Brazil Annual Review - 2020

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REVIEW <strong>2020</strong>

Author | Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong><br />

Researchers | Maria Dominguez, Vinicius Reis<br />

<strong>Review</strong>ers | Bruno Brandão<br />

Traduction | Damian Platt<br />

Graphic Designer | Rafael Regatieri<br />

Every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. All information was<br />

believed to be correct as of January 2021. Nevertheless, Transparency International <strong>Brazil</strong> cannot accept<br />

responsibility for the consequences of its use for other purposes or in other contexts.<br />

2021 Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>. Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under CC BY-ND 4.0<br />

DE. Quotation permitted. Please contact Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong> – brasil@br.transparency.org – regarding<br />

derivatives requests.<br />

www.transparenciainternacional.org.br<br />

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Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />


TABLE OF<br />


10<br />

Federal<br />

Government<br />

Political<br />

interference<br />

Charges against<br />

the President’s son<br />

A supposed end<br />

to corruption<br />

New<br />

anticorruption<br />

plan<br />

Economic<br />

regulations<br />

Environment policies’<br />

dismantling<br />

19<br />

National<br />

Congress<br />

Special committees<br />

to modify the law<br />

Relevant votes<br />

Controversial<br />

run for leadership<br />

in Congress<br />

24<br />

Judiciary<br />

Setbacks fighting<br />

corruption<br />

“Fake News” Inquiry<br />

New appointee<br />

for the Supreme Court<br />

Favorable decisions<br />

to Mr. Bolsonaro’s<br />

circle<br />

Corruption<br />

investigation<br />

into judges<br />

04<br />

Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>

BRAZIL ANNUAL REVIEW <strong>2020</strong><br />

31<br />

Public<br />

Prosecutor’s<br />

Office<br />

Undue interference<br />

Dismantle of taskforces<br />

38<br />

Civil<br />

society<br />

and the<br />

press<br />

Setbacks<br />

in access to<br />

information<br />

Threats to the<br />

press and<br />

civil society<br />

Attacks on<br />

Transparency<br />

International<br />

- <strong>Brazil</strong><br />

43 48<br />

COVID-19<br />

pandemic<br />

Investigations<br />

into fraud and<br />

corruption<br />

schemes<br />

Index of<br />

transparency<br />

in public<br />

procurement<br />

Social<br />

participation<br />

at a loss<br />

<strong>2020</strong><br />

local<br />

elections<br />

Gain in diversity,<br />

corruption<br />

debate absent<br />

Hacking episode<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />



The year <strong>2020</strong> saw little progress and many setbacks for the fight against corruption in <strong>Brazil</strong>. Among the<br />

most serious were a loss of independence for, and increasing political interference with, fundamental bodies<br />

such as the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Federal Police.<br />

Minister of Justice Sérgio Moro’s resignation, and the serious accusations he directed at Presi-dent Jair<br />

Bolsonaro, and other high profile episodes, including investigations targeting Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, have<br />

heightened concerns about the use of state structures for the personal benefit of a political elite.<br />

Another major setback in fighting corruption resulted from political and institutional pressure lead-ing to<br />

the dismantling of the Carwash and Greenfield prosecutorial taskforces. The year ended with uncertainty<br />

regarding the continuity of the taskforce model, an innovation that, with leniency agreements and plea bargains,<br />

has created crucial conditions for the advancement of investiga-tions into grand corruption schemes in the<br />

country. Rather than improving on, and correcting problems with, this largely successful model, the interests<br />

of individuals aiming to stop the anti-corruption fight have prevailed.<br />

The COVID-19 pandemic has also impacted the fight against corruption. <strong>Brazil</strong>, like many other countries,<br />

relaxed procurement rules in order to respond quickly to the need for emergency ex-penditure. Countless<br />

corruption cases have shown their most perverse consequences in the midst of a terrible humanitarian crisis.<br />

In <strong>Brazil</strong>, the lack of integrity of government officials, literally led to the theft of oxygen from the people.<br />

The pandemic also reduced public debate, and institutional and social control over official acts, due to delayed<br />

responses to the Access to Information Law, and remote sessions and special procedures in the Legislature,<br />

which further distanced society from public decisions.<br />

On a positive note, however, in <strong>2020</strong>, there was strong, courageous mobilization by civil society to denounce<br />

and prevent even more serious setbacks, amid an authoritarian wave of attacks on NGOs and the press —<br />

enhanced by the president’s own hate speech.<br />

Local elections in November included almost no constructive debate on combating corruption. The PP party, with<br />

the highest number of politicians prosecuted by Operation Carwash, was the big winner. The election results,<br />

however, also pointed towards more diversity in local legislative bodies. There were more elected officials from<br />

minority and historically excluded groups — an essential step for the democratic fight against corruption.<br />

Finally, even in the midst of cascading bad news about corruption scandals associated to the pandemic, the<br />

glass can still be seen as half-full, since unveiling corruption schemes has only been possible due to a real<br />

improvement in <strong>Brazil</strong>ian control bodies, at all levels.<br />

In <strong>2020</strong>, President Jair Bolsonaro declared that corruption was a problem of the past. He was wrong. Corruption<br />

remains a systemic problem in <strong>Brazil</strong>, one that contaminates democracy and hinders the country’s socially just<br />

and sustainable development. Populist and authoritarian solu-tions are not the way forward for an upstanding<br />

country. We need laws, institutions and, above all, the participation of free, conscious and active citizens, in<br />

the fight for their rights.<br />

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Highlights<br />


Strong mobilization of<br />

<strong>Brazil</strong>ian civil society<br />

Diversity gain in municipal<br />

elections<br />

Improvement of <strong>Brazil</strong>ian<br />

control bodies’ capacity<br />

to act during COVID-19<br />

pandemic<br />

Development, by the Central<br />

Bank, of a new platform<br />

for online transfers and<br />

payments (PIX), expanding<br />

traceability of financial<br />

transactions<br />

Severe loss of independence for the Public Prosecutor’s Office<br />

and increased political interfer-ence with bodies such as the<br />

Federal Police and <strong>Brazil</strong>ian intelligence system<br />

Dismantling of the Carwash and Greenfield taskforces without<br />

replacement by an appropriate alternative model<br />

Serious deficiencies in Federal Government transparency, both<br />

active and passive, mainly regar-ding essential information for<br />

fighting the COVID-19 pandemic<br />

Lack of significant anticorruption reforms supported by<br />

government and approved by Congress<br />

Absence of qualified debate and concrete anticorruption<br />

proposals in the <strong>2020</strong> municipal elec-tions; at the same<br />

time, a robust victory for candidates and parties involved in<br />

corruption schemes<br />

Special legislative procedures due to COVID-19 pandemic,<br />

weakening institutional and social con-trols and facilitating<br />

surreptitious legal amendments<br />

Multiple embezzlement scandals involving resources to combat<br />

the COVID-19 humanitarian crisis<br />

Increased authoritarianism and attacks against the press and<br />

NGOs responsible for social con-trols, with numerous and<br />

serious cases of harassment against journalists and activists,<br />

even committed by the president<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />



To the Federal Government<br />

- Respect the independence and not exert political interference over institutions that control corruption, such as the<br />

Public Prosecutor’s Office, Federal Police, Federal Revenue Service, Office of the Comptroller General and <strong>Brazil</strong>ian<br />

Financial Intelligence Unit (COAF);<br />

- Guarantee the strict legality and institutional control of the <strong>Brazil</strong>ian intelligence system, so that it refrains from acting<br />

outside its attributions and competences, and to maintain it as a state institution;<br />

- Respect transparency principles in public administration and ensure strict compliance with relevant legislation on<br />

active and passive transparency; among others, the Access to Information Law;<br />

- Ensure full transparency of epidemiological, health, administrative and tax information in the context of the COVID-19<br />

pandemic, with special attention to procurement procedure and the distribution of vaccines and medical supplies;<br />

- Formulate and promote effective public policies and anticorruption reforms;<br />

- Fully respect the constitutional guarantees for free and safe engagement of the press and civil society organizations<br />

in their role of social control, refraining from harassing journalists and activists.<br />

To National Congress<br />

- Reorganize the special legislative proceedings established in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, in order that<br />

legislative processes can continue under safe conditions, but, at the same time, guarantee more adequate levels of<br />

deliberation, political control and social participation;<br />

- Discuss and approve anticorruption reforms, based on proposals from experts and <strong>Brazil</strong>ian society gathered in the<br />

New Measures Against Corruption package;<br />

- Ensure the effectiveness of Ethics Councils to investigate and punish unethical, unseemly and illegal conduct by<br />

members of Congress;<br />

- Exercise effective institutional control over the appointment and subsequent conducts of judges in high courts and<br />

the prosecutor-general, as well as over presidential acts.<br />

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Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>

To the Judiciary<br />

- Guarantee the effectiveness of the National Goals System of the National Council of Justice (CNJ) and the complete<br />

fulfillment of 2021 goals, in particular goal No. 4, which prioritizes the judgment of cases relating to crimes against<br />

public administration, administrative improbity and illicit electoral acts;<br />

- Improve the Supreme Court’s internal regulation and guarantee effective compliance, regulating the administration of<br />

deadlines, agendas and the predominance of collegiate decisions;<br />

- Ensure effective compliance with the “constitutional ceiling” (an imposed upper limit) for remuneration of judges,<br />

abolishing privileges;<br />

- Significantly improve correctional mechanisms for the conduct of judges;<br />

- Deliberate on the initial date for the statute of limitations for state capacity to enforce criminal sentences;<br />

- Reaffirm, in a Supreme Court plenary decision, consolidated jurisprudence on the restricted use of “privileged forum”.<br />

To the Public Prosecutor’s Office<br />

- Guarantee the independence of the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the fulfillment of its constitutional duty;<br />

- Guarantee the proper functioning of active taskforces; institutionalize and improve this model of joint action<br />

based on proposals, within the scope of the Superior Council of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, to regulate their<br />

constitution and functioning;<br />

- Increase the number of Special Action Groups to Combat Organized Crime (the GAECOs) in state branches of the<br />

Public Prosecutor’s Office and ensure adequate operating conditions, such as prosecutors’ exclusive dedication to<br />

investigations and a specialized support structure;<br />

- Establish a general data governance system to cease the systematic leakage of information and violation of the right<br />

to privacy in the context of investigations, ensure safe and adequate sharing of information between investigators and<br />

other national and international control institutions, and prevent violation of confidentiality for specific investigations.<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />


Photo: Alan Santos / PR<br />

section 01<br />



In <strong>2020</strong>, President Jair Bolsonaro claimed there was no need for a grand corruption<br />

fighting operation like Carwash, because he ran a corruption free government. His<br />

declaration contrasts with several episodes that attested attempted political interference<br />

with control and enforcement bodies, the use of public agencies for personal or political<br />

reasons, and the weakening of institutions and mechanisms to fight corruption and<br />

other criminal activities.<br />

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Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>



The increase in political interference in federal bodies identified in 2019 1 was aggravated in the last year<br />

and became a central scar of President Jair Bolsonaro’s government. This trend led to the resignation of the<br />

minister of Justice, investigations against Mr. Bolsonaro himself and reports of a possible use of federal public<br />

agencies for the personal benefit of the Bolsonaro family.<br />

In April, the minister of Justice Sergio Moro, former judge of Operation Carwash, resigned after the president<br />

decided, against Mr. Moro’s will, to fire the Federal Police’s Director-General, Maurício Valeixo 2 . The episode<br />

followed a controversy, in the previous year, over changes in the corporation’s bureau in Rio de Janeiro, the<br />

political arena of the Bolsonaro clan. In 2019, Mr. Bolsonaro had pressured the corporation to anticipate the<br />

substitution of Rio’s bureau chief and to appoint a name of his choice — he succeeded in the first request,<br />

but not in the latter, as he faced strong internal resistance 3 .<br />

Mr. Moro left office publicly accusing President Bolsonaro of trying to interfere politically in the corporation with<br />

the aim of appointing a Director-General who he could call and request access to intelligence reports 4 . The<br />

incident turned into an ongoing inquiry authorized by the Supreme Court to investigate Mr. Moro’s accusations<br />

and potential crimes committed by the president 5 .<br />

After Mr. Moro’s resignation, President Bolsonaro tried to appoint Alexandre Ramagem, current head of the<br />

<strong>Brazil</strong>ian Intelligence Agency (ABIN), known for his proximity to the Bolsonaro family 6 , as the Federal Police’s<br />

new Director-General. The appointment was, however, quickly blocked by the Supreme Court due to a potential<br />

“non-compliance with the constitutional principles of impersonality, morality and public interest” 7 . President<br />

Bolsonaro then decided to appoint Mr. Rolando Alexandre de Souza as new head of the corporation. One of<br />

the new appointee’s first acts was to replace the corporation’s Rio de Janeiro bureau chief 8 .<br />

Another concern regarding political interference involved the Federal Revenue Service (Receita Federal, RFB),<br />

which has been labeled by President Bolsonaro as an institution that “disrupts” the country’s development 9 . In<br />

April, during a meeting with RFB’s Secretary-General and the parliamentarian son of an influential evangelical<br />

pastor, the president reportedly pressured the Federal Revenue Service to resolve millions of tax debts owed by<br />

churches in <strong>Brazil</strong>, a political group supportive of the president 10 . A few months later, after National Congress<br />

approved federal tax exemption for temples and pardoning of fines from previous debts with the RFB, President<br />

Bolsonaro declared his support for the non-taxation of temples, but said he had to veto the provision because<br />

of budgetary liability and the risk of facing an impeachment process 11 .<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />





In November, President Jair Bolsonaro’s eldest son, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, was formally charged with<br />

embezzlement, money laundering and criminal organization for what has been called the “rachadinha” scheme 12 .<br />

According to prosecutors, during his mandate at Rio de Janeiro’s State Assembly, Mr. Flávio Bolsonaro headed<br />

a criminal organization that pocketed up to 90% of his office employee’s paychecks — some of them being<br />

no-show employees — and used the money for personal expenses 13 .<br />

The investigation into the “rachadinha” scheme started in 2018, after an intelligence report from the<br />

<strong>Brazil</strong>ian Financial Intelligence Unit (COAF) showed atypical financial movement in the bank account of<br />

Mr. Fabrício Queiroz, a former aid to Mr. Flávio Bolsonaro in the State Assembly and a longtime friend of<br />

the president’s 14 . The investigation showed that, in 2016, Mr. Flávio Bolsonaro’s aide made repeated cash<br />

withdrawals preceded by cash deposits in the same amount in his bank account 15 . Prosecutors believe Mr.<br />

