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GPS Integrity and Potential Impact on Aviation Safety - intelligent ...

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NO. 1 <str<strong>on</strong>g>GPS</str<strong>on</strong>g> AND AVIATION SAFETY 57<br />

Table 2f. RF related performance failures.<br />

Performance failures Comments<br />

Onboard RF filter failure leading to corrupted side lobes.<br />

Unstable L1, L2 or L1-L2 RF delays in the SV (i.e. sudden<br />

jumps or slow fluctuati<strong>on</strong> over time).<br />

Onboard multipath <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>on</strong>board signal reflecti<strong>on</strong>.<br />

De-synchr<strong>on</strong>isati<strong>on</strong> between data modulati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> code.<br />

Onboard interferences <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> inter-channel bias.<br />

Table 3a. Intended Interference.<br />

Leads to corrupti<strong>on</strong> of the transmitted spectrum.<br />

Could result in range errors up to several<br />

metres.<br />

Cause Comments<br />

Jamming: Intenti<strong>on</strong>al interference or jamming, i.e. emissi<strong>on</strong><br />

of sufficiently powerful enough radio frequency<br />

energy. This is either realised as emissi<strong>on</strong> of a signal close<br />

to the <str<strong>on</strong>g>GPS</str<strong>on</strong>g> spectrum or if more sophisticated as emissi<strong>on</strong><br />

of a <str<strong>on</strong>g>GPS</str<strong>on</strong>g>-like signal. Civil receivers are vulnerable.<br />

Spoofing: Is the intended injecti<strong>on</strong> of false <str<strong>on</strong>g>GPS</str<strong>on</strong>g> like signal.<br />

The receiver will lock <strong>on</strong>to a legitimate appearing<br />

signal.<br />

Table 3b. Unintended RF Interference.<br />

This could prevent <str<strong>on</strong>g>GPS</str<strong>on</strong>g> receivers from tracking<br />

the signal or cause frequent loss-of-lock<br />

(positi<strong>on</strong>ing error up to 600 m).<br />

Sophisticated jamming technology could prevent<br />

a receiver from acquiring the signal.<br />

Spoofing, if not detected, could inject hazardous<br />

misleading informati<strong>on</strong> (HMI) <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> cause<br />

significant navigati<strong>on</strong> errors.<br />

Cause Comments<br />

Interference from RF transmitters emitting unwanted<br />

signal power in the L1/L2 b<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> (e.g. Ultra wideb<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

radar <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> communicati<strong>on</strong>s broadcast televisi<strong>on</strong>, VHF,<br />

pers<strong>on</strong>al electr<strong>on</strong>ic devices, mobile satellite services etc.).<br />

The new proposed L5 signal partially overlaps with, for<br />

example, the military Joint Tactical Informati<strong>on</strong> Distributi<strong>on</strong><br />

Service (JTIDS) <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> other commercially used<br />

similar services.<br />

This might lead to receivers having difficulty<br />

tracking the <str<strong>on</strong>g>GPS</str<strong>on</strong>g> signal or losing lock.<br />

Table 3c. Performance failures related to sudden changes in the signal propagati<strong>on</strong> properties.<br />

Cause Comments<br />

The i<strong>on</strong>osphere surrounding the Earth refracts radio<br />

signals in the L1, L2 <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> the proposed L5 b<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>. Therefore<br />

small-scale (spatial <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> temporal) electr<strong>on</strong> density fluctuati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

especially in periods of high solar activity may<br />

affect the <str<strong>on</strong>g>GPS</str<strong>on</strong>g> signals significantly causing n<strong>on</strong>-integrity<br />

or n<strong>on</strong>-availability situati<strong>on</strong>s.<br />

The troposphere has the effect of bending <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> refracting<br />

(delaying) the navigati<strong>on</strong> signal. The bending effect is very<br />

small <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> can be neglected.<br />

Multipath errors result from reflecti<strong>on</strong> of the navigati<strong>on</strong><br />

signal off surfaces, which disturb the code <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> carriertracking<br />

loop.<br />

For single frequency receivers the i<strong>on</strong>ospheric<br />

effect might result in range errors up to 100 m.<br />

Certain i<strong>on</strong>ospheric effects may lead to rapid<br />

changes in the phase of the signal causing lossof-lock.<br />

The delay due to the troposphere can vary from<br />

2 to 25 m. Most of this effect can be modelled.<br />

However sudden changes can cause potential<br />

n<strong>on</strong>-integrity scenarios.<br />

Multipath error is locati<strong>on</strong> specific <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> can be<br />

difficult to model. Could result in range errors<br />

of hundreds of metres.

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