189 . A few weeks later, during a speech to the United Nations Summit on Biodiversity, the 

president declared that some NGOs were associated to organizations that committed environmental crimes 

in Brazil and abroad 190 . Finally, in November, it was reported that Mr. Bolsonaro’s government was discussing 

regulation to establish control over NGOs working in the Amazon with the alleged objective of protecting 

“national interests” 191 , a move seen by organizations in the field as a threat to democracy 192 . 

Despite repeated attacks and setbacks for environmental policy in 2020, civil society and crucial institutions 

have reacted to the dismantling of programs and budgets (see page 17). 


40

ATTACKS ON 

TRANSPARENCY 

INTERNATIONAL BRAZIL 

In December 2020, Transparency International was targeted by a slander campaign in Brazil. This 

derived from false allegations that it was receiving (or would receive) funds and taking a managerial 

role over social investments (compensation funds) derived from fines imposed by leniency agreements 

signed by Brazil’s Prosecutor’s Office with companies accused of corruption. 

The false claims were categorically rejected by Transparency International 193 and by the Prosecutor’s 

Office itself 194 , in official communications. 

Attacks on Transparency International are a sad but frequent consequence of its work around the globe 

to expose and fight corruption. They are taken very seriously on every occasion, as they represent 

threats to fundamental rights and serve as indicators for the quality of civic space and the democratic 

regime in a country – particularly when the attacks derive from public authorities. 

One of the most serious setbacks in the fight against corruption in Brazil is rooted in ever-aggravating 

hostility towards the press and criminalization of civil society, fueled by hate speech from President 

Bolsonaro. The consequences of this trend, unfortunately, go beyond the anticorruption agenda and 

undermine central pillars of Brazil’s democratic regime. 

41 


section 05 


The Access to Information Law has been 

challenged by a federal government 

attempt to suspend its deadlines due to 

COVID-19 pandemic, and by a change 

in CGU’s interpretation in order to bar 

access to legal opinions provided by 

public lawyers; also, at subnational 

levels, requesters of access to 

information have faced delays, unjustified 

denials or no response at all to demands 

presented under the law 

President Jair Bolsonaro threatened to 

physically attack a journalist and compared 

NGO’s to a “cancer” he cannot “kill”; it was 

reported his government plans to control 

NGOs in the Amazon region 


42

Photo: Fernando Crispim / Amazônia Real 

section 06 

COVID-19 

PANDEMIC 

COVID-19 forced the public administration to make changes to internal and external 

procedures in order to allow for remote activities and to expedite acquisition of sanitary 

supplies. Imposed flexibility in public procurements seems to have facilitated fraud 

and corruption schemes, identified by control bodies, involving resources allocated 

to fight the pandemic. At the same time, social distancing measures impaired social 

participation in National Congress and local legislative bodies. 

43 


INVESTIGATIONS 

INTO FRAUD AND 

CORRUPTION SCHEMES 

In 2020, all levels of government in the country relaxed procurement rules and budget definitions in order to respond 

effectively to emergency demands and expenses raised by the COVID-19 pandemic 195 . Although necessary to guarantee 

quick destination of public funds to fight the unprecedented health crisis, the relaxation increased pressure on Brazil’s 

already fragile public procurement system. 

In the past months, control and enforcement bodies uncovered potential cases of multi-million fraud, involving acquisition 

of medical ventilators 196 and setting up of temporary hospitals 197 . Some problems identified in the pandemic procurement 

processes were a wide range of prices, unit values showing no reduction in large-scale purchases, contracting with 

companies from sectors other than health, and advance payments by public authorities for materials or equipment that 

were defective, delayed or even were not delivered 198 . 

In October, the Federal Police and Office of the Comptroller General (CGU) launched an operation into fraud in COVID-19 

public procurements in the state of Roraima 199 that led to Senator Chico Rodrigues being caught with money in his 

underpants (see page 13). According to the Federal Police, the corporation’s efforts during the first nine months of the 

pandemic led to 67 special operations linked to investigations into public procurement involving more than R$ 2 billion 

(US$ 373 million) destined to combat the emergency. 

In November, the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) released a list of 2020 local election candidates who had received 

emergency COVID-19 financial aid paid for by the federal government despite having declared a high income, in theory 

incompatible with emergency policy rules 200 . In the same month, TCU released a report identifying deficiencies and 

poor effectiveness in the control of emergency aid’s registries, with over 430.000 cases, from a total of 67 million 

beneficiaries, with evidence of undue payment of emergency aid, amounting to R$ 813 million (US$ 152,6 million) 201 . 

According to the TCU, internal controls and recommendations made to other instances of the federal government led 

to the cancellation of 4 million undue payments of emergency aid and an economy of R$ 8,8 billion (US$ 1,64 billion). 

To respond to the pandemic, the TCU created an internal platform to gather information that was dispersed in different 

sources and, thus, increase its capacity to analyze risk in public procurement (“Painel CoviData”). 


44

The Public Prosecutor’s Office also established an internal instance to monitor the pandemic (GIAC-COVID-19), and its 

Anti-Corruption Chamber (5CCR) made an effort to disseminate information to prosecutors on recommendations for 

emergency public procurement and other mechanisms to fight criminal activities during the pandemic. 