Queiroz, who was charged alongside his former boss, operated the ilegal scheme, being responsible for<br />

hiring employees and collecting their salaries 16 .<br />

COAF’s report also showed Mr. Queiroz made deposits totalizing R$ 24.000 (US$ 4.640) in the bank account<br />

of Mrs. Michelle Bolsonaro, now first lady 17 . At the time, Mr. Jair Bolsonaro declared Mr. Queiroz was paying<br />

back a personal debt reaching up to R$ 40.000 (US$ 7.730) 18 . Last August, however, it was reported that,<br />

from 2011 to 2016, Mr. Queiroz and his wife made 27 deposits in Mrs. Bolsonaro’s bank account, totalizing<br />

R$ 89.000 (US$ 17.200) 19 .<br />

In October, it was reported that President Bolsonaro convened Senator Flávio Bolsonaro’s defense lawyers, the<br />

<strong>Brazil</strong>ian Intelligence Agency’s (ABIN) director and the head of the Institutional Security Office (GSI) at a meeting<br />

to discuss the defense team’s suspicion that the official intelligence report that supported the “rachadinha”<br />

investigations could have been produced based on information irregularly obtained by a group of employees of<br />

the Federal Revenue Service (Receita Federal, RFB) 20 .<br />

It was later reported that, after the meeting with the president, ABIN produced at least two reports with advice<br />

on how the senator could obtain official documents that should help neutralize the “rachadinha” case’s legal<br />

argument 21 . The reports also suggested firing three RFB employees, supposedly part of a criminal group linked<br />

to internal fraud. It was also reported that the instructions were sent, by WhatsApp, from Alexandre Ramagem,<br />

head of ABIN, to Senator Flávio Bolsonaro himself, and included informal elements raising suspicions the reports<br />

had been the work of a “parallel” political structure organized within ABIN 22 .<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />




In October, President Jair Bolsonaro declared he did not “want to end [Operation] Carwash. I have ended Carwash,<br />

because there is no more corruption in government” 23 .<br />

The claim was made six months after Justice Minister Sergio Moro resigned, accusing the president of trying to<br />

interfere politically with Federal Police, (see page 11) and in the midst of increasing pressure to dismantle the<br />

Carwash and Greenfield operations, two of the most important taskforces of prosecutors currently dealing with<br />

grand corruption schemes (see page 34).<br />

Just a week after President Bolsonaro’s declaration, an operation conducted by the Office of the Comptroller<br />

General and the Federal Police investigating embezzlement of COVID-19 pandemic fighting funds caught Senator<br />

Chico Rodrigues, then deputy government leader in the Senate, hiding R$ 33.150 (US$ 6.400), in cash, in his<br />

underpants 24 . Following the operation, videos and photos of Senator Rodrigues and President Bolsonaro were<br />

shared online, highlighting the proximity between the pair 25 . A day after the embarrassment, President Bolsonaro<br />

formalized departure of Mr. Rodrigues from deputy leadership in Senate, and said the operation showed his<br />

government’s commitment to fighting corruption 26 .<br />

Despite President Bolsonaro’s attempt to assert an end to fraudulent schemes in government, <strong>Brazil</strong>’s recent<br />

legal and institutional setbacks in fighting corruption 27 were presented, in October, by Transparency International<br />

<strong>Brazil</strong>, to the OECD Working Group on Bribery. Transparency International’s report was circulated to all national<br />

delegations and used by the OECD collegiate to make enquiries to the <strong>Brazil</strong>ian delegation. Concern regarding<br />

anti-corruption practices could pose further obstacles to <strong>Brazil</strong>’s intention to join OECD.<br />

13<br />

Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>


PLAN<br />

In December, federal government published an anticorruption plan with<br />

142 prospective actions aimed at improving structure, monitoring, training,<br />

practices, collaboration, legislation, infra-legal regulation and accountability<br />

across eleven bodies of the administration 28 . With goals scheduled for the<br />

next five years, federal government promises to move forward in complying<br />

with international recommendations for preventing and fighting corruption.<br />

Although some goals are presented in a generic way or do not seem to bring<br />

significant innovation to the current situation, the plan does present important<br />

policy proposals — either new ideas or policies whose implementation has<br />

been tried in the past without success.<br />

President Jair Bolsonaro’s government proposes, for instance, to write a bill,<br />

by March 2021, to regulate lobbying activity in <strong>Brazil</strong>, to address a serious<br />

legislative gap that has still not been dealt with by National Congress, despite<br />

decades of debate in society and government, and previous attempts to<br />

regulate the issue. Also linked to transparency in contacts between public<br />

and private actors, are proposals to simplify, standardize and monitor the<br />

publication of federal authorities’ agendas, something already stipulated by<br />

federal regulation 29 , but largely overlooked 30 .<br />

Government also plans to improve public procurement by studying the<br />

creation of a national system for public procurement that would aggregate<br />

purchases from federal, regional and local instances, and publish invoices<br />

for federal purchases on The Transparency Portal 31 , allowing for online<br />

consultation. These mechanisms could help increase price comparability<br />

and facilitate fraud monitoring.<br />

Another relevant measure in the plan is the drafting of a regulation, by the<br />

Office of the Comptroller General (CGU), to publish information regarding<br />

the execution of fiscal benefit policies, to allow for more transparency in a<br />

matter involving billionaire values.<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />




In January, <strong>Brazil</strong>’s Central Bank (BACEN) introduced new regulation to establish procedures and internal controls<br />

for financial institutions to prevent money laundering crimes (Circular 3.978/<strong>2020</strong>) 32 . The new policy brought<br />

improvements to the previous situation, such as including members of control bodies for the Judiciary and Public<br />

Prosecutor’s Office (CNJ and CNMP, respectively) as politically exposed persons (PEP), and adopting a (still timid)<br />

risk-based approach to preventing illegal activity.<br />

It fell short, however, of including relevant mechanisms to enhance anti-money laundering efforts even more. The<br />

regulation establishes the generic need for financial institutions to adopt procedures and internal controls regarding<br />

PEPs, but doesn’t specify explicit measures recommended by the Financial Action Task Force that apply to this<br />

sensitive group. The new policy could also further widen the definition of PEP to explicitly include family members<br />

and intimate associates of public agents — although Circular 3.978/<strong>2020</strong> does include this extended group in<br />

obligatory monitoring that should be followed by financial institutions.<br />

In April, a new law came into force to change the voting procedures of the Administrative Council of Tax Appeals<br />

(Conselho Administrativo de Recursos Fiscais, CARF), a federal board linked to the Ministry of Economy and<br />

responsible for administrative review of appeals against Federal Revenue Service’s decisions 33 .<br />

The new law established that votes resulting in a draw should be decided in favor of the taxpayer rather than, as<br />

it used to be, by a fiscal representative. A tied vote would not be an uncommon outcome in this context, as the<br />

board is composed by equal numbers of representatives from the fiscal administration and taxpayers (appointed<br />

by the private sector) 34 . Therefore, changes introduced in April could have relevant impact.<br />

The Ministry of Economy tried to limit application of the new regulation by publishing an infra-legal norm 35 , but<br />

has already encountered legal resistance 36 . Changes introduced by the law raised concern among tax auditors,<br />

who believe the new procedure could impact the reporting of potential criminal behavior, such as corruption and<br />

money laundering, to competent authorities 37 .<br />

In September, a new R$ 200 (US$ 38) banknote entered circulation in the country. The new bill was an<br />

alleged response to an expected higher demand for cash after the government offered temporary financial<br />

aid payments of R$ 600 (US$ 116) due to COVID-19 pandemic — a policy directed, in part, at people who<br />

don’t have a bank accounts 38 . The government also raised the possibility <strong>Brazil</strong>ians would prefer to hold cash<br />

at home during a social and economic crisis 39 .<br />

The release of the R$ 200 note was, however, abrupt and surprised specialists who had been advocating for BACEN<br />

restrictions on the use of the R$ 100 banknote, given that high-value banknotes facilitate criminal activity, such<br />

as corruption, tax evasion and money laundering 40 . The recently released banknote was found, among others, in<br />

the underpants of Senator Chico Rodrigues during the Federal Police operation that investigated embezzlement<br />

of COVID-19 money (see page 13) 41 .<br />

15<br />

Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>

Despite the brusque decision to adopt the R$ 200 bill, by December, reportedly, only a small fraction of the new<br />

banknotes circulated in the economy 42 .<br />

In November, <strong>Brazil</strong>ian Central Bank launched a new system to make online transfers and pay for merchandise<br />

and services, called PIX. The platform has the potential to reduce cash payments (70% of all financial transfers<br />

estimated in the country 43 ) and increase the traceability of transfers, which could help prevent crimes such as<br />

corruption and money laundering.<br />

In the same month, a presidential decree (No. 10.540/<strong>2020</strong>) changed implementation of the Fiscal Responsibility<br />

Law, creating a temporary gap in the disclosure of budget information and a serious transparency issue at<br />

all levels of public administration 44 . The new rules will come into force only in 2023 and, in the meantime,<br />

budget administrators will be released from the obligation to update fiscal transparency systems. The twoyear<br />

gap coincides with the final years of the current state and federal executive terms. The Supreme Court<br />

is expected to rule on the decree 45 .<br />



In April, during a closed ministerial meeting convened by President Jair Bolsonaro, the minister<br />

of Environment, Ricardo Salles, argued that the COVID-19 pandemic opened the opportunity for<br />

government to pass, at once and in large quantities, infra-legal changes to simplify regulation in<br />

the environmental sector and any other sector of interest of the administration 46 . Mr. Salles claimed<br />

press attention was almost exclusively oriented by the pandemic, and that therefore government<br />

should take advantage of the “peaceful moment” to avoid being held back by legal questioning.<br />

The minister’s declaration was revealed a month later, when the Supreme Court released a video<br />

of the meeting as part of the investigation into President Bolsonaro’s potential interference with<br />

the Federal Police (see page 11).<br />

The incident was a telling example of the current government’s intention to dismantle environmental<br />

policy and its lack of transparency, a trend illustrated by several episodes in the past year.<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />


In February, following a request made by timber sector entities, the federal environmental agency<br />

(IBAMA) eliminated the need for federal authorization to allow timber exports from certain Amazon<br />

species, contrary to internal technical advice 47 . Environmental organizations denounced the<br />

measure, saying it would favor exports of illegally sourced wood 48 . It is important to note that past<br />

control and enforcement operations have exposed fraud, corruption and money laundering linked<br />

to environmental crimes 49 . In November, pressured internally and abroad for his environmental<br />

deregulation, President Bolsonaro threatened to reveal which countries had been importing illegal<br />

timber from <strong>Brazil</strong> — a threat he did not fulfill 50 .<br />

In September, controversially 51 , the National Environmental Council (CONAMA), responsible for<br />

overseeing environmental policy, revoked two resolutions stipulating the protection and use of<br />

coastal ecosystems (mangrove and “restinga” areas) and areas surrounding artificial reservoirs, a<br />

third establishing parameters for licensing irrigation projects, and substituted a fourth resolution<br />

in order to authorize the burning of toxic waste in rotary kilns 52 .<br />

The changes approved by CONAMA were in response to a specific request from the productive<br />

sector 53 , and happened a little over a year after President Bolsonaro changed the council’s<br />

composition, increasing government participation and decreasing civil society members 54 .<br />

The dismantling of <strong>Brazil</strong>’s environmental policy under the Bolsonaro administration is also evidenced<br />

by repeated federal budgetary reductions 55-56 and a decrease in the application of federal fines 57 .<br />

Environmental policy setbacks, however, have been accompanied by a reaction from civil society,<br />

political opposition parties and institutions responsible for legal checks and balances. In July,<br />

a group of twelve federal prosecutors went to court to demand the removal of the minister<br />

of Environment 58 . They accused Mr. Salles of administrative improbity for allegedly deliberate<br />

mechanisms to dismantle the country’s environmental protectio 59 . In September, the Supreme<br />

Court held a public hearing related to a lawsuit over governmental omission in use of the Climate<br />

Fund 60 , a resource to fight the climate emergency 61 . Further more, in November, after an audit,<br />

the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) concluded that eight military personnel appointed, by Mr.<br />

Salles, to senior positions in IBAMA did not meet the necessary qualification requirements for the<br />

function 62 . Finally, in December, the National Strategy to Combat Corruption and Money Laundering<br />

(ENCCLA), a network of federal and regional authorities included, in its annual planning for 2021,<br />

two actions aimed at fighting money laundering and corruption linked to illegal environmental<br />

activity, and improving gold production procedures to prevent money laundering 63 .<br />

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Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>

section 01<br />


OECD Working Group on Bribery inquired<br />

the <strong>Brazil</strong>ian delegation about setbacks in<br />

fighting corruption<br />

<strong>Brazil</strong>’s Central Bank updated regulation<br />

for financial institutions to prevent money<br />

laundering crimes, although the new rule still<br />

falls short of international recommendations<br />

Central Bank releases platform for purchases<br />

and transfers that could facilitate traceability<br />

of financial transfers<br />

Intensification and qualification (better crosschecking<br />

and data analysis) in Federal Police<br />

operations against the diversion of resources<br />

destined to fight COVID-19 pandemic<br />

Civil society and institutional reaction to the<br />

dismantling of environmental policy<br />

Federal government’s anticorruption plan<br />

puts forward relevant policies to expand<br />

prevention and control<br />

Loss of independence and increased political<br />

interference with control institutions, such as<br />

the Federal Police, Tax Revenue Service and<br />

the <strong>Brazil</strong>ian Intelligence Agency<br />

Possible use of federal agencies for the<br />

personal benefit of the president’s family<br />

Deputy leader of government in Senate<br />

caught hiding COVID-19 funds in his<br />

underpants<br />

A change in a federal tax appeals’ voting<br />

created risks of limited reporting of potential<br />

crimes to competent authorities<br />

Sudden release of a R$ 200 banknote can<br />

facilitate illicit transactions in cash<br />

Presidential decree has released public<br />

budget administrators from obligations to<br />

update fiscal transparency systems<br />

Dismantling of environmental policy, lack of<br />

transparency and social participation in the<br />

sector’s control bodies<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />


Photo: Ana Volpe / Agiencia Senado<br />

section 02<br />



In a year marked by reduced debate and activity due to the COVID-19 pandemic (see<br />

page 46), committees in the Chamber of Deputies discussed relevant changes to<br />

anti-corruption laws, such as money laundering and administrative improbity, raising<br />

concerns for potential setbacks to the fight against corruption. The year approached<br />

an end with an unconstitutional attempt to allow for the reelection of both presidents<br />

of Senate and Chamber of Deputies.<br />

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Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>




