8 The Marshes of Southern Iraq - AMAR International Charitable ...

The
Iraqi Marshlands
A human and environmental study
Edited by
PETER CLARK
and
SEAN MAGEE

2
Acknowledgements
This report is the second and final of two studies on the Marshlands of lower
Mesopotamia from the AMAR International Charitable Foundation. The first was
published in 1994.
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne MEP initiated and chaired these studies, assisted by
a number of experts eminent in their particular field.
Special thanks go to Hugh Arbuthnott and Dr Peter Clark whose help throughout was
invaluable, and to Tim Pendry from Tim Pendry Ltd.
Director Jérôme Le Roy and Executive Secretary Barbara Stevens were tireless in their
professional support.
Sponsorship from the following organisations is gratefully acknowledged:
• IUCN The World Conservation Union (Geneva)
• ODA Overseas Development Administration (UK)
• The Red Crescent Society of Kuwait
• The US Department of State
• WWF World Wildlife Fund International (Geneva)
Copyright © The AMAR International Charitable Foundation 2001

Contents
Foreword Emma Nicholson 4
Introduction Peter Clark 5
1
THE PEOPLE
Demography of the Marsh Arabs Ernestina Coast 9
2 The Economy of the Iraq Marshes in the 1990s Alexander Tkachenko 22
3 Assault on the Marshlands Christopher Mitchell 42
4 Educational Needs and Provisions for Iraqi Refugees in Iran G. Ali Afrooz 70
5 Health in the Marshes and in the Refugee Camps M. T. Cheragchi-Bashi 81
& H. Salman-Manesh
6
THE PLACE
The Deltaic Complex of the Lower Mesopotamian Plain and
its Evolution through Millennia
Paul Sanlaville 94
7 Monitoring Marshland Degradation using Multispectral
Remote Sensed Imagery
James Brasington 110
8 The Marshes of Southern Iraq: A hydro-engineering and
political profile
T. Naff & G. Hanna 133
9 The Ecosystem M. I. Evans 158
10
THE PROBLEMS
The Marsh Dwellers in the History of Modern Iraq Peter Sluglett 173
11 The International Context of Iraq from 1980 to the Present Peter Sluglett 186
12 Statistical Outline of the Situation of the South Iraqi
Refugees in Iran, including the Marsh Dwellers
Jérôme Le Roy 201
13 The Liability of the Regime for the Human Rights Violations
in the Marshlands of Southern Iraq
Adel Omer Sharif 207
14 Water Rights and International Law Joseph W. Dellapenna 222
THE PERSONAL
15 A Personal Testimony Amir Hayder 236
THE PROSPECTS
16 The Southern Iraq Marshlands Project: What it means Emma Nicholson 242
Appendix : The Survey Questionnaire Jérôme Le Roy 245
Notes on Contributors 255
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Foreword
AMAR International Charitable Foundation has been closely involved with the welfare of
refugees from the southern Iraqi Marshlands for ten years. It has provided medical,
educational and social support for up to half of the 200,000 Marsh Arabs who have fled
from the tyranny of contemporary Iraq to the Islamic Republic of Iran. We in AMAR
have endeavoured to provide some dignity in the lives of people who have been
marginalised by the international community.
But AMAR is concerned not only with the relief of suffering. We have sought to
draw attention to the broader context of the victims and the changing circumstances of
their unique social and ecological environment. The Marsh Dwellers represent a pattern
of life that has altered little for centuries. The twentieth century brought political, social,
economic and cultural changes to Iraq as it did to the whole region. But in the 1980s and
1990s the Baghdad government has conducted a sustained assault on the Marsh Dwellers
by the construction of rivers and dams, resulting in the draining of the marshes and the
obliteration of both their means and their way of life.
In 1994 AMAR published a Report that documented the environmental damage
that had been committed. This second Report is, to some extent, a follow-up of the earlier
work. But it goes further and shows how the environmental and humanitarian disasters
are interrelated. The damage to the Marshlands affects a remarkable ecology. But there
are further consequences to issues of river management and international water rights.
Ecological damage has repercussions far beyond the boundaries of Iraq. The work of the
Iraqi government is in violation of international environmental law.
The chain of events that have followed the atrocities of 11 September 2001 have
been a grim reminder of the importance of being compassionately informed about the
disadvantaged of the world. Despair is often a breeding ground for terrorism. This Report
is a contribution to the dispersal of ignorance about a volatile region where political,
humanitarian and environmental issues are inextricably linked.
The AMAR team that has written and produced this Report has drawn on the
leading world authorities in their respective fields. It has not always been easy, for the
current Iraqi government has not encouraged international research on political or social
matters. However we are confident that this Report is the authoritative document on the
subject of the situation of the Marsh Dwellers and the Marshlands today. It should be a
basic document on which policy decisions should be made.
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne
November 2001

Introduction
Peter Clark
The AMAR International Charitable Foundation (hereafter AMAR) was set up in 1991
after the war for the liberation of Kuwait and in response to the plight of the Arabs of the
southern Marshlands of Iraq. The founder was Emma Nicholson, then a Conservative
Member of the British Parliament. AMAR was established as a charity registered under
English law. In the next few years it built up a structure of support for Marsh Arabs who
had fled to Iran. The work has concentrated on providing basic health care, clean water
and essential educational services for up to 95,000 refugees in camps in Iran.
Administrative costs have been kept at a minimum. Wherever possible Iranians and Iraqis
themselves have been recruited to provide operational services. Management is restricted
to a small number of dedicated Iranians in Tehran and a staff of two in London. AMAR
has received funding from the British and other governments, from international agencies
and from corporate and private donations. Throughout its relief work it received generous
co-operation from the central and local government administrations of the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
In addition to the work of the relief of suffering, AMAR has also worked to raise
awareness of the sufferings of the Marsh Dwellers of southern Iraq within the context of
the travails of the people of Iraq as a whole. It has aimed to document and to monitor
what has been happening in southern Iraq both to the people and to the environment. This
Report falls within that programme of work.
The Marshlands of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin are geologically modern –
perhaps only 18,000 years old. Over the centuries there have been steady changes, arising
from the variable flows of water, climatic changes and developments in patterns of
irrigation. There has however been a 5,000 year continuity in the way of life of the
indigenous people of the area.
In 1991 the internal revolt against the regime of Saddam Hussein that started in
the south of the country was mercilessly crushed. The Baghdad government undertook
major drainage works that damaged the environment, destroyed sources of sustenance of
the Marsh Dwellers and, brutally and in violation of international law, accelerated trends
that had been in process for centuries.
The way of life of the Marsh Dwellers as recorded by Wilfred Thesiger, Robert A
Fernea and Shakir M Salim in the middle of the twentieth century had changed little since
Sumerian times. From the age of the Abbasids (eighth to thirteenth centuries CE) the
Marshlands were outside the control of the Baghdad authorities. They were a place of
refuge for bandits, rebels and smugglers. The waterways, the wildlife and the
conservative and independent nature of the people made the region resistant to any
external control. The twentieth century saw a relative social stabilisation and an
economic prosperity. Iraq’s oil wealth led to many changes. People from the Marshlands
drifted to the cities of Basra and Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk. A series of poor rainfalls in
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the 1950s accelerated this drift. At the same time the modern world was penetrating the
Marshlands. Schools and clinics and even factories were challenging traditional patterns
of life. Gavin Young in his Return to the Marshes (1977) records some of the social
changes that had taken place since the time he had been there with Thesiger in the 1950s.
There had also been schemes for draining the Marshlands throughout the
twentieth century. British companies had been commissioned to draw up plans to drain
the Marshlands both in the 1940s and the 1970s. Plans for drainage were linked to
projects for irrigation and the extension of cultivable land and the exploitation of
agricultural opportunities. There was also the central government’s wish to extend its
control.
The construction of dams, forcible migration of communities, the draining of the
Marshlands that was carried out in the 1990s was an extension of earlier trends. However
an obsession for security drove the agenda. By depopulating the Marshlands, by reducing
the area to desert, the region was no longer able to provide a sustainable refuge for
dissidents. Saddam Hussein was able to impose his own will on the refractory people of
the Marshlands. The drainage was carried out with no regard to international obligations
concerning water rights or the environment. The interests and the wishes of the people
most affected, people with greatest expertise on dealing with the development of the
region, were ignored. The Marsh Dwellers had limited options. Like hundreds of
thousands of other Iraqis they could submit to compulsory resettlement in an environment
not their own. Or they could leave the country as refugees, as about 200,000 did. Or they
could remain in the drained Marshlands, deprived of their inherited water-based means of
livelihood.
As part of its humanitarian mission one of AMAR’s tasks has been to record these
changes that have aggravated the personal lives of thousands of Marsh Dwellers. In 1994
it commissioned a report, An Environmental and Ecological Study of the Marshlands of
Mesopotamia. This scientific assessment of the rapidly changing conditions of a major
wetland of the world was seen as an interim report. The Marshlands supported a
significant number of rare and endemic species, which lost, would be lost for ever.
Within the region was a community that was to a large extent self-sustaining, relying on
water-buffalo, reeds, fishing and hunting.
The acceleration of the depopulation of the area and the draining of the
Marshlands has taken place at a time of increasing international concern for the world
community’s responsibilities to the environment and of an appreciation of the ecological
values of such a natural system. For the Marshlands of southern Iraq is one of the last
surviving such sites. In comparable areas such as the English Fenlands, the Mississippi
alluvial plain, the Florida Everglades and the Danube Delta remaining vestiges are highly
prized and efforts are directed towards the restoration and management of water
resources.
Six years after the 1994 Report AMAR has embarked on a further study. The
objective of the new study is to raise awareness at international level of the linkage of the
humanitarian to the environmental and ecological catastrophes. Within limited resources
AMAR has drawn together an international team of world authorities on different aspects
of the issue – historical, economic, social, legal, political. It aims to mobilise global
resources, including the analysis of satellite imagery, to determine questions that are of
significance far beyond the concern of any one government: To what extent can the

Marshlands be a sustainable socially and economically viable unit? How far and in what
conditions are the Marsh Dwellers in exile able to return? How can an assured system of
water resource management be established? What is the balance of responsibilities of the
Iraqi government, neighbouring governments and international agencies towards the
unique asset of these Marshlands? What package of international assistance and expertise
can be offered to fulfil the various claims of sovereignty, the environment and the
interests of the people of the region? What alternative sources of activity, such as
tourism, could be developed?
It is of paramount importance that policies, and recommendations for policy
options, are based on sound data. It has been AMAR’s aim to provide the most
authoritative data on which to make proposals.
In November 2000 many of the authors of the present Report attended a one-day
conference in London. This conference highlighted some of the issues. A second
conference in May 2001 is taking the discussion further. AMAR will raise the major
findings of the report and conferences with governments and international agencies,
under its President and founder, now Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne MEP, Vice-
Chairman of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights,
Common Security and Defence Policy.
AMAR’s work in this Report is concerned with one part of Iraq. However
AMAR’s concerns are not restricted to one geographical area or one community alone.
The plight of the Marsh Dwellers is part of the plight of the Iraqi people as a whole who
have been hostages of a regime that has one of the worst human rights records of any
modern government. Its aggressive policies have led to wars with two of Iraq’s
neighbours, and to international condemnation. The people of Iraq have borne the brunt
of the sufferings arising from the consequent sanctions. From being a prosperous country
with a superb social and educational infrastructure, with huge mineral and oil resources,
and with glittering prospects as a major regional power, Iraq has become one of the
poorest countries of the world, its people living from day to day in growing
impoverishment desperation.
But the economic resources will not disappear. Under a government with different
priorities, there is every possibility of a restoration of individual and national prosperity.
At present about four million of its population of 24,000,000 are outside the country.
Many of these are professional people who have migrated with their skills and their
capital. Most exiles have hopes of returning. The numerous political groupings of the
Iraqi exiles and opposition reflect the divisions of an Iraq of a generation ago, divisions
that facilitated the rise of the present regime. But the Middle Eastern cultural world has
changed considerably in the 1980s and 1990s. Migration both within and outside the
Arab world has broadened perspectives. The information revolution has exposed people
to a variety of cultures and thought patterns, of habits and tastes. Prescriptive and
authoritarian regimes can no longer claim a monopoly of truth, though many pretend that
they do. Migration has accompanied the emergence of a global economy, with
international skills and qualifications. There has also emerged international educational
and professional standards, codes of practice and even ethics. A global economy requires
a banking system, agreed standards of integrity and trust. International communications
depend on uniform codes of practice. Ecological concerns, human rights and respect for
human dignity become ethical issues that transcend the inward looking nation state.
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Younger people take to these global changes more readily. There are dangers of the
marginalisation of the unique or the special, the small nation or the threatened faith. But
there is also an awareness of these dangers. The new global culture is a more open
society, more ready to accept and to celebrate difference. The political culture of Saddam
Hussein’s regime is at a dead end, with no vision beyond its survival in power. All those
concerned with the future of the Iraqi people must consider an Iraq after the present
regime. It is not a matter of restoring a pre-Saddam Iraq, but of seeing how the people of
Iraq can profit best from and contribute to the challenges and opportunities of a twenty
first century world.
AMAR is in a strong position to contribute to these concerns. It is not political
although it operates within a political context. It has the closest links with people of Iraq
and neighbouring countries. It has a proved record of achievement. It has raised the level
and quality of debate on the issue of the Marshlands, demonstrating that the political and
human issues of one part of Iraq cannot be viewed in isolation. It is in a position of
mobilising social and political scientists, economists and ecologists to consider in a
disinterested manner the options and opportunities facing the Iraqi people after the
present regime. Such a task offers hope to a troubled nation.

1
Demography of the Marsh Arabs
Ernestina Coast
The Marsh Arabs have been in a situation of forced migration since the early-mid 1990s,
a forced migrant being ‘defined roughly as someone who is forced to leave his or her
home because of a real or perceived threat to life or well-being’ (Reed et al., 1998: 2).
Because of recent drainage of the Marshes, UNHCR has suggested that Marsh Dwellers
could now be defined as ‘environmental refugees’ as ‘the main reason for their flight had
been the drying of the marshes’ (UNHCR, 1994).
The physically dangerous and politically complicated nature of forced migration
‘presents tremendous challenges for normal data collection processes and standards’
(Reed et al., 1998: 2). The Marsh Dwellers currently comprise a wide range of forced
migrants, including internally displaced persons and dispersed refugees (with a variety of
legal statuses). The variety in forced migrants in relation to their ease of identification is
summarised in Figure 1; issues of definition are important for any demographic study, as
different agencies use different classifications and sources of data about such groups of
people. Globally, published statistics on refugees and forced migrants come from two
main sources: UNHCR and USCR, using a variety of different sources (government,
other agencies, site visits, camp registration).
Fig. 1
Dispersed internally displaced persons
Refugees with determined status
Refugees in camps
Dispersed refugees Internally displaced persons in camps
Self-settled refugees
Ease of identification
Most difficult to identify Easiest to identify
Universe unknown Universe known
Wide geographical spread Defined geographical spread
Source: Hansch in Reed et al., 1998
Estimates (both historical and contemporary) of the total number of Marsh Dwellers are
of poor validity and reliability. In 1988, at the end of the Iran–Iraq war, it was estimated
that there were about half a million Marsh Dwellers (UNHCR, 1996). Post-1988 there is
very large variation in the estimates of Marsh Dwellers, due to a combination of large
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scale population movement (both within and outside Iraq) and a history of poor data
collection in the marsh area. Internally displaced persons are often more difficult to count
than refugees who have crossed an international border (Figure 1). In 1997 it was
estimated that 192,000 Marsh Dwellers remained within southern Iraq (UNACC (SCN)
RNIS 21 Table 1), with perhaps a total of 200,000 remaining in Iraq as a whole. The
number of Marsh Dwellers who have left Iraq (mainly for Iran) are estimated to be
between 80,000 and 120,000 1 . The situation with regard to population numbers is perhaps
best summed up by a statement from USCR ‘Independent sources can not document
either the number of newly displaced Marsh Dwellers or the cumulative total since 1989.
Estimates of the number of displaced and at-risk Maadan (Marsh Arabs) ranged from
40,000 to 1,000,000’ (1988).
Because the Marsh Dwellers traditionally inhabited an area that posed extreme
logistical problems for any household data collection, data on their recent and historical
demography (fertility, mortality and migration) are extremely rare. The next section will
draw together all of the information on factors affecting the demography of those Marsh
Dwellers still resident within southern Iraq.
Marsh Dwellers in Iraq
The demographic impact of the ‘Oil for Food’ sanctions have been widely debated (Ali
and Shah, 2000; Daponte and Garfield, 2000; Zaidi and Smith-Fawzi, 1995; Cortright
and Lopez, 1997). Since 1990 more than 20 major studies have been conducted on the
humanitarian impact of the Gulf War and the continuing economic sanctions. To date,
however, none of these studies have included the southern marshes area within their
samples; therefore only tentative statements may be made about current morbidity and
mortality in the area. It must be remembered that assessment of the effect of sanctions on
civilian morbidity status is extremely difficult for four main reasons: social disruption;
the effect on health may be neither direct nor immediate; the chain of events from distal
to proximate causes for increased mortality as a result of sanctions is not well known;
and, it is difficult to document the health effects (from Daponte and Garfield, 2000).
However, all of the available evidence suggests that ‘these adverse conditions are likely
to adversely affect the Marsh Dwellers in the south-east of the country even more
profoundly since this group is traditionally neglected and marginalised by the
government’ (UNACC (1997) RNIS 21). A 1997 estimate of the effects of sanctions on
nutritional status suggested ‘Those in Marshes [are] considered to be at high risk
nutritionally since it is unclear to what extent the general improvement in food
availability is having a positive impact [on] this group’ (UNACC (SCN) RNIS 21).
Indeed, this assessment concludes ‘As in the past, access to the Marsh Dwellers is
limiting the information available on their health and nutritional status. It was hoped the
monitoring of food distributions under the ‘oil-for-food’ plan would provide much
needed information on this population. So far this has not been the case’. USCR, with
special reference to the Marsh Dwellers reported, ‘Repressive policies in 1999
included…denying food rations to thousands of people’ (2000:188).
There are recent (post-1999) reports of cholera and chronic diarrhoea spreading
among the remaining Marsh Dwellers, who are now deprived of clean water by the
draining of the Marshes. 2 Water availability (for drinking, washing, waste disposal) is a

key determinant of population health, and even more so for a population such as the
Marsh Dwellers who are highly dependent on perennial surface water. The effect on early
age (under 5 years) morbidity and mortality are likely to be great as a poor (quantity and
quality) water supply combined with inadequate sanitation are key causes of frequent and
repeated infections. Although no information is available on breastfeeding patterns
among the Marsh Dwellers, the possible addition of contaminated water to milk formula
and the dilution of milk formula in order to make supplies last longer will all place
upward pressure on early age mortality. The poor water and health infrastructure in the
marshes, combined with continued conflict in the area (causing both intentional and
unintentional injury and homicide), must also place upward pressure on adult morbidity
and mortality. Having reviewed the scanty data that are available on the current situation
of Marsh Dwellers still resident in Iraq, we now turn to the situation of those Marsh
Dwellers currently resident in refugee camps in Iran. Information from two main sources
of data, camp registration and a sample survey, are presented separately here.
Camp data
Camp registration (birth, death, total population) records exist for both camps where the
survey was carried out. Because this study is concerned with the demography of the
Marsh Dweller population, camp data for Servestan Camp are presented here. Servestan
Camp is almost totally comprised of Marsh Dweller refugees, and is situated
approximately 10km from the nearest town, making the camp population relatively
‘closed’ compared to other camps. A preliminary analysis of the fertility and mortality
data is presented here.
Table 1: Crude birth rate 3 and crude death rate 4 , from camp registration, Servestan
Camp, 1995–2000
Year Total
Number of Number of Crude birth
population deaths births rate
1995 1,950 2 93 47.7 1.03
1996 2,483 7 132 53.2 2.82
1997 2,321 18 96 41.4 7.76
1998 2,042 11 121 59.3 5.39
1999 2,270 8 133 58.6 3.52
2000 2,261 4 72 31.8 1.77
Crude death
rate
Higher numbers of male children are registered by the camps (112 male births per 100
female births), suggesting that there is selective under-reporting of female births,
therefore the CBR might be even higher than suggested by the records. The CBR
calculated for Servestan Camp are extremely high, and the reported young camp
population structure (AMAR, 1997; AMAR, 2000) points to high fertility, but cannot be
taken as proof 5 . It is impossible to determine whether the large (46%) drop in CBR 1999-
2000 is reflecting a decline in fertility (although it is unlikely given the magnitude of the
drop), or whether it is due to reporting errors 6 . One key feature of the birth data must be
noted. Refugee camps are not ‘closed’ populations, and it is possible that women who are
non-camp residents are having babies within the camp in order to take advantage of the
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good medical facilities, thus inflating the total number of children born, and hence the
CBR.
Using longitudinal camp registration data, it is theoretically possible to examine
changes in mortality over a six-year period (1995-2000). The ‘crude mortality rate most
accurately represents the health status of emergency-affected populations’ (Toole and
Waldman, 1997). Unfortunately, the data do not extend back to the period immediately
following the arrival of refugees in Iran. The camp data on deaths suggest a rapid decline
in mortality over the period 1997-2000, to levels that are extremely low. Indeed, a CDR
of less than 2 per 1,000 is so low as to invite suspicion, and imply the under-recording of
deaths within the camp. The high level of medical care available within refugee camps
combined with a selection effect for the residents 7 would imply relatively low CDRs, but
not as low as reported.
Camp registration systems report deaths during the first year, allowing for
calculation of the Infant Mortality Rate 8 (IMR) (Table 2). Levels of IMR are extremely
(too) low, especially for 1996 and 2000, probably due to the under reporting of infant
deaths. Infant deaths are often under-reported, especially if they occur in the neonatal
period (Ewbank, 1981). This problem would be exacerbated if non-camp women are
giving birth within the camp, and then leaving. Thus, their births would be incorporated
into the numerator but removed from potential inclusion in the denominator.
Table 2: Infant Mortality Rate, Servestan Camp, service statistics, 1995–2000
Year Deaths under age one Live births IMR / 1,000
1995 2 93 21.5
1996 1 132 7.6
1997 6 96 62.5
1998 5 121 41.3
1999 7 133 52.6
2000 1 72 13.9
One key feature of all of these camp data is that the total camp population might be
incorrect. Indeed, the relatively static total camp population, especially in the context of
high fertility and extremely low mortality, suggests either under-enumeration of camp
populations, or emigration from the camp. The camp registration data, whilst imperfect,
do provide some contextual demographic data within which to place the survey data. The
young population age structure does point to high fertility, but mortality levels cannot be
calculated with any certainty from the camp data.
Survey data
Demographic data presented here were collected in May 2001 and were collected using a
household-level survey in two refugee camps in Iran 9 . Questionnaires were addressed to
household heads, and detailed information was collected on all individuals aged over 16
years 10 . The data are representative only of those households that are currently resident
within refugee camps. It is possible that this population is self-selecting, and differs from
Marsh Dwellers who have either left the refugee camps in order to live elsewhere or were
never resident in a refuge camp. Further, the relatively good medical, water and nutrition
services within the refugee camps mean that these data cannot be used to provide a proxy

for Marsh Dwellers still resident in Iraq. Four subsections are presented here: population
characteristics; migration; fertility and mortality.
Sample population characteristics
A total of 400 household heads were interviewed, yielding detailed individual-level data
on 1,099 adults aged 16 years and above. The majority of household heads originated
from within the marsh area in Iraq (56.8%) 11 , and a wide variety of tribes (n=46) are
represented in the sample. The relatively unchanged residence of Marsh Dwellers over
recent decades is illustrated using a comparison of the place of origin of household heads
with that of their grandparents (Table 3).
Table 3: Percentage distribution of household heads (n=400) by place of origin with
place of residence of grandparents
Respondent’s grandparents
lived
Respondent lived
Inside marshes Marsh edge Outside marsh
Inside marshes 55.7 4.4 1.3
Marsh edge 0.3 31.9 0.3
Outside marsh 0.8 0.3 5.0
The date of arrival in Iran of individuals from Iraq is clearly shown in Graph 1. Migration
began in 1990 and reached a peak in 1993, with refugees originating from both within
and outside the marsh area. Refugees originating from outside the marshes did not begin
to arrive until 1993, indicating that conditions outside the marshes were relatively better
than those within the marshes. The arrival of new refugees has declined sharply since
1996.
Graph 1
Pe
rc
en
t
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Percentage distribution of individuals aged over 16 by place of residence in Iraq and year of
departure from Iraq
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Year of arrival in Iran
Inside marshes Marsh edge Non-marsh origin
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Household and residential arrangements within a refugee camp are, by and large, defined
by the accommodation provided. The modal household size in both camps included in the
survey was 6 people. Households within the sample ranged in size from single person
households (1.5% of the sample) to households with more than 10 residents (10.0% of the
sample), and are normally composed of a husband and wife and dependent children. Only
6.7% (n=14) of households were headed by women, 78.5% of whom were either divorced
or widowed, reinforcing ethnographic evidence on the patriarchal nature of Marsh Arab
culture. Levels of reported adoption/ fostering of children were extremely low, with only
8% of households reporting a ‘non-own’ child currently resident in the household.
As the individual-level data were only collected on all individuals aged 16 and
over, a detailed assessment of the total population age-sex structure cannot be made here.
Previous surveys (AMAR, 1997; AMAR, 2000) have confirmed the very young age
structure of the camp populations, with over 60 per cent of camp populations composed
of children under the age of 16. The age structure of the adult population (Graph 2)
demonstrates high levels of digit preference (ages ending in 0 or 5), especially for
women, typical of a population with low levels of education.
Graph 2
Number of individuals
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
-30
-40
-50
2
0
Single year age distribution, by sex, all adults aged over 16 years
25
30
35
40
45
50
There appears to be some under-reporting of women, as the sex ratio for all adults
indicates more men enumerated than women (110 men per 100 women). Overall, there
are very few elderly people reported in the sample survey, reflecting the age-selective
nature of forced migration. Marriage is virtually universal for both men and women in the
camps, suggesting that forced migration has not disrupted traditional patterns of
nuptiality. There are marked differences in the age of entry into marriage, by sex; by age
Age
55
male female
60
65
70
75
80

25, only 6.3% of women remain unmarried, compared with 37.8% of men. Levels of
widowhood for women are high, reflecting both differences in spousal age at marriage
and potentially higher mortality risks for Marsh Dweller men prior to leaving Iraq. That
these widowed women are not heads of households demonstrates that they are absorbed
into other households, possibly that of a married child, and supported there.
Migration
Data were collected on the current place of residence for all adult siblings of each
respondent (Table 4). Such data provide a descriptive overview of current patterns of
migration, and three key features are of note. Firstly, there is an age effect on the current
residence of siblings, demonstrating age selective migration. Namely, the siblings of
older respondents are more likely to still be resident in Iraq, relative to younger
respondents. This result is unsurprising, given that the majority of individuals left Iraq at
least seven years before the survey. Thus, an individual currently aged 20 would have
only been 13 years old at the time of departure, and is therefore much more likely to have
travelled to Iran as part of a family group with their siblings. An older individual is much
less likely to have travelled to Iran as part of a sibling group. Further, given the age
selectivity of migration, his/her siblings are more likely to have remained in Iraq.
Table 4: Percentage distribution, by five-year age group, of current place of
residence for adult siblings or respondents aged above 20 years 12
Adult siblings alive
Adult siblings dead
Respondent’s age In Iran In Iraq Elsewhere
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
20-24 47 38 3 6 0 0 4 4
25-29 35 24 11 20 0 0 7 2
30-34 35 20 18 18 0 0 6 2
35-39 26 22 15 21 2 1 8 4
40-44 23 13 17 27 0 2 12 6
45-49 20 16 16 20 0 0 18 9
50-54 12 9 8 24 0 0 9 9
55-59 14 7 21 29 0 0 21 7
60+ 14 10 22 26 0 0 22 5
Secondly, given the current situation in southern Iraq, it is important to remember that
reports of siblings still resident in Iraq may be based upon imperfect knowledge. That is,
they may reflect the situation at the time of the respondent’s departure from Iraq, in some
cases nine years earlier. Thirdly, there are very low levels of migration of siblings to
destinations other than Iraq, although this may reflect the fact that entire family groups
have migrated overseas, and will therefore not be reported upon. No detailed estimates of
mortality can be made based upon the reports of dead adult siblings. The only point to
note is the considerably higher proportion of dead adult male siblings relative to adult
female siblings. This may reflect higher mortality rates as a result of conflict
(unintentional and intentional injury and homicide) in Iraq.
15

16
Fertility
The fertility of forced migrants is poorly described and understood, due to a dearth of
data, although ‘There seems to be little doubt that women in many refugee settings are
having large numbers of children’ (Wulf, 1994: 7, quoted from Reed et al.: 1998:18). It
is, however, unwise to generalise about the fertility behaviour of refugee populations
because of great differences in context and culture. Within the logistical confines of the
current study, detailed birth histories could not be collected therefore explanatory factors
relating to fertility (proximate determinants including breastfeeding, contraception, etc.)
are absent here. Circumstantial evidence for prolonged breastfeeding is provided by a
1997 survey of Jahrom Camp, where 54.6% of children (n=119) were exclusively
breastfed for the first six months and 53% of children were still being breastfed at 24
months. In a comparable survey conducted in 2000, these figures had risen slightly, to
59% and 62%, respectively (n=113), possibly at the result of safe motherhood
educational programmes run in the camps (AMAR, 1997; AMAR 2000).
In the household survey, data on children ever born and surviving were collected
using ‘Brass-style’ questions, permitting indirect estimation of fertility and early age
mortality 13 . The number of children ever born to a woman is an aggregate measure of
lifetime fertility prior to the survey, and therefore provides no information on the timing
of the birth. Slightly higher numbers of male children were reported relative to female
(112 males and 100 females), reflecting the male bias in camp registration of births (or
possibly representing a misreporting of the sex of the reported children). Based upon
reports of children ever born, a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 6.4 children per woman is
estimated 14 . Average parity by age was calculated (Table 5) 15 , a measure of the average
lifetime fertility experience of the survivors of the particular birth cohort (represented by
age group).
Table 5: Mean reported parity, by five-year age group, all ever-married women
(n=433)
Age group Mean parity n (Ever-married women)
15-19 1.2 65
20-24 2.8 57
25-29 3.9 101
30-34 4.6 58
35-39 5.6 54
40-44 5.5 26
45-49 5.0 21
50-70 4.3 51
Lower reported parity for older women may represent either increased under-reporting of
children by older women, or may tentatively imply a recent increase in fertility. It is
extremely difficult to determine whether fertility has changed or is changing among
Marsh Dweller women (either upwards or downwards), and what the possible causes of
this change may be. For example, a woman aged over 45 years will have completed most
of her childbearing before arriving at the camp, whereas a woman aged under 20 will
have only borne children whilst a refugee, and camp residence may plausibly affect
fertility in either direction.

It is possible that fertility has changed among refugee Marsh Dweller women over the
past decade, although the direction of change is speculative. Given the increasingly
difficult conditions in Iraq prior to departure, it is possible that fertility since arrival in
Iran has risen due to a combination of factors including improved medical care (including
antenatal and postnatal care) and nutritional status of women (with a possible impact in
fecundity). In addition, a consequence of becoming a refugee might be to place upward
pressure on fertility as a result of increased politicisation (Pedersen et al., 2000; Randall,
2001). On the other hand, the experience of being a refugee (of whatever status), might
lead to voluntary birth control and hence a decline in fertility, especially among younger,
better educated women.
Mortality data
Given the traumatic and physically dangerous nature of forced migration, heightened
mortality is to be expected during the period immediately before and after the migration
(see, for example, Waldman in Reed et al., 1998: 16). It must be remembered that
population subgroups will be affected differently, for example, the very young and the
elderly might experience the highest excess mortality. Ideally, it would be useful to make
distinctions between mortality in the area of origin, mortality during forced migration and
mortality during resettlement (after Carballo, 2001).
Based on reports of children ever born and surviving, average life expectancy is
estimated at 64.9 years 16 . It is certain that the overall mortality levels among the refugee
Marsh Dweller population are considerably lower than mortality levels among internally
displaced Marsh Dwellers remaining in Iraq. That Marsh Dwellers had poor levels of
early age mortality before their forced migration is very probable. The only
circumstantial evidence is provided by a 1987 study by the Iraqi Central Statistical
Office, which estimated an IMR of 60 /1,000 for residents of reed houses, relative to
40/1,000 for residents of concrete houses (quoted from Saadi, 1996). The proportions of
children ever born who have died are indicators of childhood mortality and can yield
robust estimates of childhood mortality (United Nations, 1983). Using reports of children
ever born and survived from the survey it is possible to indirectly estimate levels of early
age (under five) mortality. Estimates 17 of infant (age under one year) and child (age
between and five years) mortality, are calculated at 63 per 1,000 and 25 per 1,000,
respectively.
Overall, although the proximate determinants of child health for the refugee
population are good. For example a sample survey in Jahrom Camp in 2000, reported
98% of children (n=113) as fully immunised (BCG, DPT, Measles) and 99% of children
were given ORS following a diarrhoeal episode (AMAR, 2000). Given the robust nature
of techniques for the indirect estimation of early age mortality, more confidence should
be placed in the figures derived from these techniques than those from the camp statistics.
Future
The future demography of the Marsh Dwellers currently resident in Iran is intuitively
better than that of those Marsh Dwellers still resident within Iraq. The lack of water,
17

18
healthcare and food within the marshes, combined with heightened mortality risks from
conflict, all point towards extremely poor future morbidity and mortality within the
marsh area. By way of contrast, the Marsh Dweller refugee population currently resident
in camps in Iran is receiving healthcare, shelter, water and food. The implications for the
return of Marsh Dwellers to their original area of residence, are extremely negative. As
time goes on, increasing numbers of people of Marsh Arab descent will be born in
refugee camps, or will at least have spent a large proportion of their life in a camp. This
will (has) undoubtedly affect their future aspirations in terms of place of residence, a
feature shown clearly in Graph 3.
Graph 3
80
70
Pe
rce
60
nta
ge
of 50
ag
e 40
gr
ou
30
p
20
10
0
Percentage distribution of preferred future residence, household heads (n=396)
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69
Age group
Iran Iraq Elsewhere
Older age groups are more likely to want to return to Iraq (71.4% of 65-69 year olds)
relative to younger age groups (20.5% of 20-24 year olds). Relatively low levels of
individuals at all ages want to remain in Iran, reflecting a desire to be independent that
will be found in most refugee populations.
More generally, what this study has shown, is that in order to assist both specific groups
of forced migrants and forced migrants as a whole, good demographic data are needed.
Recently, there has been an increasing recognition that there is a need for good evidence
in order to be able to both understand and deal with complex emergency situations (NRC,
2001). Of course there are many other outcomes of forced migration other than those of
demography ,including ‘changes in family and household structures, broader societal
changes, psychological effects, and potential cultural shifts’ (Keely et al., 2001: 2). To

date there is a relatively small (but growing) corpus of data on the demography of forced
migration populations, and this study provides a small contribution to that corpus.
Bibliography
Ali, M. M. and I. H. Shah (2000) ‘Sanctions and childhood mortality in Iraq.’ The Lancet
355: 1851-1857
AMAR (1997). A visit to the Iraqi refugee camps, assisted by AMAR ICF in South of
Iran. Tehran: AMAR
AMAR (2000). Health and sanitation survey in Iraqi refugee camps assisted by AMAR
I.C.F. in South of Iran. Tehran AMAR
Carballo, M (2001) ‘Reflections’ in NRC Forced migration and mortality: roundtable on
the demography of forced migration National Research Council National Academy Press:
Washington pp.130-135
Cook, R. (1998). Transcript of press conference given by the Foreign Secretary 19
December 1998.
Cortright, D. and G. A. Lopez (1997). Sanctions against Iraq: facts and analysis, Fourth
Freedom Forum.
Daponte, B. O. and R. Garfield (2000). ‘The effect of economic sanctions on the
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Public Health 90(4): 546-552.
Ewbank, D. (1981) Age misreporting and age-selective under-enumeration: sources,
patterns and consequences for demographic analysis National Academy Press:
Washington
FAO (1995). Evaluation of food and nutrition situation in Iraq. Rome, FAO.
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Fell, N. (1996). ‘Outcasts from Eden.’ New Scientist 151(2045): 24-27 ,31.
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37
NRC (2001) Forced migration and mortality: roundtable on the demography of forced
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20
Pedersen, J et al. (Eds.) (2000) Growing fast: The Palestinian population in the West
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UNACC (SCN) (United Nations Administrative Committee on Coordination –
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Reed, H., J. Haaga, et al., Eds. (1998). The demography of forced migration: summary of
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346(8988): 1485.
NOTES
1
Again, however, there is a great range in the total estimates, from 70,000 (USCR) to
150,000 (Cook, 1998).
2
Inter-annual climatic variability further compounds this scenario, for example, in 1999 a
regional drought was reported (http://www.fao.org/news/2000/000904-e.htm), with the
region receiving between one half and one third of average annual rainfall.
3
Crude birth rate (CBR) = Total live births in preceding year / Total mid-year population
4
Crude death rate (CDR) = Total deaths in preceding year/ Total mid-year population

