Executing Search Warrants - Alameda County District Attorney's Office

ehavior, beyond that necessary to execute a warrant effectively violates the Fourth
Amendment.” 69
For example, in U.S. v. Becker70 the court ruled it was reasonable for officers to use a
jackhammer to break up a recently-poured slab of concrete in the suspect’s back yard
because they had “ample reason to believe that the concrete slab was being utilized to
hide the very evidence they were legally on the premises to find.” The only way to
find this evidence, said the court, “was to use a jackhammer to break up the
concrete.”
LENGTH OF THE SEARCH: A search is not unreasonably intensive merely because it
took a long time. What counts is whether officers were diligent. 71 If so, the length of
the search is virtually irrelevant. Thus, in rejecting an argument that a search took
too long, the court in People v. Gallegos said, “[W]hile the search lasted
approximately seven hours, this was not necessarily unreasonable given that officers
searched the residence, truck, garage, and motor home. It goes without saying that
the review of even a box of documents can take substantial time. . . . Moreover, the
garage was cluttered, making a search more time consuming.” 72
Implied authorization
Affiants cannot be expected to describe every place or thing in which the listed
evidence might be found. Consequently, officers may search unlisted places and things if
authorization to search them can be implied, based on a commonsense reading of the
warrant. 73
SEARCHING GARAGES, SHEDS: A warrant to search a residence (e.g., “the house at
123 Main Street”) impliedly authorizes a search of attached and unattached structures on
the same lot that are controlled by the occupants; e.g., detached garage, storage shed. 74
69 Mena v. Simi Valley (9 th Cir. 2000) 226 F.3d 1031, 1041.
70 (9 th Cir. 1991) 929 F.2d 442, 446.
71 See People v. Gabriel (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 1261, 1265 [“More important than the length of the
detention involved in a valid warrant search is the officers’ conduct during such a search. Here,
the record is devoid of any evidence that the officers engaged in any misconduct or in any way
delayed the search.”]; People v. James (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 414, 420 [“(A) search reasonable at
its inception can become constitutionally infirm if unduly prolonged”].
72 (2002) 96 Cal.App.4 th 612, 625. ALSO SEE U.S. v. Squillacote (4 th Cir. 2000) 221 F.3d 542, 557
[six day search not excessive “given the number and type of items that can be evidence of
espionage-related activities”].
73 See People v. Minder (1996) 46 Cal.App.4 th 1784, 1788 [descriptions must be read “in a
commonsense and realistic fashion, recalling that they are drafted by nonlawyers amidst the haste
of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity have no proper place in
this area.”]; U.S. v. Bonner (1 st Cir. 1986) 808 F.2d 864, 868 [“hypertechnical readings should be
avoided.”]; U.S. v. Ferreras (1 st Cir. 1999) 192 F.3d 5, 10 [“hypertechnical readings should be
avoided.”].
74 See U.S. v. Cannon (9 th Cir. 2001) 264 F.3d 875, 880 [“If a search warrant specifying only the
residence permits the search of closets, chests, drawers, and containers therein where the object
searched for might be found, so should it permit the search of similar receptacles located in the
outdoor extension of the residence, i.e., the curtilage, such as the container in this case. To hold
otherwise would be an exercise in pure form over substance.”]; People v. Mack (1977) 66
Cal.App.3d 839, 859 [“The word ‘premises’ as used in the warrant embraces both the house and
garage.”]; People v. McNabb (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 462, 469 [“The word ‘premises’ in a search
warrant describing a house with a detached garage has been held to embrace both the house and
the garage.”]; People v. Smith (1994) 21 Cal.App.4 th 942, 949-50 [ok to search barn]; U.S. v.
Bonner (1 st Cir. 1986) 808 F.2d 864, 868 [“In the present case, the word ‘properties’ was used in
the warrant instead of ‘premises’; these words are sufficiently synonymous to be considered
interchangeable.”]; U.S. v. Frazin (9 th Cir. 1986) 780 F.2d 1461, 1467 [attached garage]; U.S. v.
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