In September, the Chamber of Deputies formed an expert committee to propose changes to the money<br />

laundering law 64 . Since its beginning, the committee attracted criticism for being composed of a great<br />

number of criminal lawyers 65 rather than government experts from <strong>Brazil</strong>’s Financial Intelligence Unit<br />

(COAF), the Federal Police and other relevant departments 66 , and for proposed changes that control<br />

and enforcement bodies believe could hamper the investigation and punishment of crimes. One of the<br />

changes discussed was to establish a list of antecedent crimes that would have to be linked to the money<br />

laundering crime 67 . This mechanism existed in <strong>Brazil</strong>ian legislation up to 2012 and is perceived as a<br />

setback by the Federal Police 68 , COAF 69 and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, who argue that the current<br />

rule is aligned with FATF recommendations and that the change could delay and even make the pursuit<br />

of illicit resources impracticable.<br />

The ongoing committee is expected to offer its suggestions in 2021, and that much effort will be<br />

centered in changes to criminal categories and definitions rather than to prevention mechanisms, such<br />

as determining more financial resources to COAF, establishing a better definition of politically exposed<br />

persons (PEP) or the due diligence for obliged subjects. The committee’s proposal will then be subjected<br />

to analysis and voting by National Congress’, a process in which significant changes can be expected.<br />

In November, another committee of experts presented a preliminary draft bill for establishing personal data<br />

protection related to public safety, prosecution and investigations into criminal offenses to the Chamber of<br />

Deputies 70 . In principle, the law’s intention is to complement <strong>Brazil</strong>’s general data protection law that came<br />

into force in September, but which refrained from dealing with public security, criminal investigations and<br />

national defense 71 , and to establish necessary guidelines to prevent the misuse of personal data. As in<br />

the case of the money laundering committee, however, control bodies strongly criticized the commission’s<br />

proposal. The Public Prosecutor’s Office assessed that the preliminary draft imposed disproportionate<br />

restrictions on investigations and could seriously affect the activity of investigating and enforcement<br />

bodies across the country 72 . Police authorities also protested against the proposal, saying it would create<br />

unnecessary bureaucracy that could delay access to data, stand against current legislation regulating<br />

access to information in investigations and, finally, establish a hostile environment for cooperation with<br />

criminal prevention and repression 73 .<br />

This matter is complex. It is imperative to balance the solution for the serious and systemic problem of<br />

data management in <strong>Brazil</strong>ian control bodies, which frequently leads to information leaks and violations<br />

of fundamental privacy rights, with the need to preserve the inter-institutional sharing of information —<br />

crucial for investigations into grand corruption schemes and other organized crime.<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />


The Chamber of Deputies is also considering a controversial change to administrative improbity legislation,<br />

this time discussed and elaborated in a special commission of deputies 74 . The proposed changes have<br />

again raised questions and complaints from public authorities. Prosecutors have declared that the bill<br />

could mean a step backwards from combating corruption, by only considering administrative improbity acts<br />

that necessarily involve illicit enrichment or losses to public resources, and by requiring proof that legal<br />

representatives of companies involved in wrongdoings were aware their acts represented administrative<br />

improbity 75 , among other concerns.<br />

The intention to update the 1992 law is legitimate. There is criticism that the current legislation is<br />

outdated and lacks specificity and efficiency, diverting efforts from grand investigations that could have<br />

a real impact on corruption 76 . It has also allowed, over the years, for injustices against public employees<br />

working within dysfunctional public administration who have been unduly sanctioned based on abusive<br />

interpretation of the law.<br />

The original bill, based on discussions by an expert committee, led to welcome adaptations of the current<br />

law to include modern features, such as compensation for non-property damages, automatic disqualification<br />

from public office, and possibilities for settlements between the state and penalized individuals. However,<br />

the bill’s current rapporteur, representative Carlos Zarattini, substantially altered the original bill and<br />

reversed its objectives, giving amnesty to corrupt practices, without proper debate.<br />


In February, the Chamber of Deputies voted to reject a Supreme Court decision to temporarily remove<br />

representative José Wilson Santiago from office 77 . Mr. Santiago had been charged, in December 2019, for<br />

corruption and criminal organization following an investigation into the diversion of public resources for fighting<br />

droughts in the Northeast of <strong>Brazil</strong> 78 .<br />

In July and August, the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, respectively, passed a bill originally intended to direct more<br />

resources towards the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic 79 . The bill, however, included a controversial amendment<br />

granting temples exemption from a federal tax and the pardoning of fines with the Federal Revenue Service. Federal<br />

debts owed by churches had mobilized President Jair Bolsonaro, who reportedly pressured the Federal Revenue Service<br />

to find a solution to help this important group of political supporters (see page 11).<br />

During <strong>2020</strong>, after COVID-19 arrived in <strong>Brazil</strong>, both the Chamber of Deputies and Senate adapted their structure<br />

and functioning to facilitate remote activity. This situation reduced tradicional spaces for accountability, social<br />

debate and participation (see page 46). In addition, there was a delay in the analysis of important proposals.<br />

Under this scenario, the analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Bill (PEC) 199/19, to allow imprisonment<br />

after second instance decisions, has been delayed 80 .<br />

21<br />

Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>


RUN FOR<br />



In December, the Supreme Court voted to bar the reelection of Rodrigo Maia and Davi Alcolumbre, respective<br />

presidents of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate 81 . Although <strong>Brazil</strong>’s Constitution clearly prohibits reelection<br />

of National Congress leadership in the same parliamentary term 82 , both Mr. Maia and Mr. Alcolumbre expected<br />

to receive an authorization from the judges in the Supreme Court to extend their tenure for a further two<br />

years in the elections scheduled for February 2021. This would be the first reelection of Mr. Alcolumbre as<br />

head of Senate. Mr. Maia, however, holds the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies since July 2016 83 .<br />

Despite being unconstitutional, in the days leading to the Supreme Court vote, it was expected for the<br />

maneuver to receive the blessing of the majority of judges. Mr. Alcolumbre and, especially, Mr. Maia, have<br />

been seen as important counterpoints to President Bolsonaro’s anti-democratic attacks against the Legislative<br />

and Judicial powers 84 . It was reported Mr. Bolsonaro did not object to the election in the Senate, but strongly<br />

opposed another term for Mr. Maia 85 . The reelection maneuver was, however, blocked after negative reaction<br />

from public opinion and pressure to maintain the original intention of 1988 Constitution.<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />


section 02<br />


After pressure from public opinion, the<br />

Supreme Court rejected unconstitutional<br />

reelection for the Chamber of Deputies and<br />

Senate presidents<br />

The modification of legislative processes,<br />

with no further analysis in committees and<br />

other limitations, hindered transparency,<br />

participation and accountability of<br />

legislative bodies<br />

Investigating and enforcement bodies<br />

are concerned that changes to legislation<br />

regarding money laundering, access to<br />

personal data and administrative improbity<br />

could hamper efforts to fight corruption<br />

23<br />

Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>

Photo: Dorivan Marinho / SCO / STF<br />

section 03<br />


In the past year, efforts to curb corruption and electoral fraud encountered critical<br />

setbacks in the Supreme Court. President Jair Bolsonaro’s appointment of a new<br />

judge for the Court raised concerns regarding the appointee’s political independence,<br />

as the impact of this nomination will be decisive in grand corruption cases, involving<br />

individuals of great power.<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />




In September <strong>2020</strong>, Justice Antonio Dias Toffoli ended his 2-year term as president of the Supreme Court. In<br />

July, while responsible for decisions during the Court recess, Justice Toffoli granted the prosecutor-general<br />

a preliminary ruling ordering the sharing of the Operation Carwash taskforce database kept by the states,<br />

including confidential data, with the Public Prosecutor’s Office, in what was seen as a blow to prosecutorial<br />

autonomy (see page 35). The concern is that the move was yet another casuistic attempt at interference,<br />

guided by interests that were not institutional improvements, such as the creation of an adequate system for<br />

governance and sharing of information in the Public Prosecutor’s Office. The decision was later reversed by<br />

Justice Edson Fachin, rapporteur for the case 86-87 .<br />

In the same month, Justice Toffoli suspended a search warrant of Senator José Serra’s office, siding with Senate<br />

president, Davi Alcolumbre. The warrant had been determined by a first instance judge in the scope of an<br />

investigation into suspected electoral crime. Justice Toffoli, however, opined that the search request was too broad,<br />

and could potentially jeopardize the senator’s “privileged forum” and Supreme Court competence in the case 88 .<br />

,Justice Toffoli subsequently accepted a request from Rio de Janeiro governor, Wilson Witzel, targeted by<br />

investigations into corruption schemes in health contracts 89 , and ordered the state’s Legislative Assembly to<br />

destitute and recreate, under other parameters, a commission formed to discuss his impeachment process 90 .<br />

Justice Toffoli’s decision was reversed a month later 91 .<br />

Not long before leaving the Supreme Court presidency, Justice Toffoli opposed a previous decision by another<br />

court’s judge, siding with the prosecutor-general in favor of closing twelve inquiries based on a plea agreement<br />

made by former Rio de Janeiro state governor Sérgio Cabral with the Federal Police 92 . It was reported that, in his<br />

plea agreement, Mr. Cabral, convicted in several cases of corruption and money laundering, implicated authorities<br />

such as judges from the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) and ministers from the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU).<br />

Justice Toffoli was substituted by Justice Luiz Fux, who declared he would spare “no effort to strengthen the<br />

fight against corruption” and would not “admit any setback in tackling organized crime, money laundering<br />

and corruption” 93 .<br />

In October, the court approved a proposal from Justice Fux that criminal cases and inquiries should, again, be<br />

analyzed by the Court’s plenary. This was the procedure until 2014, when the judges decided that a Court’s<br />

chamber should oversee this type of case 94 . Operation Carwash cases were under 2º Chamber’s responsibility,<br />

and faced several overthrow, in the past months, in decisions by this collegiate 95 . The decision to move criminal<br />

cases back to plenary is, therefore, seen potentially to favor grand corruption investigations. It is, however, expected<br />

that certain appeals will still be subjected to the chamber’s evaluation, such as the case in which former Carwash<br />

judge Sérgio Moro is accused of partiality 96 .<br />

25<br />

Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>

“FAKE NEWS”<br />


In June <strong>2020</strong>, the majority of judges in the Supreme Court ratified the legality<br />

and constitutionality of the “Fake News Inquiry” (INQ 4781), an ongoing<br />

investigation with highly controversial and allegedly unconstitutional features 97 .<br />

Justice Antonio Dias Toffoli opened the inquiry in 2019 to investigate alleged<br />

threats and fake news involving the Court and its members.<br />

Its generic object, however, allowed for a wider scope and controversial<br />

decisions, such as the suspension of auditing procedures by the Federal<br />

Revenue Service over politically exposed persons (reportedly involving Justice<br />

Gilmar Mendes and his wife, in addition to Justice Toffoli’s wife, in preliminary<br />

investigation 98 ), censoring of a news story that described an alleged mention<br />

to Justice Toffoli in a plea agreement signed under the Carwash taskforce 99 ,<br />

and a reported attempt to determine whether Court judges were under scrutiny<br />

by Carwash taskforce 100 .<br />

Despite ratification of the inquiry, Justice Edson Fachin, rapporteur of the case,<br />

argued for the need to establish stricter parameters for the investigation 101 .<br />

In May, one month before Supreme Court endorsed the inquiry, the Public<br />

Prosecutor’s Office asked for suspension of the investigation after supporters<br />

of President Jair Bolsonaro were targeted. (see page 33).<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />




In October, President Jair Bolsonaro appointed a new judge for the Supreme Court, after the retirement of Justice<br />

Celso de Mello. Justice Mello was recognized as a moderate judge with a strong stance in fighting corruption and<br />

the defense of democratic institutions 102 . WIth his first opportunity to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court, President<br />

Bolsonaro chose judge Kassio Nunes Marques.<br />

Quickly approved by the Senate, Justice Nunes Marques was an unanticipated candidate supported by congressmen<br />

from the “centrão” 103 . The “centrão” is a powerful center-right political bloc in National Congress, known to<br />

support incumbent governments in exchange for political nominations and shares of public resources distributed<br />

discretionarily by government. Several members of the informal political group are under investigation for corruption,<br />

money laundering, administrative improbity and other matters 104 . It has also been reported that Justice Nunes<br />

Marques’s appointment was endorsed by President Bolsonaro’s eldest son, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro 105 , charged<br />

for the “rachadinha” scheme. A pending case on whether Mr. Flávio Bolsonaro should be granted “privileged forum”<br />

was allocated to Justice Nunes Marques 106 (see page 28).<br />

In his first months in office, Justice Nunes Marques has repeatedly sided with President Bolsonaro or judges who<br />

tend to endorse defendants’ allegations in high profile cases 107 . In December, during the controversial discussion<br />

on whether to allow the unconstitutional reelection of Senate and Chamber of Deputies presidents (see page 22),<br />

the judge ended up isolated in favor of allowing the reelection of the Senate president, but barring the reelection of<br />

Chamber of Deputies’ president, a stance in line with Mr. Bolsonaro 108 .<br />

In the same month, Justice Marques Nunes granted a highly criticized preliminary ruling altering application of the Clean<br />

Record Law (Lei da Ficha Limpa), by which politicians convicted for crimes such as corruption and money laundering<br />

are deemed unelectable for eight years after serving time 109 . The judge’s interpretation, still to be confirmed by the<br />

Court’s plenary, would pave the way for shortening the ineligibility period for convicted politicians 110 .<br />

After being confirmed for the Supreme Court, Justice Nunes Marques joined the Court’s 2º Chamber 111 , responsible<br />

for crucial pending decisions linked to Operation Carwash, such as the one that will decide whether former Carwash<br />

judge Sérgio Moro acted with partiality when convicting former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva for corruption and<br />

money laundering 112 . The chamber is understood to be divided on this matter. Justice Nunes Marques’ opinion could<br />

be decisive and potentially impact the future of Operation Carwash.<br />

27<br />

Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>



CIRCLE<br />

In May, as the COVID-19 pandemic spread through <strong>Brazil</strong>, Justice João Otávio de Noronha, then President of the<br />