5
Age selective out migration can also cause a young population structure.
6
Any forthcoming info about contraception from AMAR to be incorporated here.
7
The selection effect refers to the fact that those less able (physically) to make the
migration from Iraq to Iran remained behind in Iraq.
8
IMR = Total deaths of infants aged under one year / Total live births during year
9
Jahrom Camp and Servestan Camp, both in Fars Province. As of December 2000 there
were 4,560 residents in Jahrom and 2,211 in Servestan.
10
Logistical considerations prevented individual-level data to be collected on all age
groups, and it is acknowledged that this is a shortfall of the data presented here. For more
detailed information on the questionnaire administration, see Appendix.
11
36.6% of household heads reported originating from the edge of the marshes and 6.6%
from outside the marsh area.
12
Sibling data weighted by the inverse of the total size of sibling group.
13
The completed fertility of women aged over 49 years by the time they left Iraq could
provide a very crude proxy for Marsh Arab fertility, but high levels (22%) of nonreporting
for this age group combined with the highly selective nature of this group of
women and small overall sample size (n=41), prevents any robust estimate from being
made.
14
Using FERTCB procedure in MORTPAK-Lite. The asfrs estimated by this procedure
show a very unusual age pattern, with the highest fertility occurring in age group 15-19.
Age group Age specific fertility rate (asfr)
15-19 0.4734
20-24 0.1956
25-29 0.1951
30-34 0.1281
35-39 0.2085
40-44 0.0565
45-49 0.0208
It is possible that never-married girls aged 15-19 were reported as children, thus biasing
the reports from this age group to include only those who have ever-married. As women
involved in early marriages tend to have relatively high levels of fertility, with
childbearing often occurring soon after marriage.
15 Anecdotal evidence suggests some very early marriage and childbearing of Marsh Arab
girls, but the inclusion of only adults aged over 16 in the survey precludes an assessment
of this.
16 Calculated using MORTPAK-Lite, sing the United Nations General Life Table ,and
based on reports of children ever born and surviving from women aged 20-29.
17 Using MORTPAK-Lite and assumption of mean age at childbearing calculated at
23.89 years. Estimates of early age mortality are based on estimates for women aged 20-
24, based on the age distribution of reported dead children and using the United Nations
General model life table.
21

2
The Economy of the Iraq Marshes
in the 1990s
Alexander Tkachenko
(1) INTRODUCTION
The history of the development of the Iraqi southern regions, populated by Marsh
Dwellers as well as the whole economy of the country in the recent decades may be
divided into three basic periods: before the Iran–Iraq war; after its outbreak in 1980
(ended in 1988); after the Kuwaiti crisis.
Having been a component part of Iraqi economy, particular as it is a unique and
marginal at the same time, the traditional economy of the Marsh Arabs was undergoing
transformation under the impact of dominant common tendencies, peculiar, at the period,
for the entire Iraqi economic and political sphere.
Before the Iran–Iraq war, the economy of the country developed under the
influence of the following factors. Iraq possessed considerable natural and human
resources, which might have made it one of the most developed and flourishing countries
of the region within a generation. It ranked (and ranks) second in the region, next to
Saudi Arabia (or, according to some estimates, even the first) in explored oil and gas
deposits, owning around 100 billion barrels of oil, which is 14.2% of all deposits in the
Middle East and North Africa or about 10% of the world’s deposits. For comparison,
Saudi Arabia possesses 261 billion barrels (37.2% of the regional deposits), Kuwait 96.5
billion (13.7%), Iran 83.9 billion (12.6%).(1)
The country has also huge agro-climatic resources, i.e., a large expanse of fertile
land, of which just 3.2–3.7 million hectares are cultivated, which is a third of the arable
land. Most of the cultivated land is irrigated. Iraq’s water resources are enough to double
the cultivated area. It has also relatively large population: 16.3 million in 1987 and over
22 million in 1997.(2)
The share of skilled manpower is relatively high. Its training was among the
priority tasks of the development. There is a considerable potential to develop
international tourism in Iraq: memorials of ancient civilisations of the world importance,
favourable agroclimatic conditions, which are suitable to produce environmentally safe
foodstuffs and create resort zones in various regions of the country. Iraq is home to many
unique species of flora and fauna. Its geographical location also is favourable, especially
in the light of the dynamically developing processes of the globalisation of the world
economy. The country lies at the junction of international trade and transportation paths

and communications. On the whole, its economic potential, determined, first of all, by the
natural conditions, geographical location, as well as historical and cultural heritage, may
be described as considerable and in some respects unique on the global level.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Iraqi economy underwent deep changes, caused
mainly by the war with Iran (1980–1988) and the sanctions imposed by the UN during
the Kuwaiti crisis. Another source of an immense harm inflicted on the country’s
economy was bombardment during the hostilities of early 1991, which destroyed many
production facilities. A sizeable part of the potable water supply system was destroyed,
including that in the south of the country. Bombardment indirectly affected many social
facilities, partly as a result of the cessation of power and water supply.
Internal conflicts also affected the economic life. Hostilities broke out in
Kurdistan with a new strength throughout the 1980s and 1990s Some of the opposition
leaders took refuge in the regions inhabited by the Marsh Dwellers, in the southern
provinces, where clashes between the government troops and opposition forces continued
in the 1990s.
Over-militarization and over-etatization became a heavy burden to the national
economy. A considerable share of manpower (above 13% in 1980) was shifted from civil
economy to non-productive military industry. Between 1975 and 1980, when the Iran–
Iraq war started, military expenses increased from $3.1 billion to $20 billion (39% of the
GDP). There is no reason to assume that the high level of military spending has come
down significantly in recent years; the country still keeps a huge army while the
government has to spend the bulk of its diminished oil export earnings to import
foodstuffs and medicines.
Low return of the realisation of the government’s privatisation programmes,
hyperinflation, and manifold depreciation of the Iraqi dinar (its exchange rate at the black
market went down from $ =3D or ID 0.31 in the early 1990s to ID 1,600 in late 1998,
falling sometimes even lower), and capital flight also hampered the development of the
national economy to a great extent. The economic difficulties were aggravated by an
unprecedented increase in foreign indebtedness: Iraq, whose pre-war hard currency
resources amounted to $37 billion, owes to foreign creditors more than any other country
in the world. Its liabilities were estimated at $340 billion, of which $220 billion were
reparations, $40 billion debts to the Gulf countries, and $80 billion debts to other
countries, including Russia and European states. Some experts calculated that, with
regard of the interest on the foreign debt and reparations, Iraq’s total indebtedness may
come to $800 billion.(3)
The deep crisis that seized the Iraqi economy in the 1990s was aggravated by the
spread of black-marketing, bribery, and other crisis phenomena in the economy and
society. As a result, the Iraqi economy was thrown back to a ‘pre-industrial’ state as early
as the beginning of the 1990s. According to the Arab Corporation of Investment
Guarantees, the loss inflicted on it by the Iran–Iraq war reached some $150 billion by
1995 and $200 billion during the Kuwaiti crisis. A sizeable part of the production
capacities in the oil industry, facilities of infrastructure, power production, and other
basic branches was destroyed. For instance, according to international experts, some 50%
of the Iraqi oil wells needed a repair in the late 1990s. Notably, their quick restoration is
quite possible: the earlier daily export volume of 3 million barrels may be reached within
a year after the embargo is lifted and then doubled within five years, although it will
23

24
require around $30 billion. In early 2000, the daily oil output was close to 2 million
barrels, and it was planned to increase it to 3 million by mid-2000 and to 3.4 million by
September. (4)
In their turn, the difficulties of the oil industry affected the performance of almost
all branches of the Iraqi economy, including agriculture. After the UN imposed its
sanctions, oil exports, which yielded up to 98% of the foreign currency proceeds, almost
ceased, undermining the financial basis of the national economy. The resulting financialeconomic
crisis deepened due to the exhaustion of the currency reserves, unprecedented
growth of foreign indebtedness, and cessation of the inflow of foreign investments.
The depth of the crisis is proven by a decrease in the gross domestic product from
$48.3 bn in 1989 to $14.4 bn by 1995. By 2000, no cardinal changes occurred in the
country’s economic condition, while the international sanctions continued. The limited
resources incoming into the country from oil export in the framework of the program of
‘Oil for Food and Medicines’, are allocated not for development but are being used for
another goals. The deep economic crisis led to a large-scale erosion of the social sphere: a
drastic decrease in the per capita national income, degradation of the basic services,
especially medical aid, food supply, education, etc. These phenomena were particularly
grave to the most vulnerable strata of the Iraqi society – i.e., disabled persons (whose
number increased as a result of large-scale and protracted hostilities and wars), children,
and elderly persons, as well as the ethnic minorities, most of whom belonged to the
marginal social groups, including the tribes who lived among the marshes of southern
Iraq.
Despite the availability of considerable agricultural-climatic resources, favourable
for producing a wide range of foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials, the agribusiness
development was lagging behind the requirements of the home market. Before 1990 the
volume of produce of the plant growing and animal husbandry extraction was practically
not growing, except the production of fruit, vegetables and white meat. The production of
such important cereals as rice, wheat, millet, barley and so forth, as well as dates, red
meat, dairy produce and other traditional food products was stagnant, in spite of using of
such modern agricultural materials as selective seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and – in
animal breeding – vaccines and fodder concentrates. Before the UN imposed embargo on
trade with Iraq, it purchased two thirds of foodstuffs abroad. Their cost is estimated at $2
bn to $4 billion. The embargo deprived the country of a considerable part of the food its
population needed. The resulting deficit could not be made for by rapidly growing food
smuggling from the neighbour countries, whose estimated yearly volume was $1 bn.
According to the FAO estimates, the harvest of cereals was just 2.5 million tons in 1994-
95, which was much less than in 1989-90 (3.5 million). The reasons were the partial
destruction of the irrigation systems, deepening deficit of fertilisers, herbicides,
pesticides, seed, and spares for agricultural equipment. The latter were mostly imported
items.(5)
The food rationing system, introduced by the government, ensured only 34% of
the required amount at fixed prices. Some 4 million people suffered from
undernourishment and lack of medical aid and medicines. According to international
organisations, the condition of the population of the central and southern regions,
including Marshlands, was especially grave. This was stated by a UN mission that visited
Iraq in July-August 1995.

The government’s economic course, side by side with the Iran–Iraq and Gulf
wars, played a decisive role in the worsening of the economic situation in Iraq on the
whole and its southern regions, populated by the Marsh Dwellers. It was characterised by
the following basic trends:
• The state’s dominant role strengthened in most of the spheres of the economy,
persisting in the 1980s and 1990s, despite the partial privatisation of state property,
which was limited and did not yield the expected results; the quite rigid bureaucratic
regulation of the state and cooperative sectors in agriculture was completely
preserved; the economy was managed in a centralised manner by administrative
methods;
• There is almost no foreign ownership or foreign private investments in the economy,
although the investment code was liberalised in the late 1980s to attract foreign
investors, first of all, from the Arab countries;
• The output of military branches was much higher than that of the civil industries. The
military sphere firmly occupied the first place in state budget financing; its total share
in Iraq’s import also was disproportionally high, some 40% of the total.
Naturally, owing to all these problems, the development of civil industries was
considerably underfinanced.
General adverse economic circumstances occurred in Iraq for the space of the
1980s to 1990s, made for the utterly grave crisis situation in the regions populated with
ethnic and religious minorities. It especially refers to Iraqi southern regions – natural
habitat of the Marsh Dwellers. By the start of this century, the crisis situation was not
overcome, despite the fact that the international sanctions had eased up. Experts note a
high level of risks for practically all sectors of investments remaining in the country,
especially for small, medium-sized and large businesses, of both local and foreign origin.
Such a situation restrained the initiative of prospective investors and entrepreneurs
practically in all branches of Iraqi economy, including those affecting, in one way or
another, the economic activity of the Marsh Dwellers in their natural habitat or in the
neighbouring regions. Thus, in the sphere of entrepreneurs and investors has developed a
motivational behaviour typical for depressive economy, in other words, a rent-seeking
behaviour, as opposed to the economic-expediency motivation. (6)
In order to overcome the crisis situation in the economy of Iraq and in the regions
of Marsh Dwellers, it is necessary to obviate all root causes that have resulted in the
development of a close to catastrophic situation. It concerns the problem of rehabilitation
of the Marsh Dwellers economy as well, which is possible only in the framework of
renewal of the Iraqi economy at large.
(2) THE ECONOMY OF THE MARSH DWELLERS
The main categories of economic activities of the Marsh Dwellers are fishery, hunting,
manufacturing of handicraft articles of cane, buffalo breeding, maintenance of small
domestic animals, and growing wheat, rice, and other crops in small and microscopic
plots for domestic consumption. According to experts’ assessments, the value of the
25

26
aggregate output of products and services in the late 80s and early 90s, amounted, by
Iraq’s relatively modest standards, to about $150–200 mn.
However, the significance of the economic activity of the Marsh Dwellers,
irrelevant of its proportions, reaches far beyond their homeland. It has, along with its
local significance, also a national, regional and even global importance. It is influenced
by the following interrelated geo-economic characteristics and circumstances:
• The traditional economy of the Marsh Dwellers (it concerns all of its main branches)
not only is the basis for subsistence of one or two million residents of the region, but,
over recent decades, was increasingly deeply integrated into the national economy of
southern provinces and Iraq as a whole – one of the world’s major oil producer and
exporter. This fact has increased its national, regional and global significance.
•
• The current pattern of economic activities in the Marshlands region is based on a
millennium-old eco-system and it was conducive to its preservation as well as to the
reproduction of national manpower and the unique agro-climatic and biological
resources of regional and global significance. The changing pattern of economic
activities in the last decade will have a profound impact not only on the state of
available resources but also on the effectiveness of the resource-utilization. It
concerns both the aforementioned resources and the huge deposits of oil and natural
gas in Iraqi southern provinces.
• The economic activity in the Marshlands exerts strong, or even decisive, influence on
the reproduction of abundant biological resources (above all, fish resources of the
Gulf countries) which is an important – non-alternative and analogous to nothing else
– component part of economic and recreational resources for other regions of the
world, above all, for certain regions of Central and South-West Asia.
The Iran–Iraq war, the Kuwaiti crisis, subsequent international sanctions, hostilities in the
region where the Marsh Dwellers lived, and some directions of the domestic economic
policy exerted a depressing influence on the marginal (natural and semi-natural) spheres
of the economy. There are all reasons to include all traditional kinds of economic activity
of the Marsh Dwellers and other ethnic entities of southern Iraq in this category.
According to international experts, the Iraqi authorities looked at the Shi‘ite
population of the southern regions, including the Marsh Dwellers, through the prism of
their relations with Shi‘ite Iran, i.e., considered them a socio-political and ethnic dissident
group connected with Iran and strove to strengthen the government’s control of this
group through economic measures, combined with shifting many Marshland Arabs to
other regions.(7)
On the one hand, some experts believe that this was the purpose of the large-scale
programmes of marsh drainage by building drainage systems, encouragement of the
migration of the rural population to cities, etc. On the other hand, this policy
corresponded also to the plans of industrialisation and development of military industry,
based mainly on labour-intensive technologies, and some other directions and purposes of
the economic policy.

An important element of these programmes was the construction of a large
irrigation system to the south of Baghdad, which comprised Lower Khalis, Diwaniyya-
Dalmaj, Ishaqi, Dujaila, and a sizeable part of Abu Ghraib. The ambitious Dujaila project
was aimed at increasing the region’s share in the national food production to 22 per cent.
Experts designed irrigation schemes for Kifl-Shifaniyya, East Garraf, Zubair, New
Rumaitha, Bastura, Saba Nisan, Greater Mussayyib, and Makhmur. The 565 km long
main outfall canal, completed in 1992, is known as the Third (handmade, artificial) River
Canal, next to the Tigris and Euphrates. It connects Mahmudiyya, to the south of
Baghdad, with Qurna, to the north of the port of Basra, and desalinates 1.5 million ha
large reclaimed land. The Fourth River Canal consists of a 120 km long canal and 140
km long Qadisiyya canal, which begins from the Euphrates. They were built to irrigate
375 thousand ha. Their construction began in 1993 (a new marsh drainage programme
was started in August 1992), after unrest in the southern provinces (1991) in the
condition of regular hostilities in the areas populated by the Marsh Dwellers. Irrigation of
large arable areas and the expected increase in the agricultural output were, undoubtedly,
among major arguments in favour of such large-scale projects. However, apart from the
political considerations, the most important economic argument is, probably, the prospect
of developing huge deposits of oil and gas. Experts estimate them as the largest in Iraq.
However, certain experts believe that agricultural reclamation, in the pattern that
was put into practice in the 1980s and 1990s, hardly would be effective, taking into
consideration the reality of recent decades in Iraq together with the agro-technological
characteristics of the proper projects and the world experience. According to their views,
the recent and current manipulation of water resources in relation to the Marshlands
cannot result in any form of sustainable development. To corroborate this estimation, the
researchers refer to a system of arguments and indices of the actual state of affairs: a drop
in production of various agricultural products in the 90s in the region of the Marsh
Dwellers, rapid salination of soil, reduction in fish catch, and so forth.(8.)
The experts point out a high risk of soil salination, probable low return against
considerable project expenses. On the whole, it is very difficult, if ever possible, to
envisage the consequences of such massive and all-round meddling with the unique agroclimatic
zone which was created by nature in the course of millennia.
However, despite all undoubted economic merits, the realisation of such projects
in a country seized by a humanitarian catastrophe, which is especially strong in the
Marshlands, strengthens the negative aspect of this programme, because marsh drainage
leads to the disappearance of the natural basis of the traditional forms of the indigenous
population’s economic activity. The concrete manifestations of this aspect were as
follows in the 1990s:
• growth of mass migration and emigration of the Marsh Dwellers, the total number of
migrants being not less than 200,000;
• partial pauperization of those who were unable to adapt themselves to the new
conditions;
• decay of the traditional spheres of production and handicrafts, noted by witnesses;
• loss by the Marsh Arabs, in the aftermath of environmental changes, of basic
industrial skills and know-how, accumulated by many generations under the impact
of annual and more protracted production cycles.(9)
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However, the damage inflicted on the life and economy of the Marsh Dwellers by the
hostilities of the 1990s was no less or even more. Application of artillery and aircraft,
poisonous gases, napalm, etc. led to not only the flight of the local population and its
emigration to Iran and other countries but to the cessation of normal economic activity,
unprecedented growth of the number of disabled persons, and casualties.
Apart from this, the hostilities of 1991 with the participation of international
forces led to the destruction of some dams and power plants, which supplied power to
irrigation facilities and pump stations. The irrigation and potable water supply systems of
southern Iraq were heavily damaged. This upset the whole life support system and was
among the reasons for the Marsh Dwellers’ mass migration.
By the late 1990s, the water supply systems were not completely restored, in spite
of financing of the respective measures by the government and donations of international
donors, such as the British Department for International Development ($3.2 mn).
One can judge the scope of the socio-economic problems of the Marsh Dwellers
from the following figures. The protracted Iran–Iraq war, international sanctions, and
other factors, which resulted in a deep economic crisis, affected Iraqi agriculture less than
other important branches of the national economy (industry, transport, power production)
but made a notable inhibitory influence on its development. Their disastrous consequence
were partly compensated by the realisation of the programmes of state support of
agricultural producers and development of agricultural production, which included such
traditional methods as supplies of fertilisers and chemicals, credits, expansion of irrigated
areas in the central and southern parts of Iraq, etc. As a result, the harvest of some
important crops approached the level of the late 1980s by the end of the century.
However, this trend can hardly be considered stable in the present conditions,
being mainly a result of favourable weather. For instance, in 1997, when rains were more
abundant than ever in the decade, the harvest of wheat was 1.1 mn tons, of rice 244,000
tons, of maize 121,000 tons against 1.2 mn tons wheat in 1990, 196,000 tons rice and
61,000 tons maize in 1987. The barley harvest (778,000 tons) also was fair though less
than in 1990 (1.8 mn tons). The harvest of vegetables, which are an important part of the
population’s diet, was 2.9 mn tons in 1997, which was close to the level of 1982-1983 (3
mn tons). However, in animal husbandry, an important sphere of agriculture, the
production level went down drastically: the meat, milk, and eggs production decreased by
almost 50% in comparison with 1990. The considerable recession of production of dates,
an important crop, grown in the south, including the regions populated by Marsh
Dwellers, delivered a severe blow on their life standard. The harvest of 1997 was 350,000
tons against 650,000 in 1987. Notably, dates are not only an export crop but an important
part of the nourishment of many Marsh Dwellers, combined with rice and fish.(10).
The realisation of the programmes of the expansion of irrigated areas, also
affected by the hostilities and economic crisis, did not weaken strong dependence of Iraqi
agriculture on major climatic fluctuations. The situation looks even more threatening, if
one takes into account the population growth in the 1990s.
Summing up the consequences of the changes that occurred in Iraq in the 1980s
and 1990s on the national level, one cannot but note their deep but controversial
influence on the life style end economic activities of the Marsh Dwellers. Some of them
led to a humanitarian catastrophe (mass migration and emigration, pauperisation,

epidemics, famine, disintegration of families, loss of homes, enhanced mortality among
local dwellers, etc.). Some others considerably limited or destroyed the basis of the
traditional occupations (fishery, hunting, trade, labour services, manufacturing of
handicraft articles of reed). At the same time these constituted economic prerequisites for
the expansion of the modern and semi-modern kinds of economic activity and the shift of
manpower to these sectors of the economy of the southern part of Iraq – i.e., industry,
cultivation of irrigated land, the informal urban economy, etc. However, the humanitarian
catastrophe in the region populated by Marsh Dwellers and their mass exodus to Iran and
other parts of Iraq eliminated most of their chances for benefiting from the results of the
economic development of the neighbouring parts of the region.
Agricultural production
Apart from development factors of this important sphere of the economy that are
common to all regions of Iraq, (the war with Iran, hostilities during the Kuwaiti crisis,
international sanctions, the unfavourable situation in the world fuel market in the 1980s
and 1990s) the implementation of the large-scale marsh drainage programmes had a
negative impact on agriculture.
Experts differ in evaluating the scope of the recent changes in the regions
populated by the Marsh Dwellers, but their estimates about the negative consequences of
these changes do not differ much. In the broad sense (including the adjacent territories),
marshes occupy a third of the area of the southern provinces of Iraq; the area of marshes
proper with marshy banks, periodically flooded areas of marshy land, and islands is close
to 6,000 sq. miles (above 30,000 sq. km).
The data cited in the report prepared by a group of international experts in the
framework of the research project AMAR (May 1994), point out that the total area of
lakes and marshes decreased from 1,942,000 ha (1984/1985) to 1,444,000 ha or more
than by 25% (to 74%). In the Central part of the region, populated by the Marsh Arabs,
the total area of permanent lakes and marshes has diminished during this relatively short
period to 25% from the previous level ‘because of the sudden loss of marshes in the
Qurnah region’.(11)
Some other data testify that the marshes, which have existed there for some
thousands of years, may disappear by 2010 if they are drained as intensely as now. By
1992, 57% of the area of lakes and marshes (15,000 sq. km) that existed in 1985 were
drained.(12) The data quoted by Shate Ali are close to this figure. (13) According to data
obtained by US satellites, a third of the marshes in Amara and along the Iranian border
(the Huwaiza marsh), i.e. about 10,000 sq. km, were drained in the early 1990s. Some
experts believe that the marshes may disappear by the mid-21st century – or even earlier,
by 2020.
According to estimates of various international organisations, including the UN
Human Rights Commission, the International Wildfowl and Wetlands Research Bureau,
and Middle East Watch that have been monitoring the Iraqi situation, by 1993, the Iraqi
government was able to prevent water from reaching two-thirds of the marshlands. The
flow of the Euphrates River has been almost entirely diverted to the Third River Canal,
bypassing most of the marshes. The flow of the Tigris River has been channelled into
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tributary rivers (with artificially high banks), prohibiting the tributary water from seeping
into marshlands. Without fresh water, the ecosystem will easily become damaged.
In economic terms, the effects are just as severe. The Marshlands region is home
to various crops (the staple crops of the region are rice, wheat, barley and maize), trees
and livestock. Date palms from the area have played an important part in Iraqi export, as
well as the woven reed mats and harvested cereals from the Ma’dan people. The loss of
reed thickets as a result of drainage undermined the production of reed, the main raw
material, used to build boats and houses, to weave mats, carpets, and food baskets, and to
fish. Reed has also been used to make beds, cots, and canoe poles. Crafting reed products
have helped sustain the Ma’dan and have given them the opportunity to barter with
people from surrounding countryside. The marshes are also home to cows, oxen, and
water buffalo.
Taking into account the scale of reduction of lakes and marshes, one can come to
conclusion that in the earlier half of the 90s, the acreage of reed has diminished roughly
by a quarter, or even a third, and by the close of the decade possibly by 50% or even
more. Such a considerable curtailment could not but cause a sharp drop in production of
traditional items of craftsmanship and in proceeds for their selling and exchange. When
the Tigris and Euphrates waters were diverted as a result of the realisation of large-scale
irrigation projects, this resulted in a decrease in the buffalo livestock. The wells dug by
the local dwellers in the drained area were salinated. The hunting and reed-growing areas
decreased. To be sure, due to the sizeable depopulation of the Marshlands, the drop in
proceeds of the Marsh Dwellers caused by reduction of reed acreage was not so acute.
However, there is no doubt that it took place.
In the former years, up to the 1990s, commerce has developed involving mostly
local trade, supported by the use of small boats for transportation. The recent scarcity of
water in the Marshlands has contributed to transport problems, which has all but put a
stop to economic movement and trade in the region. After lakes and marshes were
drained, instead of moving goods by boat the Ma’dan are often having to struggle
through hip-deep mud on foot. (14)
With the loss of valuable water, however, this way of life is quickly coming to an
end. The water-based rural economy of the Marsh Arabs is being exterminated. This is
one more factor contributing to the reduction of already diminished per capita income as
it is in the regions of the Marsh Dwellers’ homelands. In any case, the damage inflicted
on the marshes is extremely strong. It is clear from the scope of migration and
emigration, as well as transfers of the local population on the authorities’ orders in the
1990s.
As a result of the hostilities of the 1990s and drainage of sizeable areas, a third of
the Marshland inhabitants fled their homes in the early 1990s. According to the Iranian
government, in 1991 alone, 60,000 Shi‘ites emigrated there, and 17,000 went to Saudi
Arabia. After riots in Basra, thousands of Marsh Dwellers were shifted from the southern
provinces or confined to refugee camps. The government plans to continue shifting the
Marsh Dwellers for political reasons (many opponents of the regime took refuge in that
area) and because of the rich oil deposits found there. (15.)
Apart from hostilities and en masse exodus of the population, the decrease in the
cultivated area was an important reason of an abrupt recession of production of rice,
wheat, and barley, the most important crops. By various estimations, including opinion

polling among refugees from southern regions of Iraq, the decrease in harvest of field
crops in the regions of their traditional production, in the 80s, reached non less than 23 –
30%, and of some crops – 50%, which resulted in diminishing of per capita consumption
of cereals in the regions where the Marsh Dwellers reside. Some experts think that
agriculture has nothing to do with what is actually happening. Anyway, the production of
cereals and animal husbandry products and the reed harvest dropped by 30-50% or even
more by 1994.
These estimations testify to experts’ suppositions that the building of the drainage
system in the 90s will result in the drop of production of crops and livestock products due
to the decrease in the number of domestic animals and poultry in the region of the Marsh
Dwellers. (16) Moreover, the degradation of arable land that occurred in the mid-90s
continued in the following years, exerting a negative impact on the whole chain of local
fauna’s reproduction which caused damage to the entire economy of the region.
Fisheries
Marshlands are a very important factor in the reproduction of fish resources of Iraqi’s
southern regions (virtually all able-bodied permanent residents of the region were
engaged in fishery), the country at large and the Gulf countries as well. Fishery
traditionally is an important sector of the national economy for people living in the
region. The most of its population live in a harsh desert and semi-desert environment and
make up for a deficiency of some vital food ingredients by consuming wet fish and other
seafood.
In the 1980s, the volume of fish caught in Iraq started to fall. The reason for it
was Iran–Iraq hostilities that expanded upon the southern provinces of Iraq, whose sea
and river basins were main sources for fishing (about 60% of yearly catch). As early as
the mid-80s, in consequence of the decrease of fish catch, the per capita consumption of
fish dropped from 3.3 kg to 1.5 kg (from 1984 to 1986). (17). In the 1990s, this tendency
continued further because in the aftermath of the Iran–Iraq war other factors and
circumstances were added. Specifically, as a result of alteration of all drainage system in
Iraq’s Central and Southern regions owing to the building of irrigation canals, the amount
of nutritious substances for fish, that existed in the northern part of the Gulf and
communicated with Shatt al-Arab River, has diminished. As a result, an evident shrinking
of the livestock of fish shoals and a drop in fish catch were recorded not only in the
northern portion of the Gulf but practically in all countries of the region. The fact that in
certain years the catch was slightly higher, in particular in the years 1992 to 1995, did not
cast doubt on the general tendency of the 80s and 90s towards its decline.
According to the FAO, the fish catch in the Iraqi inland waters was characterised
in the 1990s by a downward trend. Whereas it was 13.200 tons in 1989 and 12.600 tons
in 1994, it went down to 9.900 tons in 1995 and 7.000 tons in 1996. (18). The fact that
the catch got almost halved within such a short period definitely reflects the serious
changes that occurred in the production basis of the branch in the 1990s. They are related
mainly to large-scale ameliorative works in the south of the country, which led to
drainage of vast areas, where the Marsh dwellers lived, and negative socio-economic
consequences of the wars and confrontation of the 1980s and 1990s, especially the mass
exodus of the local population.
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The scope of the recession is also characterised by a comparison with the catch of
the late 1970s and early 1980s, which in the Marshlands was only about 17,000 tons.
With regard for the increased food requirement, caused by the limitation of its import due
to international sanctions, the government drafted measures to stimulate the private sector
for creating fish-breeding farms in numerous lakes and basins. However, the effect of
these measures in the Marshlands was next to nothing because of great disturbances in
the traditional economic life of the Marsh Dwellers.
In some regions, including Amara and other southern provinces, the catch
drastically decreased because of the migration of the local population, numerous
casualties caused by the hostilities, and the loss of fishery devices and skills. Evidence
could be found in the annual reports of the UN Commission for Refugees that are
supplemented by numerous data of eye-witnesses – refugees of the 1990s from
Marshlands. Apparently, the negative impact on the future state of the branch, according
to the witnesses of refugees from the refugee camps located in Iran, will make the lack of
possibility for them to pursue their traditional trade, including fishery. The loss of skills
and habits of fishing would make for the most negative consequences not only to the rate
of their incomes but also to ensuring the provision of foodstuffs for fish, by experts’
estimations, is, perhaps, the most important item of food allowance for the Marsh Arabs.
Production of handicraft articles of reed
The drainage of 10,000-15,000 sq. km of marsh, which amounts to 30-50% of the
territory earlier occupied by the Marsh Dwellers, and other aforesaid factors led to a
curtailment or even full degradation and cessation of building and production of
handicraft articles of cane. The testimonies of the refugees, located in the camps in Iran,
corroborate the estimations about the steep decline of this production. The slump in
production of handicraft articles, such as boats, dwellings, wattled mats and baskets is
attributed to the consequences of protracted hostilities in the 1980s and 1990s in regions
populated by the Marsh Dwellers. The dire state of handicrafts is also caused by other
related factors: continuous tension in the region, partial (or total in some localities)
isolation of the area and loss of traditional water routes used for internal and cross border
trade. The deterioration of craftsmen’s living standards, general insecurity and widely
spread tendency for emigration also resulted in a decline in production. The general
curtailment of the lakes and Marshes area and consequent 50% shrinkage of the reed
acreage, as well as a high rate of migration and emigration of the principal producers of
reed articles, augmented difficulties in transportation and selling of the reed handicrafts,
plus other negative factors. One may assume that the drop in production of this traditional
branch was halved in the 90s. Eyewitness evidence suggests that this decline in
production amounted to between 30 and 80 percent, depending on locality.
The socio-economic consequences of the degradation of the branch that was one
of the main kinds of economic activity in the 1970s can be seen not only in the reduction
or even cessation of production but in loss of professional skills by the tens of thousands
of Marsh Dwellers living in refugee camps (mainly in Iran) or far from their homes.