Although investigations into fraud and corruption during the COVID-19 pandemic show the vulnerability of 

Brazil’s procurement systems and social assistance registries, on the other hand, they are a good indication of 

the work by comptroller offices, prosecutors and the police, also at subnational levels, in pursuing suspected 

wrongdoing and mismanagement. 

INDEX OF TRANSPARENCY 

IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 

In 2020, Transparency International Brazil created a ranking to monitor transparency efforts in public 

procurement by government entities during the pandemic, and released four evaluation rounds regarding 

improvements observed at national, state and municipal levels 202 . 

The ranking identified different levels of compliance, but highlighted the interest by a share of 

local authorities in improving transparency levels for emergency procurement processes. From the 

first assessment in May to a third one in July, TI Brazil’s index registered an improvement of 62% 

in average scores by Brazilian states and their capital cities. For the fourth round of evaluation, 

released in September, there was a change of methodology to include more rigorous criteria and 

monitoring of donations, economic stimulus programs and social protection measures. Even with 

the methodological changes, average scores remained high. 

45 


SOCIAL 

PARTICIPATION 

AT A LOSS 

Throughout the year, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies adapted 

parliamentary procedure for most activities so as to be possible remotely. By the end of 2020, under the 

new operation rules, the Chamber of Deputies claimed having approved the largest number of proposals 

in the last decade 203 . 

Despite the alleged efficiency in remote activities and a system allowing the public to follow parliamentary 

debates online, the procedural changes led to bills and other acts being voted directly 204 in the plenary 205 , 

bypassing prior analysis by thematic committees, a step that has traditionally allowed for wider debate and 

social participation. 

State and city legislative bodies made similar adaptations, equally reducing transparency and participation 

in law-making processes. With this reduction in institutional and social controls, in March, São Paulo city 

councillors passed a bill which included an opportunistic amendment (the so-called “jabuti”, an amendment 

inserted in bills intended to regulate very different matters). This amendment limited the sanctioning power of 

the Office of the Comptroller of the City of São Paulo by creating a new political instance for appeals against 

its administrative decisions and enforcement of the Anticorruption Law 206 . The episode led to the resignation 

of Gustavo Ungaro, the municipal control body’s chief 207 . 


46

section 06 


Control and enforcement bodies were 

able to identify fraud and corruption 

schemes linked to COVID-19 resources, 

both in public procurement and in 

financial aid offered due to the pandemic 

TI Brazil’s index showed that a great 

number of local authorities increased 

transparency in their emergency 

procurement processes 

Relaxation of procurement rules due to 

COVID-19 opened further opportunities for 

fraud and corruption; several investigations 

led to alleged corruption schemes 

Remote voting procedures implemented 

in National Congress and local 

legislative bodies due to COVID-19 led 

to a decrease in transparency, social 

debate and participation 

47 


Photo: Afonso Braga / Rede Câmara 

section 07 

2020 LOCAL 

ELECTIONS 

November local elections represented a gain in diversity, with a greater proportion of 

minority groups and historically marginalized candidates and elected officials, a renewal 

that could lead to changes in traditional political practices and the strengthening of 

democracy. Fighting corruption was not prominent in the electoral debate. A high share 

of Brazilians declared they would vote for candidates under investigation. 


48

GAIN IN 

DIVERSITY, 

CORRUPTION 

DEBATE ABSENT 

In 2020 local elections, Brazilians voted to elect a record number of LGBTQ candidates. According to mapping 

by civil society associations, 90 LGBTQ candidates were elected for municipal legislatives in 72 cities across the 

country 208 compared to only 38 in the previous election 209 . 30 new city councillors are transgender 210 , almost four 

times the number of transgender candidates elected in 2016 211 . In capitals such as São Paulo, Belo Horizonte and 

Aracaju, transgender candidates were among the most voted city councillors. 

For the first time since data collection began, in 2014, the number of black candidates was higher than white 

ones 212 . Still, only 32% of the elected mayors are black 213 . Women continue underrepresented. Out of 27 state 

capitals, just one executive will be ruled by a woman (Palmas) 214 . Data from the first round of local elections shows 

that women will lead 651 local governments (12,1%), against 4.750 run by men (87,9%) 215 . Advances in municipal 

legislatives are also timid: women will occupy 16% of the city council seats, compared to 13,5% grabbed in 2016 216 . 

Although there is still a long way to go to guarantee that election results reflect the Brazilian population’s composition, 

the 2020 elections diversity gain should be celebrated not only for the progressive policies it raises, but also 

the political renewal it allows for, and its potential to dislodge old political practices and open space for a more 

democratic and, potentially, less corrupt participation. 

A factor that has probably impacted the 2020 election outcomes for women and black candidates is the unequal 

distribution of public electoral funds for their campaigns. Calculations released in the weeks prior to the elections 

showed a large concentration of public electoral resources in the hands of just a few candidates 217 , and a distribution 

of resources between women and black candidates in many cases below that determined by electoral rules 218 . 

Concerns regarding the disparity in discretionary allocation of public electoral funds were expected 219 , and the 

2017 law creating the electoral fund has been challenged before the Supreme Court 220 . 