Superior Court of Justice (STJ), sided with the Office of the Attorney General (AGU) to allow President Jair Bolsonaro<br />

not to publicly release the result of his COVID-19 test 113 . Justice Noronha’s ruling overturned two previous decisions<br />

ordering Mr. Bolsonaro to hand over results under the argument that transparency was fundamental for <strong>Brazil</strong>ian<br />

society 114 . President Bolsonaro had been under pressure to release the results, which he guaranteed were negative,<br />

after several members of his entourage tested positive following a trip to the United States 115 .<br />

In July, Justice Noronha granted another controversial decision favoring the Bolsonaro clan. The judge allowed<br />

Fabrício Queiroz, a friend of the president’s and former aide to Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, arrested under the<br />

“rachadinha” investigations (see page 12), to be released under house arrest on account of COVID-19 risks and<br />

his fragile health 116 . The same benefit was extended to his wife, a fugitive from justice at that point, so that she<br />

could “take care of her husband” 117 — both decisions were later reversed. The press reported that, while granting<br />

the house arrest to the Queiroz family, Justice Noronha rejected similar requests by ordinary prisoners 118 .<br />

Months before the COVID-19 rulings, in April, President Bolsonaro had mentioned in a speech that Justice<br />

Noronha had been a case, for him, of “love at first sight” 119 . The judge is considered to be a strong candidate<br />

for a future Supreme Court seat.<br />

In June, another important decision benefited the Bolsonaro family. The president’s eldest son, Senator Flávio<br />

Bolsonaro, was granted “privileged forum” in the “rachadinha” case, meaning that he would be heard by a special<br />

instance of the Justice Tribunal of Rio de Janeiro rather than, as was expected, by a first instance judge.<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />





In May, a special instance of the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) accepted charges of criminal organization<br />

and money laundering, presented by the Prosecutor’s Office, against seven judges from the Court of Justice<br />

of the state of Bahia allegedly involved in a scheme of selling decisions favoring illegal land ownership 120 . The<br />

charges are part of a Federal Police operation that started in 2019 (Faroeste) and developed throughout <strong>2020</strong> 121 .<br />

29<br />

Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>

section 03<br />


Analysis of criminal cases and inquiries have<br />

returned to the Supreme Court plenary<br />

The Special Court of the Superior Court<br />

of Justice accepted charges of criminal<br />

organization and money laundering,<br />

presented by the Public Prosecutor’s<br />

Office, against seven judges from the Court<br />

of Justice of Bahia supposedly involved<br />

in a scheme of selling decisions favoring<br />

illegal land ownership<br />

Justice Antonio Dias Toffoli ended his 2-year<br />

term as president of the Supreme Court with<br />

several decisions that hindered investigations<br />

fighting corruption<br />

The Supreme Court ratified the “Fake News<br />

Inquiry”, a highly controversial investigation<br />

that violates basic constitutional principles<br />

and has surpassed its original motivation,<br />

interfering with anticorruption procedures<br />

and investigations<br />

New appointee to the Supreme Court,<br />

Justice Kassio Nunes Marques changed<br />

application of the Clean Record Law,<br />

shortening the period that convicted<br />

politicians are deemed unelectable<br />

Superior Court of Justice grants Fabrício<br />

Queiroz, longtime friend of President Jair<br />

Bolsonaro, house arrest due to the COVID-19<br />

pandemic while rejecting similar requests by<br />

ordinary prisoners<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />


Photo: Agência Brasil<br />

section 04<br />

PUBLIC<br />


OFFICE<br />

In the last year, the Public Prosecutor’s Office became a major source of concern<br />

due to a perceived political alignment of the prosecutor-general Augusto Aras with<br />

President Jair Bolsonaro and the dismantling of prosecutorial taskforces dedicated<br />

to grand corruption investigations such as Carwash and Greenfield.<br />

31<br />

Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>

UNDUE<br />


The appointment of Mr. Augusto Aras as prosecutor-general by President Jair Bolsonaro, in the second half of 2019,<br />

broke a key tradition that, since 2003, had been crucial in consolidating independence for the Public Prosecutor’s<br />

Office. Rather than choosing a name from a shortlist of candidates selected by an election process organized by<br />

the National Association of Federal Prosecutors (ANPR), President Bolsonaro picked a prosecutor who had not<br />

even competed in internal elections 122 . The Senate quickly confirmed Mr. Aras’ appointment 123 .<br />

Before Mr. Aras’ appointment, President Bolsonaro stressed that he would pick someone aligned with him 124 and<br />

his policies 125 . Mr. Bolsonaro’s declaration combined with the rejection of the ANPR’s shortlist generated concerns<br />

that the body’s autonomy is in jeopardy.<br />

Despite Mr. Aras’ repeated statements that he is fighting corruption 126 and that he maintains independence from<br />

the president 127 , conflicts provoked and choices made by his administration, in <strong>2020</strong>, have indeed raised fears<br />

– about a loss of autonomy at the Public Prosecutor’s Office, excessive proximity to Mr. Bolsonaro and political<br />

use of the office to benefit allies and undermine adversaries 128 . This is an especially relevant concern considering<br />

the prosecutor-general is the only individual capable of investigating and criminally charging the president.<br />

Mr. Aras’ proximity to President Bolsonaro was perceived as unusual in his first months in office, due to frequent<br />

meetings with the president 129 . In May <strong>2020</strong>, Mr. Bolsonaro praised what he saw as an “exceptional performance”<br />

by the prosecutor-general and declared Mr. Aras would be a strong candidate if a third vacancy opened in the<br />

Supreme Court during his mandate (only two judges were scheduled to retire during Mr. Bolsonaro’s first term) 130 . After<br />

the encouragement, in September, it was reported that Mr. Aras unsuccessfully mobilized allies to be appointed to<br />

the Supreme Court in replacement of Justice Celso de Mello, who retired in October 131 (see page 27).<br />

Decisions undertaken by Mr. Aras in the past year, systematically aligned to President Bolsonaro or his political<br />

inner circle 132 , have also raised concerns about a possible loss of political independence. According to reports,<br />

in his first year as prosecutor-general, Mr. Aras sided with government over 30 times while only once filling a<br />

constitutional lawsuit against President Bolsonaro 133 .<br />

In April, following the resignation of Justice Minister Sérgio Moro and his accusation that President Bolsonaro<br />

wanted to interfere with the Federal Police (see page 11), Mr. Aras asked the Supreme Court to open an inquiry<br />

into possible crimes committed by the president 134 . The prosecutor-general’s solicitation, however, included a call<br />

for an evaluation whether Mr. Moro was making slanderous claims or telling the truth. Mr. Aras also sided with<br />

government by asking the Supreme Court not to make public the entire video of the presidential meeting identified<br />

by Mr. Moro as proof of President’s Bolsonaro intention to interfere with the Federal Police, arguing it could be used<br />

politically in 2022 elections 135 . The recording was later almost entirely disclosed and revealed strong evidence<br />

that Mr. Bolsonaro had pressured the minister of Justice in an attempt to interfere with the leadership of the<br />

Federal Police and the corporation’s bureau in Rio de Janeiro 136 . The video also allowed public opinion to witness<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />


the minister of Environment’s attempt to use distraction caused by the COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity to<br />

pass infra-legal controversial reforms (see page 16), and the use of bad language by Mr. Bolsonaro to refer to the<br />

governors of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro 137 .<br />

In May <strong>2020</strong>, Mr. Aras raised suspicions that he was benefiting President Bolsonaro’s allies when he reversed<br />

his opinion regarding the “Fake News Inquiry” (INQ 4781), a controversial investigation formally installed by the<br />

Supreme Court to investigate alleged threats and fake news directed at the Court and its members (see page 26).<br />

In 2019, soon after taking office, Mr. Aras had changed the Prosecutor’s Office previous stance regarding the<br />

inquiry, arguing in favour of the investigation and his office’s participation in the case 138 . However, in May, after a<br />

Federal Police operation targeted President Bolsonaro’s supporters 139 , Mr. Aras declared surprise at the decision to<br />

go ahead with the operation despite his opinion to the contrary, asking the Supreme Court to suspend the inquiry<br />

pending further analysis of the investigation’s limits 140 .<br />

At two moments, in August 141 and September 142 , the Prosecutor’s Office petitioned the Supreme Court regarding<br />

complaints questioning the “privileged forum” granted to Senator Flávio Bolsonaro at the level of the Rio de Janeiro<br />

Justice Tribunal , a rule that has allowed the president’s eldest son’s case (the so called “rachadinha” scheme, see<br />

page 28) to be heard by a special instance of the Court rather than by a first instance judge. The senator’s case<br />

was expected to be heard by the first instance judge, in line with the current interpretation of “privileged forum”<br />

used in <strong>Brazil</strong>ian courts 143 .<br />

In September, the Prosecutor’s Office made an astonishing change of course regarding a corruption investigation<br />

into representative Arthur Lira, a political leader of the “centrão”, the informal political bloc in National Congress<br />

that, throughout the year of <strong>2020</strong>, provided crucial support for President Bolsonaro. By December, Mr. Lira was the<br />

president’s choice for heading the Chamber of Deputies 144 (see page 22). In June, Mr. Lira had been charged by the<br />

Prosecutor’s Office in a detailed lawsuit presented to the Supreme Court. Three months later, the same institution<br />

awkwardly called for the charges to be dropped, arguing that involvement of the representative was unclear 145 .<br />

In June, reports stated that prosecutor Lindôra Maria Araújo, a close ally of Mr. Aras and coordinator of the<br />

Prosecutor’s Office Carwash working group, had tried to interfere with the Rio de Janeiro’s Carwash taskforce<br />

in order to to unfreeze a Swiss bank account owned by the family of a businessman convicted for corruption<br />

in Rio’s public transport system 146 . According to the press, Ms. Araújo insisted on the unfreeze, arguing that<br />

the account was linked to the businessman’s father, who hadn’t been charged for any crime, stating that she<br />

knew the family and intended to make a deal with the clan. The taskforce perceived the move as an undue<br />

attempt to interfere with their autonomy.<br />

On the other hand, several <strong>2020</strong> episodes raised concern about politically driven investigations 147 . In April, the<br />

Public Prosecutor’s Office asked its decentralized offices in the states to report all information they received<br />

regarding potential investigations into state governors, a move seen internally as highly unusual 148 . The concerns<br />

were partly driven by the fact that, at that moment, President Bolsonaro was in permanent conflict with state<br />

governors who defended harsher measures against COVID-19 pandemic 149 and criticized his government for<br />

failures 150 in leading the health crisis 151 . In May, Federal Police searched the official residence of Rio de Janeiro’s<br />

governor, Wilson Witzel, as part of an investigation into alleged diversion of COVID-19 funds 152 . A day before the<br />

police’s operation, representative Carla Zambelli, an important ally for Mr. Bolsonaro, declared that, following the<br />

resignation of Minister of Justice Sérgio Moro (see page 11), that stalled investigations by Federal Police into<br />

state governors regarding COVID-19 would now procede 153 . Mr. Witzel, a former ally of President Bolsonaro turned<br />

adversary, readily claimed he was the target of political persecution 154 . In August, Mr. Witzel, against whom there<br />

seems to be solid evidence, was temporarily removed from office 155 .<br />

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In <strong>2020</strong>, Mr. Aras also opposed a plea agreement made by the Federal Police with former Rio de Janeiro governor<br />

Sérgio Cabral, convicted several times under Operation Carwash. When President of the Supreme Court, Justice<br />

Antonio Dias Toffoli granted Mr. Aras a request to close 12 inquires based on Mr. Cabral’s agreement that had<br />

previously been authorized by another Supreme Court judge 156 (see page 25). The move was seen as unusual<br />

and raised concerns due to the fact that Mr. Cabral had reportedly implicated authorities from the Superior Court<br />

of Justice (STJ), the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) and congressmen 157 .<br />

Foto: Divulgação Polícia Federal<br />

Another sensitive issue regarding the prosecutor-general’s administration have been his clashes with Operation<br />

Carwash, a stance that brings him close to a group of politicians, judges and lawyers highly critical of the way the<br />

grand corruption investigation was conducted. At the same time, there have been questionings whether his Carwash<br />

confrontation undermines former minister of Justice and Carwash judge, Sérgio Moro, a potential adversary to<br />

President Bolsonaro in the 2022 elections.<br />



A principal setback regarding Mr. Augusto Aras’ tenure in the Public Prosecutor’s Office has been his confrontation<br />

with taskforces which have been investigating, in the past years, corruption schemes involving high profile politicians<br />

and public and private companies. In the past months, these clashes have occurred both internally and publicly,<br />

and have involved administrative and judicial measures, political mobilization and public statements.<br />

The taskforces were an innovation in the country’s law enforcement system that, from 2014, allowed prosecutors<br />

to work in temporary teams exclusively dedicated to investigating grand corruption schemes. Leniency agreements<br />

and plea bargains became common mechanisms used by the taskforces involved in Operations Carwash (originally<br />

focused in schemes between state oil company Petrobras and <strong>Brazil</strong>’s biggest contractors) and Greenfield (launched<br />

to investigate fraud in pension funds from state owned companies). Both operations untangled complex corruption<br />

schemes involving prominent figures in <strong>Brazil</strong>ian politics. An internal evaluation of these taskforces alongside<br />

other workgroups created after 2014 highlighted, in April last year, the “significant relevance of the work in the<br />

taskforce model for the achievement of more effective results” in the Public Prosecutor’s Office, despite a general<br />

lack of structure and support 158 .<br />

Mr. Aras’ administration has, however, put the taskforce model under strain. <strong>2020</strong> came to an end with great<br />

uncertainty regarding the continuation of Carwash and Greenfield taskforces and their investigations.<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />


In December <strong>2020</strong>, after much speculation, the Public Prosecutor’s Office authorized the renewal of activities for<br />

Carwash taskforces in Curitiba (until October 2021) and Rio de Janeiro (until the end of January 2021) 159 . São<br />

Paulo’s taskforce, in charge of investigations into major infrastructure projects in the state 160 , was discontinued in<br />

September, after seven prosecutors announced their departure from the group due to incompatibilities with the<br />

new incumbent prosecutor and what they saw as obstacles to fulfilling their job 161 . 190 ongoing investigations 162<br />

were left under the responsibility of the incumbent prosecutor or were redistributed.<br />

Numerous episodes, throughout <strong>2020</strong>, already demonstrated the current administration’s animosity towards<br />