The living standards of Marsh Dwellers
The quality of life of Marsh Dwellers has deteriorated continuously and considerably in
the last two decades, especially in the 1990s, when hostilities were launched and
amelioration programmes were realised in the lake area. This manifested itself in lower
incomes, poorer quality of nourishment and medical aid, degradation of the environment,
aggravation of the deficit of potable water, etc. Witnesses note that this situation makes
the Marsh Arabs think about emigration to Iran, which makes a depressive impact on
whole life, including economic activity. In its turn, this adversely affects living standards.
Trying to describe the Marsh Dwellers’ condition in the 1990s, observers note that, on the
whole, the UN sanctions deteriorated the Iraqi quality of life, but an additional burden
was imposed by the authorities on the regions inhabited by ethnic minorities, including
the southern regions.
The hyperinflation of the 1990s depreciated poorer Iraqis’ fixed incomes.
Whereas the GDP decreased more than three times and prices went up and up in the early
1990s, the state employees’ purchase capacity decreased abruptly. This was especially
painful for the poorest strata. In the first half of 1993, flour prices were 500 times higher
than in mid-1990. The estimated ratio between the average urban wage and the average
market price of a typical family’s food requirements widened from about 1:3 to 1:9
between April and July 1993. Following increases in January and April 1993, the
monthly ration of state-subsidised foodstuffs comprised 9 kg of flour, 2.25 kg of rice,
1.75 kg of cooking oil, and 1.5 kg of sugar. (19)
In the 1990s, the government rationing system satisfied just 34% of the
population’s food requirement (at fixed prices). It was next to impossible to buy food at
market prices for people whose incomes kept falling. The realisation of the UN ‘Oil for
Food and Medicines’ programme somewhat improved the situation but did not
completely solve the problem of ensuring the minimum nutrition level for millions of
Iraqis. Other indicators of people’s living standards also deteriorated abruptly.
The poorest strata, including most of the Marsh Dwellers, suffered more than
anybody else. The rise in food and drug prices, combined with restrictions on the import
of these articles, deprived them of access to important food items, home utensils, and
even basic forms of medical care.
Taking into account such factors as the annual value of production (estimated at
$100 million) manufactured in the early 1990s by the Marsh Arabs (350,000) who were
engaged in the traditional sector of the economy (agriculture, building of reed boats and
houses, handicraft items, baskets), as well as the proportion of migration/emigration and
the economic damage caused to the Marshlands region in the 1990s, one may estimate
that the annual income per capita of each Marsh dweller was similar to that of the world’s
poorest; $200 – $300, or less than one dollar per day.
Refugees, among whom there were many children, lived in an especially
catastrophic condition. A witness who visited the Shate Ali camp (Iran) in 1995 reported
that a large number of children were barefooted and insufficiently clothed to protect them
from bone-chilling night temperatures. They slept within three metres of the all-pervasive
surrounding water. In mid-January 1995, there was a severe shortage of heating and
cooking fuel. At the beginning of the new year an international organization was able to
supply the refugees with blankets and plastic tarpaulins to cover their reed dwellings.
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Concerning sanitation, there was no safe washing or toilet facilities. The inhabitants
drank from, washed in, and defecated into the same water source. Human pollution was
simply a dangerous fact of life in the camp. In the first month after the refugees’ arrival,
means of transportation of potable water to the refugee camps were in a great shortage.
These and other facts testify that living conditions on the marshes in winter were
about as grim as it was possible, and with the coming of the warm weather the place was
going to be swarming with mosquitoes and flies, adding to the gravity of the already
extremely hazardous health conditions. Some NGOs supplied some food items, clothes,
and shoes on an irregular basis. The Iranian authorities also provided foodstuffs. Some
refugees were able to catch fish from the marshes and draw water from its deeper
reaches, which was less contaminated than that at the water’s edge. With very few boats
available, however, the fishermen were the fortunate few.
Some basic medicines were available in a makeshift reed dispensary. There was a
doctor among the refugees, and other doctors made visits on an ad hoc basis. But it was
obviously insufficient. All groups of refugees were facing serious difficulties in receiving
adequate medical attention, as well as transport, bureaucratic, and political problems.
(20).
The condition of these refugees and their living standard bear a clear imprint of
the extremely difficult situation in Iran itself. There are over 4 mn refugees there. The
Islamic Republic of Iran has become one of the largest refugee asylums in the world and
is already unable to cope with their inflow.
(3) THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON THE
MARSH ARAB ECONOMY
The expansion of urban population and urban economy in Iraq, including its southern
provinces, had an increasing influence upon economic activities of the Marsh Arabs and
their way of life. (21) This influence has especially increased after the oil ‘price
revolution’ in the mid-1970s and the subsequent economic boom in Iraq. It had the
following economic and social consequences:
• It has accelerated the Marsh Dwellers’ migration to cities and townships of the central
and southern Iraq in search of a permanent employment and residence.
• Links between the Marsh Dwellers’ traditional economy and the economy of
neighbouring provinces have become stronger. This has led to the expansion of trade
between them, increasing the production of basic commodities of the Marshlands’
traditional economy, augmenting the Marsh Dwellers’ system of seasonal work or
temporary employment. However, this practice was interrupted by military operations
in the Marshland region.
The migration from the Marshlands’ villages in the 1990s has also risen due to the
military operations in the region, the drainage of marshes and lakes and the salination of
soil, all of which represent push factors. According to the available assessments at the
start of the twenty-first century in the Marshlands’ rural area there were only 10% to 15%

of all Marsh Dwellers. The majority of them already lived in big cities as well as in a
great number of townships on the banks of the remaining lakes. (22)
The contradictory tendencies in the Marsh Dwellers’ economic life in the last
quarter of the 20th century notwithstanding, they proved to be more integrated than
before into various lines of economic activity in the Marshlands’ neighbouring regions,
and above all, into the trade, agricultural industry, many kinds of services, and
transportation. This was demonstrated by the high proportion of the Marsh Dweller
population moving to live in urban areas. (23) However the integration process of the
region’s population into the country’s economic activity was distorted due to the
aforementioned negative factors.
Before the war with Iran, the economy of the southern provinces, as well as of the
country as a whole, received quite a strong impetus to its development when oil export
proceeds increased almost four times after the dramatic rise in world oil prices in 1973-
1974. This manifested itself, first of all, in an intense increase in oil production capacities
in the oil producing regions, including southern provinces with large oilfields (mainly in
the south along the Iranian border). The result was accelerated development of the
industrial and transport infrastructure. Many manufacturing industry enterprises were
built in that period. A boom was observed in investing money into agriculture and largescale
irrigation projects. This ‘explosive development’ changed the entire economic
space of the country. Its main characteristic features were rapid growth of the modern
sector and modernisation of traditional activities, rapid urbanization and a powerful wave
of labour migration from the countryside to the urban economy. Hand in hand with the
partial modernisation of the traditional activities which dominated economic activity of
the Marsh Dwellers, i.e., agriculture, handicraft production, fisheries and hunting, they
were subject to a partial erosion as a result of the competition from the modern, mainly
urban activities and partial transformation and even destruction of the existing ecosystem,
which very closely related to the traditional activities.
The modern kinds of activity and their derivatives, symbiosis-based kinds (a
mixture of traditional and modern elements) replaced the traditional ones as the main
sources of life support for some Marsh Dwellers as early as the late 1970s. In the setting
of relatively rapid economic development and realisation of large-scale state
programmes, the traditional kinds of activity were ousted by travel for seasonal work,
which became a widespread practice. Substantial masses of the population, including
Marsh Dwellers, migrated from the countryside to the cities of southern Iraq, such as
Basra, Khor az-Zubair, Qurna, and Amara seeking additional earnings. The semi-modern
and modern types of economic activity and the informal sector of the urban economy
gradually became their main source of employment and in some cases enabled them to
support their families. These factors led to a ‘breakage’ of the entire old structure of
economic activity of a part of Marsh Dwellers. However, it may be assumed that this
process started on a limited scale even before the 1980s and 1990s, when the economic
connections between Marshlands and neighbouring regions, which were unstable even
before, in the 1990s were broken.
Although the destruction of various production facilities in southern Iraq or
suspension of their functioning as a result of hostilities and cessation of water and power
supply were disastrous, some experts believe that normal functioning of the economy of
the region can be resumed within just one or two years. This applies also for the oil
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fields. Very rapid restoration of some production and infrastructure facilities in the recent
period seems to confirm this opinion and the pace of the restoration of the prewar oil
production level also testifies to this.
However, there is another opinion, based on a more conservative estimate of the
possibilities of the nation’s economy and social services. Some experts take into
consideration not only the high tempos of restoration of certain economic and social
objects, but also the considerable proportion of restoration programmes, which would
require both a long time and very substantial resources, which are not easily obtainable.
First, the UN Security Council has imposed on Iraq the obligation to pay off reparations
as a top priority. Second, Iraq has to pay off a huge foreign debt. Besides, the experts
point out the lack of a favourable investment climate in the country that, in many
respects, mirrors the political situation in Iraq, which fetters the initiative of private
investors and limits the potential inflow of the foreign capital.
Only the oil and gas sector is an exception. It has a real chance for a relatively
quick restoration, by virtue of ensuring a speedy capital recovery and a considerable
profit. This attracts foreign investors to the sphere of hydrocarbon extraction, which
include the southern Iraq oil-field regions, located in the area of Marsh Arabs and around
them. By 2000, about 30 foreign companies have already had negotiations concerning the
investment in the Iraqi oil sector after the sanctions are abolished. The volume of
prospective investments amounts to $21 billion, which would enable Iraq to augment its
oil production to 6 billion barrels per day. It is approximately twice as much as was
produced in the period before the international sanctions were imposed. (24)
Most of the Iraqi oil fields, which are supposed to boost the country’s economy,
including those of southern Iraq after the sanctions are lifted, are concentrated in the
south. Of the 33 country’s major oil fields in the southern provinces 19 are located with
the majority Marsh Dweller populations in their vicinity, including 4 giant oil fields
(Halfaya, Bin Umr, Majnun, West Qurna). According to the data from the Iraqi Oil
Ministry, their industrial potential amounted, by the year 2000, amounted to some 3.9
billion barrels per day of the aggregate volume of 4.65 billion barrels per day or about
84% of all oil-producing capacity of Iraq.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the capacity of Iraq’s oil refineries totaled some
550,000 barrels per day or nearly 20% of all oil produced in the country. Of that, only
30% of processing capacities were concentrated in the south of the country, in Basra and
Nasiriyya provinces. (25) Bearing in mind the relatively low share of the petroleum
refining capacities in comparison with the majority of other countries who are
hydrocarbon producers, one may assume that after the abolition of sanctions the building
of petroleum refineries, mainly in the region of oil production – in the country’s southern
provinces, will be on a substantial scale. The rise of oil production in the southern
provinces, construction of petroleum refining capacities, corresponding infrastructure and
auxiliary processes, as well as non-manufacturing businesses can dramatically change the
economy shape of the region.
Thus, the restoration and development of energy resources in substantial
proportions, for the most part, will be centred near or just in the area of the Marsh
Dwellers’ place of abode and, doubtless, will exert a substantial impact on all their
economic activities and way of life. It very likely that it will intensify the tendencies that

were seen during the period of the rapid growth of towns and the urban economy,
especially after the oil boom of the mid-1970s. These features included:
• the high level of labour migration;
• the gradual transformation and modernisation of the Marsh Dwellers’ traditional
economy and its partial amalgamation with semi-modern and modern kinds of
economic activities;
• degradation of a certain part of traditional economic units caused by the pollution of
the environment and the partial destruction of the former ecosystem.
Nevertheless, the adaptation of the Marsh Dwellers’ economic life to the possible
changes will be complicated by a number of circumstances, including the mass migration
in the previous period and the difficulty of the environmental rehabilitation of the
Marshlands.
Rehabilitation of Marshlands
The comprehensive impact on Iraqi economy and society of the process of rehabilitation
and normalisation of the national economy in the region of Marshlands arises from its
special geo-economic location (the concentration of many prospective deposits of
hydrocarbons, intersection of transport communications, and close links with the
country’s central provinces). The optimum alternative for the Marshlands’ economic
rehabilitation is the integration of its sectors, for some of them turned out to be in the
inner contradictory connections. The key questions of the rehabilitation of this region are
the refugees’ willingness and readiness to return home and the compatibility of Iraq’s
large-scale irrigation projects, firstly, with the restoration (probably, in an improved
version) of the earlier ecosystem as it existed before the catastrophic destruction of the
1990s, and, secondly, with the operation of the hydrocarbon deposits in southern Iraq.
If the necessary complex of measures to protect the natural habitat is
implemented, the extraction of oil and gas resources in the regions of Marsh Dwellers’
homelands can certainly be combined both with the process of rehabilitation of the
damage of the 1990s to the natural environment and with the land-improvement and
irrigation works on a reasonable scale, determined by experts. Despite the huge external
debt, the local authorities can surely obtain the necessary funds from the exploitation of
the enormous oil deposits.
In addition the proper control over the process of soil salination on the surface of
about 1.5 million hectare in the Lower Mesopotamian Plain would help to raise the
agricultural production in one of the most fertile provinces of Iraq by 50%. (26) Among
other important components of the rehabilitation processes that are worth mentioning is
the modernisation of the basic sectors of traditional Marshlands economy, which would
allow not only the restoration of production, but also possibly a rise in output of the main
produce, traditional for the Marsh Dwellers. This would make the Marshlands a more
integrated part of the Iraqi economy.
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Nevertheless, it must be said in this connection that under conditions of a sharp
aggravation of food deficit and other products of agriculture in the 1990s, new strong
incentives, such as high prices for foodstuff and other products, could help further
development of the most sectors of the Marsh Dwellers’ traditional economy and, above
all, agriculture.
The realisation of optimal models of rehabilitation and development of traditional
and modern production located in the provinces adjacent to lakes and marshes of
southern Iraq should result in the following outcomes:
• It could exert a positive impact on the Marsh Dwellers’ economic activity – leading to
the growth of economic production in the Marshlands region and, as a result, to the
improvement of the living standards of the indigenous population. This will
encourage people (especially the young) to settle down permanently on their native
land.
• It could create the foundation for the concordant, balanced development for various
regions of the country, above all, for its southern and central provinces.
• It could make it possible to expand the export sectors of industries (foodstuffs,
including fish and sea-food, dates, etc.), as well as handicraft and manufactured goods
(wicker mattresses and baskets, paper and cellulose) and services (tourism). It could
also promote the frontier trade with the adjacent states, which are interested in trade
and economic cooperation with Iraq and in establishing good neighbourly relations;
• Restoration of the Marshlands’ fish population, water-buffalo stock, various kind of
game and fowl in their natural habitat.
• Modernisation of fisheries and other lines of business would enable increases in fish
catches and livestock production. It will also substantially promote the solution of the
country’s food supply problem, increase consumption of proteins of animal
extraction, which has no substitute in the rations, will alleviate the dependence of Iraq
on food imports.
• The normalisation of the Marshlands’ economic activity will appreciably promote the
inflow of foreign investments, modern technologies and the advanced managerial
experience necessary for renovation and modernisation of the Iraqi economy. It will
contribute to the diversification of links with the world economy and swift adjustment
to the modern tendencies in its development.
In sum, the realisation of the aforementioned possibilities will give an impetus for the
restoration of the whole Iraqi economy. The promising model of restoration of the
Marshlands economy, intended to assume its concordant interrelation with the economy
of the whole of Iraq, comprises the following trends, methods, and mechanism of
attainment of its basic objectives.

Trends of economic rehabilitation: the way forward
• Restoration of the immediate environment, which is an indispensable, constantly
renewable, industrial basis for all sectors of traditional and, to some extent, modern
economic activities. An important feature of the optimal model of the Marshlands’
economic rehabilitation should be the coordination of this process with programmes
for the industrial rehabilitation and development of Southern Iraq, as well as with the
development of the system of irrigation and land-improvement in the region;
• Aid to the development of the Marshlands’ traditional economy during the period of
rehabilitation by widening their access to the required financial resources, modern
building materials, instruments of labour and operational materials – implements of
agriculture, fishing-tackle, hunting gear, transport facilities and means for boat
production as a main means of transportation.
• Realisation of measures for the recreation of salinated soils and putting them into
cultivation of crops.
• Development of modern types and forms of economic activities in the Marsh
Dwellers’ lands and adjacent regions, such as handicrafts, including those for export
purposes, trade, modern fishery practice, hunting, tourism, high-tech services, and
vocational education.
Methods of rehabilitation and restoration of economic activities
Achieved by:
• transformation of drainage and irrigation systems in such a way as to have restored
the main part of lakes and marshes. Restoration of the former natural system of
drainage and water circulation;
• setting up of a group of experts to conduct comprehensive environmental research,
and economic activities, which would include both Iraqi and foreign experts;
• realisation of concrete programmes of funding and promotion of various types of
economic activities in the sphere of traditional and modern economy in the
Marshlands and adjacent southern Iraqi regions;
• realisation of the agricultural cultivation aimed at rehabilitation of soil salinity.
Mechanisms for the rehabilitation of the Marshlands economy
Some possible mechanisms include:
• the establishment of a supervisory council of experts involving all interested parties,
including Iraq, to combine all actions and measures necessary to achieve the main
objective – the rehabilitation of the Marshlands including its economy;
• the establishment of a national management body for the integrated management of
the drainage basin.
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NOTES
1. Middle East Economic Digest. Vol.41, no.3, 1997, p.17.
2. W.B.Fisher. Iraq, The Middle East and North Africa. London, 2000, p.578; Isam al
Khafaji. Not Quite an Arab Prussia: Revisiting Some Myths on Iraqi Exceptionalism. The
Future of Iraq. Gulf/2000 Project, Colombia University and The Centre for World
Dialogue. Cyprus 15-17 July 2000.
3. World Bank. Summary Tables Severely Indebted Middle-Income Countries. Global
Development Finance. 1997. Vol.1, pp.206/7; Haris Gazdar, The Economy under
Sanctions, Ahmed M. Jiyad. Iraq Indebtedness: From Liquidity to Unsustainability –
International Conference in Collaboration with the Iraqi Economic Forum on Frustrated
Development: The Iraqi Economy in War and Peace. 9-11 July 1997. University of
Exeter. Centre for Arab Gulf Studies; Walid Khadduri. UN Sanctions in Iraq: 10 Years
Later. – The Future of Iraq. Gulf/2000 Project, Columbia University.
4. Argus. Oil Panorama Review of World Oil Business. Moscow, issue 3, no.8.
18.4.2000.
5. FAO. Production Yearbook. Rome. 1995/9; Mahmood Ahmed. Agricultural Policies
under the Current Embargo Period. – International Conference in Collaboration with the
Iraqi Economic Forum on Frustrated Development.
6. Kamil Mahdi. Rehabilitation Prospects for Iraqi Economy. Centre for Arab Gulf
Studies. University of Exeter. June 1998; Iraq Economy 2000. www.cybergates.net.; Iraq:
Down but not out. – The Economist. 335/7909. April 8, 1995.
7. Fisher. Iraq ..., p.581; A.Alnasrawi. The Economy of Iraq: Oil, Wars, Destruction of
Development and Prospects. 1950 – 2010. West port, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994.
8. A. North. Iraq. – The Middle East. June 1994, p.34; An Environmental and Ecological
Study of the Marshlands of Mesopotamia. The AMAR Appeal. Assisting Marsh Arabs
and Refugees. 1994. Coord. and ed. by Edward Maltby.
9. Internet. UN High Commission for Refugees.
10. Fisher. Iraq ..., p.579; FAO. Production Yearbook. Rome. 1995/9.
11. An Environmental and Ecological Study of the Marshlands ..., p.16.
12. Kompas. Moscow, no.195, 30.2.1993.
13. Shate Ali. ‘A Patch of Marsh Unprepared for Massive Refugee Influx’ – Iran News.
02.19.1995; U.S. Department of State. Iraq Country Report on Human Rights Practice for
1998. Released by Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, February 26, 1999

14. Project Ploughshares. Armed conflicts. Report 2000. Iraq – Shia Muslims. Institute of
Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrade Grebel College, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada =B921
306; TED. Case Studies. Marsh Arabs. http://www.american.edu/ted/MARSH.HTM
15. Arab Oil and Gas Directory. 1999. Arab Petroleum Research Center. Paris, 1999,
p.162; Fadhil Chalabi. Post-War Iraq’s Oil Capacity: Present Situation and Future
Prospects. – International Conference in Collaboration with the Iraqi Economic Forum on
Frustrated Development: The Iraqi Economy in War and Peace. 9-11 July 1997.
University of Exeter. Centre for Arab Gulf Studies.
16. An Environmental and Ecological Study of the Marshland..., p.25.
17. An Environmental and Ecological Study ..., pp.83 – 84.
18. FAO. Yearbook of Fishery Statistics. Rome. 1993 – 2000.
19. Fisher. Iraq ..., p.518.
20.Shate Ali ..., Iran News. 02.19.1995.
21.Wilfred Thesiger. The Marsh Arabs. Penguin, Harmondsworth. 1967; Ja‘far Hayat.
The Iraqi Village. 1950. (Arab lang.); An Environmental and Ecological Study ..., p.8.
22. Mohammed Ali. Report at the Conference held by the AMAR International
Charitable Foundation, London 20 November 2000.
23. An Environmental and Ecological Study..., p.8.
24. Arab Oil and Gas Directory.1999 ..., p.154; Tariq Al-Khudayri. The Manufacturing
Industry of Iraq. Status and Future Prospects, Abdul Munim Al-Sayyid Ali. The Iraqi
Economy: Where to? Reflections and Prospects. -International Conference in
Collaboration with the Iraqi Economic Forum on Frustrated Development ... .=20
25. Arab Oil and Gas Directory. 1999 ..., pp. 162/8; Arab Oil and Gas. Arab Petroleum
Research Center. Vol. XX1X. 2000; Fadhil J. Chalabi. Iraq and the Future of World Oil.
– The Future of Iraq. Gulf/2000 Project, Columbia University.
26. An Environmental and Ecological Study ..., p.28.
41

3
Assault on the Marshlands
Christopher Mitchell
I
Saddam Hussein’s plans for the Marsh Dwellers of southern Iraq first appear among the
millions of secret police documents found when Kurdish fighters liberated the north of
the country in the uprising of March 1991. The rebellion caught officials of the Ba‘th
Party and the security services so much by surprise that they had no time to destroy their
files, which were found by the Kurds when they took over the hated secret police offices.
Two towns provided major hauls of records: Sulamaniyya, an administrative centre, and
Shaqlawa, in eastern Kurdistan, where the Kurds discovered an apparently complete set
of secret police documents. 1
Some months later the Kurds tried to give the cache of papers to the newly
appointed UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Iraq, Max van der Stoel. But the
scandalously under-resourced van der Stoel had no one to translate the documents from
Arabic, and nowhere even to store them. So the Kurds handed the files over to the United
States, and 40 cubic metres of documents were taken by the American military to
Washington. With the addition of further papers from Kurdistan, they came to fill 1,842
cardboard boxes: 10 million pages of official Iraqi documents, recording with
bureaucratic thoroughness the brutal mechanics of Baghdad’s rule. 2
Naturally, most of the documents relate to operations in the Kurdish region, but
there is a remarkable exception. Among the pages found in Shaqlawa is a confidential
letter to the local Security Director, from his counterpart in the Governorate of Arbil. The
letter is dated 30 January 1989, and its subject is a ‘Plan of Action for the Marshes’. The
officer in Arbil is informing his colleague about security issues in the south of the
country. It is now five months since the war with Iran ended, and ‘large-scale operations’
have been implemented against ‘deserter and hostile elements’. However, some of these
elements ‘are still engaging in subversive activity, using the Marsh areas as launch pads
for their operations’. The letter from Arbil refers to a security conference held in the
southern city of Basra the previous month, December 1988. The conference, attended by
the ‘Supreme Commander’, discussed what to do about the ‘hostile presence’ in the
marshlands, and after reviewing enemy activities it set forth details of a plan to deal with
the problem. According to the account given in the letter, this plan had been adopted in
1987 and approved by the President. Among its ingredients are ‘poisoning, explosions
and the burning of houses’, assassinations of ‘hostile elements’, the use of ‘helicopters,
supported by military aircraft’, a range of economic measures, such as blockade and ‘a

an on the sale of fish’, and ‘the possibility of regrouping the Marsh villages on dry land
(which is easy to control)’. 3
In this letter, four years before it was carried out, is the blueprint for the Iraqi
government’s campaign against the Marsh Arabs.
II
The documents found in Kurdistan suggest in their quantity and detail that security
operations in the southern marshlands may have been recorded with similar
thoroughness. As yet, very few official documents have come to light that refer to
government policy in the south. Neither has it been easy for researchers to obtain firsthand
information about conditions in the region. In January 1992, early in his career as
UN Special Rapporteur, Max van der Stoel paid a visit to Iraq. The tour lasted less than a
week, and the holy cities of Najaf and Kerbala were the closest he got to the marshes.
Still, such was the force of the report he produced (which included much about the
campaign against the Kurds in the 1980s) that the Government of Iraq has never since
given permission for a repeat visit. Van der Stoel’s reports on Iraq, issued from 1992 to
1999, while constituting the most important record of the abuses perpetrated against the
Iraqi people, are necessarily dependent on the testimonies of refugees and exiles, and
other sources such as amateur video recordings, photographs and information from the
Iraqi opposition. 4
Reports in the foreign media were fragmentary and intermittent between 1991 and
1994, since when they have virtually disappeared. Direct access to the marshes is difficult
and dangerous. Official Iraqi information about the region is almost non-existent. Iraqi
opposition sources, too easily disregarded, must still be treated with caution. Bearing all
this in mind, one hesitates to attempt any narrative account of the marsh-dwellers’ recent
experience. Yet the deliberate destruction of an ecosystem and a people is a phenomenon
of such horrific magnitude and human importance that even a premature and necessarily
incomplete account may have some value.
III
The Marshlands of southern Iraq, lying between and beside the lower reaches of the
Tigris and Euphrates, are the region where, in all probability, mankind first learnt to
control the flow of rivers. By means of an elaborate network of dams and irrigation
canals the ancient Sumerians (from whom the modern Marsh Dwellers are partly
descended) managed to protect themselves from the annual flooding of the rivers.
Before the drainage operations of the last 10 years, the marshes extended over an
area of 17,000-20,000 square kilometres (almost the size of Wales) and made up the
Middle East’s largest wetland ecosystem. Historically, physical inaccessibility has
conferred relative protection on the region’s Shi‘a inhabitants, but in recent years the
Marsh Arabs have been disadvantaged twice over, as a minority within the Shi‘a majority
of Iraq, itself oppressed by the Sunni-dominated regime in Baghdad
How many people have been living in the marshes? There is no reliable census
information, and estimates vary widely. The one detailed anthropological study of the
Marsh Dwellers, based on fieldwork carried out during the 1950s, suggested a total of
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400,000, of which the cultivators (of rice, millet, wheat and barley) made up by far the
majority of 350,000. Reed-gatherers and buffalo-breeders were estimated at about 25,000
each. 5
By 1990, many of the Marsh Arabs had already left for the cities or had been
killed during the war with Iran. The numbers of indigenous inhabitants commonly cited
for that year are around 250,000–300,000, figures which should possibly be doubled to
allow for the influx of refugees and rebels during the war. By 1993 (according to a report
by the Minority Rights Group) there were only 50,000 Marsh Dwellers left, together with
10,000-20,000 rebels. 6
Traditionally the marshland economy was based on cereal cultivation, buffaloherding,
the making and selling of reed matting, and subsistence fishing. Archaeology
suggests a remarkable continuity in many aspects of the Marsh Dwellers’ way of life;
until very recently, and for four or five millennia, they have been dependent on the reed
beds for fuel, buffalo-fodder, and raw materials for building their characteristic arched
mudif guest houses. 7
Temperatures in July can reach 50 degrees centigrade and the reed beds would
quickly disappear without a regular flow of water. The marshland lake systems and the
lower Euphrates and Tigris are replenished by winter rainfall upstream, mostly in Turkey.
Over the last fifty years the hydrology of the two rivers has been subjected to intensifying
change. While Baghdad’s drainage operations have had the most immediate impact on
the marshlands, the rivers have also been affected by Iraq’s water control schemes further
upstream, as well as those in Syria and Turkey. Of the latter, the Southeast Anatolia
Water Project (known as GAP, from its Turkish initials) is by far the most important. The
Ataturk Dam, giant centrepiece of GAP, has already demonstrated the significant effect it
can have on water-levels throughout the length of the Euphrates. Without a detailed
hydrological assessment, however, it is impossible accurately to distinguish the relative
impacts of the multiple dams along the two rivers from the hydraulic works specifically
aimed at the marshes. That said, of course, Baghdad’s specific policy has been the
deliberate drying-out of the marshes.
IV
Until this century, the character of the marshes remained effectively unchanged by
human activity. Iraq became an independent state in 1932 but remained substantially
under the tutelage of the British until the revolution of 1958. The first major scheme for
the draining the marshes, to be achieved by means of a huge new canal complex, was the
work of British engineers working for the Iraqi government. Studies of the marsh region
showed that the water table was close to the surface, and evaporation caused by the arid
climate led to high salinity in the soil. A solution was proposed in Control of the Rivers of
Iraq, a report by Frank Haigh, published by the Iraqi Irrigation Development
Commission in 1951. The Haigh report described a set of canals, embankments and
sluices on the lower Tigris and Euphrates, which would be used to divert salty and
polluted water away from the irrigated area between the two rivers, thereby desalinating
the land and making it cultivable. The major component in this scheme to drain the
marshes would be a huge drainage canal, the so-called Third River, running between the
other two waterways. Haigh also proposed a plan that would reclaim the marshes for

agriculture by harnessing the flow of the Tigris for irrigation, rather than letting it seep
away into the marshes where, in his view, it was wasted. He proposed concentrating the
Tigris waters into embanked channels, with one large canal to be built through the central
Amara marsh. 8
Many of the components of this water diversion project proposed by British
engineers half a century ago are remarkably similar to those implemented by the Iraqi
regime over the last decade – except that, rather than being intended for primarily
agricultural purposes, they are aimed at destroying the Marsh Dwellers’ environment.
In 1953, under the supervision of British engineers, construction work began on
the Third River (later known variously as the Leader River, Saddam River, or Main
Outfall Drain). Progress was sporadic and the canal was not completed until almost 40
years later. More work was done in the 1960s, including a section of about 20 kilometres
at Dalmaj which was designed and built by the British company Murdoch MacDonald
(now Mott MacDonald). There was at that time no intention to drain the marshes,
according to one of the engineers, who later said, ‘I’ve heard some wild stories. But our
work was concerned with draining saline water from farm land’. 9
The project was relaunched in 1973 as the answer to Iraq’s estimated annual loss
by salination of 17,500 hectares of agricultural land. The remainder was constructed in
three main stages. ‘The first phase [including that partly built by the British] runs from
Musayyib, west of Baghdad, approximately 170km to the marshes at Khor al Dalmaj, and
was supervised by the Dutch consultants NEDECO. The middle section takes the canal a
further 187km to near al-Nasiriyya, and was built with assistance from Russia’s
Selkhozpromexport. This section connects with the 261km long Euphrates East Drain
which was completed with assistance from Nespak of Pakistan in the late 1980s. The
final phase takes the canal under the Euphrates as an inverted siphon and out to the Shatt
al-Basra and into the Gulf, a further distance of 172km…the whole project was officially
inaugurated in December 1992. 10
By 1984, completed sections of the canal were having an impact on the marshes.
Drainage and reclamation had already started in the south-eastern parts of the Central (or
Amara) marshes, between the Tigris and Euphrates, though ‘the reclaimed area was still
relatively small by this date, comprising 93,000 hectares’. 11 In 1985, south of the rivers’
confluence at Qurna, in the Hammar marshes, a tract was drained to exploit the oilfield
there. 12 It is likely that the whole Third River scheme would have been finished in the
1980s, had the Iran–Iraq war not wrought such havoc on the Iraqi economy. The
Marshlands’ strategic location along Iraq’s southern border with Iran brought the Iraqi
military abruptly into the lives of the Marsh Dwellers, and the eastern part of the region,
repeatedly invaded by Iran, became a theatre of war. It is ironic, in the light of what came
later, that Iraq could never have survived without the loyalty of those Marsh Dwellers
and other Shi‘a who fought in the Iraqi army.
If the war slowed work on the Third River, it stimulated the introduction of other
schemes such as a defensive ‘moat’, built parallel to the Tigris, which would later be
developed as part of the project to drain the marshes. Iraq also built causeways through
the marshes, to enable armoured units to move around more easily, which by 1991 were
actually causing drying-up in the east of the region.
Despite the various incursions made by Baghdad during the war, the marshes
remained largely inaccessible, though highly sensitive because of their proximity to Iran.
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By August 1988, when the fighting ended, many deserters from the Iraqi army had taken
sanctuary amid the maze of lakes, narrow waterways, protective beds of tall reeds, and
small villages that could only be reached by boat. This was the context of the ‘Plan of
Action for the Marshes’. Iranian attacks on the Shatt al-Arab had given Baghdad another
incentive to resume work on the Third River, since the new waterway could also be seen
as offering a secure route further south for ships coming from the Gulf to Iraq’s inland
ports. 13 But the deliberate drying of the marshes to drive out the rebels is the opposite of
the tactic used during the Iran–Iraq war, when the water-filled marshes served Saddam’s
defences by holding up the advance of Iranian armoured divisions; the Iraqis even
flooded some areas to make them more impassable.
V
While the search for deserters and rebels continued after the war with Iran, it was the
aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991 that triggered the assault on the marshes. The intifada,
or uprising, which followed the cease-fire with America and its allies began in Basra on
28 February 1991. The commander of a tank column fleeing Kuwait parked his vehicle in
Sa‘d Square, in front of the Ba‘th Party headquarters. Standing on his tank, he delivered a
denunciation of Saddam Hussein, and then started firing shells into one of the ubiquitous
giant portraits of the dictator. It was, in every sense, a loss of face for the Great Leader.
Within hours, the people of Basra and the returning soldiers had sacked the official
buildings and taken control of the city. 14
The revolt of the Shi‘a as Saddam’s rule collapsed across southern Iraq during
early March was the most serious internal threat the regime has ever had to face. Another
uprising spread through the predominantly Kurdish north of Iraq. At the rebellion’s
height, the government had lost control of 14 out of Iraq’s 18 provinces. In the south, the
intifada was concentrated in the Shi‘a centres of Basra and the holy cities, Najaf and
Kerbala. Iran, concerned not to provoke the US, did little to help the Iraqi rebels. A day
or two after the events in Basra, however, it permitted the entry through the marshes of
five to ten thousand members of the Badr Brigade. This was a pro-Iranian militia,
recruited from among Iraqi refugees by the Shi‘a leader Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim as
the military arm of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the major
Iraqi opposition group based in Tehran. 15
The Badr Brigade ransacked the Basra Sheraton, burnt bars and casinos
throughout the town, and announced the establishment of an Islamic republic. Posters of
Hakim and Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini appeared in Basra and Amara, and there were
statements of Hakim’s authority over the ‘Islamic’ revolution. Such declarations alarmed
those Sunnis, Kurds, and secular Iraqis who were already frightened of a possible Shi‘a
takeover, and thereby assisted Saddam Hussein’s reassertion of authority. 16
The rebellion was savagely crushed amid a retaliatory wave of atrocities and an
onslaught on the sacred sites of Shi‘a culture. These included such unprecedented
violations as the Iraqi army’s sack on 23 March of Imam Ali’s shrine at Najaf, and the
shelling and desecration of Imam Hussein’s shrine in Kerbala. Senior members of the
Shi‘a clergy were also attacked; this, though, was merely the intensification of a process
which had started when the Ba‘th seized power in 1968. In Najaf, in the early 1970s,
there had been as many as 9,000 members of the ‘ulama, the Shi‘a religious and legal

experts; even before the 1991 uprising this had been reduced to 800. From March 1991
onwards, in an effort to destroy Shi‘a culture and any independent religious leadership,
many more ‘ulama would be arrested, imprisoned, tortured and executed. On 20 March
the most senior Iraqi Shi‘a clergyman, the 92-year-old Grand Ayatollah Abdul Qasim al-
Khoei, was arrested together with 108 of his associates (among them many foreigners
from India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Bahrain). The Ayatollah died under
house arrest in Najaf the following year, and only two of the others who disappeared have
ever been seen again. 17
The ideological assault followed swiftly on the heels of the physical repression. In
April 1991 the Ba‘th Party newspaper al-Thawra carried six long articles attacking the
Shi‘a in terms never before used in party publications, signifying a major change in
official attitude. In the articles the Marsh Dwellers are singled out among the Shi‘a for
their alleged poverty, backwardness and immorality; they are humiliatingly described as a
‘monkey-faced’ people who are not ‘real Iraqis’, but are rather the descendants of black
slaves brought to the south in the Middle Ages. Their women are branded sluttish and
immodest. 18
The government crackdown provoked a large outflow of refugees, numbering
65,000 to 70,000, into the countries bordering Iraq. Unlike the later waves of refugees
from the south, who were mostly Marsh Dwellers, those who fled in 1991 were people of
all kinds: lawyers and teachers, peasants and merchants, civil servants and doctors. The
majority went to Iran, mostly to the south-western province of Khuzistan, where they
have formed a refugee community ever since. Conditions were difficult: Khuzistan was
still getting over the destruction it had suffered because of the Iran–Iraq war.
VI
The aftermath of the March uprisings gave a new meaning to the Third River project.
Despite all Iraq’s problems of post-war reconstruction, and a crushing burden of debts,
loans and compensations, the regime decided to set its engineers back to work on the
giant canal. In addition to the original objective of desalinating and reclaiming land, itself
rendered more urgent by Iraq’s need to combat sanctions through expanding agricultural
production, the project had been given a new mission: to expel the inhabitants of the
marshes, so that Baghdad could more easily destroy the Shi‘a opposition. The regime’s
strategy for dealing with the insurgency would henceforth be to drain the marshes by
means of water diversion projects. Max van der Stoel, the UN Special Rapporteur,
assessed this plan as ‘the subjugation of the local population in an effort to eliminate
‘deserters’, ‘criminals’, ‘subversives’ and ‘hostile elements’ (and all those who might aid
them) who could seek refuge in the marshes and among the local people. Hence, what
was originally to have been a ‘side-effect’ of a mammoth ‘development’ project
conceived in the 1950s evidently became an end in itself in so far as it would deprive the
thousands of ‘criminals’ the natural cover of their refuge while the resulting migration of
people out of their homelands would deprive the ‘criminals’ of their shelter. 19
There was a further motive for the drainage. This bore on Iraq’s ‘negotiations
since 1991 with several international oil companies for the prospective development of
southern oilfields in close proximity to the marshes. These include the Nahr ‘Umar,
Majnun, Gharraf, al-Nasiriyya and West Qurna fields. During the uprising, vital surface
47

48
facilities at West Qurna had been wrecked and looted. The regime intended to ensure that
this would not happen again. 20
Iraqi television appealed for labourers to assist on the project, and engineering
contractors were asked to donate their equipment. ‘In addition, a large number of
forklifts, bulldozers and other types of equipment were confiscated for the effort from
construction sites abandoned by foreign companies, including some from China, South
Korea, Poland and Bulgaria.’ 21 The project would also offer a way of occupying tens of
thousands of Iraqi soldiers, first as labourers and then as killers.
It is not easy to discern the exact sequence of events in the Marshlands region
during the summer of 1991. From March onwards government forces were already active
in trying to root out participants in the intifada. The uprising by the Marsh Dwellers
appears to have begun in June, prompted by the assault on their environment that the
renewed work on the Third River implied; their rebellion was ‘not purely political’. 22 The
Marsh Dwellers could see that the draining of the marshes spelt the end of their
traditional existence. Whether Baghdad’s intention was to control the marshes in order to
subdue the Shi‘a rebels, or to destroy the Marsh Dwellers and their way of life, the upshot
was the same so far as the inhabitants of the region were concerned. At this stage the
government put forward no plans to relocate them; instead, they were driven out of their
villages, and those who resisted were killed. Eyewitnesses to the operations later told the
Washington-based human rights group Middle East Watch how ‘artillery initially
bombard a district where engineering works are planned, so as to clear the local
population; troops move in, to secure the district…Once a section has been completed,
mines are laid to protect the embankments from attack’. 23
Reports of what was going on in the marshes produced a certain amount of
concern directed at the United Nations. On 11 June Iran requested that the UN should
protect the people there, and said it could not cope with any more refugees. The UN tried
to get the Iraqi government to remove its troops from the area and permit humanitarian
access, and its Executive Delegate Sadruddin Aga Khan headed a UN mission which was
subjected to a Ba‘thist hoax when it visited marshland villages on 11 July. The Iraqi
military withdrew its artillery just before the Aga Khan’s visit, redeploying it after the
UN team left, and resuming the bombardment of civilians. Shortly afterwards, the UN
Security Council called on Iraq to withdraw its forces from the marshes and allow
humanitarian agencies access to the people living there; but there was no change in Iraqi
policy, and the agencies have never been allowed into the area.
The Republican Guard’s clearing operations were forcing the Marsh Dwellers to
flee across the borders with Iran and Saudi Arabia, swelling the numbers of Iraqi
refugees. By November 1991, according to Emma Nicholson, who was visiting a camp
near Isfahan, Iran was sheltering 58,000 Iraqis among its three million official refugees.
Unassisted by the international community, the Iranians were providing them with food
and shelter at a daily cost of $20 per refugee. Across the border in Iraq, she wrote, ‘a
quarter of a million or more frightened people hide in the marshes, surrounded by the
Republican Guard, living on fish and muddy water, saved from view only by tall, dense
banks of papyrus. It is the smoke of Saddam’s army burning their papyrus cover that can
be seen from inside Iran. The intensified shelling by helicopter gunships over the last few
weeks has killed hundreds and forced many more out of their villages into the marshes
and out of the cities nearer to or over the Iranian border.’ 24

