Gazi Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi

Distorted Architecture Of International Intellectual Property Regime And ...agriculture and textile would be insufficient to compensate the losses causedby the concessions given through the TRIPS agreement.On the other hand, it is a fact that information technologies have becomeessential for almost every aspect of the economic, social and cultural life.While this spill-over effect is creating a share in the value addition process ofvarious economic activities, it is also decreasing the net gains of the economicactivities which were subject to negotiation during the Uruguay Round.Take agricultural production as an example. Today it is not possible toseparate agricultural sector from intellectual property regime because seedproduction is under the protection of patent system. This means that one of theessential inputs is now linked to the intellectual property regime. 57As mentioned before, one of the motives for less-developed nations toparticipate in the TRIPS negotiations was their need for a relief from the threatof U.S. unilateralism. They also wanted to get rid of the risk of negotiatingintellectual property regime bilaterally with the United States (and the EC).They knew that the result of a possible bilateral negotiation would be highlyunfavorable for them because of the power asymmetry between them and theUnited States. However, the post-TRIPS period is a total disappointment forless-developed countries in these regards.In 1994, the USTR announced that Section 301 “should be an evenmore effective tool as a result of the Uruguay Round Agreements”. 58 Section301 became a tool for producing “TRIPS-plus” results without engaging ina formal agreement with the relevant less-developed country because thatcountry “may simply decide to adopt a TRIPS-plus measure in order to avoidfurther action by the United States under the 301 process.” 5957Braithwaite and Drahos explain this as follow:“Increasingly, agricultural goods are the subject of intellectual propertyrights as patents are extended to seeds and plants. Agricultural countries will fi ndthat they have to pay more for the patented agricultural inputs they purchase fromthe world’s agro-chemical companies. In addition they will have to compete withthe cost-advantages that biotechnology brings to US farmers (not to mention thesubsidies that US and EU farmers continue to receive). By signing TRIPS, agriculturalexporters have signed away at least some of their comparative advantagein agriculture.” (BRAITHWAITE and DRAHOS, Information Feudalism, p.1158DRAHOS, BITS and BIPS, p.792.59Ibid., p.792. Drahos also notes the following remark by a USTR official to explain the effectivenessof Section 301:“One fascinating aspect of the Special 301 process occurs just before we makeGazi Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi C. XV, Y. 2011, Sa. 4 41