Carwash taskforces. In June, Curitiba’s taskforce formally complained about an inspection by Ms. Lindôra Maria<br />

Araújo, appointed a few months before as the new coordinator of the Public Prosecutor’s Office Carwash working<br />

group, after the resignation of the previous coordinator, reportedly for disagreements with Mr. Aras’ administration<br />

and complaints of interference 163 . During June’s inspection, Ms. Araújo attempted to gain access to information,<br />

procedures and the group’s database, including confidential information, without official request or justification 164 .<br />

In July, Mr. Aras’ administration won a Supreme Court preliminary ruling determining the transfer of all Carwash<br />

taskforces’ decentralized databases to the Public Prosecutors’ Office in order to evaluate the existence of<br />

investigations into officials protected by “privileged forum” 165 (see page 25). Signed during the Court’s recess by<br />

its then president, Justice Antonio Dias Toffoli, the ruling was reversed a month later by Justice Edson Fachin,<br />

rapporteur of the case 166 . However conflicts around Carwash databases continued.<br />

In November, Inspector General and Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, Ms. Elizeta de<br />

Paiva Ramos, ordered the hand over of Curitiba’s taskforce database, as part of an internal procedure to evaluate<br />

potential irregularities in Ms. Araújo’s June inspection, and also regarding the taskforce 167 . In theory, neither Mr.<br />

Aras nor Ms. Araújo should have access to the information obtained by the Inspector General.<br />

In <strong>2020</strong>, Mr. Aras also criticized Operation Carwash taskforces. In July, during an online debate with lawyers,<br />

the prosecutor-general argued that it was time to “correct directions”, to put an end to the “lavajatismo” (a<br />

term used by those who criticize what they see as excesses of the operation) and that a “box of secrets”<br />

cannot exist inside the Public Prosecutor’s Office 168 .<br />

When questioned by peers about his declarations, during a meeting of the Superior Counsel of the Public Prosecutor’s<br />

Office, Mr. Aras demonstrated an authoritarian attitude and tried to censor criticism 169 . The episode revealed the<br />

serious internal crisis faced by the office.<br />

Alongside Carwash, the Operation Greenfield taskforce also suffered setbacks. Throughout the year, the working<br />

group had to deal with a sequence of short term renewals by the Public Prosecutor’s Office central administration,<br />

rather than a longer operating extension to allow the taskforce to organize its investigations 170 .<br />

Despite requesting reinforcements to help the growing investigation, the taskforce lost exclusivity for its prosecutors’,<br />

forcing them to return to their original postings in other cities and accumulate Operation Greenfield to the other<br />

demands for local investigations. In September, arguing that the taskforce lacked the support and structure to<br />

achieve its objectives, the taskforce coordinator, Anselmo Lopes, resigned 171 .<br />

In November, an internal consultation to appoint new prosecutors to Greenfield taskforce took place 172 . It was,<br />

however, considered too broad and with no guarantees that the necessary structure and support would be given<br />

by Mr. Aras’ administration. After a single candidate presented himself, Mr. Aras appointed Mr. Celso Três as new<br />

coordinator of Greenfield taskforce 173 . In the past, Mr. Três had openly criticized what he saw as “distortions”<br />

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Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>

produced by Operation Carwash 174 . In December, two more prosecutors left the Greenfield taskforce 175 . <strong>2020</strong><br />

ended with the working group’s investigations paralyzed 176 and the taskforce without a renewal 177 .<br />

In September, the Greenfield taskforce declared responsibility for 48 ongoing criminal investigations, with 24<br />

other cases still pending, involving 435 suspects and financial movement amounting to R$ 3 trillion (US$ 581<br />

billion) 178 . In a memo sent to the Public Prosecutor’s Office administration, the new Greenfield coordinator declared<br />

he wasn’t up to “working too much” and suggested what he saw as viable pathways for the operation: transfer of<br />

investigations to the Federal Police, a “production line” of settlements and redistribution of cases not directly linked<br />

to losses from pension funds 179 . Prosecutors saw Mr. Três’ proposal as a way to terminate the Greenfield taskforce.<br />

Mr. Aras’ administration has indicated the intention to replace the taskforce model by the GAECOs (Special Action<br />

Group to Combat Organized Crime), a structure that has existed for more than twenty years in state prosecutors’<br />

offices. In <strong>2020</strong>, the first five GAECOs were created in the Public Prosecutor’s Office, in Minas Gerais, Paraíba,<br />

Paraná, Amazonas and Pará. The creation of this structure must be celebrated, since it institutionalizes the work of<br />

prosecutors against organized crime. Federal GAECOs, however, still lack crucial elements, such as the exclusivity<br />

of prosecutors involved in its investigations and a specialized support structure for investigations, a formula that<br />

has already been tested and considered effective in major investigations.<br />

The GAECOs are also not necessarily a replacement for the taskforce model, as these special action groups<br />

are quite suitable for investigations related to enduring criminal organizations, such as those dedicated to drug<br />

trafficking. The taskforce model, on the other hand, already proved to have the necessary flexibility for investigating<br />

grand corruption schemes or other complex cases that would not necessarily be absorbed by the structures of the<br />

GAECOs, such as major disasters as the ones in Mariana and Brumadinho. GAECOs and taskforces can coexist,<br />

as long as they are well equipped and regulated.<br />

The taskforce model, combined with recent legal reforms that established cooperation and leniency instruments<br />

between defendants and investigators, were a helpful innovation that allowed for the investigation of grand corruption<br />

schemes to unfold. The model, as well as information management by the Prosecutor’s Office, could and should<br />

be improved. In fact, there are already proposals to improve the model’s regulation, pending evaluation by the<br />

Superior Council of the Public Prosecutor’s Office.<br />

Despite Rio de Janeiro and Curitiba’s taskforce recent renewal, there are concerns among prosecutors that the<br />

model will, indeed, be terminated, with redistribution of cases or their incorporation into new structures. There are<br />

indications that much of what ensured the success of taskforces so far — such as the prosecutor’s exclusivity to<br />

cases, joint work and a support structure for investigations — could come to an end 180 .<br />

By attacking the taskforce credibility and undermining their capacity to investigate without offering an adequate<br />

replacement model, Mr. Aras reinforces the perception that he runs a political and authoritarian administration that<br />

threatens the constitutional autonomy granted to prosecutors, with harmful consequences to corruption investigations.<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />


section 04<br />


The creation of the GAECOs under the<br />

Public Prosecutor’s Office, advancing the<br />

institutionalization of investigations on<br />

criminal organizations; federal GAECOs,<br />

however, still lack necessary conditions<br />

to allow for complex and in-depth<br />

investigations, and do not necessarily<br />

replace the task force model<br />

Loss of independence for the Public<br />

Prosecutor’s Office and increasing<br />

interference with the institution<br />

Pressure from the Public Prosecutor’s<br />

Office to access specific investigations<br />

databases, instead of conducting<br />

institutional reform to address the<br />

institution’s inadequate information<br />

governance system<br />

Aggravating internal divisions and<br />

displays of authoritarian behavior by the<br />

prosecutor-general Augusto Aras<br />

Dismantling of taskforces of prosecutors<br />

linked to Operations Carwash and<br />

Greenfield, hampering investigations into<br />

grand corruption schemes and without<br />

replacing them with an institutional model<br />

suitable for fighting macro corruption<br />

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Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>

Photo: Isac Nóbrega / PR<br />

section 05<br />


AND<br />


In the past year, the Access to Information Law has been challenged<br />

by attempts to suspend deadlines for responses during the COVID-19<br />

pandemic, and by repeated delays and denials of information at national<br />

and subnational levels. At the same time, President Jair Bolsonaro has<br />

frequently attacked journalists and NGOs.<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />





In <strong>2020</strong>, challenges to application of the Access to Information Law, a crucial improvement that has allowed for<br />

increased transparency in <strong>Brazil</strong>’s public administration, became evident.<br />

In March, when COVID-19 arrived in <strong>Brazil</strong>, President Bolsonaro published a Provisional Measure (an act with the<br />

effect of a law and temporarily validity) suspending deadlines for response to requests made under the mentioned<br />

law in specific situations involving public authorities quarantined, working remotely or directly involved in fighting<br />

the pandemic 181 . The suspension was reversed 182 a month later by the Supreme Court.<br />

In June, the Office of the Comptroller General (CGU) reversed its previous position in order to deny access, requested<br />

through the the Access to Information Law, to legal opinions provided by public lawyers concerning the presidential<br />

decision to sanction or veto laws 183 .<br />

Under the questionable argument of attorney-client privilege, the legal opinions were, in practice, considered secret<br />

and, thus, not provided via freedom of information requests, an argument previously applied by the Office of the<br />

Attorney General (AGU), in 2017 and 2018, during President Michel Temer’s government. However, considering<br />

legal opinions often contain more than just legal arguments, this is also an impediment to understanding the policy<br />

decision-making process. Reportedly, CGU technical experts were against June’s decision 184 .<br />

In parallel to barriers imposed by the federal government, in the past year, local governments 185 and specific federal<br />

institutions 186 have delayed, rejected with poor arguments or simply ignored requests made through the law.<br />

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Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>




Under pressure for his repeated diminishing of COVID-19 pandemic, for investigations that targeted his political<br />

inner circle and for controversial positions upheld by his government, President Jair Bolsonaro maintained<br />

public attacks against the press and civil society organizations throughout <strong>2020</strong>.<br />

The most serious episode concerning the press occurred in August, after Mr. Bolsonaro was questioned about a<br />

series of alleged deposits made in the bank account of his wife, the First Lady Michelle Bolsonaro, by Fabrício<br />

Queiroz, personal friend of the president and former aide to his son Flávio, investigated in the “rachadinha”<br />

scheme (see page 12). Asked about the deposits by a journalist, President Bolsonaro replied he’d like “to<br />

punch” the reporter “in the mouth” 187 . The following day, Mr. Bolsonaro continued his attacks on the press.<br />

During an official engagement, the president used an expletive to imply that fearful journalists would be less<br />

likely to survive COVID-19 than someone like him 188 .<br />

In the past months, Mr. Bolsonaro also targeted NGOs working in environmental protection. In September,<br />

while discussing environmental policies, the president compared NGOs working in the Amazon to a “cancer”<br />

he cannot “kill” 189 . A few weeks later, during a speech to the United Nations Summit on Biodiversity, the<br />

president declared that some NGOs were associated to organizations that committed environmental crimes<br />

in <strong>Brazil</strong> and abroad 190 . Finally, in November, it was reported that Mr. Bolsonaro’s government was discussing<br />

regulation to establish control over NGOs working in the Amazon with the alleged objective of protecting<br />

“national interests” 191 , a move seen by organizations in the field as a threat to democracy 192 .<br />

Despite repeated attacks and setbacks for environmental policy in <strong>2020</strong>, civil society and crucial institutions<br />

have reacted to the dismantling of programs and budgets (see page 17).<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />





In December <strong>2020</strong>, Transparency International was targeted by a slander campaign in <strong>Brazil</strong>. This<br />

derived from false allegations that it was receiving (or would receive) funds and taking a managerial<br />

role over social investments (compensation funds) derived from fines imposed by leniency agreements<br />

signed by <strong>Brazil</strong>’s Prosecutor’s Office with companies accused of corruption.<br />

The false claims were categorically rejected by Transparency International 193 and by the Prosecutor’s<br />

Office itself 194 , in official communications.<br />

Attacks on Transparency International are a sad but frequent consequence of its work around the globe<br />

to expose and fight corruption. They are taken very seriously on every occasion, as they represent<br />

threats to fundamental rights and serve as indicators for the quality of civic space and the democratic<br />

regime in a country – particularly when the attacks derive from public authorities.<br />

One of the most serious setbacks in the fight against corruption in <strong>Brazil</strong> is rooted in ever-aggravating<br />

hostility towards the press and criminalization of civil society, fueled by hate speech from President<br />

Bolsonaro. The consequences of this trend, unfortunately, go beyond the anticorruption agenda and<br />

undermine central pillars of <strong>Brazil</strong>’s democratic regime.<br />

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section 05<br />


The Access to Information Law has been<br />

challenged by a federal government<br />

attempt to suspend its deadlines due to<br />

COVID-19 pandemic, and by a change<br />

in CGU’s interpretation in order to bar<br />

access to legal opinions provided by<br />

public lawyers; also, at subnational<br />

levels, requesters of access to<br />

information have faced delays, unjustified<br />

denials or no response at all to demands<br />

presented under the law<br />

President Jair Bolsonaro threatened to<br />

physically attack a journalist and compared<br />

NGO’s to a “cancer” he cannot “kill”; it was<br />

reported his government plans to control<br />

NGOs in the Amazon region<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />


Photo: Fernando Crispim / Amazônia Real<br />

section 06<br />

COVID-19<br />


COVID-19 forced the public administration to make changes to internal and external<br />

procedures in order to allow for remote activities and to expedite acquisition of sanitary<br />

supplies. Imposed flexibility in public procurements seems to have facilitated fraud<br />

and corruption schemes, identified by control bodies, involving resources allocated<br />

to fight the pandemic. At the same time, social distancing measures impaired social<br />

participation in National Congress and local legislative bodies.<br />

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Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>




In <strong>2020</strong>, all levels of government in the country relaxed procurement rules and budget definitions in order to respond<br />

effectively to emergency demands and expenses raised by the COVID-19 pandemic 195 . Although necessary to guarantee<br />

quick destination of public funds to fight the unprecedented health crisis, the relaxation increased pressure on <strong>Brazil</strong>’s<br />

already fragile public procurement system.<br />

In the past months, control and enforcement bodies uncovered potential cases of multi-million fraud, involving acquisition<br />

of medical ventilators 196 and setting up of temporary hospitals 197 . Some problems identified in the pandemic procurement<br />

processes were a wide range of prices, unit values showing no reduction in large-scale purchases, contracting with<br />

companies from sectors other than health, and advance payments by public authorities for materials or equipment that<br />

were defective, delayed or even were not delivered 198 .<br />

In October, the Federal Police and Office of the Comptroller General (CGU) launched an operation into fraud in COVID-19<br />

public procurements in the state of Roraima 199 that led to Senator Chico Rodrigues being caught with money in his<br />

underpants (see page 13). According to the Federal Police, the corporation’s efforts during the first nine months of the<br />

pandemic led to 67 special operations linked to investigations into public procurement involving more than R$ 2 billion<br />