If conditions for the refugees in Iran were not easy, in Saudi Arabia things were
reportedly much worse. 35,000 Iraqis were sheltering in Artawiyya and Rafha camps,
where the Saudi Government ‘informed UNHCR that it has spent over US$220 million
on food, medical and relief supplies for the refugees and POWs but the State Department
and independent human rights and refugee organisations have expressed fears for their
safety’. According to the State Department, in 1991 ‘283 Iraqis were sent back in
contravention of Saudi promises to treat humanely Iraqi prisoners from the Gulf war and
civilian refugees from southern Iraq’. 25
Towards the end of 1991 details emerged of the chilling methods being used by
the Iraqi regime against its people in the Marshlands. Emma Nicholson reported that
villages near the border with Iran were being bombed, and napalm attacks were leaving
victims terribly burned. On a video-tape recorded in late 1991 the Iraqi Prime Minister,
Muhammad Hamza al-Zubaidi (himself a Shi‘ite) is seen ordering army generals to ‘wipe
out’ the three marsh tribes deemed most significant in the uprising; these included the
Jawabir of the Hammar area. From 4 December 1991 to 18 January 1992, according to
the UN, ‘military attacks [were] launched against the Marsh Dwellers…resulting in
hundreds of deaths. Animal and bird life [was] said to have been killed in large numbers,
while the marsh waters themselves [were] allegedly filled with toxic chemicals.’ 26 The
Iraqi army had encircled the region and established helicopter bases in the marshes. It
was now tightening control over food supplies coming into the area, confiscating the
boats so vital to Marsh Arab mobility, and evacuating villages. (All these measures were
prefigured in the 1987 ‘Plan of Action’.) In the same two-month period, Iraqi army
records showed that more than 50,000 people were removed and 70 marsh villages were
destroyed, according to the British writer and film-maker Michael Wood, who visited the
area the following August. 27
Internal migration was also increasing under the pressure of the drainage
operations, as people left the marshlands for the towns. In 1992, Sarah Graham-Brown
writes, ‘some families living on the fringe of Chabaish (a larger settlement drained at an
earlier date) had moved to Nasariya for greater security, while others from inside the
marshes had taken over their vacated houses. Other families were already living in
dwellings constructed from reed mats, plastic and canvas on the sides of the road from
Chabaish to Nasariya, probably displaced from marsh villages, after attacks early in the
year.’ 28
First-hand inspection of the Marshlands region was not possible for the UN
Special Rapporteur when he made his one official visit to Iraq in January 1992.
Subsequent analysis of satellite imagery, in a report commissioned by AMAR in 1994,
indicates that by 1991–92 the draining of the marshes had increased sharply by
comparison with 1984. In the worst affected areas, one-third of the area had been drained.
Between 1984 and 1991–92, ‘the amount of land drained had approximately quadrupled
to approximately 367,000 hectares, or 9.4% of the scene. A large section of the eastern
part of the Central marshes had been drained together with a triangular area south of the
Euphrates extending through the former Hammar marshes to the Main Outfall Drain [ie.
the Third River]…The Central marshes have been subject to the greatest drainage during
this period, and by 1991/92 had been reduced to 67% of the 1984/85 area.’ Within the
Central area, losses of permanent lake and marsh were especially dramatic: these had
fallen to only 21% of their 1984/85 extent, and a large, formerly permanent lake (Haur
49

50
Zikri) appeared on the satellite imagery to be ‘desiccated and covered with a salt crust’.
The most easterly of the Central marshes (Al Azair and al-Jaza’ir) had been completely
reclaimed. 29
Losses in the Huwaiza marsh, which spread east from the Tigris and into Iran,
were less severe and have to continued to be so. This is because the Huwaiza marsh has
been subject to less engineering modification, and, unlike the other main marshes, is not
dependent only on the Tigris–Euphrates basin; it is also supplied from the north-east by
the catchment of the Kharka.
VII
Throughout the period since the intifada, Shi‘a resistance has continued in the marshes
and elsewhere (as indeed it continues at the time of writing). The Badr Brigade, with
varying degrees of support from Iran, used the region as a base for raids against target in
southern Iraq. They attacked police stations and small army bases at night, assassinated
members of the security services and the military, and mounted sabotage operations
against the heavy engineering equipment being used to built the encroaching earthworks.
Iraq Update, the London newsletter of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq, has since 1991 carried almost weekly reports of defensive as well as aggressive
actions by these ‘popular forces’. On 1 April 1992, it said, the regime had failed in a
massive attack on the Amara marshlands; Infantry Battalion 704 was in ‘hasty, disorderly
withdrawal after being overpowered by resistance forces’, who took over the town of
‘Adil ‘for a few hours’. 30 The growing effectiveness of the resistance, together with the
fear that most of the marsh population was armed, persuaded Baghdad that a major
assault was necessary to subdue the region. In the same edition of Iraq Update, SCIRI
announced that the regime was preparing for another attack on the Amara region, to
coincide with Saddam Hussein’s birthday on 27 April. A visiting foreign correspondent
was told later that the army had promised the dictator ‘the key of the marsh’ as a birthday
present. 31
The onslaught was preceded by a ‘campaign of mass arrests’ launched on 25
March from a military base in Amara, and reportedly under the command of Saddam
Kamil, the Ba‘th Party’s Director of Intelligence. 32 In April, military attacks on civilian
settlements intensified and army and security forces began a campaign of artillery
bombardment, including the use of napalm. Large numbers of people were forcibly
removed from their villages. In violation of the terms of the UN cease-fire, the Iraqis
used Soviet-built Mi-24 helicopter gunships and fixed-wing planes for aerial
bombardments, especially in the central area of the Amara marshes, and there was
widespread burning of reed beds.
As the assault began, Iraq’s National Assembly was formally approving a plan by
the Revolutionary Command Council, presided over by Saddam Hussein, to displace the
Marsh Dwellers. The Washington Post reported Iraq’s claim that the plan ‘was aimed at
resettling 3,000 to 4,000 people to give them better access to medical and other services’,
and quoted the Speaker of the Assembly, Sa‘adi Mahdi Salih: ‘They will not be allowed
to settle back in the places they were taken from. The decision we passed does not
specify they will be given a choice to move or to stay…but because of the amenities we
are going to provide, I personally believe they will be happy’. 33 Not, in all likelihood, the

ones later described by the United Nations: ‘Those who have accepted the offer [of
money to leave their homes] have apparently had their livestock and their crops taken
from them and have then been placed in controlled collective settlements (apparently
called by the Government ‘model villages’) with no means of making a livelihood’. 34 The
‘model villages’ were described as being little better than concentration camps.
If we can believe ‘official documents and maps’ said to have been found with a
captured Iraqi water engineer, the expulsion of people from their villages in the Amara
marshes was proceeding at the same time as the completion in the same region of three of
the five major stages of the scheme to drain the marshlands. These stages refer to water
diversion projects additional to the Third River, though they partly intersect with it. By
July 1992, according to the documents later published by SCIRI, 35 the first three stages
were finished:
• Stage 1, the River Engineering Works, was a plan to alter the hydrological network of
40 small rivers, coming off the Tigris south of the town of Amara, all of which used
to flow into the Central (Amara) marshes. ‘Water level controllers’, locks and sluice
gates were installed on the Tigris to limit the flow of water into the distributary rivers,
whose banks were raised to stop their contents dissipating into the marshland. The
result was to deprive the land around the rivers of water, and to cut off the flow to
several towns, including Maimuna, Salam and ‘Adil.
• Stage 2, the River Banks Project, was the site of the greatest engineering activity
during 1992. A ‘moat’, running north to south, roughly parallel to the Tigris on its
western side, was begun during the Iran–Iraq war as a defensive installation. Under
Stage 2 it was converted into a drainage canal and given the name Anfal 3. Anfal,
meaning spoils of war, was the code-name given to the murderous campaign against
the Kurds from February to September 1988, in which more than 100,000 people
were killed, many with chemical weapons, and 4,000 villages destroyed. The use of
the term Anfal in the marshes project indicates the character of Baghdad’s intentions.
The ‘moat’ is between 1.2 and 2.0km wide and 48.6km long and can be seen clearly
on satellite photographs. It discharges into the Euphrates six km west of its
confluence with the Tigris, at Qurna. Stage 2 also included the prolongation of the
‘moat’, via a 35km west–east extension of the canal, constructed between a double
embankment running from the village of Al Jandallah in Misan province to Abu ‘Ajil,
near Qal‘at Salih airfield. At its western end the canal would receive the flows from
the rivers channelled by Stage 1; its effect, therefore, was to capture and divert almost
all the water that once nourished the Amara marsh, as well as depleting the amount of
water available to the inhabitants of the area.
• Stage 3 referred to the diversion of almost all the Euphrates waters into the Third
River. The Third River crossed under the Euphrates, passing below the riverbed in
three pipes before swinging eastwards towards its outlet in the Gulf. According to the
documents, a few kilometres east of the crossing an earth barrage had been built
across the Euphrates to divert it into the Third River, carrying its flow along the
canal’s route south of the Hammar marsh. The result would be the draining of the
marsh, formerly fed by the Euphrates.
• Stage 4, Shouldering the Euphrates River, was incomplete in 1992. High banks were
being built on the right bank of the old Euphrates bed to prevent any water from the
51

52
Amara marsh flowing southwards across the now dry river-bed to the Hammar marsh.
A dam was also built near the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates, to prevent
water from the North-South moat flowing back into the empty Euphrates bed (in the
‘wrong direction’) and thus into the marshes.
• Stage 5, still ‘under construction’, was the Division of the Marshes and comprised the
subdivision of the Amara and Hammar marshlands into plots through various dykes
and barriers, as a means of allowing them to be dried up in manageable volumes by
pumping and evaporation. A number of such barriers had already been put up during
the war with Iran. The captured documents stated that this stage alone would dry out
an expected 1500 square kilometres.
Despite the claims of Iraqi water engineers, and the protestations of the regime, it is
difficult to see how these stages could possibly be part of a development project to
enhance agriculture.
VIII
The full significance of the term ‘Anfal’ in connection with the drainage scheme became
clearer as the campaign of bombardment continued during the early summer of 1992. ‘In
the first two weeks of July, residents of the southern towns of ‘Adil and Salam were
evacuated and ‘told to burn their homes to ensure no one would return’; the army then
took over these two places to carry out heavy shelling of the marshes on 15 July. 36
During July and August, according to the UN, the attacks were at their most intense,
particularly during the Shi‘a festival of 10 Muharram (11 July), commemorating the
martyrdom of Imam Hussein, ‘when villagers were reportedly assembled in religious
observance and thereby suffered casualties in large numbers’. 37 None of the traditional
mourning was allowed in the holy cities during this month.
In addition to all the other hardships undergone by the Marsh Dwellers, there
were reports of the army now imposing restrictions on people bringing supplies into the
marshlands, and of discrimination against those families who did not have the ration
cards that would have entitled them to food. ‘The blockade against the delivery of food
and medicines is starting to make the population of the marshes and the remaining
refugees desperate’, wrote the Shi‘a Public Affairs Committee. ‘Flour is extremely
scarce, with the population reduced to eating reeds and reed stumps. The natural reed
cover is being attacked with defoliants and large areas of reeds – necessary for the
survival of many unique species – are being burnt along with the houses of the
inhabitants of the marshes which are made of reeds.’ 38 The same source claimed that
there was other disturbing evidence of the regime’s methods: the fish stock was being
depleted by pollution, and there were unconfirmed reports of poison being used; large
numbers of dead fish had been seen floating in the marshes. Still other reports alleged
that containers of sewage were being brought from the cities and dumped in the marshes.
In the first week of August 1992, in a policy unmistakably reminiscent of the
Kurdish Anfal, 2,500 men, women and children were rounded up from the Chabaish
marsh near al-Nasiriyya and taken to Baghdad. There they were told by the Defence
Minister ‘Ali Hasan al-Majid (nicknamed Chemical Ali after his role supervising the first
Anfal) that they were being given land to farm in northern Iraq and could ‘forget about

the south’. The people from Chabaish were said to have been transported to an Army
camp 20 miles south-west of Arbil. ‘On arrival in the north, the Shias were locked into
‘large farm sheds’ guarded by units of two security services. Then, according to a fugitive
who was forced to wash away the blood every morning, they were executed, nightly, in
groups of 100’. 39 The allegations of mass executions were ‘corroborated by reports from
local farmers in the nearby Kurdish-controlled area who claim to have witnessed the
arrival of busloads of people displaying the features common to people of southern Iraq;
gunshots were heard during subsequent evenings’. 40
Such reports prompted Max van der Stoel to take the unprecedented step of
placing the marshes section of his UN General Assembly report before the Security
Council, together with his recommendations for a team of human rights monitors to be
sent to Iraq. On 11 August 1992 he was invited to address the Security Council on the
situation in the marshes (this was, again, unprecedented for a Special Rapporteur). On 27
August, the UN imposed an air exclusion zone, banning Iraqi operation of aeroplanes and
helicopters south of the 32 nd Parallel (Iraq had been mounting an average of 30 sorties a
day, and sometimes more than 100). But there would be no UN intervention on the
ground, and no monitors. 41
In such circumstances, Baghdad’s response to the no-fly zone was absolutely
predictable: it immediately stepped up the ground-based offensive on the marshes, using
tanks, missiles, and assault boats. Refugees later described repeated and intense artillery
bombardments and mortar attacks on villages and towns across the region. The Special
Rapporteur related how government forces used ‘long-range heavy artillery shelling
against civilian settlements at night or during lunch and dinner time when families are
typically gathered together…Following bombardments, forces composed of regular army,
Republican Guard and Special Forces would advance with their armoured vehicles,
including tanks and heavy artillery and surround the villages of the area. After the capture
of the region, the troops would enter the villages, carry out indiscriminate arrests and
conduct house-to-house searches before burning the reeds and destroying the houses.
Witnesses said that those who were arrested were taken away blindfolded, were
frequently transferred to a detention centre and were never heard from or of again.
Following the bombardments, it would take three days to one week for the inhabitants to
rebuild their mostly reed houses, during which time they would have to sleep outside
deprived of everything. Sometimes, after having finished rebuilding their houses, Iraqi
forces would come and burn the houses again.’ 42
It was widely believed that the regime was using the imposition of the no-fly zone
as an excuse to intensify security police activities as well as the military’s ground
offensive. The UN observed that additional check-points were ‘being placed between and
inside cities in the region, leading to a large number of arbitrary arrests. Allegations exist
that a terror campaign is being waged in the region in order to track down participants of
the March 1991 uprisings. One report indicates that many citizens have been blackmailed
or terrorized into accusing neighbours of ‘offences’. The existence of secret prisons and
detention centres has also been reported. 43 The UN also received accounts of members of
the Security Forces ‘placing different tribal leaders in charge of designated areas,
providing some with arms and encouraging tribal disputes in a policy aimed at
fragmenting the communal relations of the Ma’dan [Marsh Arab] people…this ‘divide
and rule’ policy…reportedly led to 2,000 deaths in the fall of 1992’. 44
53

54
First-hand accounts of the events in the marshes are too intermittent and
incomplete to allow an assessment of whether, or how far, the military and security forces
have changed or adapted their methods in the period since 1991. Shyam Bhatia of the
Observer was told that in October 1992 Mukhabarat agents had ‘poured poison into the
waters at strategic locations. Dr Abu Aiman, a Basra-trained GP who runs a modest clinic
in the marshes, believes it was organo-phosphorus poison, brand-name Endrine 192…
Another type of poison, Indolin, was left in barrels disguised as agricultural chemicals.
Local families were encouraged to use it rather like a cheap form of dynamite to stun the
fish on which their livelihood depends. They did not realise they were poisoning
themselves.’ 45 But we do not know whether this was the first occasion on which such
poisons were used, or how widely, or how many times. 46
In addition to the array of military and security techniques being deployed against
the people of the marshes, the campaign with bulldozers and cranes was proceeding
apace. What became strikingly clear in the second half of 1992 was the impact of the
drainage works: ‘The Third River is draining the marshes’, said Emma Nicholson in
September. ‘I can give you first-hand visual evidence. I’ve seen it myself. For the first
time ever, the level of water in the marshes has sunk. I was previously there in early June,
and three days ago I was in Iraq, and in those weeks this Third River has started to
achieve its objective of draining the marshes.’ 47 Not only the Third River: by November,
according to SCIRI sources, engineering units around Amara had completed their
blockade of the rivers coming off the Tigris and diverted their waters from the marshes.
Six of the feeder rivers had been completely drained and were now passable on foot;
‘these atrocities took place when rice was being harvested and resulted in the total
destruction of the crop’. 48
That month, a team from the Organisation for Human Rights in Iraq became the
first observers since the imposition of the no-fly zone to go deep inside the marshes. In
the eastern Huwaiza marsh they found that because of the draining, ‘wide stretches of
marshland have been reduced to a crazy paving of mud inimical to water buffalo’. The
Third River was nearing completion, and the observers found that increasing dryness in
many areas was making it more difficult to plant traditional crops. ‘’We saw a white line
that extended like chalk on the reeds for dozens of miles’‘ said the team’s leader. ‘’It was
the old water level – at least three feet higher than the present level. Many, many people
told us there is something wrong with the water, too.’ 49
On 7 December 1992, Baghdad announced the completion, at 565 kilometres and
after almost four decades’ work, of the Third River. The Iraqi government would soon be
able to prevent water from reaching two-thirds of the Marshlands. The flow of the
Euphrates at its seaward end was diverted to the Third River, thus bypassing the Hammar
marsh, while the flow of the rivers and streams running southwards from the Tigris into
the Central marshes was channelled into the ‘moat’. As the Marshlands dried out, it was
much easier for the Iraqi military to advance their land-based attacks on the villages. In
January 1993 a number of villages in Amara marsh were reported burned to the ground;
in April, government forces burned homes in two villages in Misan governorate; in June,
villages in the Hammar marshes were bombarded for four days, and what was left of the
inhabitants’ homes was then flattened by tanks and armoured vehicles. 50

IX
By early 1993 the UN Special Rapporteur was amassing evidence from inside Iraq which
corroborated the reports he had received from refugees and others. He had seen the
videotape of Iraq’s Prime Minister telling the generals to eliminate certain tribes, and the
1987 ‘Plan of Action for the Marshes’ had come to light. The ensemble of evidence so
closely recalled the Iraqi Government’s earlier Anfal operations that Van der Stoel was
persuaded to give ‘considerable credence’ to the extraordinary allegations he was hearing
about the Marshlands area; especially when they were taken with ‘reports that the present
military actions in the south of Iraq are under the direction of ‘Ali Hasan al-Majid who
previously directed the Anfal operations, the admission of the Government of Iraq that it
has in fact been pursuing large-scale ‘police’ actions and ‘development’ projects, and the
refusal of the Government to allow human rights monitoring…’ 51
Van der Stoel had also seen videotapes showing the widespread destruction of the
Marshlands and villages. He was now convinced that ‘a whole unique ecosystem is
evidently being destroyed and the ancient lifestyle of the local people done away with. As
the soils dry out, reeds and bamboo have been dying which deprives the tribespeople of
their source of construction material, fuel and food for their livestock. Dry or shallow
waterways have obstructed the local means of transportation, rendering the traditional
‘mashhuf’ boats useless and stranding some of the population. The self-sufficient
agrarian and fishing traditions of the Ma’dan are in extreme danger as large numbers of
fish have reportedly been dying as a result of the falling water levels whereby freeflowing
water drops to form stagnant pools in which poisonous algae grow and release
their toxins. Therefore, in addition to being deprived of food, fuel and construction
materials, the water supply for drinking, for livestock, for agriculture (mainly rice), and
also for hospital and medical use has become contaminated.’ 52
In addition to their role in destroying the Marsh Dwellers’ habitual sources of
food, the new embankments and dams were also working to tighten the government’s
economic blockade of the region. The earthworks began to be used for the emplacement
of the troops surrounding the Marshlands, and to block supply routes to the marshes.
Since the establishment of the no-fly zone the previous August, the UN was told, the
government had intensified the internal blockade to the point that food and medical
supplies were no longer available south of the 32 nd Parallel: ‘The inhabitants remaining in
the marshes are apparently no longer able to feed themselves as the environmental
destruction taking place has removed local food sources and they are not able to purchase
food due to the blockade. There have even been reports that Government forces are
cutting down the date palms to remove the one remaining local source of food.’ 53
In February 1993, while Van der Stoel was working on his report, the Observer
journalist Shyam Bhatia became the first foreign journalist to be taken deep inside the
marshes by the Shi‘a resistance. He spent 10 days in the area, under constant threat of
capture, or death by shelling, before bringing back a lengthy eyewitness account. 54 He
could see that water levels had dropped ‘alarmingly’ and confirmed earlier accounts of
the impact of the drainage scheme: ‘Massive earthen dykes erected in the north near the
town of Amara have succeeded in turning the tributaries of the Tigris so that their
precious water is now channelled into the massive new canal, Anfal 3…water levels in
the northern marshes have dropped by as much as two metres, making it easier for the
55

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Iraqi army to move in…In the southern marshes, the Euphrates has been dammed, its lifegiving
water channelled to flow uselessly into the Gulf at Khor Zubair.’ Bhatia also heard
about the dumping of toxic chemicals in the waters (referred to above), and he saw at
first-hand the effects of the continued artillery bombardment of marsh villages: ‘The
army’s favourite tactic is to blow up villages selectively and then sow mines in the water
before retreating. In Chabaish village they even planted butterfly mines disguised as toys,
pens and cigarette lighters.’
Despite such evidence from the media and the UN Special Rapporteur, and
despite the plumes of smoke rising from the torched marsh villages, clearly visible to the
American and British pilots as they patrolled the no-fly zone, no international action was
taken to stop Baghdad doing exactly as it liked in the south. Indeed, the principal
manifestation of international will, the continuing economic embargo on Iraq, simply
worsened the position for most of the population.
The completion of the drainage scheme the previous year almost certainly
accounts for the sharp deterioration in the Amara marshes during 1993. Analysis of
satellite imagery in the AMAR report already cited showed that these marshes
‘essentially no longer exist as a functioning wetland ecosystem. Open water has been
replaced by salt crusts. The reed-beds are unlikely to survive long and an agricultural
development scheme occupies a large proportion of the eastern section…[This] is the
direct result of diversion in 1993 of inflows which would have occurred from the Tigris
distributaries, now captured by means of a west-east and north-south ‘moat’ complex
which diverts water to the Euphrates’. 55 Some people moved to be near the new canal,
where they hoped to find the fish that could no longer survive in the sticky mud now
surrounding their former homes.
Evidence exists to suggest that the drying of the marshes was being hastened by
yet other schemes of water diversion and control. A satellite image taken in early July
1993 was taken to indicate ‘extensive flooding of a depressional area south of the
Euphrates near Al Khidr’, west of al-Nasiriyya. It appeared that the depression was being
filled through diversion of the Euphrates, though there had been ‘no indication of
flooding of this depression a year before in 1992’. 56 Such an additional diversion would
of course accelerate the contraction of the Hammar marshes. Exile groups later reported
that this flooded depression in the desert had turned into a massive new lake, 100
kilometres long by 15 kilometres wide and still growing. 57 Still further upstream were
three other artificial lakes, each linked by canal either to the Tigris or the Euphrates. They
had originated as natural depressions, at Habbaniyya, south of the Euphrates, Abu Dibbis,
further south again, and Tharthar, between the two rivers near Baghdad. At some point in
the late 1980s or early 1990s, all three had been turned into reservoirs. Satellite
photography revealed that in the early 1990s the three lakes were very full, which
indicated that they were being used to stop water from flowing downstream. 58
X
Given the continuing bombardment, the terror tactics of the security forces, and the total
assault on their environment, the Marsh Dwellers had little choice but to migrate. Some,
as we have seen, went to settlements on the outskirts of the southern cities. Many others
left for Iran, which accepted more than 10,000 refugees between the summer of 1993 and

the end of 1994. The refugees might have endured bombardment and blockade, but in the
scorching heat of summer it was impossible to continue without water in the newly driedup
areas. The journey to Iran was difficult. In three weeks during July 1993, 4,000
people, of whom most were Marsh Dwellers, arrived at Himmet, a temporary camp in the
Huwaiza marshes on the Iran–Iraq border. Conditions there were terrible: at the height of
summer, the temperature could reach 60ºC, and reportedly there were cases of typhoid,
dysentery and cholera. 59 From Himmet the Iranian authorities would slowly disperse the
refugees to other camps inside Iran, mostly in Khuzistan, but also at Asna in Luristan
province, and Jahrom in Fars province.
Throughout the government’s offensive against the Marshlands in 1992-93, armed
elements of the Shi‘a opposition had maintained their resistance. The Badr Brigade, the
militia which followed the exiled Ayatollah al-Hakim, was by far the largest of the four
groups believed to be acting in the marshes. Without Western backing, they could never
hope to maintain a major campaign, but still they continued their operations against a
vastly more powerful adversary. With the Marshlands encircled by the Republican
Guard, the guerrillas’ transport was limited to small boats gliding past army positions at
night. The Iraqi military had extended its control of the region to the point where it was
almost impossible to get supplies into the Marshlands, or the wounded out. And if the
guerrillas did manage to attack one of the new installations, they found that the drainage
system, with all its giant earthworks, embankments, dams and canals, was too extensive,
and too readily repaired, to be seriously damaged by their sporadic small-scale attacks.
Still, that summer Baghdad judged the Shi‘a rebellion in the Marshes serious
enough to appoint the much-feared Defence Minister, ‘Ali Hasan al-Majid, as acting
governor of Basra province. By then, the Amara marshes were drained and under
government control, so ‘Chemical Ali’ focused on the Hammar marshes, now seen as the
remaining centre of insurgency. Rebel groups in the Marshlands ignored the warnings
given to tribal leaders that chemical weapons would be used to punish the resistance.
On 26 September 1993, at 8.15am, a resistance unit was having breakfast outside
the village of Qaryat ‘Alaui, on the eastern edge of the Hammar marsh near Basra. The
fighters saw armoured personnel carriers of the Iraqi Army’s 51 st Division approaching.
The Iraqi attack on the village opened with a bombardment, but after an hour the
guerrillas heard shells falling with a thud rather than an explosion; white clouds rose up,
and settled above the houses before falling to the ground. The Iraqi troops, equipped with
gas masks, then attacked the Shi‘a but were defeated by them. ‘When we went inside one
of the armoured personnel carriers’, one of the fighters was reported as saying, ‘we saw
that the battle orders for the company called for a chemical assault’. 60 Most of the 1,000
families living in the village had fled before the attack, so casualties were not as serious
as they might have been. Documents later seized in battle indicate that the gas used was
phosgene, a choking agent used in the First World War and likely to have been available
in large quantities in Iraq. The papers included orders advising soldiers to take
‘cautionary measures against phosgene as discussed at the meeting of the units
participating in the attack’, as well as minutes of a meeting authorising the use of
chemical weapons ‘as a last resort’ against the rebels. 61
According to SCIRI, the attacks were repeated on 28 and 29 September in the
area of Abu Zargi marsh in Basra province. Earlier, the organisation had reported that
two artillery battalions had been moved to southern Iraq with ‘huge numbers of chemical
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58
and poison filled shells. The first battalion is based in Al Dair and the second in Al
Rumailah’, believed to be areas intended for subordination by the regime. SCIRI sources
stated that ‘Chemical agents were extensively used, inflicting heavy casualties among the
troops and the people. Some estimates put the figure of casualties at 2,800 killed and
wounded’. The inhabitants were forced to flee southwards, in the direction of Sallin
marsh, which was also under attack. 62
The Documentary Centre for Human Rights in Iraq wrote to the UN Special
Rapporteur with the allegations of chemical attacks in the Basra marshes and, seven
weeks after the event, in November, a UN inspection team went to Iran to interview
refugees. But the ensuing report was inconclusive, and the UN proved itself as incapable
of dealing with these violations of human rights as it had after the chemical attack on the
Kurdish village of Halabja in 1988. In the south as in the north of Iraq, even Saddam
Hussein’s gassing of his people was not reason enough to provoke a significant
international response.
The chemical assaults seemed to have little effect on the rebels’ desire to go on
fighting, and a number of clashes were reported in November and December 1993. As
1994 opened, however, their frequency fell off. This was not due to any relaxation in the
government’s policy of repression; in January there was at least one division of 15,000
soldiers operating in Amara province. As in previous years, the artillery attacks and
large-scale burning operations continued against civilians in the marshes. There were
reports that government engineers were working to expand the network of drainage
canals and dykes in the Amara and Huwaiza marshes before the spring floods, so that
they could further block the movements of local people as well as rebel groups.
According to Middle East International, ‘Saddam has been particularly keen to reduce
the number of open water courses near the Iranian border, because they provide an easy
entry and escape route for rebel fighters operating from Iran’. 63
On 4 March 1994, four Iraqi armoured and infantry divisions began what the US
State Department later described as the largest search-and-destroy operation in the
Marshlands since the opening of the campaign in April 1992. The State Department also
recorded that ‘the offensive included the razing of villages and burning operations in the
triangle bounded by Nasiriya, Qurna, and Basra. The magnitude of the operations caused
the inhabitants to flee in several directions: deeper into the marshes, to the outskirts of
southern Iraqi cities, and to Iran.’ 64 SCIRI and the Organisation of Human Rights in Iraq
reported that napalm and phosphorus were being used in the Basra and Amara regions.
From mid-January to early March, about 2,000 Marsh Dwellers were forced to leave for
Iran. 65 Allied planes enforcing the no-fly zone flew low over the areas but, as usual, took
no action. Of the extent of the water diversion schemes, however, there could no longer
be any doubt. Video footage taken from a Royal Air Force Tornado on 4 March showed
the massive set of canals and embankments near al-Nasiriyya; the Third River could be
seen crossing beneath the Euphrates before intercepting its flow further east.
In June, 320 people were detained during military operations in the Amara
marshes, and in the al-Nasiriyya area several marsh villages were attacked. The 80 homes
in Al-Abra village were burnt to the ground, and their inhabitants taken away by the
army. The State Department’s report for 1994 relates that security forces ‘stormed the
villages of Al-Sajiya and Al-Majawid in Al-Chibaish district, near the main road leading
into the marshes. Simultaneously, armor units supported by heavy artillery attacked the

village of Al-Kheyout in the district of Al-Madina. Also in July, the military conducted
large-scale artillery bombardment in the Jindala area of the Al-Amarah marshes’; at the
same time ‘the military caused destruction and arrested inhabitants in Al-Hashriya, Al-
Wasdiya, and Al-Malha’ 66
Further deterioration in the marsh environment was also apparent. The Special
Rapporteur’s comments that year carried a note of finality, as he wrote of ‘very large
parts of the former marshes having dried out and, therefore, the environment so necessary
to the Marsh Arab culture having been destroyed’. 67 In August, UN human rights
monitors in Iran met newly arrived refugees in Iran, most of whom were in very poor
shape. They had travelled a dangerous route by boat, by car and by foot, for which they
had needed a guide; ‘most refugees reported that they had sold everything they had in
order to pay the guides’. They were also exposed to attack by the Iraqi army, which was
benefiting from the new embankments to survey and patrol the drained Marshlands. The
new arrivals provided up-to-date information on life in the marshes. All reported the
‘dramatic decline of water in the southern marshes, especially in the summer of 1994, and
emphasized that the main reason for their flight had been the drying of the marshes; the
sinking water-level makes survival in the marshes more and more difficult, almost
impossible. Because of the loss of water, the Marsh Dwellers can basically no longer use
their traditional boats. As the soils have dried out, the reed beds have dried, thus
depriving the tribespeople of their main material for building shelters and feeding their
buffalo and cattle. The formerly self-sufficient agrarian and fishing traditions of the
Marsh Dwellers are now in extreme danger as fish stocks have been depleted and the
necessary habitat has disappeared. In addition to being deprived of food, construction
materials and means of transportation, there is almost no drinkable water left in any part
of the marshes; in areas where there was still some water left, it had become salty or toxic
owing to the fact that it had become stagnant.’ 68
One of the ways in which Baghdad has turned the imposition of international
sanctions to its advantage has been through the system of rationing, introduced in
September 1990. The ration card system gives the state a great deal of social information
and has become a potent instrument of control – to the point where it has taken over some
of the work of the security apparatus. Many people in the marshes were being denied the
food rations to which, as Iraqi citizens, they should have been entitled. Because their
traditional way of life had put them in only tenuous contact with the bureaucratic system,
some Marsh Dwellers did not have the identification documents they needed to get the
ration cards. And there were others who might be going hungry as the consequence of
punitive measures being taken against a relative: ‘if, among a family or tribe, a person
had evaded service in the Iraqi Army or had deserted, the Iraqi Government would apply
a collective punishment preventing the other members of the family from having foodration
cards’. Such discrimination would also be levelled at those suspected of having
taken part in the March 1991 uprising, or being otherwise disaffected. 69
The Marsh Dwellers were being starved out. The drying of the marshes,
international sanctions, and deprivation by the government, had combined to make them,
in van der Stoel’s words, ‘dependent on intermediaries and smugglers who sold them
flour, sugar and oil at black-market prices. In some areas of the marshes, women would
sometimes go to nearby markets to buy food and basic goods, but on their way back they
could be subject to many controls by Iraqi forces who would confiscate their
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60
merchandise. As the drying of the marshes continued and the Iraqi forces increased their
control of the area, access to the zone became severely restricted and the inhabitants of
the marshes became more and more isolated and dependent on the natural resources of
the area they lived in. Since these natural resources have by now almost been completely
destroyed, and since the inhabitants fear the government authorities, the refugees asserted
that they have little other choice but to flee their natural territory.’ 70
Economic conditions may have been worst in the Marshlands region, but a deep
social crisis was created throughout Iraq by the impact of sanctions (and their
manipulation by Baghdad). The government’s response was to introduce new forms of
torture, for certain economic crimes (such as car theft) and military desertion. A series of
laws was passed during the summer of 1994 which prescribed the amputation of ears,
hands and feet, and the branding of foreheads. Many victims reportedly bled to death as a
result of the amputations, and several doctors refusing to carry them out were executed. 71
No doubt fortified by these measures against deserters, the Iraqi army continued
its terror campaign against the Marsh Dwellers. In September 1994 ‘military forces used
incendiary bombs and launched an armored attack against the area of Al-Seigel in the Al-
Amarah marshes. The army later set fire to the entire area. In 1994 military operations
caused an undetermined number of civilian casualties in the marshes. More than 10,000
refugees from the marshes fled to Iran, where they joined between 50,000 and 60,000
who had fled in previous years.’ 72 US Government analysts estimated that ‘more than
200,000 of the 250,000 former inhabitants of the marshes had been driven from the area
since 1991’. 73
At about the same time reports emerged of Saddam Hussein promoting a reverse
migration, aimed at ‘ethnically cleansing’ Baghdad of its second-class Shi‘a citizens.
Between 1.5 and two million of them were being deported from Baghdad to the south, the
first 5,000 to 10,000 of whom had already been taken by troops and ‘dispersed into the
marshlands, and such cities as Basra. Some, but not all, had been marsh dwellers
originally’. 74 There was evidence of growing regional discrimination, as the cities of the
Sunni heartland – Baghdad, Samarra, Tikrit – were getting a disproportionate share of the
limited resources available. An official Iraqi report conducted with UNICEF’s support in
April 1995 shows that ‘50 per cent of the rural population in the central/southern part of
Iraq have no access to potable water supplies…90 per cent of the rural population in the
southern governorate of Thiqar had no access to potable water supplies. An erratic
electric power supply and a shortage of water has had a negative impact on public
health.’ 75
From the lack of specific references in reports after 1994, it is probable that the
engineering work on the water diversion projects was now substantially complete, and
that the schemes had already had their most dramatic impact. Since 1991 the landscape
had been changed, the environment altered in all the ways described above. The Shi‘a
resistance had been obliged to change its tactics, since the Marshlands offered the fighters
so much less shelter. In 1995-96 it appears that those operating in Iraq moved from the
Marshlands into the villages, and even to the desert regions, while their military bases
remained in Iran. The Badr Brigade upgraded itself to the Badr Corps and claimed to
have well over 10,000 men; this made it by far the biggest force among the resistance
bodies. SCIRI videotapes from the period show the hardware at the Corps’ disposal:
Soviet-built T-54 and T-62 tanks captured from the Iraqi army, artillery, 122mm

