GPANet-Report-2012

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17 Birger Heldt !"#$%&'()'*+,+-+./0'1+--%2' (!!!!!" '!!!!!" &!!!!!" %!!!!!" $!!!!!" #!!!!!" Mass Atrocities Early Warning Systems: Data Gathering, Data Verification, and Other Challenges 4+5"&%'667'8.9-%:;%-.
Mass Atrocities Early Warning Systems: Data Gathering, Data Verification, and Other Challenges going conflict has actually decreased by 90%, although this is mainly due to the statistical impact of a handful of large wars mentioned above (cf. Human Security <strong>Report</strong> 2010). New wars are on average much less - not more - deadly than old wars. Concerning deaths caused by atrocities, the peak in 1994 represents the genocide in Rwanda. In general the annual figure is between 5,000 and 10,000, and is showing a downward trend, just like battle-related deaths. An important insight is that the estimated total of 700,000 civilians wilfully killed in civil wars 1989-2010 is in general – but far from always – a fraction of those killed during the course of military battles, which in turn are a fraction of the indirect war deaths or indirect deaths due to G/P. Important to note is that, and excluding the Rwandan genocide, data show that armed groups were responsible for almost 65% of the very conservatively estimated 200,000 intentional direct killings of civilians in civil conflicts during the period studied. 7 An extreme case is the conflict patterns in Nord and Sud Kivu, the DRC, from 1994 to 2010, where rebel forces have been estimated to be responsible for 90% of all civilian deaths 8 . Not counting the Rwandan genocide, this means that during the past almost 20 years, it is not governments but rebels that carry out the majority of atrocities against civilians in civil conflicts. Nevertheless, some rebel movements are proxies for – or supported by – governments inside or outside the country in question. The role of governments in atrocities is thus larger than the above ratio suggests. A final insight is that the impact on post-conflict health is more negative and hence necessary to add to final casualty estimates. Hoddie & Smith (2009) report that the magnitude of atrocities (carried out by governments) in terms of G/P is a more robust predictor of post-conflict health (disability and death) than the magnitude of crossfire killings. One alleged reason is that G/P involves the murder of professionals (e.g., health care staff) and the destruction of human capital that serve important functions throughout societies. Another alleged reason is the large displacements of entire populations, which in turn lose access to healthcare and live under difficult conditions (including the spread of diseases, hunger, and lack of access to health care facilities). A third alleged reason is the destruction of social capital (e.g., trust) that in turn decreases the possibility of individuals to receive help through friends and networks. G/Ps and atrocities against civilians will thus continue to cause fatalities and worsened quality of life long after G/Ps have ceased to a larger extent than civil 7 Data is from UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset (version 1.3 2011) 1989-2010. 8 Data is from UCDP GED version 1.0-2011, 1989-2010. 18
Page 3 and 4: Guiding Principles of the Emerging
Page 5 and 6: Foreword Yehuda Bauer Contents On E
Page 7: Foreword units that take into consi
Page 10 and 11: 5 Barbara Harff Countries at Risk o
Page 16 and 17: 11 Barbara Harff Zimbabwe 10 Equato
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Page 20 and 21: 15 Birger Heldt Mass Atrocities Ear
Page 24 and 25: 19 Birger Heldt wars in general. Ma
Page 38 and 39: 33 Data Gathering and Verification
Page 40 and 41: 35 Raymond Kitevu Data Gathering an
Page 48 and 49: 43 Ted Robert Gurr The Security Cha
Page 58 and 59: 53 Ekkehard Strauss Impact of Recen
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67 Ekkehard Strauss Impact of Recen
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On Linkages with Terrorism
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Preventing Extremism in the Tactica
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Preventing Genocide: Some Possible
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Preventing Genocide: S
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127 Yehuda Bauer Holocaust Educatio
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145 Gregory Stanton Why Do We Look
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147 Gregory Stanton Why Do We Look
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149 Daniel Feierstein A Critique of
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157 Liberata Mulamula GENOCIDE PREV
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159 Emerging Genocide Prevention St
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161 Alice Ackermann The worst incid
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163 Conference at The Hague, Nether
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165 the crisis in Kosovo in 1999, D
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169 From Keynote Addresses, GPANet
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