49 


Another missed opportunity in the 2020 elections was the lack of debate regarding policies to enhance the fight 

against corruption. An opinion poll revealed that over 40% of Brazilians from four state capitals (São Paulo, Rio 

de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte and Recife) admitted the possibility of voting for candidates under investigation for 

corruption, a percentage that rose to 50% in Rio de Janeiro 221 , a city immersed in several criminal investigations. 

In this sense, despite housing the greatest number of politicians with “privileged forum” investigated by Operation 

Carwash 222 , the PP party won the second largest number of city halls in 2020 elections, going from 495 mayors 

to 685, with a specially strong performance in South and Northeast regions 223 . 

HACKING EPISODE 

The November elections were troubled by invasion of the TSE (Brazil’s highest electoral Court) system, allegedly 

by the hacker group CyberTeam, led by a 19-year-old Portuguese citizen identified as Zambrius and arrested in 

a joint action between Brazilian Federal Police and Portuguese Police 224 . The attack consisted of disseminating 

administrative information from former TSE officials and ministers. In addition, there was a second attempted attack, 

with multiple access from Brazil, New Zealand and the United States. The second attempt was fully neutralized. 

Although experts have confirmed that the breach did not compromise the reliability of the polls 225 , several groups 

that support President Jair Bolsonaro engaged in online activity to disqualify the country’s electoral system 226 . 

Research carried out by the Getulio Vargas Foundation showed that posts with misinformation about alleged fraud 

and manipulation of the electoral system are increasingly numerous in the country, on platforms such as YouTube 

and Facebook 227 . It is, therefore, expected that the TSE hacking episode could be used, in the upcoming 2022 

general elections, to question an eventual unfavorable result for President Bolsonaro and his political inner circle. 


50

section 07 


A gain for diversity in the 2020 local 

election, with an increase of the number 

of candidates and elected representatives 

from minority or historically excluded 

groups. The democratization of political 

representation is one of the most 

important paths for the fight against 

corruption in the medium and long terms, 

as it helps to dislodge old structures 

of power largely responsible for the 

country’s systemic corruption 

Distribution of public electoral funds to 

women and black candidates still seems to 

fall short of that stipulated by legislation 

Fighting corruption was absent from debate 

in 2020 elections and a high percentage 

of Brazilians declared they would vote for 

candidates under investigation 

The 2020 elections hacking episode may 

increase fake news and distrust in Brazilian 

electoral systems 

51 


NOTES 

1 https://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/ti_br_-_retrospectiva-brasil-2019 

2 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/04/bolsonaro-avisa-moro-que-vai-trocar-diretor-geral-dapolicia-federal.shtml 

3 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/pressao-de-bolsonaro-levou-pf-antecipar-em-4-meses-saida-de-superintendentedo-rio-23883048 

4 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/moro-ao-pedir-demissao-bolsonaro-queria-interferir-pessoalmente-na-pf-ligarpara-diretores-superintendentes-ter-acesso-relatorios-1-24390923 

5 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/04/28/moro-bolsonaro-inquerito-stf-entenda.ghtml 

6 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/04/28/novo-diretor-geral-da-pf-alexandre-ramagem-esta-nacorporacao-desde-2005-e-e-amigo-da-familia-bolsonaro-veja-perfil.ghtml 

7 https://portal.stf.jus.br/noticias/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=442298&ori=1 

8 https://www.metropoles.com/brasil/politica-brasil/primeiro-ato-de-novo-chefe-da-pf-e-mudanca-da-direcaono-rio-de-janeiro 

9 https://oglobo.globo.com/economia/e-impressionante-como-receita-atrapalha-desenvolvimento-do-brasildiz-bolsonaro-24289029 

10 https://www.em.com.br/app/noticia/economia/2020/04/30/internas_economia,1143278/bolsonaro-pressionareceita-federal-perdoar-dividas-igreja-evangelica.shtml 

11 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/09/13/bolsonaro-veta-perdao-de-dividas-tributarias-de-igrejasinforma-governo.ghtml 

12 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/mp-denuncia-flavio-bolsonaro-queiroz-mais-15-pessoas-por-rachadinhana-alerj-1-24727627 

13 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/11/ex-assessora-de-flavio-bolsonaro-admite-rachadinha-eentrega-de-dinheiro-a-queiroz.shtml 

14 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/12/saques-de-ex-auxiliar-de-flavio-bolsonaro-ocorriam-aposdepositos-de-valor-similar.shtml 

15 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/12/saques-de-ex-auxiliar-de-flavio-bolsonaro-ocorriam-aposdepositos-de-valor-similar.shtml 

16 https://g1.globo.com/rj/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2019/12/20/entenda-suspeitas-do-mp-sobre-flavio-bolsonaroem-esquema-de-rachadinhas-na-alerj.ghtml 

17 https://g1.globo.com/jornal-nacional/noticia/2020/08/07/queiroz-e-a-mulher-depositaram-r-89-mil-emcheques-na-conta-de-michelle-bolsonaro.ghtml 

18 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/bolsonaro-diz-que-cheque-de-ex-assessor-para-michelle-foi-pagamentode-divida-23289990 

19 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/08/quebra-de-sigilo-revela-27-depositos-da-familia-queiroz-amichelle-e-coloca-em-duvida-versao-de-bolsonaro.shtml 