Katyusha missiles. Such heavy equipment could not readily be taken on the highly
mobile, rapid incursions the resistance typically mounted inside Iraq. Mortars, rocketpropelled
grenades and small arms would be used in such operations. Despite the
difficulties they now faced through lack of cover, the resistance had its greatest military
success on 11 February 1995, when the Badr men defeated the 426 th Brigade of the Iraqi
army in a clash at Qurna; several hundred of the Iraqis were killed or taken prisoner.
Having taken control of the area, the Shi‘a guerrillas laid a train of explosives and blew a
major breach in one of the artificial dykes, reflooding the area. 76
The increased effectiveness of the opposition meant that there was no let-up in the
regime’s bombardments and burnings of civilian settlements in the Marshlands region
during 1995. Security forces ‘continue to relocate Shi‘a inhabitants of the southern
marshes to major southern cities. Many have been transferred to detention centres and
prisons in central Iraq, primarily in Baghdad, or even to northern cities like Kirkuk as
part of the Government’s attempt to ‘Arabize’ traditionally non-Arab areas.’ 77 The
destruction of villages was accompanied by extrajudicial executions of many civilians.
XI
In October 1995, during the run-up to the ‘free’ referendum on the question, ‘Are you in
favour of Saddam Hussein assuming the post of President of the Republic of Iraq?’, a
large number of security personnel ‘were dispatched to the marshes area where they
reportedly intimidated people, warning them that their ration cards would be confiscated
if they did not vote for Saddam’. 78 The continuing power of the ration card system was
noted by the United Nations Special Rapporteur in the months following the UN’s
conclusion with the Iraqi government of the oil-for-food agreement in May 1996. This
meant that Security Council resolution 986 could be implemented, allowing Iraq to sell
up to one billion dollars’ worth of oil every 90 days to buy essential food and medicine;
the supplies were supposed to be distributed equitably throughout the country within the
government’s distribution networks. In fact, as van der Stoel observed, the system of
rationing was ‘unfair, corrupt and arbitrary’. We have already seen the individual Marsh
Dweller’s vulnerability with regard to the ID card, vital for access to the rationing
system. Collective punishments, too, continued during 1996: ‘tribal areas and villages
surrounding the southern towns which are considered by the Iraqi Government as hiding
places for its opponents are also denied the rationing cards…most families of the al-
Hayyadir tribe who reside near the Salih River in the al-Amdayna district in Basra
Governorate have been denied rationing cards. Reports also indicate that about 70% of
the families living near the al-Izz River are without rationing cards.’ 79
The State Department, meanwhile, reported that ‘the Government’s abysmal
record on human rights worsened in 1996’: there was an increased number of summary
executions, disappearances, amputations, torture victims. In the phrases used with weary
repetition in the Human Rights Practices Report every year, ‘Iraqi military operations
continued to target Shi‘a Arabs living in the southern marshes’ and ‘credible reports
confirm the ongoing destruction of the marshes’. 80 The interest of the Western media,
never great, had by the mid-1990s faded almost completely, and the UN and State
Department become the only regular sources of information aside from the Iraqi
opposition. Throughout the south, from 1996 to 1998, the repressive presence of the
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62
military and security forces remains; arbitrary arrests and detention are common. There
are sporadic clashes between resistance units and government forces, and the latter go on
exacting indiscriminate revenge upon civilians. The UN expresses further concerns that
the ration card system is being abused: ‘the system is widely used by the Government of
Iraq to reward political supporters and to silence opponents…The matter of possession of
valid identification cards places most of the inhabitants of the remaining southern
marshes…beyond the receipt of humanitarian assistance.’ 81
The attacks on the independent leadership of the Shi‘a community were to
become more serious. After Friday prayers, on 21 April 1998, Ayatollah al-Burujirde was
assassinated in Najaf; and on 18 June gunmen shot Grand Ayatollah al Gharawi, together
with his son and son-in-law, on the road from Karbala to Najaf. Neither of the ayatollahs
was a political activist but both had refused to stop carrying out their religious duties. The
killings were followed by an increase in military operations against civilians. Mass
arrests and assaults on villages during May and June were the prelude to a resumption of
attacks on the marshes, which reached their peak in November 1998. Ba‘th party officials
and the army carried out operations targeted against specific tribes: there were ‘repeated,
intense artillery and mortar attacks followed by ground-force attacks on villages and
towns in several areas of the three governorates, in particular in the Al Jazira area near Al
Rifai…and in Suk al Shuyukh and Chabaish districts…the operations targeted a large
number of tribes, including the Al Jawaber, Al Rahma, Al Bu Salih and Asakira tribes’. 82
Families were arrested or expelled, houses were burned, entire villages confiscated
together with their community lands. In late September and early November the
operations were supervised by Saddam’s son Qusay Hussein, and the President’s cousin,
Ali Hasan al-Majid. Some of the arrests were ordered directly by Qusay, ‘to intimidate
the population of the southern marshes by taking hostages. It is reported that the
concerned relatives, recalling the Anfal operations, fear for the safety and physical
integrity of the persons detained incommunicado and whose fates have remained
unknown since their arrest.’ Numerous summary executions followed the November
visit, and ‘the bodies of three persons executed during this campaign were reportedly
seen hanging on Amara bridge’. 83
The sustained violence of the assault against the Marsh Dwellers and their
homeland make one question the possibility of the community’s survival in anything like
its traditional form. Reports from the refugee camps in Iran speak of the breakdown of
tribal society and the demoralisation of a people uprooted from the surroundings to which
they had become so finely adapted. Not that life has been much easier for those who
stayed in Iraq. During 1998, there were accounts of displaced people living around al-
Nasariyya in very poor conditions, in great poverty and with no government support.
Many of the households were headed by women whose menfolk were in hiding, or in
prison, or working elsewhere, or in Iran. Even in those marsh villages which are still
intact, few men of working age were to be found. The break-up of communities also
means that skills have been lost; to choose a poignant example, before the Gulf War there
were 400 boat-builders and carpenters in the marshes, whereas by 1996 there were no
more than 10 workshops left. 84
The apparently systematic campaign to eliminate the Shi‘a religious leadership
was not yet over. On 14 January 1999, according to SCIRI, Sheikh Awas, imam of the al-
Nasiriyya city mosque, was arrested. The next day, a Friday, he failed to appear to lead

Friday prayers, so his deputy went to the local security directorate to beg that he be
released. Soon he was joined by hundreds of members of the Shi‘a congregation, who
marched on the security bureau to demand the imam’s release. ‘Security forces allegedly
opened fire on the unarmed crowd with automatic weapons and hand grenades. Five
persons were killed, 11 wounded, and 300 arrested.’ 85 Then, on 19 February, for the third
time in less than 12 months, a leading Shi‘a cleric was killed. Like Burujirde in 1998,
Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq Al-Sadr was shot immediately after leading Friday prayers,
together with two of his sons, and the highly provocative timing of the assassination was
taken to signify a government agent operating with impunity. In another replay of the
previous year’s events, the assassination led to protests, which provided the regime with a
pretext for yet further repression. The day after the killing, ‘22 persons reportedly were
killed in the Suq al-Shuyukh area of al-Nasiriyya when security forces attempted to
disperse mourners from the three mosques who gathered in the marketplace. When the
crowds could not be forced to disperse, the army reportedly surrounded the town and
shelled its center, which killed 17 more persons. Shi‘a sources reported that 10 to 20
armored personnel carriers then entered the city, sealed off the marketplace, and caused a
stampede within the crowd, which resulted in further injuries and deaths.’ 86
In the days that followed, hundreds more were killed in military assaults on
protesters in Shi‘a areas of Baghdad, and other cities with a majority Shi‘a population
such as Najaf, Kerbala, al-Nasiriyya and Basra. Ali Hasan al-Majid, now southern Iraq’s
military ‘supergovernor’, declared martial law throughout the region. In late March 1999,
wrote Max van der Stoel in his last report before resigning as Special Rapporteur, Iraqi
Armoured Division Six surrounded and bombarded a number of tribal areas in the
Governorate of Basra, and in Basra city itself the houses of ‘opponents’ were flattened by
bulldozers in broad daylight ‘in full view of the occupants’. 87 In the nearby village of Al
Masha, on 29 June, 160 houses were demolished, as a punishment for the families of
those suspected of having taken part in the protests against the regime; many of the
inhabitants were executed. That month, in Basra alone, almost 1100 people were
arrested. 88
Another campaign against a specific tribe, the Al Rahma in the Suq al-Shuyukh
district, was launched in September 1999. ‘Jabbar Saad al-Rahmawi, the tribe’s sheikh,
and his son Falih Jabbar al-Rahmawi were executed on 5 October 1999 and their bodies
were handed over on the same day. Subsequently, on 10 November 1999, 11 young men
of the tribe were executed and signs of torture were observed on their bodies.’ 89 This
report is by Andreas Mavromattis, who took over as UN Special Rapporteur in late 1999.
Like his predecessor, he has been denied access to Iraq. Like his predecessor, when he
interviewed refugees in Iran he was told that armed raids against villages were still being
carried out by the Iraqi security forces. 90 He is still obliged to report cases of arbitrary
arrest and disappearance, torture and execution. But one thing in his report is different:
unlike his predecessor, Mr Mavromattis writes nothing about the destruction of the
Marshlands, because it is now substantially complete.
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NOTES
1 Peter Galbraith, ‘Saddam’s Documents’, report to the United States Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, (US Government Printing Office, Washington, May 1992), pp.1-2
2 On Van der Stoel, see Julie Flint, ‘No chemical reaction to the marshes’, The Guardian,
18 November 1993. The Iraqi secret police documents have since been translated,
analysed and digitally stored by researchers from Middle East Watch and the Defense
Department, and scanned discs containing the entire collection are now in the possession
of the Iraq Research and Documentation Project at Harvard University’s Center for
Middle Eastern Studies. A selection of the documents can be found on the IRDP website,
3 A translation of the entire document, entitled ‘Iraqi Government Document Relating to
the Marshes’ can be found on the IRDP website cited in footnote 2.
4 Sarah Graham-Brown, Sanctioning Saddam (London, 1999), gives an account of the
UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Iraq (pp. 121-126)
5 S.M.Salim, Marsh Dwellers of the Euphrates Delta (London, 1962), p.11
6 Minority Rights Group, The Marsh Arabs of Iraq (London, 1993)
7 Salim, op.cit., pp. 5-12. The other classic descriptions of the marshes are Gavin
Maxwell, A Reed Shaken by the Wind (London, 1957), Wilfred Thesiger, The Marsh
Arabs (London, 1964), and Gavin Young, Return to the Marshes (London, 1977)
8 For details of the Haigh Report, see Fred Pearce, ‘Draining life from Iraq’s marshes’,
New Scientist, 17 April 1993, pp.11,12
9
Bill Pemberton, quoted in Andrew North, ‘Saddam’s water war’, Geographical
Magazine, July 1993, p.11
10 Edward Maltby (ed.), An Environmental & Ecological Survey of the Marshlands of
Mesopotamia, draft consultative bulletin published by the AMAR Appeal Trust, May
1994, p.36
11 Ibid., p.12
12 Andrew North, ‘Saddam’s water war’, p.12
13 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Report
on the situation of human rights in Iraq, prepared by Mr Max van der Stoel, Special
Rapporteur, 19 February 1993, E/CN.4/1993/45, para.122

14
Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence (London, 1993) contains a vivid description of the
events in Basra (pp. 59-60)
15 Andrew Cockburn & Patrick Cockburn, Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam
Hussein (New York, 1999), pp. 183-184; Makiya, ibid., p. 90
16 Makiya, loc.cit., and Cockburn & Cockburn, op. cit. p. 22. The Cockburns point out,
however, that it so suited Saddam Hussein for the uprising ‘to be identified with Iran and
militant Islam that some Iraqi opposition leaders were quick to believe that he had
planted evidence of Iranian involvement. ‘He sent his own Mukhabarat [secret police] to
the south with pictures of Khomeini’’, insisted one opposition figure. (loc.cit.)
17 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Report
on the situation of human rights in Iraq, prepared by Mr Max van der Stoel, Special
Rapporteur, 18 February 1992, E/CN.4/1992/31, paras.119-123, 125
18 United Nations (1992), ibid., para. 126; Makiya, op.cit., pp. 102-102.
19 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Report
on the situation of human rights in Iraq, prepared by Mr Max van der Stoel, Special
Rapporteur, 19 February 1993, E/CN.4/1993/45, para.122
20 Graham-Brown, op.cit., p.160, quoting the Middle East Economic Digest of 20 January
1997
21 Caryle Murphy & Nora Boustany, ‘Iraq Reported Taking New Steps Against Shiite
Insurgents In South’, Washington Post, 2 July 1992
22 Said Aburish, Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge (London, 2000), pp.321-322
23
Quoted in Fred Pearce, ‘Draining life from Iraq’s marshes’, New Scientist, 17 April
1993, p.12
24 Emma Nicholson, ‘Letter from Isfahan’, Middle East International, 8 November 1991
25 ‘Uncertain Fate Awaits Refugees’, editorial in Dialogue (newsletter published by the
Public Affairs Committee for Shia Muslims, London), March 1992
26 United Nations (1992), ibid., para. 127
27 Thomas W Lippman, ‘Artillery, bulldozers assault fragile habitat’, Washington Post,
18 October 1992, quoting a report in the London Independent.
28 Graham-Brown, op.cit., p.204
29 Maltby, op.cit., pp12, 15, 16
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66
30 ‘Dictator’s forces suffer shameful defeat in Amara marshlands’, Iraq Update, 22 April
1992
31 Andrew Hogg, ‘Marsh Dwellers endure revenge of Saddam’, Sunday Times, 31 May
1992
32 United Nations (1993), ibid., para. 118
33 Quoted in Caryle Murphy & Nora Boustany, ‘Iraq Reported Taking New Steps Against
Shiite Insurgents In South’, Washington Post, 2 July 1992
34 United Nations (1993), ibid., para. 121. Again, this displacement policy conforms with
the instructions in the 1987 ‘Plan of Action’ (‘regrouping the Marsh villages on dry
land’)
35 ‘Saddam’s wide-ranging scheme to drain the marshlands’, Iraq Update, 25 December
1992
36 Caryle Murphy, ‘Baghdad cracks down on Shi’ites’, Washington Post, 24 July 1992
37 United Nations (1993), ibid., para.116
38 ‘Marsh Dwellers threatened with annihilation’, editorial in Dialogue, August 1992
39
Julie Flint, quoting from a report by Middle East Watch, in ‘Saddam killing Shias
‘daily’’, Observer, 4 October 1992
40 United Nations (1993), ibid., para.119
41 United Nations (1993), ibid., para.12; on the no-fly zone proposals see Julie Flint,
‘West aims to turn army against Saddam’, Observer, 23 August 1992
42
United Nations. General Assembly (1994), Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, 8
November 1994, A/49/651, para. 39
43 United Nations (1993), ibid., para. 118
44 United Nations (1993), ibid., para. 120
45 Shyam Bhatia, ‘Murder in the Marshes’, Observer, 28 February 1993
46 Later UN reports lead one to suspect that this may not have been an isolated instance:
Army forces are said to have ‘deliberately poisoned the marsh water. Witnesses point to
the greenish colour of the water, ‘black spots’ on the surface, its bitter taste and the
volumes of dead fish as proof of some kind of poisoning. However, as it has not been
possible for anyone to conduct a scientific analysis of the marsh water, it is unclear
whether these phenomena result from deliberate chemical poisoning, the pumping of

sewage waste into the marshes, or simply the drop in water levels.’ United Nations
(1993), ibid., para. 125
47 Emma Nicholson, in an interview for BBC Arabic Service, 25 September 1992
48 ‘Saddam’s regime intensifies inhuman atrocities’, Iraq Update, 20 November 1992.
Some weeks later, SCIRI reported that the resistance carried out ‘a lightning attack
targeting the regime’s engineering units engaged in draining the marshlands in Al Majr
Al Kabir [one of the areas cut off in November]…the attack resulted in the total
destruction of three cranes’. See ‘Regime’s engineering unit’s attacked’, Iraq Update, 15
January 1993
49 Dr Sahib al Hakim, head of the Organisation of Human Rights in Iraq, quoted in Julie
Flint, ‘Marsh Dwellers fail to escape the wrath of Saddam’, Observer, 29 November 1992
50 US Department of State, Iraq Human Rights Practices, 1993, 31 January 1994, section
1.g
51 United Nations (1993), ibid., para.115
52 United Nations (1993), ibid., para.124
53 United Nations (1993), ibid., para.128
54
Shyam Bhatia, ‘Saddam onslaught aims to kill off Marsh Dwellers’, and ‘Murder in the
Marshes’, Observer, 28 February 1993
55 Maltby, op.cit., p.25
56 Maltby, op.cit., p.12
57
Andrew North, ‘Draining the marshes to flood the desert’, Geographical Magazine,
March 1994
58 Maltby, op.cit., p.11. See pp.110-111 for further details on the reservoirs
59 Tom Rhodes, ‘Saddam hounds Shias to deadly last refuge’, The Times, 2 August 1992
60 Guerrilla quotes from Chris Hedges, ‘Rebel morale falls as water ebbs away’,
originally in the New York Times and reprinted in the Guardian, 17 November 1993; see
also Julie Flint, ‘Turning away from genocide, New Statesman, 19 November 1993.
61 ‘Saddam “used choking gas”’, Guardian, 8 November 1993.
62 Various unsigned reports in Iraq Update, 22 October 1993 and 29 October 1993
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68
63 Andrew North, ‘Clamp-down intensified’, Middle East International, 4 February 1994,
p.15
64 US Department of State, Iraq Human Rights Practices, 1994, February 1995, section
1.g
65
‘Saddam’s soldiers hit Shiites with napalm in new offensive: MP’, unsigned AFP
reports, 10 & 11 March 1994
66 US Department of State, Iraq Human Rights Practices, 1994, February 1995, section
1.g
67 United Nations General Assembly (1994), Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, 8
November 1994, A/49/651, para. 43
68 United Nations (1994), ibid., paras. 34-37, 42
69 United Nations (1994), ibid., para. 38
70 United Nations. (1994), loc. cit.
71 The best analysis of this barbarous policy is in the Introduction to the updated edition
of Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear (Berkeley, 1998) pp. ix-xxxiii. A year after the new
laws came into effect, the UN commented, ‘Penal amputations continued to be enforced
in southern Iraq…Military deserters who had escaped to Kuwait stated that they saw
many soldiers with their ears cut off…several hundreds…had been brought from
throughout Amara, Nasariya and Basra governorates in order to have their ears cut off in
the prison hospital’. See United Nations General Assembly (1995), Situation of Human
Rights in Iraq, 8 November 1995, A/50/734, para. 30
72 US Department of State, Iraq Human Rights Practices, 1994, February 1995, section
1.g
73 US Department of State (1995), ibid., section 2.d
74
Emma Nicholson, ‘Baghdad drives Shia Muslims into arid exile’, The Times, 14
October 1994
75 United Nations General Assembly (1995), Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, 8
November 1995, A/50/734, para. 47
76 Cockburn & Cockburn, ibid., pp. 183-184; and information supplied by SCIRI
77 US Department of State, Iraq Human Rights Practices, 1995, March 1996, section 2.d
78 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Report
on the situation of human rights in Iraq, prepared by Mr Max van der Stoel, Special

Rapporteur, 4 March 1996, E/CN.4/1996/61, paras. 43-44. Iraqi television reported an
‘approval’ vote of 99.96%, based on a participation rate of 99.467%. Not one person
voted against the President in the southern governorates of Kerbala, Najaf, Misan,
Muthana or Dhiqar.
79 United Nations General Assembly (1996), Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, 15
October 1996, A/51/496, paras. 74-75
80
US Department of State, Iraq Human Rights Practices, 1996, 30 January 1997,
Introduction.
81 United Nations General Assembly (1997), Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, 15
October 1997, A/52/476, paras. 50-51
82 US Department of State, Iraq Human Rights Practices, 1998, 26 February 1999,
section 1.g; and United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human
Rights, Report on the situation of human rights in Iraq, prepared by Mr Max van der
Stoel, Special Rapporteur, 26 February 1999, E/CN.4/1999/37, para. 12
83 United Nations (1999), paras. 16, 19
84 Graham-Brown, op.cit., p.205
85
US Department of State, Iraq Human Rights Practices, 1999, 25 February 2000,
section 1.g
86 US Department of State (2000), loc.cit.
87 United Nations General Assembly (1999), Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, 14
October 1999, A/54/466, paras. 16-17
88 US Department of State (2000), loc.cit.; for the Al Masha incident, see ‘Punitive
Measures in South’, 2 July 1999, on the Iraq Foundation website:
www.iraqfoundation.org/news/1999/gjul/02_south.html
89 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Report
of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iraq, Mr Andreas
Mavromattis, 16 January 2001, E/CN.4/2001/42, para. 33
90 For example, in early October 2000, ‘allegedly…a raid was carried out in the village of
Atchidi, in the district of Comert, Governorate of Misan, by the 4 th Brigade of the Iraqi
Army. About 450 heavily armed Iraqis were reportedly involved against a population of
approximately 300 people. During this raid, shots were allegedly fired at fleeing villagers
without any warning’. See United Nations (2001), ibid., para. 38
69

4
Educational Needs and Provisions for
Iraqi Refugees in Iran
G. Ali Afrooz
Education is considered both a basic need and the a social right of a human being. It is
the right of all children to benefit from appropriate educational provisions for their timely
mental, intellectual, moral and social development.
Indeed, education and schooling are as vitally important in situations of armed
conflicts when families are relocated and their normal way of life disrupted while the
stress levels of family members, especially those of the children, are dramatically
increased through no fault of their own.
It is over a decade since the international humanitarian community has slowly yet
steadily increased the momentum for giving priorities to education as a basic need of
every child in the form of a rapid intervention in complex emergencies. Sanctioning of
mandates on the rights of children has led many humanitarian organisations to consider
more deeply how better to fulfil the children and adolescent’s right to education at all
stages of an emergency condition. International conventions such as those relating to the
status of refugees (in 1975) and Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (in 1994)
points that education must be made available and accessible to all children including the
refugees as well as those seeking an asylum.
Article 28 of the CRC reads: ‘make primary education compulsory and available
free to all; encourage the development of different forms of secondary education
including general and vocational education, make that available and accessible to every
child ...’
Article 2 of the CRC emphasises the rights of all children by stating that: ‘States
parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present convention to each child
within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s
national, ethnic or social origin ... or other status.’
It is the policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran that all registered refugee children
have the right to a free education much the same way as Iranian children. According to
the Rules of Procedure for Refugees in Islamic Republic of Iran when a refugee gains
admittance to the country, he/she will enjoy the same rights as Iranian citizen to health,
cultural, social and educational services. This has been practised since the Islamic
Revolution of 1979. As a result, a whole generation of children of refugee families who
have been in Iran for the last twenty-two years has grown up and been educated as
Iranians. Documented or registered Iraqi children only have to meet the same criteria as

Iranian children might do to attend school, i.e., they can only register at schools in their
own residential areas and they must be within a certain age limit. At the present, all Iraqi
children in different parts of Iran and those who live in refugee camps have access to
schools enjoying the same national and private curriculum.
Children are among the most vulnerable of any refugee population and they
represent over 50% of the world’s refugees, displaced persons and war conflict victims.
They experience a variety of psychological and psychosomatic problems in their new
living habitats.
On the whole, four types of stresses or psychological problems predominantly
influence the lives of refugees in general and those of Iraqi refugees living in Iran in
particular:
1. Everyday life stresses, which are associated with refugees’ physical, biological
and safety needs.
2. Stress of adoption associated with the necessity of adjustments to the new
conditions of life.
3. Stress of uncertainty associated with the unpredictable future and undetermined
social status.
4. Low level of self-respect, self esteem and fear of identity loss.
The consequences of ignoring psychological problems and stress situation of
refugees especially children and youth can lead to a number of disorders, which may fall
into four categories:
Biological: Psychosomatic symptoms, stomach aches, headaches and diarrhoea, sleep
disorders, bed-wettings, sucking thumbs and shakings, etc.
Emotional: Feelings of sadness and depression, being easily disturbed and feeling
generally tense, anxious, hopeless, guilty and helpless.
Cognitive: Loss of concentration, loss of memory, inability to perform simple tasks and
constantly daydreaming.
Behavioural: Becoming uncooperative, acting particularly naughty or quite unsettled,
social isolation, withdrawal and aggressiveness.
It is normal for children to behave differently upon any major changes in their life
pattern. Therefore, refugee and displaced children may experience:
• a different culture and language in an unfamiliar living environment,
• changes in family dynamics,
• an unfamiliar school environment,
• possible loss of family members, and
• difficulties of making new friends.
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72
There is no doubt that all children need support and encouragement from their
parents, family and school to develop both emotionally and physically.
The main purpose of this chapter is to highlight the educational, psychological
and rehabilitation needs of Iraqi refugee families, children, adolescents and adults
who live in Iran. Developing comprehensive and functional educational programmes
and provisions for refugees living under stress situation is highly significant.
Education is the main key to the solving of all kinds of psychological and
social problems. It is the main service at the onset of emergencies because educational
opportunities provide structure, stability and a sense of normality to young people.
Educational programmes are likely to promote security, protection and
rehabilitation for children – particularly for adolescents, who without targeted
education interventions are at increased risks of falling prey to a variety of abuses and
social deviations.
Education within Iraq and Arab Marshlands
During the years before 1980 Iraq had done much to improve its educational system
with special emphasis on advanced and vocational training. However, school
attendance has been hampered enormously since the beginning of the war (1980) and
the inevitable shortage of teaching staff, especially at secondary levels.
In fact, the quality of Iraq’s educational system had been drastically worsening
even before the international embargo on 1990. Primary enrolment had dropped to
85% in 1988, from 100% in 1978. (1) The literacy rate has reached 55%. This means
that about 45% of population in Iraq are illiterate. The Marsh Dwellers in southern
Iraq have been suffering insecurity and inadequate health provisions for decades, as a
result of military oppression and lack of educational provisions.
Marsh Dwellers families living in Iraq have been facing a very difficult time
in order to have their young children registered in a primary school. Today, official
educational provision for Marsh Dwellers even at the elementary level is very poor.
Most marshland Arabs still living in southern part of Iraq do not have the chance of
sending their children to school. For most of them, informal religious education in the
mosques and Quranic classes are the only available educational means to get a chance
of learning how to read and write.
In most cases, deprivation from a basic educator is closely associated with
income poverty and wider human-development indicators. Of course, a correlation is
not causation. Income poverty does not automatically reflect educational attainment.
The danger is that the failure to overcome educational inequalities will, in turn, lead to
more intensive patterns of marginality especially in southern part of Iraq and amongst
Marsh Dweller families.
Education in the Islamic Republic of Iran
The high rate of population growth during the years 1980-1990 (e.g., 3.4% in 1986)
associated with the years immediately after the Islamic revolution put a heavy burden
on the educational system of the land.
This also coincided with the peak of the refugee population in Iran. In 1991,
the number of new entrants to public sector primary schools in Grade I was just under
two million children, which only fell to one and half million in 1998. The total
enrolment in public primary schools in 1991 was 9,911,511 children, which decreased
gradually to 8,642,696 in I998. At present, the Ministry of Education is providing

educational services for more than l9 million students, at elementary, guidance course
and high school levels. (2)
Primary schooling in Iran is of the responsibility of Ministry of Education.
The school system is organised broadly into three tiers:
1. primary (age 6-11 years),
2. guidance course or lower secondary (11-14 years),
3. upper secondary or high schools (14-18 years).
Pre-primary or readiness school is not compulsory in Iran. Therefore, only a
small number of children attend pre-primary school (5-6 years). The same applies to
the university preparation course for 17-18 year-olds.
All schooling is free but only five years of primary school education are
compulsory.
The main objectives of the government’s primary education programme are as
follows:
• Preparing children to adapt themselves to an Islamic teaching for their individual
and social life.
• Fostering their morale to respect the law and orders of a social discipline and
responsibility.
• Establishing an environment for the growth at development of scientific, artistic,
athletic and mathematical talents of pupils. (3)
Over the last two years, the Ministry of Education’s main strategy focused on
improving the quality of education, raising the enrolment and intake rate (particularly
for girls) and developing educational facilities in underprivileged areas of the country.
After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, all schools were nationalised and until
1989 there were no private schools in Iran.
Since 1990, private schools, termed as non-profit schools, have been allowed
to operate using exactly the same text books and curriculum as those of the
government schools. By the academic year of 1999-2000, there were 2,175 private or
non-profit schools covering 3% of the total school population. Parents pay the costs of
these schools.
All teachings in Iranian schools are carried out in Farsi. Iran and Arab states
share the same alphabets (known as Arabic alphabets) in much the same way that
other states use Latin alphabets with their own pronunciation and relevant
connotations. All text books were completely revised scientifically and culturally
upon the Islamic Revolution.
Educational provisions for Iraqi refugees in Iran
It is estimated that the total number of Iraqis currently living in Iran is 600,000; they
are mostly of Arab origin. Of these, some 480,000 are refugees from the 1971-75
period, while the remaining 20,000 are refugees from the years 1987-91, during the
Iraqi regime’s imposed war on Iran. Then there are residual refugees from the Iran–
Iraq war and a small number of residual refugees from the September 1996 influx. Of
these 120,000, some 65,000 live in 27 camps and the rest are scattered in towns and
villages nationwide. A considerable number of Iraqis are living in a southern part of
Tehran called ‘Dulataabaad’.
73

74
The Iraqi refugee population in Iran also includes an estimated over
70,000 Shiite Arabs who have mostly fled from the southern Iraqi Marshlands to Iran
over the years. Iraqi Marsh Arabs, originate in the south-eastern corner of Iraq in the
delta area where the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers meet. The Iraqi regime had chosen
the Marsh Dwellers as the target of its vengeance, burning villages and draining large
tracts of the marshy areas where they lived.
Government statistics verified by the UNHCR indicate that in mid-1997 there
was 64,485 Iraqi living in 27 camps established by IRA N.
Table 1: Breakdown of Iraqi Refugee population living in camps established
in different provinces of Iran
Province Refugee number
Khuzistan 23,608
West Azerbaijan 16,551
Fars 7,394
Kermanshah 5,781
Kurdistan 4,797
Lourstan 2,923
Central 2,595
Zanjan 484
Tehran 170
Most of the camps are located far away from neighbouring villages and towns. About
30 per cent of adult male refugees living in the camps have been able to find some
employment outside the camps.
The Iraqi refugees living outside the camps are largely considered as selfreliant,
earning their livings in various types of occasional trades, business and odd
jobs in towns and cities. Of course, finding appropriate jobs for those adult Iraqis who
speak Farsi, however imperfectly, is much easier.
Taking this population figure and making the reasonable assumption based on
several statistical Reports, (4) 50% of the Iraqi refugees living in Iran are under 15
years of age. It is estimated that there could be up to 250,000 Iraqi children aged 5–16
(school age) in Iran, living in the refugee camps or with their relatives in different
cities.
According to the statistical reports of the Ministry of Education, in academic
year of 1999-2000, in addition to the number of Iraqi children attending private
schools in their camps, a total of 26,238 Iraqi school age refugees in 29 provinces
nationwide had access to educational services in Iranian schools at different levels. Of
course, this figure represents only those school age Iraqi children who live with their
families in different cities of Iran.
There are considerable numbers of Iraqi school age children who attend
special or private schools within the camps. For example, AMAR operates a largeschool
primary education scheme in Arabic language using the Iraqi curriculum, for
about 3,500 refugee children, living in different comps mostly in the south-west of
Iran staffed by 137 primary and secondary school teachers.
AMAR has been providing educational facilities such as books and teaching
staffs for these children. During the 1999-2000 school year, AMAR was able to build
and reconstruct a number of schools for children living within the camps.

Table 2: Number of Iraqi children attending Iranian government schools
Levels Elementary Secondary High School % Total
Boys 9,084 3,071 1,308 10 13,463
Girls 8,404 2,894 1,477 11 12,775
Total 17,488 5,965 2,785 26,238
This table shows that about 67% of Iraqi school age children are attending primary
school and only about 10% of them are registered at high school level; the rest are in
guidance course.
Table 3: Number of Iraqi school age children studying in private schools within the
camps (supported by AMAR)
Camp Ashrafi 1 Ashrafi 2 Beheshti Ansar Mutahari Shustar Servistan 1 Servistan 2 Total
Boys 558 190 155 390 200 280 146 49 1,968
Girls 535 155 164 250 140 140 120 41 1,545
Total 1,093 345 319 640 340 420 266 90 3,513
These figures show that out of total students attending schools within the camps, 57%
are boys and 43% girls.
Table 4: Distribution by province and sex of Iraqi children attending Iranian
schools, academic year 2000–2001
Province Boys Girls Total
Ardebil 8 13 21
Azerbaijan
East
28 31 59
Azerbaijan
(West)
406 298 704
Esfahan 947 946 1950
Ilam 903 911 1,814
Bushehr 64 35 99
Tehran 1,489 1,577 3,066
Chaharmahal
va Bakht.
2 1 3
Khorassan 1,147 1,314 2,461
Khuzistan 2,919 2,290 5,209
Zanjan 22 43 65
Sistan
Balouchistan
0 1 1
Semnan 23 22 45
Fars 695 608 1,303
Qazvin 281 226 504
Qom 1,879 1,921 3,800
75

76
Kurdistan 396 336 732
Kerman 8 2 10
Kermanshah 1,141 1,008 2,149
Kohkiloyeh 6 3 9
Golestan 23 32 55
Gilan 28 56 84
Luristan 102 116 218
Mazandaran 23 27 50
Central 239 311 550
Hormozgan 34 41 75
Hamadan 24 22 46
Yazd 626 5554 1,180
Total 13,463 12,775 26,238
The table shows that close to 50% of Iraqi children attending public schools are living
with their families in the three provinces of Khuzistan, Qom and Tehran.
Besides official educational facilities for Iraqi school age children nationwide
in public schools and private schools within different camps with Arabic language
and Iraqi curricula a good number of Iraqi adults (aged 20-49) had attended literacy
classes.
According to statistical reports of Iranian Literacy Movement Organisation
from 1983 to 2000, more than 25,307 illiterate Iraqi refugees have attended 736
literacy classes in different levels throughout the country. (5)
It should be mentioned that many Iraqi adults especially those among Marsh
Dwellers at the time of their arrival in Iran were illiterate. Literacy classes are being
administrated by the Literacy Movement Organisation, which was created after the
Islamic Revolution as a government-supported volunteer movement to tackle the
problem of widespread adult illiteracy especially in the rural areas. Literacy
Movement Organisation classes are held in whatever building is available, often
mosques or even in tents, and are flexible enough to meet even the needs of nomadic
people. Teachers use standard school text books supplemented by adult education
materials, and classes are held at flexible times to suit the needs of the students to
overcome cultural barriers to girl’s and women’s education, all teachers are of the
same sex as their students.
Educational and psycho-social rehabilitation of refugees
A range of activity needs to be carried out to support the educational needs,
psychological and social rehabilitation of refugees’ communities, especially for those
who are still living within the camps. The strategy of psycho-social rehabilitation
includes:
1. Developing programmes that enhance the lives of at-risk youth in the areas of
personal growth, community service, cultural awareness and interpersonal
skill development.
2. Providing community guidance, support and protection for families and youth.
3. Fostering youth community building.
4. Training and recruiting local counsellors and child care and social workers in order
to provide individual and family and group counselling services for the

efugee communities and helping them to help themselves to overcome
psychological problems.
5. Fostering the values of faith, hope, trust, love, peace, strength, discipline, wisdom,
determination, knowledge and excellence service.
6. Effective communication training and conflict management in order to overcome
stress adoption.
7. Cognitive training and restructuring desirable future images in order to reduce the
stress of uncertainty.
8. Developing positive social attitudes amongst refugee population towards their new
life and new living environment in order to reduce depression and emotional
problems.
9. Cognitive training and encouraging positive thinking amongst refugee families
especially the youth in order to develop strong motivation for an active
participation in social affairs through the development and implementation of
social programmes.
The educational and psycho-social rehabilitation work with refugee families,
especially with children and adolescents, will reduce their main psychological
problems, which are mainly as follows:
1. The feeling of being unprotected.
2. The feeling of being helpless.
3. The lack of positive attitudes and poor personal and social motivation.
4. The feeling of victimisation.
5. The low level of self-reliance and self-respect.
6. The state of frustration arising from the need for self-respect and self-identity.
According to the Refugee Reports the second biggest health problem in Iraqi
refugee camps was psychological disorders, most commonly coupled with depression,
anxiety and stress.
Only by solving or reducing these psychological problems and implementing
comprehensive and meaningful psyche-social programmes and activities and
functional education within the refugee camps communities would the development
of sound mental health and fostering desired moral and social values amongst refugee
families especially at-risk youth be possible.
Principles of successful educational programmes for refugees
As vitally important steps serious consideration should be given to the emotional
wellbeing and psycho-social needs of refugee children and families. These could be
maintained through improving and normalising the conditions of life of children and
their families. This will enable them to overcome the impact of their experiences
preventing an increased risk to the children’s wellbeing by composing comprehensive
and functional educational programmes for refugee children and adults.
Education should be directed to the full personality development of refugee
children and adults and to the strengthening of respect to their rights and social
functioning.
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
refers to the right of education in Article 2: ‘No person should be denied the right of
education in the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education
and teaching, The State shall respect the rights of parents to ensure such education
77