(US$ 373 million) destined to combat the emergency.<br />

In November, the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) released a list of <strong>2020</strong> local election candidates who had received<br />

emergency COVID-19 financial aid paid for by the federal government despite having declared a high income, in theory<br />

incompatible with emergency policy rules 200 . In the same month, TCU released a report identifying deficiencies and<br />

poor effectiveness in the control of emergency aid’s registries, with over 430.000 cases, from a total of 67 million<br />

beneficiaries, with evidence of undue payment of emergency aid, amounting to R$ 813 million (US$ 152,6 million) 201 .<br />

According to the TCU, internal controls and recommendations made to other instances of the federal government led<br />

to the cancellation of 4 million undue payments of emergency aid and an economy of R$ 8,8 billion (US$ 1,64 billion).<br />

To respond to the pandemic, the TCU created an internal platform to gather information that was dispersed in different<br />

sources and, thus, increase its capacity to analyze risk in public procurement (“Painel CoviData”).<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />


The Public Prosecutor’s Office also established an internal instance to monitor the pandemic (GIAC-COVID-19), and its<br />

Anti-Corruption Chamber (5CCR) made an effort to disseminate information to prosecutors on recommendations for<br />

emergency public procurement and other mechanisms to fight criminal activities during the pandemic.<br />

Although investigations into fraud and corruption during the COVID-19 pandemic show the vulnerability of<br />

<strong>Brazil</strong>’s procurement systems and social assistance registries, on the other hand, they are a good indication of<br />

the work by comptroller offices, prosecutors and the police, also at subnational levels, in pursuing suspected<br />

wrongdoing and mismanagement.<br />



In <strong>2020</strong>, Transparency International <strong>Brazil</strong> created a ranking to monitor transparency efforts in public<br />

procurement by government entities during the pandemic, and released four evaluation rounds regarding<br />

improvements observed at national, state and municipal levels 202 .<br />

The ranking identified different levels of compliance, but highlighted the interest by a share of<br />

local authorities in improving transparency levels for emergency procurement processes. From the<br />

first assessment in May to a third one in July, TI <strong>Brazil</strong>’s index registered an improvement of 62%<br />

in average scores by <strong>Brazil</strong>ian states and their capital cities. For the fourth round of evaluation,<br />

released in September, there was a change of methodology to include more rigorous criteria and<br />

monitoring of donations, economic stimulus programs and social protection measures. Even with<br />

the methodological changes, average scores remained high.<br />

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Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>

SOCIAL<br />


AT A LOSS<br />

Throughout the year, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies adapted<br />

parliamentary procedure for most activities so as to be possible remotely. By the end of <strong>2020</strong>, under the<br />

new operation rules, the Chamber of Deputies claimed having approved the largest number of proposals<br />

in the last decade 203 .<br />

Despite the alleged efficiency in remote activities and a system allowing the public to follow parliamentary<br />

debates online, the procedural changes led to bills and other acts being voted directly 204 in the plenary 205 ,<br />

bypassing prior analysis by thematic committees, a step that has traditionally allowed for wider debate and<br />

social participation.<br />

State and city legislative bodies made similar adaptations, equally reducing transparency and participation<br />

in law-making processes. With this reduction in institutional and social controls, in March, São Paulo city<br />

councillors passed a bill which included an opportunistic amendment (the so-called “jabuti”, an amendment<br />

inserted in bills intended to regulate very different matters). This amendment limited the sanctioning power of<br />

the Office of the Comptroller of the City of São Paulo by creating a new political instance for appeals against<br />

its administrative decisions and enforcement of the Anticorruption Law 206 . The episode led to the resignation<br />

of Gustavo Ungaro, the municipal control body’s chief 207 .<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />


section 06<br />


Control and enforcement bodies were<br />

able to identify fraud and corruption<br />

schemes linked to COVID-19 resources,<br />

both in public procurement and in<br />

financial aid offered due to the pandemic<br />

TI <strong>Brazil</strong>’s index showed that a great<br />

number of local authorities increased<br />

transparency in their emergency<br />

procurement processes<br />

Relaxation of procurement rules due to<br />

COVID-19 opened further opportunities for<br />

fraud and corruption; several investigations<br />

led to alleged corruption schemes<br />

Remote voting procedures implemented<br />

in National Congress and local<br />

legislative bodies due to COVID-19 led<br />

to a decrease in transparency, social<br />

debate and participation<br />

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Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>

Photo: Afonso Braga / Rede Câmara<br />

section 07<br />

<strong>2020</strong> LOCAL<br />


November local elections represented a gain in diversity, with a greater proportion of<br />

minority groups and historically marginalized candidates and elected officials, a renewal<br />

that could lead to changes in traditional political practices and the strengthening of<br />

democracy. Fighting corruption was not prominent in the electoral debate. A high share<br />

of <strong>Brazil</strong>ians declared they would vote for candidates under investigation.<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />


GAIN IN<br />




In <strong>2020</strong> local elections, <strong>Brazil</strong>ians voted to elect a record number of LGBTQ candidates. According to mapping<br />

by civil society associations, 90 LGBTQ candidates were elected for municipal legislatives in 72 cities across the<br />

country 208 compared to only 38 in the previous election 209 . 30 new city councillors are transgender 210 , almost four<br />

times the number of transgender candidates elected in 2016 211 . In capitals such as São Paulo, Belo Horizonte and<br />

Aracaju, transgender candidates were among the most voted city councillors.<br />

For the first time since data collection began, in 2014, the number of black candidates was higher than white<br />

ones 212 . Still, only 32% of the elected mayors are black 213 . Women continue underrepresented. Out of 27 state<br />

capitals, just one executive will be ruled by a woman (Palmas) 214 . Data from the first round of local elections shows<br />

that women will lead 651 local governments (12,1%), against 4.750 run by men (87,9%) 215 . Advances in municipal<br />

legislatives are also timid: women will occupy 16% of the city council seats, compared to 13,5% grabbed in 2016 216 .<br />

Although there is still a long way to go to guarantee that election results reflect the <strong>Brazil</strong>ian population’s composition,<br />

the <strong>2020</strong> elections diversity gain should be celebrated not only for the progressive policies it raises, but also<br />

the political renewal it allows for, and its potential to dislodge old political practices and open space for a more<br />

democratic and, potentially, less corrupt participation.<br />

A factor that has probably impacted the <strong>2020</strong> election outcomes for women and black candidates is the unequal<br />

distribution of public electoral funds for their campaigns. Calculations released in the weeks prior to the elections<br />

showed a large concentration of public electoral resources in the hands of just a few candidates 217 , and a distribution<br />

of resources between women and black candidates in many cases below that determined by electoral rules 218 .<br />

Concerns regarding the disparity in discretionary allocation of public electoral funds were expected 219 , and the<br />

2017 law creating the electoral fund has been challenged before the Supreme Court 220 .<br />

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Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>

Another missed opportunity in the <strong>2020</strong> elections was the lack of debate regarding policies to enhance the fight<br />

against corruption. An opinion poll revealed that over 40% of <strong>Brazil</strong>ians from four state capitals (São Paulo, Rio<br />

de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte and Recife) admitted the possibility of voting for candidates under investigation for<br />

corruption, a percentage that rose to 50% in Rio de Janeiro 221 , a city immersed in several criminal investigations.<br />

In this sense, despite housing the greatest number of politicians with “privileged forum” investigated by Operation<br />

Carwash 222 , the PP party won the second largest number of city halls in <strong>2020</strong> elections, going from 495 mayors<br />

to 685, with a specially strong performance in South and Northeast regions 223 .<br />


The November elections were troubled by invasion of the TSE (<strong>Brazil</strong>’s highest electoral Court) system, allegedly<br />

by the hacker group CyberTeam, led by a 19-year-old Portuguese citizen identified as Zambrius and arrested in<br />

a joint action between <strong>Brazil</strong>ian Federal Police and Portuguese Police 224 . The attack consisted of disseminating<br />

administrative information from former TSE officials and ministers. In addition, there was a second attempted attack,<br />

with multiple access from <strong>Brazil</strong>, New Zealand and the United States. The second attempt was fully neutralized.<br />

Although experts have confirmed that the breach did not compromise the reliability of the polls 225 , several groups<br />

that support President Jair Bolsonaro engaged in online activity to disqualify the country’s electoral system 226 .<br />

Research carried out by the Getulio Vargas Foundation showed that posts with misinformation about alleged fraud<br />

and manipulation of the electoral system are increasingly numerous in the country, on platforms such as YouTube<br />

and Facebook 227 . It is, therefore, expected that the TSE hacking episode could be used, in the upcoming 2022<br />

general elections, to question an eventual unfavorable result for President Bolsonaro and his political inner circle.<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>Brazil</strong> <strong>2020</strong><br />


section 07<br />


A gain for diversity in the <strong>2020</strong> local<br />

election, with an increase of the number<br />

of candidates and elected representatives<br />

from minority or historically excluded<br />

groups. The democratization of political<br />

representation is one of the most<br />

important paths for the fight against<br />

corruption in the medium and long terms,<br />

as it helps to dislodge old structures<br />

of power largely responsible for the<br />

country’s systemic corruption<br />

Distribution of public electoral funds to<br />

women and black candidates still seems to<br />

fall short of that stipulated by legislation<br />

Fighting corruption was absent from debate<br />

in <strong>2020</strong> elections and a high percentage<br />

of <strong>Brazil</strong>ians declared they would vote for<br />

candidates under investigation<br />

The <strong>2020</strong> elections hacking episode may<br />

increase fake news and distrust in <strong>Brazil</strong>ian<br />

electoral systems<br />

51<br />

Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>

NOTES<br />

1 https://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/ti_br_-_retrospectiva-brasil-2019<br />

2 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/04/bolsonaro-avisa-moro-que-vai-trocar-diretor-geral-dapolicia-federal.shtml<br />

3 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/pressao-de-bolsonaro-levou-pf-antecipar-em-4-meses-saida-de-superintendentedo-rio-23883048<br />

4 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/moro-ao-pedir-demissao-bolsonaro-queria-interferir-pessoalmente-na-pf-ligarpara-diretores-superintendentes-ter-acesso-relatorios-1-24390923<br />

5 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/04/28/moro-bolsonaro-inquerito-stf-entenda.ghtml<br />

6 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/04/28/novo-diretor-geral-da-pf-alexandre-ramagem-esta-nacorporacao-desde-2005-e-e-amigo-da-familia-bolsonaro-veja-perfil.ghtml<br />

7 https://portal.stf.jus.br/noticias/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=442298&ori=1<br />

8 https://www.metropoles.com/brasil/politica-brasil/primeiro-ato-de-novo-chefe-da-pf-e-mudanca-da-direcaono-rio-de-janeiro<br />

9 https://oglobo.globo.com/economia/e-impressionante-como-receita-atrapalha-desenvolvimento-do-brasildiz-bolsonaro-24289029<br />

10 https://www.em.com.br/app/noticia/economia/<strong>2020</strong>/04/30/internas_economia,1143278/bolsonaro-pressionareceita-federal-perdoar-dividas-igreja-evangelica.shtml<br />

11 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/09/13/bolsonaro-veta-perdao-de-dividas-tributarias-de-igrejasinforma-governo.ghtml<br />

12 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/mp-denuncia-flavio-bolsonaro-queiroz-mais-15-pessoas-por-rachadinhana-alerj-1-24727627<br />

13 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/11/ex-assessora-de-flavio-bolsonaro-admite-rachadinha-eentrega-de-dinheiro-a-queiroz.shtml<br />

14 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/12/saques-de-ex-auxiliar-de-flavio-bolsonaro-ocorriam-aposdepositos-de-valor-similar.shtml<br />

15 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/12/saques-de-ex-auxiliar-de-flavio-bolsonaro-ocorriam-aposdepositos-de-valor-similar.shtml<br />

16 https://g1.globo.com/rj/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2019/12/20/entenda-suspeitas-do-mp-sobre-flavio-bolsonaroem-esquema-de-rachadinhas-na-alerj.ghtml<br />

17 https://g1.globo.com/jornal-nacional/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/08/07/queiroz-e-a-mulher-depositaram-r-89-mil-emcheques-na-conta-de-michelle-bolsonaro.ghtml<br />

18 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/bolsonaro-diz-que-cheque-de-ex-assessor-para-michelle-foi-pagamentode-divida-23289990<br />

19 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/08/quebra-de-sigilo-revela-27-depositos-da-familia-queiroz-amichelle-e-coloca-em-duvida-versao-de-bolsonaro.shtml<br />

20 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/10/23/orgaos-do-governo-buscaram-anular-investigacao-de-exassessor-de-flavio-bolsonaro-diz-revista.ghtml<br />

21 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/revista-epoca-abin-fez-relatorios-para-orientar-defesa-de-flavio-bolsonarona-anulacao-do-caso-queiroz-1-24792193<br />

22 https://crusoe.com.br/edicoes/138/a-abin-do-b/?utm_source=crs-site&utm_medium=crs-login&utm_<br />


23 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/10/07/bolsonaro-diz-que-acabou-com-a-operacao-lava-jatoporque-governo-nao-tem-mais-corrupcao.ghtml<br />

24 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/10/pf-apreende-dinheiro-entre-as-nadegas-de-vice-lider-dogoverno-bolsonaro-em-acao-sobre-covid.shtml<br />

25 https://www.metropoles.com/brasil/em-video-bolsonaro-diz-que-tem-quase-uniao-estavel-com-chico-rodrigues<br />

26 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/10/apos-flagra-de-dinheiro-entre-as-nadegas-aliados-pedem-asenador-que-se-afaste-de-vice-lideranca-de-bolsonaro.shtml<br />

27 https://transparenciainternacional.org.br/retrocessos/<br />

28 https://www.gov.br/cgu/pt-br/anticorrupcao/plano-anticorrupcao.pdf<br />

29 https://www.in.gov.br/materia/-/asset_publisher/Kujrw0TZC2Mb/content/id/1101277/do1-2017-12-18-<br />

resolucao-n-11-de-11-de-dezembro-de-2017-1101273-1101273<br />

30 https://gazetaweb.globo.com/portal/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/02/75-dos-orgaos-federais-descumprem-regras-sobrepublicacao-de-agendas-diz-cgu_97516.php<br />

31 http://www.portaltransparencia.gov.br<br />

32 https://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/busca/downloadNormativo.asp?arquivo=/Lists/Normativos/<br />

Attachments/50905/Circ_3978_v2_P.pdf<br />

33 https://outraspalavras.net/desigualdades-mundo/carf-um-tribunal-paralelo-a-servico-dos-sonegadores/<br />