20 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/10/23/orgaos-do-governo-buscaram-anular-investigacao-de-exassessor-de-flavio-bolsonaro-diz-revista.ghtml 

21 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/revista-epoca-abin-fez-relatorios-para-orientar-defesa-de-flavio-bolsonarona-anulacao-do-caso-queiroz-1-24792193 

22 https://crusoe.com.br/edicoes/138/a-abin-do-b/?utm_source=crs-site&utm_medium=crs-login&utm_ 

campaign=redir

23 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/10/07/bolsonaro-diz-que-acabou-com-a-operacao-lava-jatoporque-governo-nao-tem-mais-corrupcao.ghtml 

24 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/10/pf-apreende-dinheiro-entre-as-nadegas-de-vice-lider-dogoverno-bolsonaro-em-acao-sobre-covid.shtml 

25 https://www.metropoles.com/brasil/em-video-bolsonaro-diz-que-tem-quase-uniao-estavel-com-chico-rodrigues 

26 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/10/apos-flagra-de-dinheiro-entre-as-nadegas-aliados-pedem-asenador-que-se-afaste-de-vice-lideranca-de-bolsonaro.shtml 

27 https://transparenciainternacional.org.br/retrocessos/ 

28 https://www.gov.br/cgu/pt-br/anticorrupcao/plano-anticorrupcao.pdf 

29 https://www.in.gov.br/materia/-/asset_publisher/Kujrw0TZC2Mb/content/id/1101277/do1-2017-12-18- 

resolucao-n-11-de-11-de-dezembro-de-2017-1101273-1101273 

30 https://gazetaweb.globo.com/portal/noticia/2020/02/75-dos-orgaos-federais-descumprem-regras-sobrepublicacao-de-agendas-diz-cgu_97516.php 

31 http://www.portaltransparencia.gov.br 

32 https://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/busca/downloadNormativo.asp?arquivo=/Lists/Normativos/ 

Attachments/50905/Circ_3978_v2_P.pdf 

33 https://outraspalavras.net/desigualdades-mundo/carf-um-tribunal-paralelo-a-servico-dos-sonegadores/ 

34 https://www.jota.info/tributos-e-empresas/tributario/voto-de-qualidade-e-extinto-no-carf-14042020 

35 https://www.jota.info/tributos-e-empresas/tributario/parecer-carf-economia-06072020 

36 https://www.conjur.com.br/2020-nov-30/justica-afasta-uso-voto-qualidade-processo-carf 

37 https://www.jota.info/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/sindifisco-nacional-gafi-mr-david-lewis.pdf 

38 https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/business/2020/12/18/notas-de-r-200-encalham-e-menos-de-10-do-prometidocircula-na-economia 

39 https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/economia/noticia/2020-07/banco-central-anuncia-lancamento-danota-de-r-200 

40 https://www.transparencia.org.br/blog/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/NOTA_PÚBLICA_NOTA_200.pdf 

41 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/laudo-da-pf-mostra-dinheiro-apreendido-na-cueca-do-senador-vejaimagem-24694628 

42 https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/business/2020/12/18/notas-de-r-200-encalham-e-menos-de-10-doprometido-circula-na-economia 

43 https://g1.globo.com/economia/pix/noticia/2020/11/16/pix-comeca-a-funcionar-nesta-segunda-feira-saibatudo-sobre-a-nova-modalidade-de-pagamentos.ghtml 

44 https://noticias.uol.com.br/colunas/rubens-valente/2020/11/12/bolsonaro-decreto-transparencia-revogacao.htm 

45 https://migalhas.uol.com.br/amp/quentes/336379/psb-alega-no-supremo-que-decreto-de-bolsonaro-produz- 

-apagao--na-transparencia-publica 

46 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/05/22/ministro-do-meio-ambiente-defende-passar-a-boiada-emudar-regramento-e-simplificar-normas.ghtml 

47 https://oglobo.globo.com/sociedade/presidente-do-ibama-se-reuniu-com-madeireiras-multadas-em-26- 

milhoes-antes-de-afrouxar-regras-para-exportacao-24766354#:~:text=BRASÍLIA%20–%20O%20presidente%20 

do%20Ibama,no%20dia%206%20de%20fevereiro 

48 https://www.greenpeace.org/brasil/blog/politica-antiambiental-de-bolsonaro-em-xeque/ 

49 http://www.mpf.mp.br/grandes-casos/operacao-arquimedes/entenda-o-caso 

50 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ambiente/2020/11/alemanha-e-franca-compraram-madeira-ilegal-do-brasilindicam-acoes-da-pf-bolsonaro-ameaca-europeus.shtml 

51 https://oglobo.globo.com/sociedade/sob-comando-de-salles-conselho-revoga-resolucoes-que-protegemrestinga-manguezais-24664661 

52 https://www.greenpeace.org/brasil/blog/em-nova-boiada-salles-enfraquece-normas-ambientais/

53 http://www.diretodaciencia.com/2019/01/23/mma-e-aliados-de-bolsonaro-discutem-hoje-pauta-contrariaao-discurso-em-davos/ 

54 https://www.oeco.org.br/reportagens/novo-conama-completara-um-ano-esvaziado-e-sem-se-reunir/ 