78
and teaching are in conformity with their own religious and philosophical
convictions.’
A comprehensive and functional educational programme for Iraqi refugee children
and adults should include the following considerations:
• Conducting a needs-assessment study programme in order to identify the specific
educational needs of refugee in different areas. These include general education,
curricula, equipment, materials, trained and qualified teachers, special education
for exceptional children, effective education programmes and the availability of
schools from elementary through high school for girls and boys. The list also
incorporates basic technical and vocational education, adult education and
availability of higher education for high school graduate refugees.
• Providing effective and functional educational programmes at all levels in order to
help refugee children to: develop good communication and social skills, think
creatively, get involved in team-working, and take responsibility for their own
learning and advancement.
• Training highly qualified motivated and bilingual (Farsi and Arabic) speaking
teachers for all refugee children and adults. Teachers of Iraqi refugees must be
sensitive to the differences in cultures and personality characteristics of students.
Without doubt, a teacher-training scheme is a very critical component of any
educational programme.
• Providing opportunity for all school age Iraqi children to enable them to study
their own Arabic curriculum meanwhile helping them to read, write and speak
Farsi as the language of the host country.
• An effective language programme is highly significant. Providing Farsi and
Arabic classes for all Iraqi students is vitally important. All Iraqi refugee children,
adolescents and adults living in Iran, especially those living in different refugee
camps, need to communicate, read, write and speak fluently in Farsi and Arabic.
Language proficiency both in Farsi and Arabic for all Iraqi refugees presently
living in Iran will serve to increase their self-esteem, social skills, school and
university achievements and appropriate job placement in the host country,
whether they decide to stay on permanently or return to their own motherland.
• Providing basic education opportunities for children and illiterate adults, men and
women alike, in Farsi and Arabic languages.
• Giving more attention to secondary education and promoting students’ enrolment
(both girls and boys) at this level. As already stated, statistical reports of Ministry
of Education (table 2) shows that only about 10 percent of Iraqi children attending
Iranian public schools are enrolled in secondary school. The refugee enrolment
pattern shows an education pyramid with a broad base and narrow top. This
pattern needs to be taken into full consideration. In some cases, an effective and
functional high school curriculum and school meals have provided a strong
incentive for parents to send their children to school and the meals have also
improved cognitive performance and test scores.
• Providing comprehensive technical and vocational training programmes for
refugee population, especially for at-risk youths and adults, is truly significant.
Academic and vocational skill development will help employment of the at-risk
populations. The comprehensive bilingual vocational education for young
refugees will prove to be very effective and immensely helpful. Primary and
secondary education are vital for refugee children and youths, as is vocational
training. Effective vocational programmes as practical livelihood opportunities for

efugee can help many young refugees to find appropriate jobs. At present, the
vocational education programme is very limited, though it has long been
acclaimed for its ‘hands-on’ approach to education and its ability to demonstrate a
connection between what is learned in school and what is required for
employment.
• Providing bilingual functional literacy and continuing education for the Iraqi
refugee adult population, especially within the refugees camps.
• Expanding comprehensive family education, enhancing personal growth, cultural
awareness, interpersonal skills, social and legal rights education, child raising,
maintaining family mental health, problem solving, coping with psychological
discomforts and prevention of handicapping conditions amongst children.
• Conducting comprehensive physical, sense-motor, mental, emotional and
behavioural scales and screening tests with all refugee children (age 2-8) in order
to recognise children with special needs or talents. The identification and
protection of talented and disturbed children are very important.
• Preparing an effective Special Education and Rehabilitation programme for
students with special needs.
• Establishing bilingual educational counselling services for refugee students and
their families.
• Providing higher education opportunities for talented Iraqi high school graduate
refugees. Allocating a number of collage scholarships for eligible Iraqi students
will serve as a strong motivation and encouragement for all refugee adolescents’
school achievements.
The current system of education mainly focuses on the integration of Iraqi children,
especially those who do not live in camps, into the Iranian mainstream. However,
refugee children and adolescents do have special needs of which sympathetic teaching
staff and committed school counsellors need to be aware of so as to take necessary
steps to meet these needs adequately.
SOURCES
1. Ajdukovic, Marian; Ajdukivic, Dean.(1993): ‘Psychological well-being of refugee
children’. (Special Section on Children and war) Child Abuse and Neglect v 17, no 6,
(Nov-Dec).
2. Davis, Austen P. (l996): ‘Targeting the vulnerable in emergency situations: who is
vulnerable?’ (Public Health) Lancet v 348, n 9031.
3. Education for All 2000, Islamic Republic of Iran Country Report.(1999): Ministry
of Education /UNICEF/UNESCO, Tehran, Iran.
4. Literary Activities for Afghan and Iraqi Refugees in the I.R of Iran, (1999):
Literacy Movement Organisation, Tehran.
5. Literacy Movement Organisation at a Glance (1999): LMO, Tehran, Iran.
6. Preston, Rosemary (1995): ‘Is there a Refugee-specific Education?’ in the Courier,
Brussels, No.150, March and April.
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80
7. Sarjveladze, N. (1997): ‘stress disorders among Internally Displaced Persons (IPD)
and their Psycho-Social Rehabilitation’. Fifth European Congress.
8. The International Guide to Qualification in Education.(1996). Mansell Publishing
Limited.
9. UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (1999), UNESCO, New York.
NOTES
(1) Encyclopedia of the Orient
(2) Statistical Reports, Iranian Ministry of Education (1999–2000)
(3) Ministry of Education and UNICEF (1999)
(4) UNESCO, Tehran, March 2000
(5) LMO, Statistical reports, December 2000

5
Health in the Marshes and in the Refugee
Camps
Mohammed Taghi Cheragchi-Bashi and
Hassan Salman-Manesh
Introduction
The Marshlands of Iraq are a unique part of the world. Recent political and
environmental changes have threatened a way of life that has continued for millennia.
The Marshlands have supported a traditional way of life, maintained by the Marsh
Arabs or Ma’dan, which has survived for millennia. The marshes provide the Ma’dan
with the environment for traditional agriculture and for the sustainable use of natural
resources – reed gathering, mat weaving, fishing, hunting and grazing of water buffalo.
They live on islands in the marshes entirely constructed of reeds, and use these to build
beautiful cathedral-like homes.
The Marshlands have also been the home of many endemic and unique species,
both birds and mammals, now globally threatened. Already, some species have been
entirely lost: spectacular wildlife such as the smooth coated otter, Indian crested
porcupine and grey wolf are thought to have become extinct in Marshes. In addition they
support almost the entire world population of two species: the Basra reed warbler and the
Iraq babbler, which among many other indigenous species are threatened. The Marshes
are also vital to the survival of an important fish population, in particular to the shrimp
Matapenacus affinis, which are vital to fishermen along the coast of the Northern Gulf.
These Marshlands are:
• essential for the maintenance of a unique cultural heritage
• of global importance for wildlife and biodiversity
• important natural resources for Iraq and for the people beyond Iraq’s frontiers
• significant in maintenance of environmental quality
• a rare and critically threatened wetland landscape within a desert environment
The Iraqi regime has employed an ambitious civil engineering project with the aim of
deliberately draining the marshes. This will not only permit political and social objectives
but also it will have an impact on the health and environmental status of Marsh Arab

82
people. In this paper the authors will try to touch issues regarding the health and
environmental health aspects of this tragic international project.
The Marshlands and the delivery of health services
Health is a basic human need and considered as one of the human rights by governments
and international communities. Delivery of health services is the responsibility of
governments and should by achieved in collaboration with different sectors and private
practices.
Based on the Alma Ata Declaration, primary health care delivery is the minimum
level of health which should be accessible to all inhabitants regardless of their political,
social and spiritual status and the place of their residence. This became a basis for the
WHO’s ‘health for all’ (HFA) by the year 2000 and the key strategy for implementation
of the HFA concept. Supposed services rendered as primary health care (PHC) are what
the health professionals call the eight elements of PHC. These services are as follows:
• Education for health, which consists of all types of activities for health promotion and
public awareness.
• Local endemic disease controls, which depends to the area. These diseases are well
known both to the local community and also health professionals in all defined areas.
• Expanded programme of immunization. In this element the services delivered are
giving vaccines to infants (under one year old children) to protect them against 6
major vaccine preventable and life threatening diseases including Tuberculosis,
Measles, Tetanus (mainly neonatal), Pertussis, Diphtheria and Poliomyelitis. Hepatitis
B vaccine has been included recently as one of EPI antigens.
• Maternal and childcare, which covers anti-natal postnatal care and clean delivery and
also family planning. These activities were grouped following the International
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo (1994) under
reproductive health. It also covers women’s health. Childcare covers children from
newborns up to adolescence with particular emphasis on children under five.
• Essential drugs provision. In this element of PHC, essential drugs should be available
and affordable to all communities.
• Nutrition and food supplements for at risk groups particularly pregnant women and
children. The main objective of this element is prevention and reducing the number of
low birth weight children and childhood malnutrition. Micro-nutritional deficiency
disorders have been recently included in this element.
• Treatment of common diseases and prevalent seasonal diseases is an important
element of PHC. It represents a major part of client referrals to health facilities.
• Safe drinking water supply and sanitation. This also covers environmental health.
The PHC elements mentioned above are the minimum. Many countries have extended the
number of services. For example, in Iran these elements have increased to ten including
mental health, oral health and school health.

An appropriate infrastructure should be developed and established in every country
according to socioeconomic and geographical condition for delivery of health services.
These services should be:
• accessible to the community and covering all needy people
• acceptable by recipients
• affordable by all socioeconomic classes
• utilizing appropriate technology
• with full commitment of policy makers
• supported by full and active involvement of the community
• participated in by all related parties and also the private sector
In the light of the above criteria, all governments should design their own health system
accordingly.
Geographical and cultural characteristics and conditions are really important for both
providing accessibility and also utilization of services.
Establishment of health system in Marshlands area as one of the geographical
circumstances is not a heavy task. It depends on the concentration of dwellers and also on
their cultural behaviours.
Basic services will be delivered by trained community health workers based in
facilities established in more populated areas. These facilities will be furnished with basic
equipment and supplies. Community health workers who are natives selected from the
Marshlands may deliver schedule based outreach services to other less populated
settlements around the fixed facility.
The fixed location with its outreach sites population will be defined as area under
coverage of community health workers.
All PHC elements will be delivered by Marshlands community workers and
special cases will be referred to the related health centres located around the Marshlands
vicinity staffed with physicians and other health professional for more advanced care.
Every health centre will support and supervise a cluster of Marshland health facilities.
The Marshlands health network is a part of the country’s overall health system that
observes their own and special characteristics. It will be advisable if a unit in the local
health authority could accept the responsibility for supervising of running the health
services in less accessible areas.
Marshlands health related lifestyle
Marshland Dwellers have their own cultural structure that reflects on the lifestyle of these
communities. They live in special environment surrounded by water and high humidity.
Shelters in these areas are mainly made from reeds, so the following factors will affect on
the lifestyle of Marshlands dwellers.
• watery and wet living conditions
• difficult sanitary conditions
• special food habits
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• close contact with buffaloes
• highly concentrated insect population
• outdoor sleeping habits
• hard to reach residences
Against the background of the above conditions, Marsh Dwellers are living with the
following related risks:
• a high incidence of vector borne and waterborne disease
• bad sanitary conditions
• higher mortality due to difficult access to health facilities
• a higher prevalence of zoonosis
Health consequences of Marshlands drainage
Marshlands drainage will change the ecosystem and environment of the area to a great
extent. It makes life hard or impossible not only for animals birds, fish and other living
creatures but also for the human inhabitants in the area. The reason is mainly due to the
nature and habits of these living creatures, which have been accustomed to the physical
and biological situation of Marshlands which is wet and humid. Drying of the Marshlands
intentionally or naturally will result in the migration of flying and land animals to other
places and the death of the majority of fishes and other water living creatures. Finally,
people living in the Marshlands also should migrate to other marshes or if they stay there
they have to change their way of life.
Changing the traditional lifestyle of Marsh Dwellers from fishery and livestock to
farming and agriculture is difficult. Therefore they can not move to other villages and
agriculture areas. This is why they are forced or persuaded to migrate to the cities or
become refugees in neighboring countries. In both cases, they will be settled
compulsorily around the cities (pre-urban areas) or in the villages or cities close to the
borders. Consequently, drainage of Marshlands will create the following impacts on
health that degrade healthy life:
• poor shelter and crowded families
• poor environmental condition
• inadequate access to health facilities
• shortage of food and the risk of high malnutrition due to reduced income
• unhealthy social conditions
• risk of mental disorders
• low access to education
• high morbidity from infectious diseases
• higher mortality, particularly from disease
The human and ecological disaster which has taken place in the Marshlands, towns and
cities of southeast Iraq has been one of the most sustained and cruel attacks in history.
Villages have been bombed, inhabitants killed and up to a million people displaced. The
draining of Marshes has brought to an end a unique habitat that goes back to the birth of

civilization. The environmental effects are incalculable. People are having to cope with
impossible odds and more than 95000 of Marshland Iraqi refugees have fled their country
to camps in the safe haven of Iran.
Health and sanitation of Marsh Arab Refugees
Iran’s more than 2 million refugees include 500,000 Iraqis; some 95,000 of these Iraqis
are south Iraqi Shi‘a, including Marsh Arabs, now taking shelter in southwest Iran.
The refugees comprise townspeople who have escaped through the marshes, as well as
Marsh Dwellers; many of the townspeople are educated and before the uprising had
access to reasonable health services. The Marsh Arabs on the other hand, who have
traditionally dwelt in the inaccessible marshlands, had lacked both education and health
services and suffered from chronic poor health when they entered Iran. The refugees live
either as squatters (45,000) or in camps (50,000).
Health services
The AMAR ICF was set up to provide humanitarian and for refugees in the south of Iran
and the Iraqi Marshland in 1991 and has done so without interruption since then.
In the early years, the AMAR ICF worked inside Iraq, and until 1996 the AMAR ICF
worked at Himmet, the entry point of the refugees on the border.
The AMAR ICF operates 6 clinics (4 clinics in the camps of Jahrom, Ketwend,
Servistan and Beheshti of Dezful and two larger polyclinics outside the camps in the
towns of Huwaiza and Dezful in the south of Iran). These clinics are staffed by 15
doctors and 70 medical staff supported by 3 ambulances. All clinics deliver primary
health care and are supported by pharmacies and four of them provide laboratory
services. Two polyclinics have more advanced facilities including radiology, sonography,
ECC etc. Three oral health clinic are working, two in the polyclinics and one in Jahrom
where gynaecological and obstetric services are also offered.
Environmental health and sanitation
Environmental health management constitutes a very important, indeed an essential,
component of the health system. The need for a healthy environment is common to all
situations, whether refugees are concerned or not.
Communities where basic sanitation needs are not properly met face not only the
threat of communicable diseases, but also the loss of valuable material resources in
meeting the cost of preventable sickness.
However, taking appropriate measures in the establishment of sustained and effective
environmental health operations in camps can reduce or eliminate the risk of preventable
diseases and death among the refugee population. Such measures not only contribute to
the good health of individuals in the camps and nearby areas, but also reduce the high
cost of providing health care services.
A high incidence of enteric diseases associated with poor sanitation is characteristic of
the disease picture in many less developed communities.
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The best ways of combating these diseases, from the cost-benefit and cost
effectiveness point of view, are through the provision of basic sanitation. Improvement in
sanitation generally has parallels in overall health as well as economic conditions.
AMAR environmental sanitation activities
The most important environmental health and sanitation measures that should be
considered in refugee areas include:
• provision of appropriate shelters
• provision of safe water, accessible in sufficient quantities for drinking and domestic
purposes
• protection of distribution of safe food products
• provision of sanitary systems, including latrines and solid waste and sewage disposal.
The south Iraqi refugee problem is acknowledged by the Iranian government and AMAR
ICF. But the budget that organizations and NGOs are allocating to south Iraqi refugees is
extremely limited.
The AMAR ICF has provided the basis for a sustainable infrastructure (medical
facilities, safe drinking water supply and sanitation) as well as primary and secondary
education for Marsh Dwellers who have been taken from their original background as
well as for other Arab refugees.
Fortunately, due to the very good relations that AMAR ICF has established with
the Iranian authorities, all AMAR’s projects are flourishing and expanding rapidly. Most
fit within the overall goals and needs of the government of Iran, without any interference
with or duplication of existing systems and programmes, though AMAR’s system is well
organized, which means that most of AMAR investments in the field are of a sustainable
nature. The camps’ health centres and clinics will stay there as long as the problem
remains.
• Shelter
For cooperation with the shelter programme, which has been set up for refugees, it is
planned to construct small masonry shelters in Jahrom and Servistan in the current year.
• Water supply
AMAR has provided safe drinking water in all Iraqi refugee camps in Khuzestan and Fars
province, either renovated or reconstructed. Chlorinators are provided for disinfecting the
water supply networks. In one of the camps a complete water purification plant and
distribution system has been constructed, including the house connections for all houses
in the camps.
• Excreta disposal
In almost all camps, an adequate number of individual pit privies with standard slab has
been provided for houses.
• Waste water disposal
Since last year according to the priorities set out in AMAR’s environmental sanitation
master plan, a waste treatment plan was constructed in one of the camps, as a pilot
project. Since this project was successfully completed, others will be provided.

• Garbage collection and disposal
The camps’ general cleanliness and garbage disposal has been improved by providing
public garbage bins and garbage pick-ups equipped with hydraulic containers; also
garbage workers have been employed from among the refugees themselves. Solid wastes
are collected and sanitarily disposed of daily, in all the camps.
• Sanitary food protection and distribution
Food hygiene is of vital importance, particularly in the camps. This can pose a major
problem due to poor sanitation measures and spread food-borne diseases caused by
micro-organisms in the camps. Unless proper sanitary measures are applied to the
storage, preparation and distribution of food, conditions in refugee camps will be a
constantly danger to health; so AMAR has planned to construct a sanitary food centre,
including shops equipped with sanitary facilities, in one of the most severely affected
camps in the current year.
• Food and clothing distribution
Different kinds of food materials as well as dried powder milk frequently have been
distributed among the refugees, donated by different sources.
Health and sanitation assessment of Marsh Dweller refugees in Iran
To assess the health and sanitary status of Marsh Dweller refugees in Iran, two health,
demography and sanitation surveys were conducted among Arab refugees living in the
south of Iran by WHO consultants in collaboration with AMAR staff in the south in
August 1997 and June 2000 respectively. Methodology, process and approach were the
same in both surveys.
Two camps, one in Fars provinces (Jahrom) and the other in Khuzestan, were selected as
sites for the survey. A questionnaire was developed to collect data about population
immunization, nutrition, family health, diarrhoeic diseases and basic sanitation of
households. Sanitary conditions in the camps were studied in both surveys by visits and
observation. A rapid quality assessment also was carried out in both occasions. A random
sampling approach was exercised in both surveys through family files in the camp health
centres and also in blocks of residences.
Comparison of the results of two surveys are shown in the tables in the appendices.
The survey reveals good improvement in sanitation and health status during the threeyear
survey period.
• Population structure: the percentage of children under one year old has dropped by
one percent
• Immunization: the status of immunization in under one year old children has
improved and the high coverage has sustained
• Nutrition: the nutritional status of children has not improved and comparatively is the
same
• The morbidity of diarrhoeic diseases has dramatically decreased; management of
diarrhoea has improved and the knowledge and behaviour of mothers concerning
diarrhoea also increased and improved.
AMAR has started new activities in strengthening the quality of services in its clinic and
has launched a new programme for the training of Women Health Volunteers selected
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from the refugees to secure more community involvement in the delivery of health
services. The Foundation has also begun the implementation of new environmental and
sanitary projects.
REFERENCES
• ‘The Marsh Arabs and the Marshlands’, The AMAR appeal-assisting Marsh Arabs
and refugees, March 2001.
• Review of Health situation of refugees, Islamic Republic of Iran. WHO mission
report Sept. 1999 by Dr. D. Buriot and Dr. Maire Connolly
• A visit to the Iraqi refugees camps assisted by AMAR in south of Iran, August 1997,
by Dr. M. T. Cheraghchi Bashi and Dr. R. Bahar
• Health and sanitation survey in Iraqi refugees camps assisted by AMAR in south of
Iran, June 2000, by Dr. R. Bahar , Eng. H. Salman Manesh, Dr. M. T. Cheraghchi
Bashi and others.
• Child and maternal mortality survey, Iraq 1999, Report by UNICEF, July 1999, Iraq

APPENDICES
Direct beneficiaries of medical and health care by settlement:
Settlement Area covered Population
Dezful polyclinic Camps/squatters 20,000
Huwaiza polyclinic Squatters 13,000
Beheshti clinic Camp 1,000
Ketwend clinic Camp 3,500
Jahrom clinic Camp 5,000
Servistan clinic Camp 2,500
Total 45,000
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Table 1: Population structure in survey sample; demographic survey in Iraqi
refugees camps (Shaheed Dast Ghaib in Jahrom and Bani Najjar in Gutwand)
Comparison of two surveys (1997 and 2000)
Age groups
(years)
Dast Ghaib
Camp
Gutwand
Camp
No. %
No. %
97 00 97 00 97 00 97 00
Less than one year M 13 12 34 21
F 12 10 40 19
T 25 22 6.1 5.8 74 40 7 6
1 – 4 M 45 45 93 98
F 49 46 93 76
T 94 91 29.1 22.7 186 174 17.7 26
5 – 14 M 72 70 139 85
F 67 68 135 76
T 139 145 34.2 36.3 274 161 26 24
15 – 49 M 75 72 247 137
F 74 73 18* 213 129 20*
T 149 145 36.4 36.3 460 266 43 40
50 + M 0 1 19 12
F 2 3 37 17
T 2 4 0.3 1 56 29 5.3 4
Total M 205 200 532 353
F 204 200 518 317
T 409 400 100 1050 670 100 100
* Child bearing age women.
Remarks

Table 2 : Results of immunization survey in Dast Ghaib (Jahrom) and Beni Najjar
(Gutwand) refugee camps
Comparison of two surveys (1997 and 2000)
Results Shaheed Dast Ghaib
camp
Shaheed Beni Najjar
Camp
1997 2000
1997 2000
1 No. of children surveyed 119 113 224 214
2 % of children holding imm
card
97.5 98 98 95
3 Immunization coverage in
less than one year old
children (percent)*
• BCG 96.6 98 81 96
• DPT / OPV 3 97.5 98 90 97
• Measles ** 91.5 95 85 92
4 % of mothers with knowledge
of immunization
93 90 96 81
5 % of mothers received TT.
Imm during pregnancy of the
index child (by history or
card)
92.5 89 84 81
6 % of mothers of childbearing
age women holding imm card
with at least 3 TT shots. 17 59 91 92
7 % of fully immunized under 5
years old children holding
imm card
97.5 98 94 95
91
Remarks
* According to the National immunization schedule in Iran, Hepatitis B vaccine is
one of the routine immunization antigens. This antigen was not included in the survey.
But all children surveyed had a record for this immunization on their cards.
** Based on instruction endorsed by Iranian National Committee on
immunization, children in refugee camps should receive 3 shots of measles vaccine at 6,
9 and 15 months of age. One shot was calculated as immunized before the first birthday
in this survey.

92
Table No. 3: Results of nutritional survey in Dast Ghaib (Jahrom) and Beni Najjar
(Gutwand) refugee camps nutritional status in children under 5 years old
Comparison of two surveys (1977 and 2000)
Results Shaheed Dast Ghaib
camp
Shaheed Beni Najjar
Camp
1997 2000
1997 2000
No. of children < 5 years old
survey
119 113 224 214
1 Upper Arm
Circumference
• Less than 125 mm. (%) 5.8 6.2 4.5 6.2
• 125 – 135 mm 1.6 5.3 6.3 4.6
• more than 135 mm.(%) 92.6 88.5 89.2 89.2
2 Breast-feeding
• % of exclusive breastfed
infants up to 6 months
of age
54.6 59 50 61
• % of breast-fed
children up to their first
birthday
63 73 64.7 73
• % of breast-fed
children up to 24 months
of age
53 62 56 60
3 Weight for age
• percentage of children
with a weight < 75 % of
standard values
7.9 6.4 11 11
4 Birth weight
• % of infants born * * ** **
alive with a birth 13 4 17.6 6.5
5
weight < 2.5kg
Presence of clinical signs
of malnutrition. (%)

Table 4: Morbidity of diarrhoea in index children in the past two weeks before
the survey. Multi-indicator health survey in Iraqi refugee camps in Jahrom and
Gutwand
Comparison of two surveys (1997 and 2000)
Indicators Shaheed Dast Ghaib
camp (Jahrom)
Shaheed Beni Najjar
Camp (Gutwand)
1997 2000
1997 2000
No of children in the survey
% of children with diarrhoea
119 113 224 214
during the two weeks before
the survey
% of children given less liquid
43.7 18.5 32.6 13.5
during the diarrhoea
% of children given less food
7.7 5.2 16.4 10.5
during the diarrhoea
% of children given ORS for
19.2 10.8 19.2 8.2
treatment of diarrhoea
% of children referred to clinic
in the camp for treatment
91 99 87 95
95 100 94 100
Remarks
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6
The Deltaic Complex of the Lower
Mesopotamian Plain and its Evolution
through Millennia
Paul Sanlaville
Introduction
The Mesopotamian Plain has played a prominent part in the history of mankind. It is
there that during the fourth millennium the first cities appeared (Huot, 1989). This region
has given very characteristic examples of water control and irrigation techniques. In the
vast marshlands, too, originated an original way of life celebrated by Thesiger (1964).
But this area is also an excellent example of a very complex delta system due on one
hand to the combined work of three great rivers flowing down from a range of mountains
and providing large quantities of water in a desert, and on the other hand to particular
structural conditions resulting in the coexistence of a double delta: an inner continental
one and a marine one. This complicated area can be understood only through an analysis
of both the spatial organization and its evolution through the millennia.
PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY OF LOWER MESOPOTAMIA
Mesopotamia, south of Samarra on the Tigris River and Ramadi on the Euphrates River,
is a large clayey-silty plain, low, flat, with a very weak longitudinal slope and important
problems of drainage and salinization, created by three great rivers and in continuous
evolution through space and time. These characteristics can be explained by a number of
factors.
Structure
Between the old and stable Arabian shield to the west and the recent and active Zagros
mountain range to the east, the Mesopotamian Plain and the Gulf lie in a huge tectonic
depression, which corresponds to an unstable shelf area where the Arabian plate plunges
under the Iranian plate and where very thick sediments have been accumulating for a long
time. Between the Widian limestone plateau to the west and the piedmont of the Zagros
mountains to the east, the Mesopotamian Plain is about 200 km wide, but in the south, at

the latitude of Basra, the alluvial sedimentary plain gets very narrow. The western
limestone plateau draws to the east, overlaid with the huge Pleistocene conglomeratic
alluvial fan of Wadi Batin coming down from the Najd and well fed during Pleistocene
humid periods, while to the east, lies the Holocene big alluvial fan built by both the
Karun and the Kharka Rivers coming down from the Zagros range (figure 1). These
rivers rise in the relatively humid uplands and, descending rapidly from the mountains,
have an enormous erosive power and brought down large quantities of sediments which
were deposited during the lower Holocene. So, the width of the Mesopotamian Plain is
restricted to less than 45 km, forming a kind of barrier impeding water circulation.
The Quaternary alluvial deposits of the Mesopotamian Plain lie on top of very
thick older sediments resting on the very deep basement characterized, mainly in its
eastern part, by NW trending antiforms separated by broad synforms. South of the
Takhadid–Qurna deep fault separating the Mesopotamian region from the Zubair block,
the basement is shallower and the structure is north–south, with long expressive
anticlines extending over ten hundreds of km on the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian territories
(Buday, 1987). Occurrence of tectonic accidents and subsidence is probably more
frequent in the alluvial Mesopotamian Plain than in the southern Zubair area.
Climate
The climate is arid, the mean annual rainfall varying from about 100 mm west of the
plain to 150 mm to the east, with a very long summer dryness, extending from 9 months
in Baghdad to 11 months in Basra. Rainfall occurs with a double maximum, a main one
in winter (December and January) and a second one in spring (March and April).
Summers are very hot, the mean daily maximum temperature of July being higher than
42°C (with an absolute maximum of 50.5°C in Basra) and the mean daily minimum
higher than 25 °C (but with an absolute minimum of – 4.4°C in Basra). As a
consequence, the evapotranspiration is strong: 3426 mm/year in Baghdad (Alex, 1985).
So, almost all the water flowing over this area comes from the northern and eastern
mountain belt, but the climate favours evaporation over the marshes and lakes and
explains the rather high watertable salinity (about 5% in wells near the Larsa
archaeologic site, in 1989).
We know very little concerning the past climatic conditions in south
Mesopotamia for want of early and middle Holocene deposits. This area probably
experienced a relatively wet phase between 9000 and 6000 years BP due both to the
shifting to the north of the summer monsoon as attested in the Nafud, the Rub al Khali
and also the Near East, and to the increase in the Mediterranean winter rains (Blanchet et
al., 1997), but we have had no clear evidence of this in the Mesopotamian plain so far,
and possibly the climate remained rather arid, but the rivers could be fed more
abundantly by snowfall and rainfall increasing on the Taurus and Zagros mountains,
resulting in more important floods and heavier fresh water discharges.
Hydrology
It explains the relatively large quantity of continental water in south Mesopotamia. Rivers
bring this water from Anatolia (the Tigris, and the Euphrates and its tributaries) and from
the Zagros mountains (the Greater and the Lesser Zab, the Diyala and the Kharka , the
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tributaries of the Tigris, and the Karun River). These rivers have high water in spring
(April and May) due to the melting of the snow and spring rainfall (figure 2). Ninety per
cent of the Euphrates runoff comes from Turkey, and after the Khabur branching, in
Syria, the Euphrates receives no more tributaries and loses much of its water due to
considerable evaporation, infiltration and diverting for irrigation. The Tigris lies much
closer to the Zagros range and all along its course to the Gulf, it receives many
tributaries, some quite large. The Zagros rivers play a very important role: because of the
direct surface run-off and the strong longitudinal gradient of the valleys, their waters rush
down fast and have strong discharges. When all these rivers arrive in the Mesopotamian
Plain, more or less important and devastating floods occur in spring. Then the rivers leave
their beds, cut their banks and overflow all the depressions. Between 1944 and 1954,
before the major dams on its tributaries were built, the Tigris broke its banks above
Baghdad in four of those years and downstream in eight of them, and up to 84 % of Iraqi
cultivated lands were in danger of being flooded (de Vaumas, 1955).
The rivers are strongly loaded. According to Ionides (1937), the Euphrates had an
estimated approximate average silt content, in dry grammes per cubic metre of water,
varying from 130 in September to 1800 in May at Ramadi, and for the Tigris the figures
varied from 170 in October to 2300 in April, near Baghdad. During the flood of 3 March
1953, the Tigris carried 103 m 3 /sec of sediment and during the whole year the Tigris
would have carried 111.3 millions m 3 of sediments (Kholy, 1956). Cressey (1958)
estimated that the Tigris deposited in the 1950s about 40,000,000 cubic metres of
sediment annually, 90 % of this in the lower alluvial plains between Baghdad and Basra.
Geomorphology
In fact, the Mesopotamian Plain is a rather complex area: very distinct regions can be
distinguished, according to altitude, slope, microtopography, soils, water table, etc.
(Buringh, 1957, 1960; Sanlaville, 1989). The longitudinal profile is very gentle and
becomes smoother and smoother to the south. Then, the rivers meander and water has
increasing difficulty in flowing, especially in the south where the plain is almost closed
up by the Karun and Batin alluvial fans and the Western Plateau promontory. From the
northwest to the southeast the following areas can be identified (figure 1):
The River Plain
This is the upper part of the Mesopotamian plain. Between Baghdad and Kut, the average
slope of the Tigris River is only of 0.07 %: in this flat and low-lying Holocene plain both
rivers meander. Under natural conditions, when floods occurred, the water rose higher
than the river banks and the plain was flooded over a large area. Shifting of the river bed
over the plain was not infrequent; as a consequence of the filling up of the riverbed with
sediments, during floods the river broke through its levees and entered the plain, forming
a new river bed. As the quantity of sediment in suspension was important, the coarsest
material (sandy silt and silt) was deposited first near the river, forming higher and higher
levees, from 1 to 3 kms wide, on each side of the streams. In the large and shallow
depressions lying between the rivers, generally 2 to 3 metres lower than the river levees,
silty clay and clay were deposited. In the levees, the groundwater table was rather deep
and the soils were relatively well textured, but the groundwater table was shallower in

depressions where the soils have low permeability, and semi-permanent marshes and
lakes could form in the lowest areas.
The interior fluviatile delta
Downstream from Kut and Al-Hindiyya, the very weak slope of the plain (0.034 %
between Kut and Amarah) induces the formation of a real Interior Fluviatile Delta. The
Tigris and the Euphrates split up into many branches (notably the Al-Hindiyya and Hillah
branches for the Euphrates and the Gharraf for the Tigris), that still meander and give
way in their turn to smaller branches. The levees are smaller and lower than in the River
Plain, the basins are smaller too but numerous, the groundwater is near the surface and
the deepest parts of the basins are marshy. During floods, large parts of the Interior Delta
Plain may be inundated. The rivers have lost a great part of their water and sediments in
this area. According to de Vaumas (1955), on 17 March 1946 the waterflow in the Tigris
was 6200 m 3 /sec near Kut but only 560 m 3 /sec near Amarah: more than 90% of the flood
water passing Kut did not reach Amarah (figure 2). During the low water periods, in
autumn, losses were smaller but notable: 40% in October for the Tigris between Kut and
Amarah, and 37% in September for the Euphrates between Hit and al-Nasiriyya (Ionides,
1937). This important loss of turbid water results in the building of continental deltaic
fans. Then, the Interior Delta Plain must be considered as the main sedimentation area,
more especially as silting was increased by irrigation practices. But, today conditions
have strongly changed due to dams, canals and agricultural requirements, so the upper
fan-deltas of the Tigris (Gharraf) and the Euphrates (Al-Hindiyya) are no longer active.
The marsh and lake area
This is the third physiographic region. Due to the extreme flatness of the region, there are
two active fan-deltas so far, at Suq al-Shuyukh along the Euphrates and at Amarah on the
Tigris (al-Azzawi, 1986; Baltzer and Purser, 1990). As one goes downstream, the
groundwater table gets higher and higher, and marshes and lakes overlay increasing
surfaces to the southeast: the central marshes with the Haur Sa’diyya and Haur Sanniyya,
fed by the Tigris, the Hammar marshes and the Haur al-Hammar, fed by the Euphrates,
and the Huwaiza marshes east of the Tigris, fed by the Kharka River. Some marshes are
temporary, only flooded during the highest floods. The mean water level of the
permanent marshes varies from about 0.50 m during the dry season to 2 m during the
highest floods, and the level and surface of the lakes strongly vary during the year
(AMAR, 1994). The last suspended sediments are trapped within marshes and lakes,
where the presence of a dense vegetation of reeds favours their deposition, and the active
evaporation of salt loaded waters increases the lake and marsh salinity: so south of the
Haur al-Hammar lie ephemeral saline lakes and sebkhas. The Euphrates finally disperses
into the Haur al-Hammar, whose outflow is very small compared with the discharge of
the river at Hit and its water is very clear. In April 1931, the Tigris was flowing at about
5000 m 3 /sec at Baghdad, it had dwindled to 3800 m 3 /sec at Kut and, at Qal’at Salih, there
remained no more than 180 m 3 /sec, or 3.6% (figure 2; Ionides, 1937).
The estuary
Due to the natural dam formed by the Widian plateau promontory and the Karun alluvial
fan, the Mesopotamian plain disappears as well and the Shatt al-Arab corresponds to an
estuary, influenced by the strong twice daily tidal action of the Gulf. Salt sea water does
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not penetrate farther than Abadan (the sea salinity tide) due to the important fresh-water
discharge of the Karun river, but the river water rises and falls as far as Qurna: it is the
dynamic tide, used for the irrigation of the date palms and gardens in empoldered areas of
the lower levees, beyond which stretch extensive sebkhas, and on the northern border of
the Haur al-Hammar, farmers made use of a few centimetres of tidal water to irrigate
their rice-fields.
The marine delta
The huge true marine deltaic system, stretching mainly to the east, in Iran, but also to the
west as far as Bubiyan Island, in Kuwait, has been generated mainly by the silt and clay
deposits brought about by the Karun and other Iranian rivers coming down from the
Zagros range, and a very important submarine delta has been built (figure 1). The Shatt al
Arab discharges on average 27 km 3 into the Gulf, but 22 km 3 are supplied by the Karun
and only 5 km 3 by the Tigris and the Euphrates.
So the Mesopotamian Plain presents highly complex and both continental and marine
deltaic depositional landscapes, reflecting global variations in such controlling factors as
discharge regime and sediment load of three great rivers, climatic data and changes over
the catchment area, marine energy conditions, structural control (lithology, tectonics) and
various human undertakings, sometimes resulting in disturbances, with complex
interacting processes, which we have to take into account to sketch its evolution through
the last millennia.
THE EVOLUTION OF LOWER MESOPOTAMIA SINCE THE LAST GLACIAL
MAXIMUM
Concerning the evolution of the Mesopotamian Plain, two main questions have to be
answered: has the Gulf shoreline significantly changed since the last postglacial
transgression? What are the consequences of modern transformations (dams, irrigation
and drainage networks, pollution) in this region and mainly in the marsh area?
Since the early nineteenth century, scientists (geologists, archeologists,
geographers) have tried to trace the evolution of Lower Mesopotamia. The earliest
theories claimed that the head of the Gulf was far to the north of the present one and there
was a gradual retreat of the sea and a strong progradation of the delta plain throughout
prehistoric and historic ages, and de Morgan (1900) mapped the presumed shoreline at
the time of Sennacherib (in 696 BCE) between Basra and Amarah.
Challenging these traditional concepts, Lees and Falcon (1952) stated that there
was no evidence that the head of the Gulf had ever been to the northwest of its present
limit since the early Pliocene and asserted that the Euphrates–Tigris–Karun delta was
very stable during the Quaternary, without appreciable progradation of the delta, due to a
delicately balanced system of subsidence and sedimentation.
Since that paper was published, new field researches have been carried out and
several authors criticized Leeds and Falcon’s assertions (especially Larsen, 1975,
Sanlaville, 1989). Nevertheless, recent geological and geomorphological research is
bitterly lacking and the Quaternary evolution of the Mesopotamian Plain has remained

ather badly known so far. Meanwhile, we shall try here to bring up the subject again and
to take the few latest data into account.
Five main periods have to be considered:
The last glacial maximum
During the last glacial period, the characteristic features of the Mesopotamian Plain were
very different from the present ones. About 18,000 years BP, the global sea level was at
about –120/130 m and the Gulf had completely dried up, the Shatt al-Arab flowing
directly into the Gulf of Oman (figure 3). Then in Mesopotamia the general base level
was relatively low, though the Gulf floor is shallow (less than 100 m) particularly in its
northern part. Data are lacking, but, during the regression, as evidenced by some
boreholes, the Tigris, the Euphrates and their tributaries fairly cut down into the
Mesopotamian plain lower than –26 m between Qurmat Ali and Qurna and lower than –
30 m at Fao. The ground water level was very low and probably there was neither marsh
nor problem of drainage, and in that arid country most of the villages and the first cities
must have been settled on the lower valley-sides, close to the rivers and clearly below the
present level of the plain. But there is no reason to consider that this area was neither
populated nor cultivated as early as the Jazira, in the northern part of Syria and Iraq.
The postglacial sea-level rising
The sea-level rose progressively in the Gulf basin from 14000 years BP onwards. Off
Fao, it was at about –30 m about 10,000 years BP, and fresh-water peat formed at
Bubiyan up to 8000 BP at –20 m, just a little above the contemporaneous sea-level
(Gunatilaka, 1986; Al-Zamel, 1985): then at 8000 BP the surface of the Shatt al-Arab
delta was 20 m lower than the present one (figure 4). Sea rising was particularly fast
between 9000 and 6000 years BP and the sea-level reached its maximum circa 4000 years
BCE (calibrated), at the end of the Ubaid period (which lasted from 6500 to 3700 years
BCE). This maximum was probably slightly above the present one (+1 or 2 m?), ‘in
response to the hydrostatic adjustment of the earth, inundating the very low areas of
lower Mesopotamia’ (Lambeck, 1996).
Recent estuarine or marine faunas have been discovered in different localities of
southern Mesopotamia. In various borings in the Basra area, the so-called ‘Hammar
Formation’ occurs near the surface, constituted of sands and silts containing mainly small
marine gastropods and lamellibranchs, overlying gravels and sands of the continental
‘Dibdibba Formation’ and overlaid by recent fluvial silts (Hudson et al.,1957; Macfadyen
and Vita-Finzi, 1978). These faunas have been found in the north up to Amarah where,
between –2.7 and –8.5 m below the soil surface, clayey silts have yielded marine
foraminifers and Cyprideis cf. torosa, but only a campaign of borings in the marsh and
lake area would enable us to be sure of the exact area affected by the marine ingression,
the western and northern outline of which is hypothetic so far. In the south, the Hammar
formation was carbon dated to 5020 ± 90 years BP and 4310 ± 160 years BP (oysters) on
the southern shore of Lake Hammar, and 5730 ± 210 years BP and 4770 ± 140 years BP
north of Khor Abdallah (Purser et al., 1982; Al Azzawi, 1986). One can add that in the
south of Kuwait, five oolithic beach-dune ridges have been dated between 5500 and 2190
99

