busting-frame-busting-a-study-of-clickjacking-vulnerabilities-on-popular-sites-slides

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X-Frames-Options (IE8) • HTTP header sent on responses • Two possible values: DENY and SAMEORIGIN • On DENY, will not render in <strong>frame</strong>d context. • On SAMEORIGIN, only render if top <strong>frame</strong> is same origin as page giving directive.
X-Frames-Options • Good adoption by browsers (all but Firefox, coming in 3.7) • Poor adoption by sites (4 out <strong>of</strong> top 10,000, survey by sans.org) • Some limitations: per-page policy, no whitelisting, and proxy problems.
Page 2 and 3: What is frame <str
Page 4 and 5: What is frame <str
Page 6 and 7: Why frame
Page 8 and 9: Clickjacking 2.0 (Paul Stone, BHEU
Page 10 and 11: Obfuscation/Packing �
Page 12 and 13: Survey Conditional Statements if (t
Page 14 and 15: All frame
Page 16 and 17: Courtesy of Walmar
Page 18 and 19: Courtesy of if (wi
Page 20 and 21: Courtesy of if (se
Page 22 and 23: Strategic Relationship? Norweigan S
Page 24 and 25: Courtesy of try{ A
Page 26 and 27: Referrer = Funky Stuff Many attacks
Page 28 and 29: Courtesy of Facebo
Page 30 and 31: Facebook - Ray of
Page 32 and 33: Courtesy of many i
Page 34 and 35: Descendent Policy • Introduced in
Page 36 and 37: Location Clobbering IE 7: IE 7: var
Page 38 and 39: Asking Nicely
Page 40 and 41: • IE 8: Restricted zones Javascr
Page 42 and 43: Reflective XSS filters Can be used
Page 46 and 47: Content Security Policy (FF) • Al
Page 48 and 49: … a little bit more. These sites
Page 50 and 51: No, they generally don’t… Site
Page 52: Questions? rydstedt@stanford.edu

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