55 https://oglobo.globo.com/sociedade/meio-ambiente/organizacoes-da-sociedade-civil-lancam-campanha-poraumento-no-orcamento-para-meio-ambiente-em-2021-24777164 

56 http://www.observatoriodoclima.eco.br/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/nota-OC-execução-orçamentária-MMA- 

Administração-Direta-final.pdf 

57 https://apublica.org/2020/08/governo-bolsonaro-reduz-multas-em-municipios-onde-desmatamento-cresce/ 

58 https://g1.globo.com/df/distrito-federal/noticia/2020/07/06/ministerio-publico-federal-pede-afastamento-docargo-do-ministro-ricardo-salles.ghtml 

59 http://www.mpf.mp.br/df/sala-de-imprensa/noticias-df/mpf-pede-a-justica-que-decida-sobre-afastamentode-ricardo-salles-do-ministerio-do-meio-ambiente 

60 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ambiente/2020/09/ao-stf-heleno-diz-que-governos-e-personalidadesestrangeiras-mentem-sobre-amazonia-para-derrubar-bolsonaro.shtml 

61 https://www.conectas.org/noticias/stf-realiza-audiencia-inedita-sobre-crise-ambiental-e-emergencia-climatica 

62 https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/agencia-estado/2020/11/12/tcu-questiona-nomeacoes-de-salles.htm 

63 http://enccla.camara.leg.br/acoes 

64 https://www.camara.leg.br/assessoria-de-imprensa/694727-camara-instala-comissao-de-juristas-parapropor-mudancas-na-lei-de-lavagem-de-dinheiro/ 

65 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/lavagem-de-dinheiro-comissao-da-camara-para-flexibilizar-lei-tem-advogadosde-geddel-cunha-eike-24671288 

66 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/10/06/entidades-pedem-participacao-em-comissao-da-camarasobre-lavagem-de-dinheiro.ghtml 

67 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/em-comissao-na-camara-advogados-propoem-amenizar-lei-da-lavagemde-dinheiro-1-24713842 

68 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/11/27/exigencia-de-crime-anterior-pode-matar-apuracao-delavagem-de-dinheiro-no-brasil-diz-especialista.ghtml 

69 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/coaf-bc-bancos-rebatem-mudancas-propostas-por-advogados-na-lei-delavagem-de-dinheiro-em-comissao-da-camara-1-24732681 

70 https://www.jota.info/opiniao-e-analise/artigos/o-anteprojeto-da-lgpd-penal-e-a-in-seguranca-publica-e-naopersecucao-penal-09122020 

71 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/12/texto-de-lei-de-protecao-de-dados-para-assuntos-penaisrestringe-investigacoes-diz-estudo-da-pgr.shtml 

72 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/12/texto-de-lei-de-protecao-de-dados-para-assuntos-penaisrestringe-investigacoes-diz-estudo-da-pgr.shtml 

73 https://images.jota.info/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/alerta-geral-contra-lgpd-penal-ult.pdf 

74 https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra?codteor=1938173&filename=Tramita 

cao-PL+10887/2018 

75 http://www.mpf.mp.br/pgr/documentos/NT4.2020AnalisedePontosCriticos.PL10.887.20.pdf 

76 https://virtunews.com.br/carlos-ari-sundfeld-lei-de-improbidade-e-reforma-administrativa/ 

77 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/02/05/camara-reverte-decisao-do-stf-e-derruba-afastamento-dodeputado-jose-wilson-santiago.ghtml 

78 http://www.mpf.mp.br/pgr/noticias-pgr/operacao-pes-de-barro-pgr-envia-ao-supremo-relatorio-das-buscase-apreensoes-em-enderecos-ligados-ao-deputado-wilson-santiago 

79 https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2020/08/18/recursos-economizados-com-precatorios-poderaoser-usados-no-combate-a-COVID-19 

80 https://www.camara.leg.br/noticias/699382-maia-espera-votar-ate-o-fim-do-ano-a-pec-da-prisao-em-2-instancia

81 https://www.jota.info/stf/do-supremo/stf-julga-ser-inconstitucional-reeleicao-dos-presidentes-da-camara-edo-senado-06122020 

82 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/12/veto-a-reeleicao-no-congresso-foi-incluido-na-constituicaode-maneira-explicita.shtml 

83 https://www.camara.leg.br/noticias/493156-rodrigo-maia-assume-presidencia-da-camara-e-agradeceapoio-de-partidos 

84 https://www.poder360.com.br/congresso/maioria-pro-maia-fica-em-risco-no-stf-e-reeleicao-pode-ser-vetada/ 

85 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/12/isolado-voto-de-kassio-sobre-reeleicao-no-congresso-coincidiucom-desejo-do-governo-bolsonaro.shtml 

86 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/08/03/fachin-revoga-decisao-de-toffoli-que-permitiacompartilhamento-de-dados-entre-pgr-e-forcas-tarefa-lava-jato.ghtml 

87 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/08/03/fachin-revoga-decisao-de-toffoli-que-permitiacompartilhamento-de-dados-entre-pgr-e-forcas-tarefa-lava-jato.ghtml 