100
± 70 years BP, the sea-level being close to the present one and reaching a maximum
around 4630 ± 60 years BP (Gunatilaka, 1986).
These dates clearly indicate that the Hammar Formation is Holocene and that,
contrary to Lees and Falcon’s assertions, the postglacial transgression penetrated rather
far into lower Mesopotamia (figure 5). It swiftly flooded a low-lying delta region into a
shallow marine-lagoonal environment, behind the narrowing of Basra, and concurrently
raised the river level and the watertable, converting a dry region into an aquatic one. The
inner gulf water was probably increasingly more brackish than salty, due to its
shallowness and to the important freshwater discharge from the rivers. Much research
should be done to outline the exact shoreline at the maximum of the transgression, but we
can assume that it did not occur before 4300 BCE, and presume that it included the whole
area between Haur al-Hammar and Amara and in those days the coastline must have been
some 150 to 200 km north of the present one (figure 5). As related in the cuneiform
sources, the third millennium Sumerian cities of Ur and Eridu could have settled
alongside or very near the coast of the Gulf (Falkenstein, 1951; Jacobsen, 1960).
There is no need, probably, to seek for a scientific or historic reality in the Deluge
foundation myth, whose theme, actually, is universal. However, the Bible’s Deluge myth
might have originated in this huge, general and incomprehensible elevation of both
marine and continental waters which, in a rather short lapse of time, completely disrupted
the ancient geographical context and utterly modified living conditions.
The rapid progradation of the Tigris-Euphrates-Karun delta
The alluvial silty deposits overlying the marine Hammar Formation can be interpreted as
resulting from a deltaic progradation to the southeast (figure 5). As a consequence of the
abundant alluvial supply of the rivers and of the extreme shallowness of the northern part
of the Gulf, an important filling occurred, first preventing the sea to enter too far inland,
then bringing about a rapid receding of the coastline to the south and progressively
changing a saline and brackish lagoon into a fresh water marsh and lake area (Admiralty
Intelligence Division, 1944). Archeological sites of the second half of the second
millennium and the first millennium BCE exist on the southern border of the Haur al-
Hammar and to the east of the Tigris between Qurna and Basra, proving that the Gulf
shoreline was then more southerly, and contradicting de Morgan’s assertion of the
presence of a marine gulf in that region in the fourth century BCE (Roux, 1960;
Hansman, 1978). It is also possible to understand why no neolithic sites could be found in
lower Mesopotamia: established on valley-sides, they were buried under several metres
of fine grained flood deposits of the prograding delta (Geyer and Sanlaville, 1996). At
Oueili, the oldest archaeological excavated level (Ubaid 0, 6500–5900 years BCE) has
been found 4.5 m below the present plain level (figure 6; Calvet, 1985). Unfortunately,
we seriously lack maps and data concerning the precise elevation of the plain in the
different sites.
From then on, the rivers were no longer incised but ran on the surface of the plain
and, during the spring floods, immense areas were inundated. Then lower Mesopotamia
got its present configuration and zoning, in particular the diffluence area and the marshes
and lakes area, which in the previous phase were probably located more to the north.
We do not know when the Gulf reached its present shoreline, but Al-Zamel
(1985) has demonstrated that Bubiyan Island (Kuwait) emerged at about 3500 years BP:

101
multiple shelly beach ridges have been dated to 3500-2800 years BP on its southern
shoreline, facing the Gulf. In the light of historical and archaeological evidence,
Hansman (1978) considers that the southern limit of the Mesopotamian delta was very
near to the present one at the Hellenistic period. At that time, each of the three rivers had
its own estuary, the Euphrates flowing into the Gulf through the Khor al-Zubair and the
Khor al-Sabiha. Meanwhile, it seems that the Gulf level was slightly lower (about one
metre) than today (Dalongeville, 1990) and the coastline possibly was a little south of the
present one (figure 5).
Variations of the marsh area in the course of time
Afterwards, only less important changes occurred. For instance, in the seventh century
CE, the Tigris flowed down the Gharraf bed and into the Euphrates, forming vast
marshes, 370 km long and 90 km wide, spreading from Kufa to Basra and called ‘the
Great Swamp’ by Le Strange (1905). We have had the opportunity to identify these
marshes in the Larsa-Oueili area, thanks to the presence of very dark clayey-silty
sediments yielding an abundant fresh water malacofauna (Corbicula fluminalis,
Melanoides tuberculata, Unio tigridis, Lymnaea gr. auricularia), carbon dated to 975-
1263, 1230-1445 and 1082-1429 years CE (calibrated), overlying a lighter silty deposits
containing Bellamya bengalensis, Melanoides and Lymnaea, carbon dated to 1577-941
and 673-21 years BCE (Geyer and Sanlaville, 1996) and overlain by more recent sandy
deposits (figure 6). At that time, the marshes were much vaster than today and certainly
more important in the west than in the east, due to the shifting of the Tigris river to the
west. Then Abadan was on the Gulf coast (it is 32 km away today), possibly due to a sealevel
slightly higher than the present one or more probably because, most of the Tigris
waters flowing into the Euphrates and running through the Khor al-Sabiya, a strong
marine erosion occurred at the less fed mouth of the Shatt al Arab (figure 5).
We do not know when the Haur al-Hammar formed: it is not indicated in the
Chesney’s Survey Report (1850), and the Handbook of the Admiralty Intelligence
Division (1944) ascribed its formation to a big flood sometime after 1870 (Potts, 1997),
but it certainly was part of the ‘Great Swamp’ of Le Strange and may have formed and
disappeared in the course of time.
Lees and Falcon (1952) thought that the vast amount of silt carried along by the
rivers and the wind-blown material should have filled the Gulf but for a continued
subsidence which allowed sedimentation to continue, and argued that tectonic subsidence
through time had more than negatived the effects of siltation. In fact, the thickness of the
Hammar formation and of the overlying alluvial deposits as indicated by borings proves
that subsidence was rather weak in south Mesopotamia. The fact is also attested at Oueili
thanks to excavations. There was no significant tectonic subsidence of this area in
Holocene time. As noted further up concerning a flood of March 1946, 90% of the water
passing Kut did not reach Amarah: the major area of silting is not the Marsh and Lake
area but the Interior Fluvial Delta area upstream, where most of the waters and of their
sediment supply spread out; it is probably in the inner delta that the main sinking occurs
under the weight of accumulating deposits.
Present disturbances and previsions for the future

102
Lower Mesopotamia has been extremely disturbed since the middle of last century and
completely disorganized during the last two decades. Huge dams have put an end to
yearly large floods and significantly reduced the water and sediment supply. The strong
alluvial build-up which characterized southern Mesopotamia is no longer working, the
Gulf coast is now eroded by waves and currents and the marine delta recedes. Recent
important drying operations, mainly the digging of two important ‘moats’, accelerated the
evolution, deeply disrupted the inner delta hydrology and disturbed the natural running of
the marsh and lake. Marshes are less or no longer fed, and salinity is rapidly increasing.
The growing use of chemical fertilizers and phytosanitary products on one hand, and the
discharge of urban and industrial wastewater on the other, have considerably spoilt the
water to the prejudice of mankind, the fauna and flora. So the natural milieu has been
deeply and often negatively modified or even definitely destabilized.
CONCLUSION
As a common delta of three main rivers, the Lower Mesopotamian Plain presents a
complex, coherent and harmonious but very fragile organization of very different but
interdependent areas that undergo a complex evolution depending on numerous factors
(tectonics or subsidence, regional climatic and hydrological changes, small oscillations of
the Gulf level, human factors, etc.) tending towards a slow and progressive filling up of
lakes and marshes and ultimately to their long-term disappearance.
Since the middle of the twentieth century and more particularly during the last
two decades, huge dams, drastic drainage operations, chemical pollution have completely
destabilized this region. The slow and natural evolution of the delta which had been at
work for more than five millennia has been abruptly upset. The last area to be concerned,
the marsh and lake area, is today the most strongly affected. Numerous and considerable
disruptions are to appear, and it is very difficult to anticipate all their dramatic and
irreversible consequences for the milieu and Man. Very impressive recent satellite
imagery shows an almost complete disappearance of marshes. Part of humanity’s
heritage, the Iraqi marshlands have existed for almost six millennia and, owing to a very
slow natural evolution, would have lasted centuries (or millennia!) more, but huge
drainage works have dried them in a mere two decades.
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Figure 1 - Mesopotamian morphological map
105

106
Figure 2 - Mean annual discharge of the Tigris River (after Al-Azzawi, 1986)
Figure 3 - Rising of the postglacial transgression in the Persian Gulf (after
Lambeck, 1996)

Figure 4 - Evolution of the Lower Mesopotamian shoreline since the postglacial
transgression maximum
107

108
Figure 5 - Evolution of the Persian Gulf level and of the Lower Mesopotamian
shoreline since the postglacial transgression

Figure 6 - Upper Pleistocene and Holocene sedimentation in the Larsa-Oueili region
(after Geyer and Sanlaville, 1996, modified)
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7
Monitoring Marshland Degradation
Using Multispectral Remote Sensed
Imagery
James Brasington
Introduction
The Mesopotamian Marshes of southern Iraq and Iran are of global significance, in part
because of their scale (estimated at 15,000-20,000 km 2 ; Thesiger, 1964), but particularly
for their unique biodiversity and historic pattern of human settlement, which dates back
to the early Sumerian civilizations of 5000-6000 BP. Recent deepening demand for water
supply, in particular for irrigated agriculture, however, now presents a growing risk to
this marginal ecosystem. The potential problems associated with irrigation, in particular
salinization, have long between understood in Mesopotamia and a sustainable and
sophisticated pattern of cultivation developed in response to this threat. It was not until
the 1960s however, that the acute sensitivity of the marshes to the rapid intensification of
irrigation during the twentieth century was first comprehensively evaluated (Buringh,
1960). More recently, and in a mood of growing concern, a number of studies have
highlighted the actual extent and rapidity of wetland degradation and questioned the
underlying political context of river diversion schemes in the area. Previous research has
revealed that nearly 50% of the marsh area became desiccated during the late 1980s and
early 1990s (Pearce, 1993; AMAR, 1994). The precise cause of this environmental
change remains disputed, but it is largely attributed to a combination of major water
supply projects throughout the upstream basin of the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates as well
as a number of localized river diversion schemes.
A precise assessment of the contemporary situation and the severity of
environmental degradation by conventional ground surveys is hindered by the sheer scale
of the ecosystem and the difficulty of navigating across the complex mosaic of wetlands.
More specifically, regional international tension between the key riparian states has
restricted access to the marshes and limited the availability and exchange of hydrometric
data. Under these constraints, an increasingly popular alternative to monitoring
ecosystem structure and development is provided by the interpretation of digital satellite
imagery. A growing body of research has demonstrated the potential for detailed multitemporal
characterization of large wetlands based on remotely sensed imagery (e.g.,
Shima et al., 1976; Jensen et al., 1991; Jensen et al., 1995). This approach combines the

111
advantages of synoptic, high-resolution perspectives over wide areas unhindered by
international borders, with repeatable, systematic survey methods. Furthermore, an
increasing number of earth resource satellite mapping programmes such as the
NASA/USGS Landsat and CNES SPOT now offer temporal coverage spanning three
decades and thus provide the opportunity for rigorous historical analysis of ecosystem
development.
This paper reports a study of the evolution of the Mesopotamian marsh complex
based on an analysis of historical and recent Landsat imagery, and seeks to update and
consolidate previous research by AMAR (1994) and Munro and Touron (1997). The
primary objective was to document the extent and distribution of changes within the
marshlands over the period 1977-2000 and to investigate the potential role of localized
river diversion schemes within the marsh area. The moderate resolution, multispectral
imagery provided by the Landsat generation of satellites is ideal for characterizing
wetland ecosystems as key landcover units can be effectively distinguished by their
spectral separability in the optical and infrared wavelengths. However, restricted access
to the region and very limited ground data make precise ecological mapping impossible,
so here only a broad categorization of landcover types which can be identified from
simple image processing techniques is presented. While further validation and
elaboration of the classification would be ideal, the results presented here demonstrate the
extraordinary rate of change within the last decade and reveals the spectre of the entire
eradication of marshes in the very near future.
The physiographic context
The wetlands of Lower Mesopotamia comprise a system of shallow lakes and marshes
which, in the mid-twentieth century, occupied an area of between 15,000-20,000km 2
(Figure 1). Situated predominately within southern Iraq to the north of Basra (30-33 o N,
45-47 o E), this wetland complex is constructed upon a naturally poorly drained, low-lying,
very low-gradient Quaternary alluvial plain (Larsen and Evans, 1978; Sanlaville, 1989).
The climate of the region is arid and the annual rainfall of 100-150mm is greatly
exceeded by the evaporative demand which reaches 3400mm per annum (Alex, 1985).
The main marsh area has developed on two large, flat, active fan-deltas nourished by
distributaries and overbank floods of the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates, both of which rise
in the highlands of eastern Turkey. The marshlands lie at the downstream margin of this
international river basin, where the two rivers join to form the Shatt al Arab waterway
before discharging into the Persian Gulf 90km south of Basra. The drainage area of this
combined basin exceeds 915,000km 2 and extends over five countries; Turkey, Syria, Iran,
Iraq and to a lesser extent, Saudia Arabia.
The regime of the Tigris and Euphrates is strongly seasonal, reflecting high winter
rainfall and spring snowmelt in their highland headwaters. Contributions to runoff are
highly variable across the basin and over 85% and 50% of the flow of the Euphrates and
Tigris respectively, originates in Turkey. The winter rains and spring snowmelt give rise
to an annual flood which peaks downstream in southern Iraq during April and May and is
main source of recharge to the wetlands.

112
Figure 1. The study area: the Marshlands of Mesopotamia based on 1985 Landsat
imagery

113
Water levels within the marshes respond sensitively to this hydrological regime
and Salim (1962) reports typical depths within the marshes fluctuating between 0.5-3.5m,
although depths of up to 6m have been recorded in some of the major permanent lakes
(AMAR, 1994). This flood cycle can more generally be interpreted as the key driver of
wetland dynamics, as recharge to the marshes depends non-linearly on river stage (level),
and is primarily maintained by the high spring flows. Upstream river engineering
projects, in particular dam construction, which disrupt this flood cycle by regulating and
distributing discharge more evenly may therefore, be expected to have a major impact on
the marshlands.
For their greater part, the marshes are covered by natural wetland vegetation,
dominated by reed (Phragmites australis) and reedmace (Typha angustifolia).
Phragmites dominates the permanent areas of the marsh while Typha is more common in
peripheral areas with seasonally variable water levels (Evans, this volume). Extensive
permanent lakes used to be common within the marshes, including the 120 km long Lake
Hammar, which was the largest lake in the Lower Euphrates basin. Along the fringes of
the marshes where irrigation water is available, rice is cultivated on small bunded parcels
of land and barley on higher areas.
The entire wetland complex is often considered as three individual marshes,
incorporating the Hammar, Hawizeh and the Central or Qurnah Marshes (Figure 1). The
Hammar marsh lies to the south of the Euphrates and to the west of the Shatt al Arab.
Historically, this wetland was dominated by Lake Hammar, and is fed from the west by
the Euphrates. The Qurnah marsh lies directly north of the Hammar marsh and receives
flows from the west and south via the Euphrates but also from distributaries of the Tigris
to the north and east. Prior to recent river diversion schemes (see discussion) the Qurnah
marshes also received floodwaters along their eastern limit from the Tigris. The Hawizeh
marsh, straddles the Iran-Iraq border and receives its influx from the north via the Nahr al
Musharrah, a left bank tributary of the Tigris, and to a lesser extent along its western
margin from the Tigris itself. The Hawizeh is also fed from Iran in the east, by the rivers
Kharkeh, Dwairij and Teab.
Methodology
Data Selection and Acquisition
(a) Spectral and Spatial Considerations
The application of remotely sensed image analysis in wetland ecology is a wellestablished
methodology, and has been used extensively in the environmental planning
process to provide baseline and environmental change data where sensitive wetlands are
at risk from local and upstream changes to their feeder catchment (Federal Interagency
Committee for Wetland Delineation, 1989). Typically, characterization of wetlands is
achieved by an analysis of the spectral separability of key landcover units, based on their
optical and infrared reflectance properties. At the broad level of classification required
for this study, separation of open water, vegetation and desert soils is best achieved using
the red (0.60-0.69mm) and near infrared (0.70-1.30mm) wavelengths. Water shows
characteristically low levels of reflectance at both wavelengths, whereas healthy

114
vegetation reflects strongly in the near infrared due to leaf structure, but weakly at red
wavelengths because of chlorophyll absorption. Desert soils and sediments exhibit
moderate to strong reflectance at both wavelengths, particularly in the red channel.
Historically, a combination of analogue panchromatic and infrared photography
has been used for such analysis, although now digital multiband scanners have become
the preferred medium. A wide range of both aerial and space-borne satellite imaging
systems provide data over this spectral range but differ substantially in their temporal
imaging frequency (overpasses per year), swath diameter, spatial resolution and cost. The
selection of imaging system is enforced by a trade-off between these variables and must
be attuned to the objectives of the study and not vice versa.
For the relatively broad scale mapping objectives of the study, two polar orbiting
satellites presently supply data with suitable spectral resolution. The SPOT system in XS
mode (band 2; 0.61-0.68µm: band 3; 0.79-0.89µm) with a spatial resolution of 20m and
the Landsat (band 3; 0.63-0.69µm: band 4; 0.76-0.9µm) generation of satellites and
sensors (MSS, TM and ETM) which have spatial resolutions of between 79-15m. In their
sun-synchronous polar orbits, both the SPOT and Landsat satellites overpass the study
area regularly (26 and 18/16 days respectively). While the higher pixel resolution of the
SPOT system is preferable for detailed mapping, the smaller spatial extent of SPOT
scenes, 60x60km cf 180x180m for Landsat, implies a significant increase in the number
of scenes and hence cost of data required to provide full spatial coverage of the study
area. Moreover, the most recent generation of the Landsat scanners (ETM+) now
incorporates a high resolution 15m panchromatic band thus enhancing the spatial fidelity
of the system.
(b) Temporal Considerations
Recent research by AMAR (1994) and Munro and Touron (1997) has suggested that
rapid deterioration of the marshes occurred in the early 1990s. However, comparatively
little is known about the condition of the marshes in the period leading up to this, in
particular through the first Gulf conflict in the early 1980s, nor of the contemporary
extent of degradation post 1994. In order to complement and extend the existing research
context, data covering the period before the Iran–Iraq conflict to the present were
therefore required. Of the two satellite systems described above, only the Landsat
programme extends into the 1970s and thus ultimately determined the data format.
However, during its period of development, the Landsat programme has deployed three
generations of sensor on different satellites – the MSS (multispectral scanner), TM
(thematic mapper) and ETM+ (enhanced thematic mapper) – which have differing
spectral and spatial specifications. Coverage over the entire study period inevitably
incorporates data from all sensors and thus precludes simple radiometric comparison
between scenes (discussed below).
In addition to considerations about the broad temporal coverage, the strong
influence of the flood cycle on the annual pattern of marshland vigour complicates interannual
comparison unless the effects of the flood regime are accounted for. Given
concern that the weak spectral separability of wet soils from open water may prevent
accurate definition of landcover units in the post flood state, images were selected for
dates corresponding approximately to the flood peak (April-May). It is important to note
however, that this decision potentially introduces bias due to natural climatic variability
in the strength of the annual flood (see results).

115
Ultimately, in order to balance cost and time constraints, scenes from three years,
1977, 1985 and 2000 were chosen to compile the analysis. Examination of the scene path
and row configuration for Landsat revealed that for each year a subset of between 2-3
adjacent scenes encompassed all but a small segment of the Hammar marsh. When
possible, scenes were acquired from consecutive overpasses in order to minimize any
potential for change, although the scene mosaics described below must in some cases be
considered as time-transgressive impressions of the system. A full breakdown of the data
acquired is presented in Table 1.
Scene path/row
Date of Acquisition Sensor Type Pixel Resolution
identification
(m)
179/039 17 April 1977 MSS 79 x 79
178/039 16 April 1977 MSS 79 x 79
179/038 12 March 1977 MSS 79 x 79
166/039 28 May 1985 TM 30 x 30
166/038 19 May 1985 TM 30 x 30
166/038 13 May 2000 ETM+ 30 x 30 †
166/039 13 May 2000 ETM+ 30 x 30 †
167/038 20 April 2000 ETM+ 30 x 30 †
Table 1. Landsat data type, scene identification and acquisition dates. † Landsat 7
ETM+ incorporates 15m high resolution panchromatic band 8.
Data Analysis
(a) Image Rectification
In order to mosaic scenes together to provide full contiguous cover of the study area,
images were first rectified to the UTM projection using the WGS84 ellipsoid. The image
analysis software ERDAS Imagine was used for this and all later processing. Given the
limited availability of accurate maps for the area, ground control points were established
throughout the 2000 imagery and used to provide a relative georeference base for the
1985 and 1977 images. The total root mean square (r.m.s) error for each scene was
between 1-3 pixels. No orthorectification was necessary to remove topographic distortion
due the very limited relief over the marsh area. Following rectification, image composites
for each year were mosaicked together using nearest neighbour resampling to minimize
alteration of the pixel brightness (digital number, DN) values.
(b) Radiometric Correction
Multi-temporal analysis of remotely sensed imagery generally involves a preliminary
series of tests to establish that the spectral response of landcover units is consistent across
dates (Hall et al., 1991). Some variation is usually inevitable and arises from variations in
the look-angle geometry, scene illumination and atmospheric properties. A variety of
both analytical and empirical approaches can be used to calibrate imagery to remove this
distortion, involving for example; atmospheric transmission modelling (Kneizys et al.,
1983), terrain-based haze correction and radiometric normalization (Lillisand and Keifer,
1999). Direct correction of the imagery used in this study is, however, complicated by
atmospheric heterogeneity caused by smoke plumes, the low surface relief and thus

116
limited shadow and critically, the difficulty of establishing reliable, stationary,
radiometric targets which could be used for normalization. Correction of radiometric
variation is also complicated by the use of different multiband scanners, in particular the
MSS and TM which monitor spectral reflectance at slightly different wavelengths and
pixel resolutions. Given these difficulties, rather than attempt direct intercomparison of
pixel brightness numbers, the analysis of marsh dynamics was undertaken by first
categorizing each year of data separately. While this makes a precise analysis of the
spatial pattern of change hazardous, broad overall changes in the percentage cover can
still be reliably tracked over time. It should be noted that significant atmospheric
differences, in particular high cloud, were evident in one of the scenes from 1977 which
was acquired 2 weeks earlier than the remaining scenes used to cover the study region.
As such, all further processing of data for this year was conducted on each component
scene independently (as the ratio of brightness values between bands should remain more
consistent) and the false colour composite mosaic presented in Figure 3 is for illustrative
purposes only.
(c) Image Analysis
Wetland landcover was categorized into areas of open water, vegetation, and desert
materials. While significantly more detail can be established from the imagery, as
discussed below, the limited ground data available precludes robust validation. Within
these constraints a simple approach to classification was developed based on the design
of Munro and Touron (1997). This involved the calculation of a Normalized Difference
Vegetation Index or NDVI (Rouse et al., 1973) image for each of the mosaics (Equation
1):
NDVI
band 4 - band 3
band 4 + band 3
= [1]
where band 3 is the reflectance (DN) in red wavelength (0.63-69µm) and band 4 is the
near infrared reflectance (0.76-0.90µm) and the image values lie between –1 and 1.
Healthy vegetation appears as high values, while desert materials have values near to zero
with open water well below zero (Figure 2a, b).

Figure 2. NDVI image and histogram of sub-sampled area of 1985 mosaic showing
the Hawizeh Marsh
117

118
This method of discrimination allows the cover classification to be reduced to a level or
density slicing operation (Lillesand and Keifer, 1999) where threshold values are used to
separate classes. The areal and thus percentage cover of each landcover category can then
be determined by simple pixel counting.
The specification of thresholds was based on a visual inspection of the mosaics
and comparisons with false (infrared) colour composites (see Figures 3, 4, and 5). This
revealed some complications with the simple level slicing approach. In particular, some
of the shallowest water bodies appear radiometrically bright in the visible due to the high
reflectance of underlying evaporite deposits, while other water bodies were turbid and
dark. Areas of vigorous vegetation growth with high NDVI distinct from the main
permanent marshes were also evident, particularly around the margins of the main
wetland bodies. In the main these correspond to a seasonal flush of Typha during the wet
season but in some cases appear to reflect small areas of localized irrigated agriculture.
While these two landcover units could be separated by extensive manual processing or
refined image processing, again the lack of ground date limits the scope for precise
mapping. As such, a further category was introduced into the classification to account for
this broad grouping although care must be taken in the interpretation of aggregate
statistics.
In order to refine the classification of open water, a supervised classification
algorithm based on TM bands 1-5 and 7 and MSS bands 4-7 was trained on areas
delimited from the false colour composites. Visual inspection of the results revealed
some confusion between the vegetation and water categories derived from these two
methods. In order to avoid double counting, the two classifications were first merged
using the supervised classification to define areas of open water. Pixel counts were then
used to establish the extent of each landcover class. To exclude the effects of changes
outside the marshes, a sub-setting option was used in which the boundary of each of the
main marshes was defined from the 1977 and 1985 images and subsequently restricted to
the geometric intersection of the total image dataset.
Results
Rectified and enhanced near infrared false colour composites of the marshes in 1977,
1985 and 2000 are shown in Figures 3-5. A cursory visual inspection reveals the
extraordinary degree of degradation during this period. The 2000 image shows the near
complete collapse of the Hammar and Qurnah marshes while the Hawizeh marsh has
shrunk substantially. The NDVI and supervised landcover classification provides a
quantifiable estimate of the extent of change, a breakdown of which is provided in Tables
2-5 while an example of a classified landcover map image is presented in Figure 6.

Figure 3. Near infrared false colour composite of the 1977 MSS mosaic. Note the
effects of high cloud in north-west image.
119

120
Figure 4. Near infrared false colour composite of the 1985 TM mosaic.

Figure 5. Near infrared false colour composite of the 2000 ETM mosaic.
121

122
Landcover Category 1977
(km 2 1985
) (km 2 2000
) (km 2 )
Permanent Marsh 1,632 2,347 60
Seasonal Marsh/Agriculture 286 339 210
Open Water 1,933 694 112
Total Wetland 3,565 3,041 172
Table 2. Landcover classification and change in the Hammar Marsh area 1977-2000
Landcover Category 1977
(km 2 1985
) (km 2 2000
) (km 2 )
Permanent Marsh 2,765 3,244 82
Seasonal Marsh/Agriculture 380 190 689
Open Water 646 203 66
Total Permanent Wetland 3,411 3,447 148
Table 3. Landcover classification and change in the Qurnah Marsh area 1977-2000
Landcover Category 1977
(km 2 1985
) (km 2 2000
) (km 2 )
Permanent Marsh 2,408 2,496 973
Seasonal Marsh/Agriculture 286 224 507
Open Water 785 766 173
Total Permanent Wetland 3,193 3,262 1,146
Table 4. Landcover classification and change in the Hawizeh Marsh area 1977-2000
Landcover Category 1977
(km 2 1985
) (km 2 2000
) (km 2 )
Permanent Marsh 6,805 8,087 (119%) 1,115 (16%)
Seasonal Marsh/Agriculture 952 753 (79%) 1,406 (148%)
Open Water 3,364 1,663 (49%) 351 (10%)
Total Permanent Wetland 10,169 9,750 (96%) 1,466 (14%)
Table 5. Landcover and change in the whole marsh complex 1977-2000. Note that
here and in all the above, permanent wetland is taken as the sum of
permanent marsh and open water.

Figure 6. Classified landcover map for 2000 showing the distribution of permanent
and degraded wetlands.
123

124
Relatively little change is evident in the overall wetland cover between 1977 and 1985,
and the estimated 4% change is well within the level of methodological error. The greater
apparent proportion of permanent marsh in 1985 reflects the difference in flood extent
between these two dates and demonstrates the difficulty of disentangling the effects of
short-term climatic variability from the overall trend. Both images show the marshes to
be relatively healthy and ringed by fresh seasonal growth, a pattern suggestive of active
distributary systems feeding the marshes.
A number of comparatively minor changes are, however, visible on the false
colour composites including evidence of embankments around parcels of marshland
which have subsequently been drained. Some of these parcels are dissected by what
appear to be a system of extensive ditches and may well have been actively pumped,
although there is little evidence of any significant attempt at reclamation for agriculture.
Significantly, the 1985 image also shows the construction of a major waterway to the
south of the Hammar marsh. This represents the final stage of the 527km ‘Third River’ or
‘Main Outfall Drain’, MOD, from An Nasiriyah to Basra. This project was originally
conceived in the 1950s to drain saline irrigation waters from the Tigris-Euphrates
interfluve south of Baghdad, direct to the Shatt al Basra and from there to the Gulf. While
construction appears to be well underway by 1985 little flow is evident and this coincides
with reports that the project was not completed until 1992 (AMAR, 1994).
The dramatic change in the extent and form of the marshlands occurs between
1985 and 2000. Comparison of Figures 4 and 5 shows the complete collapse of the
Hammar and Qurnah marshes and a reduction of the whole marsh complex to less than
1,500km 2 , only 14% of its 1977 size. It should be noted that this estimate incorporates
large bodies of open water associated with engineering works, in particular, water
retained alongside the completed MOD and within the Qurnah marsh which together total
some 130km 2 . Removing these areas from the definition of total wetlands adjusts the
estimate downwards to just 13% of 1977 levels. From an ecological and economic
perspective the complete desiccation of major open water bodies is highly significant due
to the impact (eradication) on fisheries and wildfowl (see Evans, this volume). The 2000
image shows both the central lake complex within the Qurnah marsh and the whole of the
120km long Lake Hammar to have been replaced by bright evaporite deposits. Similarly,
the broad former bed of the Shatt al Muminah distributary system which fed the Qurnah
marshes from the north-west also appears as bright evaporite deposits in 2000.
The only remaining large area of wetland is now focused around the open water
bodies, Haur al Hawizeh and Haur Limr Sawan in the north of Hawizeh marsh. By 2000,
this area constitutes 85% of the total permanent marsh and incorporates the largest
remaining lakes in the entire marshes. Significantly, the natural dynamics of this marsh
area also appear to have been largely altered. In both the 1977 and 1985 images, a broad
area of fringing marsh was evident around the major distributary systems feeding this and
the other main marshes. By 2000 this signature of active marsh development is only
evident on the Iranian border of the marsh, while what appears to be a system of
embankments and enclosures isolates the marsh from its primary drainage supplies, the
Tigris to the west and the Nahr al Musharrah to the north.

Discussion
125
The results described above clearly demonstrate the rapid pace of degradation within the
marshes over the last two decades. The comparatively sparse temporal frequency of this
analysis though, sheds little light on the precise timing of major changes and thus the
primary forcing variables. Some further insight is however, provided by comparing the
1985 and 2000 patterns observed here, with the satellite surveys of Munro and Touron
(1997). Their analysis involved a short-term study of Landsat TM imagery between
1992-1994. While simple direct intercomparison is complicated by minor differences in
the methods used (particularly definition of the subsetting boundaries) their results
summarized in Table 6 help to explain the broad pattern of change intermediate between
1985 and 2000.
Wetland Vegetation 1992
(km 2 1993
) (km 2 1994
) (km 2 )
Hammar 516 441 94
Qurnah 1,826 1,043 153
Hawizeh 1,845 1,493 1,136
Open Water Cover 1992
(km 2 1993
) (km 2 1994
) (km 2 )
Hammar 983 442 202
Qurnah 141 122 5
Hawizeh 847 1,663 875
1992
(km 2 1993
) (km 2 1994
) (km 2 )
Total Wetland Area 6,158 5,204 2,465
Table 6. Pattern of marshland degradation 1992-1994 summarized after Munro and
Touron (1997). The landcover estimates shown are based on classified
Landsat TM imagery using methods similar to those reported above.
This shows the total area of wetlands having fallen to 63% of the 1985 level by 1992, and
then diminishing rapidly so that by 1994 the total marshland area stood at only 25% of
the 1985 extent. The following two years witnessed the almost complete desiccation of
the Hammar and Qurnah marshes and Munro and Touron (ibid.) also note the presence of
evaporite deposits on the bed of the major open water bodies in these marshes.
Intercomparison with Tables 2-5 reveals that substantial degradation post 1994 has been
associated primarily with the loss of 865km 2 of the southern Hawizeh marsh. Accepting
the potential differences arising between these two studies, if interpreted with some
caution, the combined results can be projected to reveal the timeline of environmental
change in the marshes (Figure 7).

