Emilie Marie Hafner-Burton - School of International Relations and ...

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“Backwaters of Global Prosperity: How Forces of Globalization and GATT/WTO Trade Regimes Contribute to the Marginalization of the World’s Poorest Nations. Caf Dowlah, 2004. International Studies Review, 2005, 7(3), pp. 441-444. “Coping with Globalization: cross-national patterns in domestic governance and policy performance. Chan, Steve & James R. Scarritt, 2002.” Book note. Journal of Peace Research, 2004, vol. 42, no. 6. Research Programs in Progress Election Violence: As elections have spread to nearly every country in the world, so have complaints about the role of violence in democratization and the use of violence as an electoral tool for incumbents to stay in power. This multi-year research project seeks to identify which governments are prone to engage in election violence as well as the conditions under which violent strategies lead to the removal of incumbent leaders from power. Most importantly, it aims to identify which factors mitigate government incentives to use violent electoral tactics. Our research approach includes global, historical statistical analysis, case studies and field experiments. Our first two working papers are available from http://ilar.ucsd.edu/publications/: “When Governments Use Election Violence to Stay in Power.” With Susan Hyde and Ryan Jablonski. British Journal of Poltiical Science, forthcoming 2013. “Surviving Elections: Election Violence and Leader Tenure.” With Susan Hyde and Ryan Jablonski. A Behavioral Approach to International Cooperation: Theories on treaty design and participation have relied heavily on the structure of bargaining problems, the allocation of power in the international system, and interest group politics to explain states’ preferences for international legal cooperation. Using experiments drawn from behavioral economics and cognitive psychology—along with substantive surveys focused on international trade, security, environment and human rights treaties—this multi-year research project is probing whether the personality traits of the individual people who make key policy decisions in negotiating, ratifying and implementing international treaties also shape preferences for legal content. Our results may be especially valuable in identifying why cooperation processes are, in reality, often far from rationally optimal or functional to the strategic problem at hand, as well as in identifying where and why experienced elites differ from less experienced subjects. Several working papers are available from http://ilar.ucsd.edu/publications/: “The Cognitive Revolution and the Political Psychology of Elite Decision Making.” With D. Alex Hughes and David G. Victor. Perspectives on Politics, forthcoming 2013 (summer issue). “A Behavioral Approach to International Cooperation.” With Brad L. LeVeck, David G. Victor and James H. Fowler. “Reputation in International Law: A Behavioral Approach to International Cooperation.” With Brad L. LeVeck and David G. Victor. “The Behavioral Attributes of Policy Elites.” With Brad L. LeVeck, Alex Hughes, David G. Victor and James H. Fowler. 4
Private Firms and Public International Law: For decades, scholars who studied the organization of private industry have known that firms often seek regulation as a part of their business strategy. By controlling the regulatory process firms could use regulation to stabilize markets and generate lucrative rents by preventing competitors from entering the industry. Yet nearly all research on the “regulatory capture” hypothesis has focused on domestic regulation, mainly within advanced industrialized countries. In the four decades since that hypothesis was first advanced, markets have become more globalized and important regulatory activity has shifted from nations to international institutions. In theory, a similar logic of business strategy should thus be evident at the international level. Through globalization the demand for international regulation by firms should rise and business strategy should shift from local to global. This multi-year project explores which firms actually seek and shape international regulation, the strategies they adopt, and their practical impact. Our research approach includes the collection of new data on firm adjudication in varied legal forums (e.g., NAFTA, international arbitration under BITs, and the Court of International Trade), data on firm-level comments on regulatory action (e.g., at the EPA) and data sets on how firms lobby Congress related to internationally oriented legislation. Presently, we have research on several papers in progress: “Delegation to Firms Under Public International Law: Private Rights of Action under NAFTA Chapters 11 and 19.” With David G. Victor “Bilateral Investment Treaties and Firm Adjudication.” With Zachary C. Steinert-Threlkeld and David G.Victor. “Who lobbies? The Role of Private Firms in Shaping the Content of U.S. Legislation” With Thad Kousser and David G.Victor. Other Selected Works in Progress “Sovereignty Costs, Human Rights Institutions, and Democratization.” With Ed Mansfield and Jon Pevehouse. Under review. “Centrality in Politics.” With Alexander H. Montgomery. Under review. “Why The International Criminal Court Isn’t Working (and How It Can)” With Barbara Walter. “Human Rights Institutions, Membership, and Compliance.” With Jon Pevehouse and Jana von Stein. “The New Power Politics of International Organizations: Social Structural Inequality in the International System.” With Alexander H. Montgomery. 5
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Emilie Marie Hafner-Burton - School of International Relations and ...

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