88 http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=447952 

89 https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-53947451 

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91 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/08/28/moraes-revoga-decisao-de-toffoli-e-mantem-rito-doimpeachment-de-witzel.ghtml 

92 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/toffoli-arquiva-todos-os-inqueritos-da-delacao-de-sergio-cabral-compolicia-federal-24641718 

93 http://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/noticiaNoticiaStf/anexo/DiscursoPosseFux.pdf 

94 https://www.reuters.com/article/politica-lavajato-stf-plenario-idLTAKBN26S332 

95 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/10/em-vitoria-da-lava-jato-stf-retira-acoes-penais-das-turmase-devolve-ao-plenario.shtml 

96 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/04/moro-tera-agora-de-defender-sua-biografia-no-stf-em-casoque-pode-beneficiar-lula.shtml 

97 https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/brazil-setbacks-in-the-legal-and-institutional-anticorruption-frameworks 

98 https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,entenda-em-capitulos-a-crise-entre-a-receita-federal-e-os-trespoderes,70002976993 

99 https://www.oantagonista.com/brasil/o-amigo-do-amigo-de-meu-pai/ 

100 https://crusoe.com.br/edicoes/125/em-causa-propria-2/ 

101 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/06/10/relator-edson-fachin-vota-no-stf-pela-validade-de-inqueritodas-fake-news-julgamento-e-suspenso.ghtml 

102 https://g1.globo.com/jornal-nacional/noticia/2020/10/07/semana-marca-despedida-de-celso-de-mellodas-sessoes-do-supremo.ghtml 

103 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/kassio-nunes-tem-apoio-de-lideres-do-centrao-flavio-bolsonaro-parastf-24669471 

104 https://www.otempo.com.br/politica/um-em-cada-quatro-deputados-do-centrao-que-apoiam-bolsonaro-einvestigado-1.2349132 

105 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/10/amiga-de-flavio-bolsonaro-tia-carminha-e-madrinha-daindicacao-de-kassio-ao-stf.shtml 

106 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/acao-no-stf-contra-foro-privilegiado-de-flavio-no-caso-da-rachadinha-ficacom-kassio-nunes-ministro-indicado-por-bolsonaro-24732599 

107 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/12/kassio-se-isola-na-defesa-de-pautas-de-bolsonaro-no-stfe-cumpre-expectativa-garantista.shtml

108 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/12/isolado-voto-de-kassio-sobre-reeleicao-no-congressocoincidiu-com-desejo-do-governo-bolsonaro.shtml 

109 http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/lcp/lcp64.htm 

110 https://www.jota.info/stf/do-supremo/nunes-marques-da-liminar-que-suspende-trecho-da-lei-da-fichalimpa-21122020 

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113 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/05/presidente-do-stj-permite-que-bolsonaro-nao-entregueresultado-de-exame-de-coronavirus.shtml 

114 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/justica-manda-bolsonaro-entregar-resultado-de-exames-decoronavirus-24413680 

115 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/03/23/sobe-para-23-o-total-de-pessoas-que-estiveram-combolsonaro-nos-eua-e-tem-coronavirus.ghtml 

116 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/07/presidente-do-stj-decide-transferir-queiroz-paraprisao-domiciliar.shtml 

117 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/07/09/em-decisao-ministro-diz-ser-recomendavel-que-esposade-queiroz-foragida-fique-com-ele.ghtml 

118 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/07/apos-autorizar-prisao-domiciliar-para-queiroz-noronha-negabeneficio-a-grupo-de-risco-de-COVID-19.shtml 


120 https://www.stj.jus.br/sites/portalp/Paginas/Comunicacao/Noticias/Operacao-Faroeste-recebida-denunciacontra-desembargadores-do-TJBA-e-mais-11-pessoas.aspx 

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122 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2019/09/bolsonaro-ignora-lista-triplice-e-diz-a-augusto-aras-queo-indicara-a-pgr.shtml 

123 https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2019/09/25/senado-aprova-indicacao-de-augustoaras-para-a-pgr 

124 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2019/09/bolsonaro-diz-que-novo-pgr-deve-ser-um-homem-e-seraindicado-ate-quinta-feira.shtml 

125 https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/politica/noticia/2019-08/bolsonaro-diz-que-novo-pgr-devera-seralinhado-com-o-governo 

126 https://noticias.uol.com.br/colunas/constanca-rezende/2020/07/29/aras-diz-que-assegurou-a-senadoresque-combate-a-corrupcao-esta-garantido.htm 


128 https://transparenciainternacional.org.br/retrocessos/ 

129 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/06/procurador-geral-augusto-aras-esteve-com-presidente-maisque-o-dobro-de-vezes-de-antecessora.shtml 

130 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/bolsonaro-diz-que-atuacao-de-aras-excepcional-sugere-indicacao-ao-stfcaso-surja-uma-vaga-alem-das-ja-previstas-ate-2022-24451567 

131 https://epoca.globo.com/guilherme-amado/aras-trabalha-para-ser-indicado-por-bolsonaro-ao-stf-janesta-vaga-24661939 

132 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/09/em-1-ano-na-pgr-aras-move-uma-acao-contra-bolsonaroe-se-alinha-ao-governo-mais-de-30-vezes.shtml 