34 https://www.jota.info/tributos-e-empresas/tributario/voto-de-qualidade-e-extinto-no-carf-1404<strong>2020</strong><br />

35 https://www.jota.info/tributos-e-empresas/tributario/parecer-carf-economia-0607<strong>2020</strong><br />

36 https://www.conjur.com.br/<strong>2020</strong>-nov-30/justica-afasta-uso-voto-qualidade-processo-carf<br />

37 https://www.jota.info/wp-content/uploads/<strong>2020</strong>/09/sindifisco-nacional-gafi-mr-david-lewis.pdf<br />

38 https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/business/<strong>2020</strong>/12/18/notas-de-r-200-encalham-e-menos-de-10-do-prometidocircula-na-economia<br />

39 https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/economia/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>-07/banco-central-anuncia-lancamento-danota-de-r-200<br />

40 https://www.transparencia.org.br/blog/wp-content/uploads/<strong>2020</strong>/08/NOTA_PÚBLICA_NOTA_200.pdf<br />

41 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/laudo-da-pf-mostra-dinheiro-apreendido-na-cueca-do-senador-vejaimagem-24694628<br />

42 https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/business/<strong>2020</strong>/12/18/notas-de-r-200-encalham-e-menos-de-10-doprometido-circula-na-economia<br />

43 https://g1.globo.com/economia/pix/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/11/16/pix-comeca-a-funcionar-nesta-segunda-feira-saibatudo-sobre-a-nova-modalidade-de-pagamentos.ghtml<br />

44 https://noticias.uol.com.br/colunas/rubens-valente/<strong>2020</strong>/11/12/bolsonaro-decreto-transparencia-revogacao.htm<br />

45 https://migalhas.uol.com.br/amp/quentes/336379/psb-alega-no-supremo-que-decreto-de-bolsonaro-produz-<br />

-apagao--na-transparencia-publica<br />

46 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/05/22/ministro-do-meio-ambiente-defende-passar-a-boiada-emudar-regramento-e-simplificar-normas.ghtml<br />

47 https://oglobo.globo.com/sociedade/presidente-do-ibama-se-reuniu-com-madeireiras-multadas-em-26-<br />

milhoes-antes-de-afrouxar-regras-para-exportacao-24766354#:~:text=BRASÍLIA%20–%20O%20presidente%20<br />

do%20Ibama,no%20dia%206%20de%20fevereiro<br />

48 https://www.greenpeace.org/brasil/blog/politica-antiambiental-de-bolsonaro-em-xeque/<br />

49 http://www.mpf.mp.br/grandes-casos/operacao-arquimedes/entenda-o-caso<br />

50 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ambiente/<strong>2020</strong>/11/alemanha-e-franca-compraram-madeira-ilegal-do-brasilindicam-acoes-da-pf-bolsonaro-ameaca-europeus.shtml<br />

51 https://oglobo.globo.com/sociedade/sob-comando-de-salles-conselho-revoga-resolucoes-que-protegemrestinga-manguezais-24664661<br />

52 https://www.greenpeace.org/brasil/blog/em-nova-boiada-salles-enfraquece-normas-ambientais/

53 http://www.diretodaciencia.com/2019/01/23/mma-e-aliados-de-bolsonaro-discutem-hoje-pauta-contrariaao-discurso-em-davos/<br />

54 https://www.oeco.org.br/reportagens/novo-conama-completara-um-ano-esvaziado-e-sem-se-reunir/<br />

55 https://oglobo.globo.com/sociedade/meio-ambiente/organizacoes-da-sociedade-civil-lancam-campanha-poraumento-no-orcamento-para-meio-ambiente-em-2021-24777164<br />

56 http://www.observatoriodoclima.eco.br/wp-content/uploads/<strong>2020</strong>/09/nota-OC-execução-orçamentária-MMA-<br />

Administração-Direta-final.pdf<br />

57 https://apublica.org/<strong>2020</strong>/08/governo-bolsonaro-reduz-multas-em-municipios-onde-desmatamento-cresce/<br />

58 https://g1.globo.com/df/distrito-federal/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/07/06/ministerio-publico-federal-pede-afastamento-docargo-do-ministro-ricardo-salles.ghtml<br />

59 http://www.mpf.mp.br/df/sala-de-imprensa/noticias-df/mpf-pede-a-justica-que-decida-sobre-afastamentode-ricardo-salles-do-ministerio-do-meio-ambiente<br />

60 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ambiente/<strong>2020</strong>/09/ao-stf-heleno-diz-que-governos-e-personalidadesestrangeiras-mentem-sobre-amazonia-para-derrubar-bolsonaro.shtml<br />

61 https://www.conectas.org/noticias/stf-realiza-audiencia-inedita-sobre-crise-ambiental-e-emergencia-climatica<br />

62 https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/agencia-estado/<strong>2020</strong>/11/12/tcu-questiona-nomeacoes-de-salles.htm<br />

63 http://enccla.camara.leg.br/acoes<br />

64 https://www.camara.leg.br/assessoria-de-imprensa/694727-camara-instala-comissao-de-juristas-parapropor-mudancas-na-lei-de-lavagem-de-dinheiro/<br />

65 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/lavagem-de-dinheiro-comissao-da-camara-para-flexibilizar-lei-tem-advogadosde-geddel-cunha-eike-24671288<br />

66 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/10/06/entidades-pedem-participacao-em-comissao-da-camarasobre-lavagem-de-dinheiro.ghtml<br />

67 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/em-comissao-na-camara-advogados-propoem-amenizar-lei-da-lavagemde-dinheiro-1-24713842<br />

68 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/11/27/exigencia-de-crime-anterior-pode-matar-apuracao-delavagem-de-dinheiro-no-brasil-diz-especialista.ghtml<br />

69 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/coaf-bc-bancos-rebatem-mudancas-propostas-por-advogados-na-lei-delavagem-de-dinheiro-em-comissao-da-camara-1-24732681<br />

70 https://www.jota.info/opiniao-e-analise/artigos/o-anteprojeto-da-lgpd-penal-e-a-in-seguranca-publica-e-naopersecucao-penal-0912<strong>2020</strong><br />

71 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/12/texto-de-lei-de-protecao-de-dados-para-assuntos-penaisrestringe-investigacoes-diz-estudo-da-pgr.shtml<br />

72 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/12/texto-de-lei-de-protecao-de-dados-para-assuntos-penaisrestringe-investigacoes-diz-estudo-da-pgr.shtml<br />

73 https://images.jota.info/wp-content/uploads/<strong>2020</strong>/12/alerta-geral-contra-lgpd-penal-ult.pdf<br />

74 https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra?codteor=1938173&filename=Tramita<br />

cao-PL+10887/2018<br />

75 http://www.mpf.mp.br/pgr/documentos/NT4.<strong>2020</strong>AnalisedePontosCriticos.PL10.887.20.pdf<br />

76 https://virtunews.com.br/carlos-ari-sundfeld-lei-de-improbidade-e-reforma-administrativa/<br />

77 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/02/05/camara-reverte-decisao-do-stf-e-derruba-afastamento-dodeputado-jose-wilson-santiago.ghtml<br />

78 http://www.mpf.mp.br/pgr/noticias-pgr/operacao-pes-de-barro-pgr-envia-ao-supremo-relatorio-das-buscase-apreensoes-em-enderecos-ligados-ao-deputado-wilson-santiago<br />

79 https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/<strong>2020</strong>/08/18/recursos-economizados-com-precatorios-poderaoser-usados-no-combate-a-COVID-19<br />

80 https://www.camara.leg.br/noticias/699382-maia-espera-votar-ate-o-fim-do-ano-a-pec-da-prisao-em-2-instancia

81 https://www.jota.info/stf/do-supremo/stf-julga-ser-inconstitucional-reeleicao-dos-presidentes-da-camara-edo-senado-0612<strong>2020</strong><br />

82 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/12/veto-a-reeleicao-no-congresso-foi-incluido-na-constituicaode-maneira-explicita.shtml<br />

83 https://www.camara.leg.br/noticias/493156-rodrigo-maia-assume-presidencia-da-camara-e-agradeceapoio-de-partidos<br />

84 https://www.poder360.com.br/congresso/maioria-pro-maia-fica-em-risco-no-stf-e-reeleicao-pode-ser-vetada/<br />

85 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/12/isolado-voto-de-kassio-sobre-reeleicao-no-congresso-coincidiucom-desejo-do-governo-bolsonaro.shtml<br />

86 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/08/03/fachin-revoga-decisao-de-toffoli-que-permitiacompartilhamento-de-dados-entre-pgr-e-forcas-tarefa-lava-jato.ghtml<br />

87 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/08/03/fachin-revoga-decisao-de-toffoli-que-permitiacompartilhamento-de-dados-entre-pgr-e-forcas-tarefa-lava-jato.ghtml<br />

88 http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=447952<br />

89 https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-53947451<br />

90 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/07/27/toffoli-determina-formacao-de-nova-comissao-especialpara-analisar-impeachment-de-witzel.ghtml<br />

91 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/08/28/moraes-revoga-decisao-de-toffoli-e-mantem-rito-doimpeachment-de-witzel.ghtml<br />

92 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/toffoli-arquiva-todos-os-inqueritos-da-delacao-de-sergio-cabral-compolicia-federal-24641718<br />

93 http://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/noticiaNoticiaStf/anexo/DiscursoPosseFux.pdf<br />

94 https://www.reuters.com/article/politica-lavajato-stf-plenario-idLTAKBN26S332<br />

95 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/10/em-vitoria-da-lava-jato-stf-retira-acoes-penais-das-turmase-devolve-ao-plenario.shtml<br />

96 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/04/moro-tera-agora-de-defender-sua-biografia-no-stf-em-casoque-pode-beneficiar-lula.shtml<br />

97 https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/brazil-setbacks-in-the-legal-and-institutional-anticorruption-frameworks<br />

98 https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,entenda-em-capitulos-a-crise-entre-a-receita-federal-e-os-trespoderes,70002976993<br />

99 https://www.oantagonista.com/brasil/o-amigo-do-amigo-de-meu-pai/<br />

100 https://crusoe.com.br/edicoes/125/em-causa-propria-2/<br />

101 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/06/10/relator-edson-fachin-vota-no-stf-pela-validade-de-inqueritodas-fake-news-julgamento-e-suspenso.ghtml<br />

102 https://g1.globo.com/jornal-nacional/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/10/07/semana-marca-despedida-de-celso-de-mellodas-sessoes-do-supremo.ghtml<br />

103 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/kassio-nunes-tem-apoio-de-lideres-do-centrao-flavio-bolsonaro-parastf-24669471<br />

104 https://www.otempo.com.br/politica/um-em-cada-quatro-deputados-do-centrao-que-apoiam-bolsonaro-einvestigado-1.2349132<br />

105 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/10/amiga-de-flavio-bolsonaro-tia-carminha-e-madrinha-daindicacao-de-kassio-ao-stf.shtml<br />

106 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/acao-no-stf-contra-foro-privilegiado-de-flavio-no-caso-da-rachadinha-ficacom-kassio-nunes-ministro-indicado-por-bolsonaro-24732599<br />

107 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/12/kassio-se-isola-na-defesa-de-pautas-de-bolsonaro-no-stfe-cumpre-expectativa-garantista.shtml

108 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/12/isolado-voto-de-kassio-sobre-reeleicao-no-congressocoincidiu-com-desejo-do-governo-bolsonaro.shtml<br />

109 http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/lcp/lcp64.htm<br />

110 https://www.jota.info/stf/do-supremo/nunes-marques-da-liminar-que-suspende-trecho-da-lei-da-fichalimpa-2112<strong>2020</strong><br />

111 http://portal.stf.jus.br/noticias/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=455028&ori=1<br />

112 http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=397584<br />

113 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/05/presidente-do-stj-permite-que-bolsonaro-nao-entregueresultado-de-exame-de-coronavirus.shtml<br />

114 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/justica-manda-bolsonaro-entregar-resultado-de-exames-decoronavirus-24413680<br />

115 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/03/23/sobe-para-23-o-total-de-pessoas-que-estiveram-combolsonaro-nos-eua-e-tem-coronavirus.ghtml<br />

116 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/07/presidente-do-stj-decide-transferir-queiroz-paraprisao-domiciliar.shtml<br />

117 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/07/09/em-decisao-ministro-diz-ser-recomendavel-que-esposade-queiroz-foragida-fique-com-ele.ghtml<br />

118 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/07/apos-autorizar-prisao-domiciliar-para-queiroz-noronha-negabeneficio-a-grupo-de-risco-de-COVID-19.shtml<br />

119 https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-53358224<br />

120 https://www.stj.jus.br/sites/portalp/Paginas/Comunicacao/Noticias/Operacao-Faroeste-recebida-denunciacontra-desembargadores-do-TJBA-e-mais-11-pessoas.aspx<br />

121 https://g1.globo.com/ba/bahia/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/12/30/operacao-faroeste-mpf-denuncia-desembargadora-dotj-ba-e-3-advogados-por-corrupcao-lavagem-de-dinheiro-e-organizacao-criminosa.ghtml<br />

122 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2019/09/bolsonaro-ignora-lista-triplice-e-diz-a-augusto-aras-queo-indicara-a-pgr.shtml<br />

123 https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2019/09/25/senado-aprova-indicacao-de-augustoaras-para-a-pgr<br />

124 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2019/09/bolsonaro-diz-que-novo-pgr-deve-ser-um-homem-e-seraindicado-ate-quinta-feira.shtml<br />

125 https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/politica/noticia/2019-08/bolsonaro-diz-que-novo-pgr-devera-seralinhado-com-o-governo<br />

126 https://noticias.uol.com.br/colunas/constanca-rezende/<strong>2020</strong>/07/29/aras-diz-que-assegurou-a-senadoresque-combate-a-corrupcao-esta-garantido.htm<br />

127 https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-52899361<br />

128 https://transparenciainternacional.org.br/retrocessos/<br />

129 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/06/procurador-geral-augusto-aras-esteve-com-presidente-maisque-o-dobro-de-vezes-de-antecessora.shtml<br />

130 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/bolsonaro-diz-que-atuacao-de-aras-excepcional-sugere-indicacao-ao-stfcaso-surja-uma-vaga-alem-das-ja-previstas-ate-2022-24451567<br />

131 https://epoca.globo.com/guilherme-amado/aras-trabalha-para-ser-indicado-por-bolsonaro-ao-stf-janesta-vaga-24661939<br />

