GPS Integrity and Potential Impact on Aviation Safety - intelligent ...
GPS Integrity and Potential Impact on Aviation Safety - intelligent ...
GPS Integrity and Potential Impact on Aviation Safety - intelligent ...
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NO. 1 <str<strong>on</strong>g>GPS</str<strong>on</strong>g> AND AVIATION SAFETY 57<br />
Table 2f. RF related performance failures.<br />
Performance failures Comments<br />
Onboard RF filter failure leading to corrupted side lobes.<br />
Unstable L1, L2 or L1-L2 RF delays in the SV (i.e. sudden<br />
jumps or slow fluctuati<strong>on</strong> over time).<br />
Onboard multipath <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong>board signal reflecti<strong>on</strong>.<br />
De-synchr<strong>on</strong>isati<strong>on</strong> between data modulati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> code.<br />
Onboard interferences <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> inter-channel bias.<br />
Table 3a. Intended Interference.<br />
Leads to corrupti<strong>on</strong> of the transmitted spectrum.<br />
Could result in range errors up to several<br />
metres.<br />
Cause Comments<br />
Jamming: Intenti<strong>on</strong>al interference or jamming, i.e. emissi<strong>on</strong><br />
of sufficiently powerful enough radio frequency<br />
energy. This is either realised as emissi<strong>on</strong> of a signal close<br />
to the <str<strong>on</strong>g>GPS</str<strong>on</strong>g> spectrum or if more sophisticated as emissi<strong>on</strong><br />
of a <str<strong>on</strong>g>GPS</str<strong>on</strong>g>-like signal. Civil receivers are vulnerable.<br />
Spoofing: Is the intended injecti<strong>on</strong> of false <str<strong>on</strong>g>GPS</str<strong>on</strong>g> like signal.<br />
The receiver will lock <strong>on</strong>to a legitimate appearing<br />
signal.<br />
Table 3b. Unintended RF Interference.<br />
This could prevent <str<strong>on</strong>g>GPS</str<strong>on</strong>g> receivers from tracking<br />
the signal or cause frequent loss-of-lock<br />
(positi<strong>on</strong>ing error up to 600 m).<br />
Sophisticated jamming technology could prevent<br />
a receiver from acquiring the signal.<br />
Spoofing, if not detected, could inject hazardous<br />
misleading informati<strong>on</strong> (HMI) <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> cause<br />
significant navigati<strong>on</strong> errors.<br />
Cause Comments<br />
Interference from RF transmitters emitting unwanted<br />
signal power in the L1/L2 b<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> (e.g. Ultra wideb<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />
radar <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> communicati<strong>on</strong>s broadcast televisi<strong>on</strong>, VHF,<br />
pers<strong>on</strong>al electr<strong>on</strong>ic devices, mobile satellite services etc.).<br />
The new proposed L5 signal partially overlaps with, for<br />
example, the military Joint Tactical Informati<strong>on</strong> Distributi<strong>on</strong><br />
Service (JTIDS) <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> other commercially used<br />
similar services.<br />
This might lead to receivers having difficulty<br />
tracking the <str<strong>on</strong>g>GPS</str<strong>on</strong>g> signal or losing lock.<br />
Table 3c. Performance failures related to sudden changes in the signal propagati<strong>on</strong> properties.<br />
Cause Comments<br />
The i<strong>on</strong>osphere surrounding the Earth refracts radio<br />
signals in the L1, L2 <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> the proposed L5 b<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Therefore<br />
small-scale (spatial <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> temporal) electr<strong>on</strong> density fluctuati<strong>on</strong>s<br />
especially in periods of high solar activity may<br />
affect the <str<strong>on</strong>g>GPS</str<strong>on</strong>g> signals significantly causing n<strong>on</strong>-integrity<br />
or n<strong>on</strong>-availability situati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />
The troposphere has the effect of bending <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> refracting<br />
(delaying) the navigati<strong>on</strong> signal. The bending effect is very<br />
small <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> can be neglected.<br />
Multipath errors result from reflecti<strong>on</strong> of the navigati<strong>on</strong><br />
signal off surfaces, which disturb the code <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> carriertracking<br />
loop.<br />
For single frequency receivers the i<strong>on</strong>ospheric<br />
effect might result in range errors up to 100 m.<br />
Certain i<strong>on</strong>ospheric effects may lead to rapid<br />
changes in the phase of the signal causing lossof-lock.<br />
The delay due to the troposphere can vary from<br />
2 to 25 m. Most of this effect can be modelled.<br />
However sudden changes can cause potential<br />
n<strong>on</strong>-integrity scenarios.<br />
Multipath error is locati<strong>on</strong> specific <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> can be<br />
difficult to model. Could result in range errors<br />
of hundreds of metres.