133 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/09/em-1-ano-na-pgr-aras-move-uma-acao-contra-bolsonaroe-se-alinha-ao-governo-mais-de-30-vezes.shtml

134 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/aras-pede-inquerito-contra-bolsonaro-no-stf-para-apurar-crimes-eminterferencia-na-pf-24392004 

135 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/05/assim-como-governo-bolsonaro-aras-defende-no-stfdivulgacao-de-apenas-parte-de-video.shtml 

136 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/05/pressao-sobre-pf-e-criticas-a-politicos-e-stf-dominaramreuniao-entenda.shtml 

137 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/05/22/bolsonaro-chama-doria-de-bosta-e-witzel-estrume-durantereuniao-ministerial-veja-video.ghtml 

138 https://www.jota.info/stf/do-supremo/aras-muda-posicao-da-pgr-e-passa-a-defender-inquerito-dasfake-news-25102019 

139 https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2020-05-27/policia-federal-mira-aliados-de-bolsonaro-em-investigacaosobre-noticias-falsas.html 

140 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/05/aras-nega-mudanca-de-opiniao-e-diz-que-visa-preservarinquerito-do-stf-que-mira-bolsonaristas.shtml 

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142 https://www.oantagonista.com/brasil/aras-recomenda-ao-stf-rejeitar-acao-contra-foro-privilegiadode-flavio-bolsonaro/ 

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144 https://www.metropoles.com/brasil/politica-brasil/bolsonaro-declara-apoio-a-arthur-lira-na-disputa-pelapresidencia-da-camara 

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146 https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/chumbo-grosso-no-ministerio-publico/ 

147 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/monicabergamo/2020/05/pgr-investiga-gestao-doria-e-outrossete-governadores.shtml 

148 https://noticias.uol.com.br/colunas/rubens-valente/2020/04/28/pgr-ministerio-publico-governadores.htm 

149 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/coronavirus-bolsonaro-volta-minimizar-pandemia-chama-governadores-deexterminadores-de-emprego-24321885 

150 https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2020/04/13/witzel-bolsonaro.htm 

151 https://www.poder360.com.br/coronavirus/doria-critica-bolsonaro-em-relacao-ao-coronavirusquando-faz-faz-errado/ 

152 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/05/pf-faz-operacao-contra-desvios-na-saude-com-buscas-naresidencia-do-governador-wilson-witzel.shtml 

153 https://g1.globo.com/jornal-nacional/noticia/2020/05/26/carla-zambelli-antecipou-a-radio-que-governadoresseriam-alvos-de-operacoes-da-pf.ghtml 

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155 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/08/alvo-de-operacao-witzel-e-afastado-do-governo-do-rjpelo-stj.shtml 

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159 https://crusoe.com.br/diario/aras-prorroga-forcas-tarefa-da-lava-jato-em-curitiba-e-no-rio/ 

160 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/09/lava-jato-de-sp-chega-ao-ultimo-dia-com-futuro-indefinidosobre-investigacoes.shtml 

161 https://g1.globo.com/sp/sao-paulo/noticia/2020/09/29/lava-jato-de-sp-encerra-forca-tarefa-apos-saidade-procuradores-do-grupo.ghtml 

162 https://g1.globo.com/sp/sao-paulo/noticia/2020/10/28/lava-jato-em-sp-completa-um-mes-sem-forcatarefa-e-com-190-investigacoes-ainda-em-curso.ghtml 

163 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/coordenador-da-lava-jato-na-pgr-pede-demissao-por-divergenciascom-aras-2-24207518 

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165 https://g1.globo.com/politica/operacao-lava-jato/noticia/2020/07/09/toffoli-manda-forcas-tarefa-da-lavajato-entregarem-base-de-dados-a-pgr.ghtml 

166 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/fachin-revoga-liminar-de-toffoli-que-dava-aras-acesso-dados-dalava-jato-1-24564353 

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168 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/07/28/aras-diz-que-e-hora-de-corrigir-rumos-para-quelavajatismo-nao-perdure.ghtml 

169 https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2020/07/31/aras-bate-boca-com-procuradores-que-ocriticaram-por-fala-sobre-a-lava-jato.htm 

170 http://www.mpf.mp.br/df/sala-de-imprensa/docs/relatorio-greenfield-1 

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173 https://blogdofred.blogfolha.uol.com.br/2020/11/26/aras-esvazia-forca-tarefa-e-nomeia-aliado-paraconduzir-a-operacao-greenfield/ 

174 https://oglobo.globo.com/economia/aras-nomeia-procurador-critico-da-lava-jato-para-operacao-greenfieldsobre-desvios-em-fundos-de-pensao-24765269 

175 https://blogs.oglobo.globo.com/bela-megale/post/dois-procuradores-deixam-forca-tarefa-da-operacaogreenfield.html 

176 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/investigacoes-da-operacao-greenfield-estao-paralisadas-apos-pgr-nomearnovo-coordenador-24808732 

177 http://www.mpf.mp.br/df/sala-de-imprensa/noticias-df/procuradores-apresentam-relatorio-final-de-atividadesapos-encerramento-da-ft-greenfield 

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183 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/governo-amplia-sigilo-de-pareceres-muda-regras-detransparencia-1-24467779 