132 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/09/em-1-ano-na-pgr-aras-move-uma-acao-contra-bolsonaroe-se-alinha-ao-governo-mais-de-30-vezes.shtml<br />

133 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/09/em-1-ano-na-pgr-aras-move-uma-acao-contra-bolsonaroe-se-alinha-ao-governo-mais-de-30-vezes.shtml

134 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/aras-pede-inquerito-contra-bolsonaro-no-stf-para-apurar-crimes-eminterferencia-na-pf-24392004<br />

135 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/05/assim-como-governo-bolsonaro-aras-defende-no-stfdivulgacao-de-apenas-parte-de-video.shtml<br />

136 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/05/pressao-sobre-pf-e-criticas-a-politicos-e-stf-dominaramreuniao-entenda.shtml<br />

137 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/05/22/bolsonaro-chama-doria-de-bosta-e-witzel-estrume-durantereuniao-ministerial-veja-video.ghtml<br />

138 https://www.jota.info/stf/do-supremo/aras-muda-posicao-da-pgr-e-passa-a-defender-inquerito-dasfake-news-25102019<br />

139 https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/<strong>2020</strong>-05-27/policia-federal-mira-aliados-de-bolsonaro-em-investigacaosobre-noticias-falsas.html<br />

140 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/05/aras-nega-mudanca-de-opiniao-e-diz-que-visa-preservarinquerito-do-stf-que-mira-bolsonaristas.shtml<br />

141 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/pgr-recomenda-ao-supremo-rejeitar-recurso-do-mp-do-rio-contra-foroprivilegiado-de-flavio-bolsonaro-24608449<br />

142 https://www.oantagonista.com/brasil/aras-recomenda-ao-stf-rejeitar-acao-contra-foro-privilegiadode-flavio-bolsonaro/<br />

143 https://www.jota.info/opiniao-e-analise/colunas/sem-precedentes/sem-precedentes-encontro-marcadoentre-flavio-bolsonaro-e-o-stf-2706<strong>2020</strong><br />

144 https://www.metropoles.com/brasil/politica-brasil/bolsonaro-declara-apoio-a-arthur-lira-na-disputa-pelapresidencia-da-camara<br />

145 https://oglobo.globo.com/analitico/braco-direito-de-aras-teve-acao-incomum-ao-rever-denuncia-contraaliado-de-bolsonaro-24669190<br />

146 https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/chumbo-grosso-no-ministerio-publico/<br />

147 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/monicabergamo/<strong>2020</strong>/05/pgr-investiga-gestao-doria-e-outrossete-governadores.shtml<br />

148 https://noticias.uol.com.br/colunas/rubens-valente/<strong>2020</strong>/04/28/pgr-ministerio-publico-governadores.htm<br />

149 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/coronavirus-bolsonaro-volta-minimizar-pandemia-chama-governadores-deexterminadores-de-emprego-24321885<br />

150 https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/<strong>2020</strong>/04/13/witzel-bolsonaro.htm<br />

151 https://www.poder360.com.br/coronavirus/doria-critica-bolsonaro-em-relacao-ao-coronavirusquando-faz-faz-errado/<br />

152 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/05/pf-faz-operacao-contra-desvios-na-saude-com-buscas-naresidencia-do-governador-wilson-witzel.shtml<br />

153 https://g1.globo.com/jornal-nacional/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/05/26/carla-zambelli-antecipou-a-radio-que-governadoresseriam-alvos-de-operacoes-da-pf.ghtml<br />

154 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/05/witzel-nega-participacao-em-desvios-na-saude-e-sugereinterferencia-de-bolsonaro-em-operacao-da-pf.shtml<br />

155 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/08/alvo-de-operacao-witzel-e-afastado-do-governo-do-rjpelo-stj.shtml<br />

156 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/ao-arquivar-inqueritos-da-delacao-de-cabral-toffoli-concorda-com-arascontraria-pf-24641727<br />

157 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/toffoli-arquiva-todos-os-inqueritos-da-delacao-de-sergio-cabral-com-policiafederal-24641718<br />

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159 https://crusoe.com.br/diario/aras-prorroga-forcas-tarefa-da-lava-jato-em-curitiba-e-no-rio/<br />

160 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/09/lava-jato-de-sp-chega-ao-ultimo-dia-com-futuro-indefinidosobre-investigacoes.shtml<br />

161 https://g1.globo.com/sp/sao-paulo/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/09/29/lava-jato-de-sp-encerra-forca-tarefa-apos-saidade-procuradores-do-grupo.ghtml<br />

162 https://g1.globo.com/sp/sao-paulo/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/10/28/lava-jato-em-sp-completa-um-mes-sem-forcatarefa-e-com-190-investigacoes-ainda-em-curso.ghtml<br />

163 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/coordenador-da-lava-jato-na-pgr-pede-demissao-por-divergenciascom-aras-2-24207518<br />

164 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/lava-jato-acusa-auxiliar-de-aras-de-manobra-ilegal-para-copiar-dadossigilosos-da-operacao-24501543<br />

165 https://g1.globo.com/politica/operacao-lava-jato/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/07/09/toffoli-manda-forcas-tarefa-da-lavajato-entregarem-base-de-dados-a-pgr.ghtml<br />

166 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/fachin-revoga-liminar-de-toffoli-que-dava-aras-acesso-dados-dalava-jato-1-24564353<br />

167 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/corregedora-do-mpf-determina-que-lava-jato-de-curitiba-forneca-copiados-bancos-de-dados-sigilosos-da-operacao-24753078<br />

168 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/07/28/aras-diz-que-e-hora-de-corrigir-rumos-para-quelavajatismo-nao-perdure.ghtml<br />

169 https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/<strong>2020</strong>/07/31/aras-bate-boca-com-procuradores-que-ocriticaram-por-fala-sobre-a-lava-jato.htm<br />

170 http://www.mpf.mp.br/df/sala-de-imprensa/docs/relatorio-greenfield-1<br />

171 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/09/procurador-reclama-de-aras-e-se-afasta-de-operacao-sobrebancos-e-fundos-de-pensao.shtml<br />

172 http://www.mpf.mp.br/pgr/noticias-pgr/procuradoria-geral-da-republica-abre-consulta-para-selecionarmembros-para-atuar-em-casos-da-operacao-greenfield<br />

173 https://blogdofred.blogfolha.uol.com.br/<strong>2020</strong>/11/26/aras-esvazia-forca-tarefa-e-nomeia-aliado-paraconduzir-a-operacao-greenfield/<br />

174 https://oglobo.globo.com/economia/aras-nomeia-procurador-critico-da-lava-jato-para-operacao-greenfieldsobre-desvios-em-fundos-de-pensao-24765269<br />

175 https://blogs.oglobo.globo.com/bela-megale/post/dois-procuradores-deixam-forca-tarefa-da-operacaogreenfield.html<br />

176 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/investigacoes-da-operacao-greenfield-estao-paralisadas-apos-pgr-nomearnovo-coordenador-24808732<br />

177 http://www.mpf.mp.br/df/sala-de-imprensa/noticias-df/procuradores-apresentam-relatorio-final-de-atividadesapos-encerramento-da-ft-greenfield<br />

178 http://www.mpf.mp.br/df/sala-de-imprensa/docs/relatorio-greenfield-1<br />

179 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/novo-coordenador-da-operacao-greenfield-propoe-encerrar-investigacoesno-mpf-nao-estou-aqui-para-trabalhar-muito-24805397<br />

180 https://crusoe.com.br/diario/na-pratica-portaria-de-aras-acaba-com-forca-tarefa-de-curitiba-e-deixa-lavajato-do-rio-em-suspense/<br />

181 https://www.in.gov.br/en/web/dou/-/medida-provisoria-n-928-de-23-de-marco-de-<strong>2020</strong>-249317429<br />

182 Moraes suspende MP que autorizava limitação da Lei de Acesso à Infor…<br />

183 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/governo-amplia-sigilo-de-pareceres-muda-regras-detransparencia-1-24467779<br />

184 https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/area-tecnica-da-cgu-foi-contra-decisao-que-ampliou-sigilo-de-pareceresjuridicos-do-governo-24493253

185 https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,dois-tercos-das-cidades-paulistas-desrespeitam-lei-de-acessoa-informacao,70003524397<br />

186 https://abraji.org.br/noticias/ministerio-da-saude-volta-a-atender-pedidos-de-informacao-apos-seismeses-de-recusas<br />

187 https://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/08/23/bolsonaro-ameaca-jornalista-minha-vontade-e-enchertua-boca-na-porrada.ghtml<br />

188 https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/08/24/bolsonaro-chama-pessoal-da-imprensa-de-bundao-e-dizque-chance-de-jornalistas-sobreviverem-a-covid-e-menor.ghtml<br />

189 https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/reuters/<strong>2020</strong>/09/03/nao-consigo-matar-cancer-chamado-ongsque-atuam-na-amazonia-diz-bolsonaro.htm<br />

190 https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/reuters/<strong>2020</strong>/09/03/nao-consigo-matar-cancer-chamado-ongsque-atuam-na-amazonia-diz-bolsonaro.htm<br />

191 https://sustentabilidade.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,governo-bolsonaro-planeja-norma-para-controlaracao-de-ongs-na-amazonia,70003506777<br />

192 https://www.redebrasilatual.com.br/ambiente/<strong>2020</strong>/11/plano-de-controle-ongs-amazonia-governo-bol/<br />

193 https://transparenciainternacional.org.br/notas/<strong>2020</strong>-12-07-resposta-a-materia-e-coluna/<br />

194 http://www.mpf.mp.br/df/sala-de-imprensa/noticias-df/comissao-de-leniencia-esclarece-relacao-do-mpfe-transparencia-internacional-na-leniencia-da-j-f<br />

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196 https://g1.globo.com/pa/para/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/06/10/pf-realiza-operacao-para-apurar-fraudes-na-compra-derespiradores-em-belem.ghtml<br />

197 https://g1.globo.com/se/sergipe/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/10/02/pf-faz-busca-e-apreensao-contra-desvios-no-hospitalde-campanha-de-aracaju.ghtml<br />

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200 https://portal.tcu.gov.br/imprensa/noticias/tcu-disponibiliza-lista-de-candidatos-as-eleicoes-de-<strong>2020</strong>-quereceberam-auxilio-emergencial.htm<br />

201 https://portal.tcu.gov.br/imprensa/noticias/auditoria-do-tcu-aponta-falhas-no-controle-do-auxilio-emergencial.htm<br />

202 https://transparenciainternacional.org.br/ranking/<br />

203 https://www.camara.leg.br/noticias/718873-camara-aprova-180-propostas-em-<strong>2020</strong>-maior-numero-da-decada/<br />

204 https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/arquivos/<strong>2020</strong>/03/17/ato-da-comissao-diretora-no-7-de-<strong>2020</strong><br />

205 https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/arquivos/<strong>2020</strong>/03/17/ato-da-comissao-diretora-no-7-de-<strong>2020</strong><br />

206 https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,vereadores-de-sp-incluem-jabutis-em-pacote-contracoronavirus,70003251304<br />

207 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/<strong>2020</strong>/03/apos-covas-tirar-poder-de-orgao-anticorrupcao-controladorpede-demissao-em-sp.shtml<br />

208 https://votelgbt.org/eleicoes<br />

209 https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/arco-iris-na-urna/<br />

210 https://www.facebook.com/antrabrasil/<br />

211 https://g1.globo.com/politica/eleicoes/<strong>2020</strong>/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/11/20/quem-sao-os-vereadores-trans-eleitosem-<strong>2020</strong>.ghtml<br />

212 https://g1.globo.com/politica/eleicoes/<strong>2020</strong>/eleicao-em-numeros/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/09/28/proporcao-decandidatos-negros-nas-eleicoes-de-<strong>2020</strong>-e-a-maior-ja-registrada-pela-1a-vez-brancos-nao-sao-maioria.ghtml<br />

213 https://www.camara.leg.br/noticias/708351-cresce-percentual-de-candidatos-negros-eleitos-para-prefeituras/

214 https://www.terra.com.br/noticias/eleicoes/conheca-a-unica-mulher-eleita-prefeita-de-uma-capital,45bb3<br />

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215 https://www.tse.jus.br/imprensa/noticias-tse/<strong>2020</strong>/Novembro/mulheres-representam-apenas-12-dosprefeitos-eleitos-no-1o-turno-das-eleicoes-<strong>2020</strong><br />

216 https://www.dw.com/pt-br/o-avanço-da-diversidade-na-eleição-municipal-de-<strong>2020</strong>/a-55641506<br />

217 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/10/menos-de-1-dos-candidatos-concentram-80-dos-fundospublicos-de-campanha.shtml?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=twfolha<br />

218 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/11/partidos-descumprem-regra-de-repasse-de-verba-decampanha-para-negros-e-mulheres.shtml<br />

219 https://www.editoraroncarati.com.br/v2/phocadownload/transparencia_internacional_medidas_contra_<br />

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220 http://stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=359360<br />

221 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/10/44-em-sao-paulo-e-50-no-rio-votariam-em-investigadopor-corrupcao-diz-datafolha.shtml<br />

222 https://g1.globo.com/politica/blog/matheus-leitao/post/2018/04/24/pp-de-ciro-nogueira-e-um-dos-maisenvolvidos-em-investigacoes-como-lava-jato-e-mensalao.ghtml<br />

223 https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-55129554<br />

224 https://g1.globo.com/politica/eleicoes/<strong>2020</strong>/noticia/<strong>2020</strong>/11/28/policia-federal-e-policia-portuguesaprendem-hacker-suspeito-de-invadir-sistemas-do-tse.ghtml<br />

225 https://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/estadao-verifica/ataque-de-hackers-no-sistema-do-tse-nao-violaseguranca-da-eleicao/<br />

226 https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/<strong>2020</strong>/11/ataque-hacker-vira-arma-politica-de-desinformacao-sobreeleicao-para-bolsonaristas.shtml<br />

227 https://portal.fgv.br/noticias/estudo-inedito-fgv-dapp-e-tse-avalia-circulacao-desinformacao-sobresistemas-eleitorais

Transparência Internacional - Brasil<br />

Associação Transparência e Integridade<br />

Rua Dr. Virgílio de Carvalho Pinto, 445<br />

São Paulo, SP<br />

brasil@br.transparency.org<br />

www.transparenciainternacional.org.br<br />

61<br />

Transparency International - <strong>Brazil</strong>

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