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Compendium of Publications - The Geneva Association

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54<br />

<strong>Compendium</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Publications</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>The</strong> <strong>Geneva</strong> <strong>Association</strong><br />

� Background Risk, Demand for Insurance, and Choquet Expected Utility Preferences,<br />

by Meglena Jeleva<br />

� Financial Markets for Unknown Risks if Beliefs Differ, by Susanne Klimpel and Till Requate<br />

� <strong>The</strong> Production <strong>of</strong> Goods in Exces <strong>of</strong> Demand: A Generalization <strong>of</strong> Self-Protection,<br />

by Carole Haritchabalet<br />

� <strong>The</strong> Consequences for a Monopolistic Insurance Firm <strong>of</strong> Evaluating Risk Better than Customers:<br />

<strong>The</strong> Adverse Selection Hypothesis Reversed, by Bertrand Villeneuve<br />

� Arbitrage and Viability in Insurance Market, by Anja De Waegenaere<br />

Vol. 24 – No. 2 / December 1999<br />

� <strong>The</strong> Econometrics <strong>of</strong> Risk Classification in Insurance, by C. Gourieroux<br />

� Experimental Tests <strong>of</strong> Self-Selection and Screening in Insurance Decisions,<br />

by Zur Shapira and Itzhak Venezia<br />

� <strong>The</strong> Design <strong>of</strong> an Optimal Area Yield Crop Insurance Contract, by Olivier Mahul<br />

� <strong>The</strong> Coexistence <strong>of</strong> Distribution Systems When Consumers Are Not Informed, by S. Hun Seog<br />

� Corporate Insurance as a Necessary Form <strong>of</strong> Consultant-Investigator Contract,<br />

by Jaeyoung Sung<br />

Vol. 24 – No. 1 / June 1999<br />

� Coalition-Pro<strong>of</strong> Allocations in Adverse-Selection Economies, by Jeffrey M. Lacker and<br />

John A. Weinberg<br />

� Should More Risk-Averse Agents Exert More Effort?, by Bruno Jullien, Bernard Salanié and<br />

François Salanié<br />

� Optimal Insurance Under Random Auditing, by Marie-Cécile Fagart and Pierre Picard<br />

� Regulation <strong>of</strong> Insurance Markets, by Ray Rees, Hugh Gravelle and Achim Wambach<br />

� An Equilibrium Model <strong>of</strong> Catastrophe Insurance Futures and Spreads, by Knut Aase<br />

� Automobile Insurance Contracts and Risk <strong>of</strong> Accident: An Empirical Test Using French<br />

Individual Data, by Didier Richaudeau<br />

Vol. 23 - No. 2 / December 1998<br />

� An Extended Family <strong>of</strong> Financial-Risk Measures, by Christian S. Pedersen and<br />

Stephen E. Stachell<br />

� Pareto-Improving Social Security Reform, by Pascal Belan, Philippe Michel and Pierre Pestieau<br />

� A Reexamination <strong>of</strong> the Relationship Between Preferences and Moment Orderings by Rational<br />

Risk-Averse Investors, by Patrick L. Brockett and James R. Garven<br />

� Government Deposit Insurance and the Diamond-Dybvig Model, by J. Huston McCulloch and<br />

Min-Teh Yu<br />

� Voluntary Contributions with Uncertainty: <strong>The</strong> Environmental Quality, by Pierre-André Jouvet<br />

Vol. 23 – No. 1 / June 1998<br />

� Editor’s note, by Christian Gollier<br />

� Background Uncertainty and the Demand for Insurance Against Insurable Risks,<br />

by Luigi Guiso and Tullio Jappelli<br />

� Changes in Background Risk and the Demand for Insurance, by Donald J. Meyer and<br />

Jack Meyer<br />

� A Model <strong>of</strong> an Oligopoly in an Insurance Market, by Matthias K. Polborn<br />

� Long-Term Care Insurance and Life Insurance Demand, by Volker Meier<br />

� Risk Classification by Fuzzi Inference, by Per-Johan Horgby<br />

Vol. 22 – No. 2 / December 1997<br />

SPECIAL ISSUE ON ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION<br />

� Editor’s Comments, by Harris Schlesinger<br />

� Competition and Insurance Twenty Years Later, by Michael Rothschild and Joseph E. Stiglitz<br />

� Complete Versus Incomplete Insurance Contracts under Adverse Selection with Multiple Risks,<br />

by Claude Fluet and François Pannequin

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