184 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/area-tecnica-da-cgu-foi-contra-decisao-que-ampliou-sigilo-de-pareceresjuridicos-do-governo-24493253

185 https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,dois-tercos-das-cidades-paulistas-desrespeitam-lei-de-acessoa-informacao,70003524397 

186 https://abraji.org.br/noticias/ministerio-da-saude-volta-a-atender-pedidos-de-informacao-apos-seismeses-de-recusas 

187 https://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2020/08/23/bolsonaro-ameaca-jornalista-minha-vontade-e-enchertua-boca-na-porrada.ghtml 

188 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/08/24/bolsonaro-chama-pessoal-da-imprensa-de-bundao-e-dizque-chance-de-jornalistas-sobreviverem-a-covid-e-menor.ghtml 

189 https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/reuters/2020/09/03/nao-consigo-matar-cancer-chamado-ongsque-atuam-na-amazonia-diz-bolsonaro.htm 

190 https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/reuters/2020/09/03/nao-consigo-matar-cancer-chamado-ongsque-atuam-na-amazonia-diz-bolsonaro.htm 

191 https://sustentabilidade.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,governo-bolsonaro-planeja-norma-para-controlaracao-de-ongs-na-amazonia,70003506777 

192 https://www.redebrasilatual.com.br/ambiente/2020/11/plano-de-controle-ongs-amazonia-governo-bol/ 

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200 https://portal.tcu.gov.br/imprensa/noticias/tcu-disponibiliza-lista-de-candidatos-as-eleicoes-de-2020-quereceberam-auxilio-emergencial.htm 

201 https://portal.tcu.gov.br/imprensa/noticias/auditoria-do-tcu-aponta-falhas-no-controle-do-auxilio-emergencial.htm 

202 https://transparenciainternacional.org.br/ranking/ 

203 https://www.camara.leg.br/noticias/718873-camara-aprova-180-propostas-em-2020-maior-numero-da-decada/ 

204 https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/arquivos/2020/03/17/ato-da-comissao-diretora-no-7-de-2020 

205 https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/arquivos/2020/03/17/ato-da-comissao-diretora-no-7-de-2020 

206 https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,vereadores-de-sp-incluem-jabutis-em-pacote-contracoronavirus,70003251304 

207 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2020/03/apos-covas-tirar-poder-de-orgao-anticorrupcao-controladorpede-demissao-em-sp.shtml 

208 https://votelgbt.org/eleicoes 

209 https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/arco-iris-na-urna/ 

210 https://www.facebook.com/antrabrasil/ 

211 https://g1.globo.com/politica/eleicoes/2020/noticia/2020/11/20/quem-sao-os-vereadores-trans-eleitosem-2020.ghtml 

212 https://g1.globo.com/politica/eleicoes/2020/eleicao-em-numeros/noticia/2020/09/28/proporcao-decandidatos-negros-nas-eleicoes-de-2020-e-a-maior-ja-registrada-pela-1a-vez-brancos-nao-sao-maioria.ghtml 

213 https://www.camara.leg.br/noticias/708351-cresce-percentual-de-candidatos-negros-eleitos-para-prefeituras/

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215 https://www.tse.jus.br/imprensa/noticias-tse/2020/Novembro/mulheres-representam-apenas-12-dosprefeitos-eleitos-no-1o-turno-das-eleicoes-2020 

216 https://www.dw.com/pt-br/o-avanço-da-diversidade-na-eleição-municipal-de-2020/a-55641506 

217 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/10/menos-de-1-dos-candidatos-concentram-80-dos-fundospublicos-de-campanha.shtml?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=twfolha 

218 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/11/partidos-descumprem-regra-de-repasse-de-verba-decampanha-para-negros-e-mulheres.shtml 

219 https://www.editoraroncarati.com.br/v2/phocadownload/transparencia_internacional_medidas_contra_ 

corrupcao.pdf 

220 http://stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=359360 

221 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/10/44-em-sao-paulo-e-50-no-rio-votariam-em-investigadopor-corrupcao-diz-datafolha.shtml 

222 https://g1.globo.com/politica/blog/matheus-leitao/post/2018/04/24/pp-de-ciro-nogueira-e-um-dos-maisenvolvidos-em-investigacoes-como-lava-jato-e-mensalao.ghtml 


224 https://g1.globo.com/politica/eleicoes/2020/noticia/2020/11/28/policia-federal-e-policia-portuguesaprendem-hacker-suspeito-de-invadir-sistemas-do-tse.ghtml 

225 https://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/estadao-verifica/ataque-de-hackers-no-sistema-do-tse-nao-violaseguranca-da-eleicao/ 

226 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2020/11/ataque-hacker-vira-arma-politica-de-desinformacao-sobreeleicao-para-bolsonaristas.shtml 

227 https://portal.fgv.br/noticias/estudo-inedito-fgv-dapp-e-tse-avalia-circulacao-desinformacao-sobresistemas-eleitorais

Transparência Internacional - Brasil 

Associação Transparência e Integridade 

Rua Dr. Virgílio de Carvalho Pinto, 445 

São Paulo, SP 

brasil@br.transparency.org 

www.transparenciainternacional.org.br 

61

Brazil Annual Review - 2020

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