Area of Component Marshes (km 2 )
126
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
0
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Figure 7. Time-line of environmental degradation
Hammar Marsh
Qurnah Marsh
Hawizeh Marsh
Tot al Wetlands
12000
10000
Linking Cause and Effect
The underlying driving force behind the pattern of degradation is difficult to establish due
to the limited data on the changing upstream flow regime. During the last 50 years the
upstream catchment of the marshes has been subject to extensive hydro-engineering to
improve water supply and reduce flood risk in all the major riparian states. Major dam
construction projects including the on-going GAP programme in Turkey (see Naff, this
volume, for a comprehensive review) have undoubtedly had a major impact of the flood
regime within the marshes. Flow regulation, in particular a reduction in the spring flood
discharges on the Tigris and Euphrates has major implications due to the non-linear
relationship between river stage and water supply to marshes which depend primarily on
high flow events. While this backdrop of extensive river regulation has undoubtedly
played a major role in reducing water supply to the marshes the collapse of the each
marsh unit can also be directly traced to localized, on-site, water control projects that
influence the hydrological pattern of sources and sinks within the ecosystem.
The Hammar Marsh
The Hammar marsh appears to have undergone rapid desiccation between 1985-1992 and
in particular 1992-1994. From their analysis of TM imagey, Munro and Touron (ibid.)
report the desiccation of Lake Hammar to have occurred between 1992-1993. The
collapse of this ecosystem coincides closely with the completion of the ‘Third River’ or
MOD project which was officially inaugurated in 1992 (AMAR, 1994). In its original
conception, the downstream stage of this waterway was planned to pass under the
8000
6000
4000
2000
Area of Total Marsh Extent (km 2 )

127
Euphrates at An Nasiriyah, and then flow south of the Hammar marsh towards to the
Shatt al Basra, with fluid momentum augmented by pumps to drive the flow across the
very low relief gradient of the desert plain. The junction of the Euphrates and the MOD at
An Nasiriyah is clearly visible on the 15m panchromatic channel of the Landsat 7 ETM+
image of the western marshes in 2000 (Figure 8). Unlike the original design, however,
this close-up clearly reveals two separate diversions of the Euphrates into the main drain,
presumably designed to provide the additional hydraulic head required to drive the drain
downstream. Downstream of this junction and through the main area of the marshes, the
Euphrates is embanked and large reaches of the river at the head of the Hammar marsh
are dry in the flood season in 2000. This section of the Euphrates was the primary
drainage supply to the Hammar marsh and the diversion into the MOD is thus heavily
implicated in the desiccation of the ecosystem.
The Qurnah Marsh
The Qurnah marshes show a similar timeline of desiccation to that of the Hammar marsh,
with an even more accentuated rate of degradation between 1992 and 1994. The diversion
and embankment of the Euphrates discussed above is also implicated in this desiccation
of this ecosystem as overspill from the Euphrates historically represents a major source of
drainage to the southern margin of these marshes. However, a more significant and
striking explanation for the rapid decline of the Qurnah marshes is change in flow supply
to the north resulting from an impressive engineering project known as the ‘Mother of
Battles River’. This project comprises a major barrage and dyke system inaugurated in
April 1993 which diverts the Shatt al Muminah river into a 2km wide, 48km long canal
which joins the Euphrates at Al Qurnah. This major waterworks project is again clearly
visible in the 15m panchromatic image in 2000 (Figure 9).
The diversion of this supply, coupled with the modification of drainage along the
Euphrates, completes the isolation of the Qurnah marshes and is undoubtedly responsible
for their very rapid and entire desiccation during 1993-1994. The 2000 image shows
some evidence of land reclamation (appearing as bright near infrared on the false colour
composite image, Figure 5) around the Mother of Battles River, although it should be
noted that this area of conversion is small compared to the extent of the entire marsh area.
The Hawizeh Marsh
Unlike both the Qurnah and Hammar marshes, the Hawizeh ecosytem exhibits a more
gradual pattern of decline, although the current marsh area in 2000 stands at only 35% of
the 1977 level. Despite this more optimistic outlook, it is clear that major local
embankment and drainage projects are also implicated in the pattern of degradation for
this marsh. Again, close-up panchromatic images from May 2000 reveal the nature of
engineering works. These show an extensive pattern of drains, dykes and sluices which
have been constructed connecting the historic centre of the marsh to the Tigris.

128
Figure 8. High resolution panchromatic images of the diversion of Euphrates in the
Main Outfall Drain at An Nasiriyah. The arrows show interpreted flow patterns.

Figure 9. The Mother of Battles River in May 2000
129

130
Figure 10. Embankment and drainage canals on the Hawizeh marsh, May 2000

131
While the exact pattern of use is difficult to determine is it clear that such water control
works could act to selectively drain parcels of the marsh over time. Furthermore, while
the connection to the main northern drainage supply in Iraq (the Nahr al Musharrah )
remains intact, the pattern of flow here can again be controlled by locks and sluices. In
2000 it appears that a major source of water supply is now provided from within Iran, and
the extensive growth of seasonal fringing marsh on this side of the border is indicative of
active naturalized supply.
Conclusions
Satellite remote sensing provides a powerful tool for the analysis of recent environmental
change, particularly where the phenomena under consideration extend over wide areas
and across international borders. The application of multi-temporal image analysis
described here has provided a novel record of the changing pattern of this highly
significant ecosystem over the last three decades and emphasizes the extraordinary rate of
environmental degradation. These marshes, which have a unique environmental history
stretching through the late Holocene, now appear to be on the verge of destruction and in
the last twenty years have been reduced in size by over 85%. The loss of marshland has
major ramifications for the future survival of the ancient Marsh Arab or Madan society as
well as numerous globally threatened and endangered fauna and flora, topics discussed at
length elsewhere in this volume.
This recent pattern of dewatering has been forced by a combination of off-site and
on-site water supply and river diversion schemes. Assessing the relative balance of these
two sets of influences is difficult given the limited hydrometric data context. It is clear,
however, that as with any hydrological problem, a consensus regarding the nature of the
problem, its causes, and future needs must be reached by all the major riparian states of
the river basin before secure environmental management can be formulated and executed.
It is also clear that localized river management has undoubtedly played a major part in
the controlling the recent timeline of change. While the motives underlying many of these
schemes remain the subject of significant political debate and scrutiny, their localized
impact is comparatively incontrovertible. What is less clear at this stage is whether such
diversion schemes would have been possible, and had the same impact, if it were not for
the prior regulation and reduction in river flows caused by upstream dam development.
Such uncertainty in linking cause and effect provides a weak basis for developing future
environmental protection strategies and there is considerable scope to develop rigorous
physically based numerical models of basin dynamics to begin to address this question.
References
Alex, M. 1985. Klimadaten ausgewahlter stationen des Vorderen Orients. Tubinger Atlas
des Vorderen Orients, Reihe A, 14, Reichert, Weisbaden.
AMAR. 1994. An Environmental and Ecological Study of the Marshlands of
Mesopotamia. Unpublished Report, The AMAR Appeal.

132
Buringh, P. 1960. Soils and soil conditions in Iraq. Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture,
Baghdad.
Federal Interagency Committee for Wetland Delineation, 1989. Federal Manual for
Identifying and Delineating Jurisdictional Wetlands. Cooperative Technical
Publication, Washington.
Jensen, J.R., Narumalani, S., Wetherbee, O. and Mackay, H.E. 1991. Remote sensing
offers an alternative for mapping wetlands. Geographical Information Systems, 3,
46-53.
Jensen, J.R., Rutchey, K., Koch, M.S. and Narumalani, S. 1995. Inland wetland change
detection in the Everglades water conservation area 2A using a time series of
normalized remotely sensed data. Photogrammetric Engineering and Remote
Sensing, 61, 199-209.
Kneizys, F.X., Shettle, E.P., Gallexy, W.O., Chetwynd, J.H., Abreu, L.W., Selby, J.E..A.,
Clough, S.A. and Fenn, R.W. 1983. Atmospheric Transmission/Radiance:
Computer Code LOWTRAN 6 (Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusettes: US Air
Force Geophysics Laboratory).
Larsen, C.E. and Evans, G. 1978. The Holocene geological historic of the Tigris-
Euphrates-Karun delta. In, Brice W.C. (ed.), The Environmental History of the
Near and Middle East since the last Ice Age. Academic Press, London.
Lillesand, T.M. and Keifer, R.W. 1999. Remote Sensing and Image Interpretation. Wiley,
Chichester.
Munro, D.C. and Touron, H. 1997. The estimation of marshland degradation in southern
Iraq using multitemporal Landsat TM images. International Journal of Remote
Sensing, 18, 1597-1606.
Rouse, J.W., Haas, R.H. and Shell, J.A. and Deering, D.W. 1973. Monitoring vegetation
systems in the Great Plains with ERTS-1. Proceedings of the Third Earth
Resources Technology Satellite Symposium, Goddard Space Flight Centre, NASA.
Salim, S.M. 1962. Marsh dwellers of the Euphrates Delta. University of London Press.
Sanlaville, P. 1989. Considerations sur l’evolution de la basse-Mesopotamie au cours des
derniers millenaires. Paleorient, 15, 5-27.
Shima, L.J., Anderson, R.R. and Carter, V.P. 1976. ‘The use of color infrared
photography in mapping the vegetation of a freshwater marsh’. Chesapeake
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Thesiger, W. 1964. The Marsh Arabs, Longman, London.

8
The Marshes of Southern Iraq:
A Hydro-Engineering and Political Profile
Thomas Naff and George Hanna
Summary
This paper examines and analyzes in summary form the effects on the marshlands of southern
Iraq, and on their human and wildlife inhabitants, of half a century of hydro-engineering
development along the entire lengths of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. The political,
economic, and international dimensions of the issue are also factored. In the light of the
picture that emerges, the authors conclude that obstacles raised by the rate of marsh damming,
drainage, and dehydration coupled with political and strategic considerations all but foreclose
the restoration of the marshes along with their inhabitants. In the highly unlikely event that
some portions of the marshes are salvaged, they will emerge in some very diminished and
different lineaments; recommendations are made accordingly. The principal recommendation
regarding restoration focuses on the Huwaiza marsh, which the authors consider to be the only
viable marsh that offers any hope of a limited but successful reclamation.
Introduction
The marshes of southern Iraq were created thousands of years ago when the Euphrates and
Tigris rivers, in their natural state, carried great quantities of water and sediments downstream
at a discharge rate perhaps three times more than at present, frequently bursting their channels
to inundate the surrounding lands as they flowed toward the Persian Gulf. The subsurface
waters were in some places only a few inches below the ground and in some areas of low
basin elevation, such as present-day Basra and Al-Qurna, the water actually broke surface.
The marshes emerged as the result of repeated flooding that submerged the lands adjacent to
the rivers. The floodwaters of the Euphrates were mainly responsible for the creation of the
Lake Hammar marshes and those of the Tigris brought forth the Al Huwaiza and Qurna
marshes. The catchment area of the marshes in this century, before their depletion, has varied
between 14,000 and 16,000 km 2 . But the rate of shrinkage in the last two decades has been
alarming. Satellite images show that in 1985 the total area of the marshes was about 14,777
km 2 ; in 1992 the marshes occupied 8,386 km 2 , that is, 57% of the marshes remained viable; in
2000 only 16% – i.e. 2,291 km 2 – survive, and most of those are in mortal danger. 1 (In another
part of this Report, Dr Brassington’s satellite images and analysis provide dramatic evidence
of what has happened to the marshes; they are relevant to this entire article.)

134
A hydrological snapshot of the rivers
The Euphrates
The Euphrates rises in Turkey where it collects 84% of its flow, then passes through Syria
where it receives another 13%, crosses into Iraq to take in the remaining 3% of its waters. The
total catchment area of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers combined is 915,000 km 2 . Of that
total, the Euphrates basin covers an expanse of 440,000 km 2 with the largest stretch of about
177,000 km 2 running through Iraq. The mean annual flow of the Euphrates prior to the
introduction of significant engineering projects executed in the 1970s by the basin’s three
riparian governments was 931 cumecs (cubic meters per second) which is equivalent to 30
bcm/yr (billion cubic meters per year). On May 13, 1969, the maximum flow at Hit, 180 km
south of the Syrian–Iraqi border, was 7,390 cumics. The minimum flow occurred in July 1974
when only 50 cumecs were recorded. This low point was reached during the process of filling
the Keban and Tabqa Dam reservoirs in Turkey and Syria, respectively. The current annual
average flow of the Euphrates fluctuates between 18 and 20 bcm depending on upstream
reservoir fillings and operations.
Prior to 1974, the three riparian states on the Euphrates withdrew annually the
following volumes from the river: Turkey, 2 bcm, Syria, 4 bcm, and Iraq 13 bcm. The present
estimated annual withdrawals are Turkey, 6 bcm to 8 bcm, Syria, 5 bcm to 6 bcm, and Iraq 14
bcm. Today, of that 14 bcm flow, Iraq uses approximately 13 bcm/yr during the 680 km run
between Hit and Lake Hammar near the city of al-Nasiriyya – the largest lake along the
southern sector of the basin. Recalling that the annual average natural flow of the Euphrates is
931 cumecs at Hit, the rate decreases to 485 cumecs by the time the river arrives at Lake
Hammar. The Euphrates can lose up to 47% of its water as it moves along the 1,040
kilometers from the border with Syria to the marshes in the south. Some of the loss is
attributable to evaporation and irrigation but the greater portion is lost almost entirely in the
marshes, especially around Lake Hammar.
The system of lakes and marshes below the Hindiya Barrage have a storage capacity
of 5 bcm/yr. Lake Hammar requires 3.6 bcm/yr of Euphrates water to maintain a level
sufficient for the needs of fishing and rural life. [See the Euphrates water balance in Appendix
1]
The water quality of the Euphrates tends to be generally good but varies from season
to season and location to location along the course of the river. Quality tends to be better
overall in the upper than in the lower reaches of the river and normally improves during the
season of high flows. At Hit the quality averages about 500–600 ppm of dissolved salts and
increases to 1000–1500 ppm at Nassiriya in the south. These figures will increase
significantly when Turkey’s GAP project is competed (see further below).
The Tigris
The Tigris River basin covers some 365,000 km 2 and, like the Euphrates, most of that
dimension – 182,000 km 2 – lies in Iraq. Turkey’s share of the basin amounts to 37,000 km 2 ,
and Iran’s is 146,000 km 2 consisting mainly of the basins of the two tributaries in western
Iran, the Karun and Diyala Rivers. The Tigris runs only a very short distance along the eastern
edge of Syria and constitutes a border with Iraq. There is no hydrological or developmental
contribution to the river from Syria.

The Tigris has a length of 2000 km, of which 1360 km fall between Iraq’s northern
and southern borders. The Tigris collects its water from runoffs and tributaries that originate
in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. The average long-term runoff that Turkey contributes to the Tigris
in Iraq is 21.5 bcm/yr The intermediate water supply flowing into the Tigris within Iraq’s
borders comes from the principal tributaries of the river. They are:
• The Greater Zab, whose annual flow is 14.2 bcm
• The Lesser Zab, annual flow 7.4 bcm
• The Adhaim, annual flow 0.7 bcm
• The Diyala, annual flow 5.6 bcm
High gradient heads characterizes all of these tributaries with steep slopes caused by erosion,
and all carry sediments into the Tigris. Two other rivers need to be cited as tributaries, the
Karkha and Karun. They both originate in Iran and join the Tigris near Basra in Iraq. Each has
an annual flow of about 0.8 bcm. The mountainous regions of the Tigris basin constitute a
drainage area equal to 166,000 km 2 .
When these tributaries flowed in their natural, undeveloped state, they accounted for
the Tigris’s annual floods and the maintenance of deltas, lakes, and marshes in the southern
reaches in the regions of Kut, Amara, and Basra. But owing to the construction of dams and
reservoirs, all of the tributaries have lost their force and no longer supply as much water and
sediments as previously to the Tigris.
The total average annual flow of that stretch of the Tigris originating within Iraq’s
borders is 27.9 bcm. Thus the potential mean annual runoff of the Tigris downstream of
mouth of the Diyala River is estimated at 49.5 bcm. About 2 bcm of water is lost each year
because of flood overflows upstream of Baghdad. Downstream of the Diyala River
confluence with the Tigris, the major portion of the river flow is used for irrigation and part of
the flood runoff is discharged into the marshes and depressions along the riverbanks.
The hydraulic activities at Lake Tharthar and the Sammara Dam have had a serious
effect on the water levels of the Tigris as it passes downstream below Baghdad, negatively
affecting the water level in the region between Kut and Amara. It is from these waters in
particular that most of the Tigris River marshes receive their hydration. Before the creation of
the Tharthar lake system in 1984, the average annual flow of the Tigris downstream of the
Kut Barrage was 20 bcm/yr. After construction, the loss of flow to the marshes and lakes on
both sides of the Tigris could range between 9 bcm/yr and 15 bcm/yr. Today, owing to further
hydraulic engineering, the flow is almost fully controlled.
The quality of water flowing in the northern tributaries is good. In the Greater Zab, the
Lesser Zab, and the Diyala Rivers, the total dissolved solids (TDS) varies from 100–300 mg/l
(milligrams per litre). Adhaim River water is of lower quality due to the high return flow from
cultivated land drainage from the Kirkuk irrigation project. Downstream of the Sammara
Dam, 80 km north of Baghdad, the water quality begins to deteriorate gradually owing to
drainage and industrial wastes that are dumped into the river. Along the 60 km stretch of the
Tigris in the Baghdad area water quality during the high flow winter months is 400 mg/l and
in the low flow summer months it ranges from 500 to 650 mg/l. South of Baghdad water
quality continues to decline reaching a level of 800 mg/l of TDS and more in low flow
periods.
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In the Shatt al-Arab, salinity rates are even higher because of the accumulation of salts
in the lower portions of both the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which are supplemented by salt
water induction from the twice daily tidal movement of Gulf water. The TDS in the Shatt al-
Arab vary between 700 mg/l and 1400 mg/l. The water quality of the Shatt al-Arab continues
to deteriorate steadily because of increased industrial wastes and return flows from irrigated
lands and because of evaporation from the reservoirs that are connected to the river.
During the flood season, when water turbidity in the Tigris is high, its silt content is
commensurately elevated (turbidity is measured by its silt and sediment content as mg/l).
Around Mosul in the north of Iraq, the turbidity of the Tigris varies from 2,500 mg/l in low
flow season to 10,000 mg/l during high flows. During the lowest water levels that occur
between July and October, the turbidity drops to as little as 100–400 mg/l. Water turbidity in
the north is an important factor in maintaining the marshes in the south. However, the
turbidity of the river has been decreasing for decades owing to the construction of dams and
reservoirs that capture the silt and sediments before they replenish the marshes. [See the
Tigris water balance in Appendix 2]
As indicated, the hydrological regimes of both river systems have been enormously
altered in the modern era by the construction of dams, reservoirs, barrages, regulators,
irrigation schemes and drainage projects carried out in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. As expected,
the consequent changes in the water balance and sediment transport of both rivers have
drastically affected the natural, physical, biological, agricultural, and hydrological condition
of the marshes, principally in the loss of large areas to dehydration. The Marsh Dwellers, their
way of life and culture, and the wildlife of the marshes have also suffered a heavy toll from
the changes inflicted on the marshlands.
It will be clear that owing to the often cited, continuing hydraulic infrastructure
projects and their operations up and down both rivers, their discharges have become very
dynamic. Such highly variable flows have had their consequences, not least on the health of
the marshes. These activities are not expected to abate until around 2020 and when they do,
all that engineering will have enabled the managers of the Tigris and Euphrates basins to
create uniform flows in their basins. This uniformity will, in turn, make possible significantly
more efficient hydrological operations. Moreover, were the marshes still extant, they would
benefit greatly from an assured, consistent delivery of water – assuming there were a policy in
place dedicated to their well being, a policy not discernable at present.
A brief general profile of the marshes
The Marshlands are located at the bottom of the Euphrates and Tigris basins, mainly within
the triangular area formed by the cities of Amara, al-Nasiriyya, and Basra. The marshes (haur
in Arabic) are vitally linked to and dependent on the supply of water (and its quality) coming
from both rivers upstream.
The area of the marshes is 35,000 km 2 . The area is entirely flat except for a few
mounds of ancient city ruins. The more shallow marshes dry out in the summer months while
the deeper marshes become shallow lakes. About 25% of the marshes used to be permanently
flooded. The marshland in the Lake Hammar vicinity is about four meters above the mean sea
level. Owing to the shallow nature of the marshes, and to the saline quality of water in the
southern parts of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, and to the constant process of evaporation,

transpiration, and intake of irrigation waters, the salt concentration in the ground water of the
marsh wetlands is 10,000 to 60,000 ppm.
The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers have their own clusters of marshlands. Those of the
Tigris are located in the vicinity of Basra, Amara, and Kut and between the Tigris and the
Iranian border. The most important of these marshes are the Huwaiza, the Siniya, Adem, and
the Auda, which are associated with the Tigris. The most important of the Euphrates marshes
are the Lake Hammar system that extends from Gumat Ali (about five miles north of Basra)
to Suk al-Shiyukh and Shatra at the bottom of the Gharraf River. (The Shatt al-Gharraf, which
was an ancient natural connection between the two rivers, is now dry.)
In addition to the Lake Hammar system, the Euphrates marshes consist of a small
group between Hilla and Hindiya and between Khuder and Kefil. The mean annual
temperatures in the marshes vary widely. The mean minimum temperatures range from about
46 degrees Fahrenheit (F) in January to 81 degrees F in June and July and the mean maximum
temperatures go from 64 degrees F in January to 106 degrees F in August. January and July
have had the lowest and highest temperatures. The lowest minimum temperature can reach 24
degrees F in January and the highest can climb to 120 degrees F in August. The lowest annual
mean rainfall is 117 mm (4.5 inches); the highest is 302 mm (11.8 inches). Virtually no rain
falls between the months of June and September. The highest rate of precipitation occurs in
the month of March. Marsh winds are of very low velocity (though some recorded winds
reached a force of as much as 75 km/hr). Dust storms in the driest months are common.
Evidence of oil deposits under most of the marshes has been discovered.
The marshes and associated lakes are covered with natural wetland vegetation
dominated by Phragmites australis and Typha somingenesis. Along the fringes of the
marshes, summer rice is cultivated on small parcels of land and winter barley on higher
ground. Low river levees, on which villages are situated, are mostly saline and support date
palms, fruit trees, and some vegetables. Elsewhere, where no cultivation exists, the soil is
saline and barren and forms seasonal mudflats when inundated. The marshes are dotted with
hundreds of small islands built up from layers of reed. On these islands the marsh dwellers
have built house from reeds and other indigenous plants. (Stunning photographs of Marsh
Dweller reed dwellings and depictions of their way of life may be seen in Wilfred Thesiger’s
seminal book The Marsh Arabs.
Marsh basin soil is water logged or submerged for various periods of time after
flooding. The natural drainage of the marshland is low and the ground water table is high.
These factors influence soil structures, consistence, porosity, density, aeration, etc. Such
variation has produced variegated natural vegetation. [See the 2000 Landcover Analysis of the
major marshes in Appendix 3]
The marsh wetland soil is lucustrine clay. Some of the marshes have been silted up as
a consequence of intensive irrigation farming, mainly because of rice cultivation. Owing to
the high water table in the marshes and insufficient water for leaching and draining, the soil of
the marshes is becoming very salinated. 2
The marshlands are a crucial habitat for important populations and species of wildlife,
contributing significantly to regional bio-diversity and supporting the international migration
of birds. The existence of the marshes as an oasis surrounded by desert amplifies their
ecological importance. Several globally threatened species of wildlife listed in the 1994 IUCN
red list of threatened animals also inhabit the marshes. 3
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The permanent wetlands of the Tigris and Euphrates basin in southern Iraq are large
enough and have been isolated from other comparable wetland areas for a sufficient length of
time to allow for the evolution of several forms of animal life which have become unique to
the Iraqi marshlands. 4
The marshlands of Mesopotamia have been for millennia home to unique human
communities as well – the Marsh Arabs or ma c adan in Arabic; the term is the marsh
equivalent of Bedouins who live an analogous life in the desert. Tribal traditions among the
Marsh Dwellers and their particular way of living in harmony with the environment have
enabled them to be self-sufficient and to survive under difficult economic and natural
conditions for centuries.
In modern times, increasingly steady and significant contact between the Marsh
Dwellers and the surrounding cities commenced after World War I when they began
experiencing larger volumes of trade and commerce in their region. This circumstance
encouraged many of them to migrate to urban centers. Tribal conflicts, oppressive landlords,
severe living conditions, onerous government regulations and controls, and worsening
economic condition – particularly the changing hydrology of the marshes and harsh
government actions – created powerful push factors for moving some of the marsh dwellers
out of their traditional habitat. These trends were drastically intensified during the Iran–Iraq
war and its aftermath. The marshes were repeatedly drained and flooded during the hostilities
for tactical reasons. The policy of the current regime has been the deliberate eviction of the
Marsh Dwellers for political reasons compounded by ideological motives.
The most telling aspects to emerge from this brief profile are, first, the vulnerability of
the marshes with their shallow waters, fluctuating climate, and inconsistent water supply.
They are virtually defenseless against any negative effects from the increasing number of
hydraulic engineering projects extending from Turkey to Iraq on the two river systems.
Mismanagement, poor maintenance, and warfare have only magnified their fragility. Second,
the marshlands of Iraq are of international ecological, political, and strategic importance. If
for no other reason, they are integral to two large international river basins. This international
quality of the marshes and their inhabitants (human and animal) endow them with particular
political, human rights, and environmental significance.
Navigation and fisheries
Navigation
Presently, navigation on Iraq’s two major rivers is negligible owing to a combination of
engineering structures, two wars, and the steep decline of the Iraqi economy over the last 20
years. Previously, barges, tugboats, steamers, sail boats, and rafts could be seen navigating the
river transporting manufactured goods and agricultural products among the cities that line the
3000 km route taken by the rivers. The most heavily used stretches were in the196 kilometers
from Fao to Qurna in the Shatt al-Arab area, and the 729 kilometer reach from Qurna to
Baghdad.
Three decades ago, the data on river traffic passing through the Kut Barrage indicated
a healthy stream of river trade on the Tigris. In 1970, almost a half million tons of goods were
transported through the barrage. But two years later, that figure dropped to only 74,000 tons,
in large measure because of infrastructure construction on the river.

Navigation in the marshlands is limited to the use of small, mostly flat-bottomed boats
for the transport of people, goods, and livestock. Most of the marsh navigation moved among
the cities of Basra, al-Nasiriyya, and Amara. There is virtually no significant navigation,
commercial or otherwise, on the marshes today – hardly a surprising circumstance
considering the destruction the marshes have suffered over the last quarter century.
Fisheries
The potential size of a fish catch depends on several factors: the area of the body of water
being fished, the length of the vegetation season within that water, the availability of other
food sources for the fish, and the average temperature of the water which should be, ideally,
more than 15 degrees C (69 degrees F). In Iraq, the fishing season lasts nine months, from
March to November.
Iraq’s inland waterways suitable for fishing are equal in size to 4,448,000 dunum (1
dunum = 2500 m 2 or 0.247 acres or 0.1 hectares). The average yield of fish has been
estimated at 1.5 kg/dunum in the upper stems of the two rivers, 3 kg/dunum in the lower
stems, 5 kg/dunum in the marshes, and 10 kg/dunum in the lakes, particularly Lake Hammar.
The total fishing and vegetation area of the marshes is 2,468,000 dunum and the total
marshland fish catch is 15,230 tons per year.
The marshes and lakes on both sides of the Tigris between Amara and Qurna have
constituted the main water bodies for fisheries. In addition to the marshes, the reservoirs, fish
farms, and lakes in the central and northern sectors of the Tigris and Euphrates basins are also
productive fishing waters. Most important among those ancillary sources are Lake Tharthar
and the Dokan, Derbendi-Khan and Sammara reservoirs.
There are certain hydro-ecological factors regarding the marshes and their fish
population that need to be borne in mind. A consistent discharge of at least 3 bcm/yr in the
Euphrates at Lake Hammar and 5 bcm/yr in the lower Tigris at the Huwaiza and adjacent
marshes are necessary to maintain the marshes, lakes, and ponds in the lower reaches of the
two rivers as sources of fish and other wildlife. Further, normal spawning conditions require a
depth of water of at least one meter between mid-January and mid-June. With the steady
dehydration of the marshes, these conditions no longer obtain consistently. This is a clear
example of how the destruction of the marshes can and is having a negative multiplier effect
on both the ecology and productivity of Iraq’s water systems.
The impact of technology and development on the marshes
Many factors that affect the viability of the marshes and their inhabitants have been cited:
domestic and international political stability, the state of the economy, climate, environmental
conditions, water quality, and the application of various technologies to the two river systems.
These factors are inter-related and have reciprocal effects, but none have had more regular,
longer-term impact than the technological and agricultural development of the Tigris and
Euphrates Rivers.
Technological water resource development projects in Iraq may be divided into two
broad categories: those of a national, permanent nature about which little can be done in the
foreseeable future, and those that are local and temporary and which are susceptible to
ameliorating actions.
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Most of the large-scale permanent projects have been a necessary component of the
modernization of Iraq and were executed for perceived beneficial reasons: to provide power
for energy, expand agricultural production, make possible large urban centers, and as
protective measures against floods and drought. Water and the processes of oil production are
intimately related and water and food are, of course, militarily important as well.
The basic units of Iraq’s large water infrastructure projects were planned in the decade
of the fifties but most of them were executed after 1973 when oil revenues increased
significantly. With the construction and operation of these permanent dams, barrages, and
reservoirs, the natural flow of the rivers into the marshes disappeared; henceforward –
permanently – the marshes would receive only the regulated – and diminished – flows that
passed downstream.
Large-scale, permanent projects
Moving north to south on the Tigris River, the most important of the permanent engineering
projects have been:
• Dohuk Dam located 70 miles north of the city of Mosul. Storage capacity is 1.5
bcm. Its purposes are flood control and irrigation.
• Mosul Dam located 40 miles northwest of the city of Mosul. Storage capacity is
11.8 bcm. Its main purposes are flood control, power generation, and water storage
for irrigation and recreation.
• Dokan Dam on the Lesser Zab River near the city of Sulaimaniya. Storage
capacity is 6.8 bcm. Used for flood control and irrigation.
• Darbandi-Khan Dam on the Diyala River. Storage capacity is 3.0 bcm. Function is
flow and flood control.
• Hamrin Dam also on the Diyala River. Storage capacity is 4.0 bcm. Purpose is
flood control and irrigation.
• Diyala Weir. A submerged dam to maintain the water level in the river for the
intake of irrigation canals.
• Sammara Dam. Built in 1956, it is the first hydroelectric station in Iraq. In addition
to producing electricity, the dam also diverts large volumes of Tigris water to the
very large Lake Tharthar.
• Kut Barrage. The first hydraulic structure built on the Tigris in 1937 near the city
of Kut. Its main purpose is to regulate the flow of water and to control the water
level for the intake of irrigation canals. It is equipped with a navigation lock.
• Three dams and ten regulators on the Euphrates.
• Qadisiyya Dam. Located near the town of Haditha. Storage capacity of 7 bcm.
Used for power generation, flood control, and water storage.
• Falluja Dam built to provide water for the Abu Gharib irrigation project.
• Hilla Dam. Located near the city of Hilla. Control water level for irrigation.
• Ramadi Barrage. Used to regulate the river flow and to control the water level for
the Warrar Regulator.
• Warrar, Dhiban, and Mujarra Regulators. Regulates the flow of water to the lake
systems of Habbaniya and Abu Dibbis.

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• Kufa, Shamiya, and Nasiriyya Barrages. On the Kufa and Shamsiya branches of
the river there are four barrages and two more downstream of al-Nasiriyya. They
too are used to control flow and water level.
• Lake Tharthar. The largest reservoir in Iraq with a storage capacity of 80 bcm. It is
used for flood control of the Tigris and for balancing the inter-basin transfer of
water from the Tigris to the Euphrates through the Tigris–Tharthar Canal and the
Euphrates–Tharthar Canal.
The Main Drain Canal (or ‘Third River’)
All the technology applied to Iraq’s river systems produced very large increases in irrigated
agriculture that in turn produced commensurate increases in polluted drainage water that was
returned to the rivers from the cultivated lands. The return increased the level of salinity in the
river waters making them more and more unsuitable for farm and domestic uses. The problem
became urgent. Iraqi organizations along with several foreign firms commissioned by the
government considered various plans.
The solution agreed upon, one that was conceived in the 1950s, was the construction
of a large canal between the two rivers. It would be, altogether, 527 km long starting just
south of Baghdad and running south emptying into the Gulf. Its function would be to collect
all the waste-water drainage from irrigated farms located in the central and southern portions
of the Euphrates–Tigris delta. Construction was completed in late 1992.
The Main Drain, as it became known (or, alternately, because of the volume of its
flow, ‘The Third River’), has an upper reach of 42 km with a discharge capacity of 30 cumecs
(cm/s), a central stretch of 154 km with a discharge of 38 cumecs, and a tail reach of 220 km.
The width of the canal below al-Nasiriyya, the point at which it collects most of its water is
about 250 meters wide and at least two meters deep. The total discharge of the Third River is
about 325 cumecs or roughly 10 bcm/yr. After al-Nasiriyya, the Main Drain crosses Lake
Hammar and the Euphrates and empties into the Gulf. In the original design, the Third River
was to pass under the Euphrates through a siphon, but in 1992 the Euphrates was diverted into
the Main Drain southeast of al-Nasiriyya. The reason given for the diversion was that the
government did not have the necessary funds to siphon under the Euphrates so the connection
was made to create a single canal. Then the Euphrates was dammed east of the Main Drain
diverting the previous direction of the river’s flow.
In addition to its primary function of carrying off drainage water from cultivated
fields, the Main Drain could be used to drain the marshes. In fact, the groundwater tables in
the vicinity of the marshes are already being lowered by the normal operation of the Main
Drain.
Other lesser drainage canals have been constructed to supplement the capacity of the
Main Drain. The Qadisiyya Canal, also tagged the ‘Fifth River’, takes water from the
Euphrates and diverts it into a stagnant, closed catchment basin. In 1990, a new drainage
project in the Ammara marsh area was begun. The canal, approximately 50 km long, runs
from south of Qalat Salih to west of the Ash-Shahin River (known as the ‘Mother of all
Battles’ River). 1992 Satellite photos show that together with this drainage canal, a causeway
was built in August 1992 for the purpose of diverting the Shatt al-Mumina, a tributary of the

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Tigris, into another newly constructed canal with the result that the Amara marshes were
deprived of water. [See the Tigris–Euphrates Major Water Projects in Appendix 4]
Local hydro-engineering projects
Recent satellite images together with reports from reliable witnesses recently arrived from
Iraq indicate that over the period from 1990 to the present, the marshes have been subjected to
the effects of significant engineering projects. In 1992, a large moat running along a north–
south parallel to the west bank of the Tigris River and north of Qurna was constructed. The
moat is approximately 2 km wide and 48.6 km long. It is connected to an altered hydrological
network which captures flow from the Tigris distributaries – denying water to the central
marshes – and channels the flow into the moat via an east–west extension. The moat
discharges into the Euphrates west of Qurna at the confluence with the Tigris by means of an
artificial outlet channel. The upshot has been that the central marsh at Qurna, has been almost
completely destroyed. It is interesting to note that the satellite photos show that a uniform
network of irrigation has been developed west of the city of Qurna and the surrounding
central marshlands. Incidentally, satellite photos from May 2000 and November 2000 also
show that in November the amount of water in the moat was only 40% of what the volume
had been in May. However, in all probability, this difference is due to the seasonal high and
low flows of Tigris into the marshes. In May, which is a time of high flows, more water is
withdrawn either by gravity or pumping from the marshes than in November, when the levels
are very low.
May 2000 satellite photos show that the Huwaiza marsh east of the Tigris has also
been affected by construction. Embankments have been built up on the eastern shores of the
Tigris to prevent any water overflow, a source from which the marsh had previously been fed.
Moreover, the May 2000 satellite photo shows that a canal connecting the Huwaiza marsh
with the Tigris has been built.
Haur al-Hammar, the largest combination of marsh and lake, which draws its water
mainly from the Euphrates, is now almost dry. Witnesses report that drainage canals were dug
that withdraw water from Lake Hammar and dump it into the Main Drain – for some
unknown reason other than the obvious one of augmenting the Main Drain’s flow. In addition,
the damming of the Euphrates southeast of al-Nasiriyya has contributed to the recession of
Lake Hammar.
A causeway, consisting of three built-up parallel roads was constructed along the
border with Iran during the war, but sometime prior to 1988. Actually the causeway had a
dual purpose: in addition to facilitating Iraqi troop movements, it was used to control the level
of the marsh waters in ways to frustrate the advance of Iranian troops. The causeway prevents
marsh overflows from re-entering the already dehydrated marshland in the area of the Amara
marshes. It is worth noting that these roads were built primarily for military purposes, mainly
for the movement of troops and supplies during the war with Iran.
Yet another dam, the Amara, is presently under construction on the Tigris near the
town of Amara. It is more than fifty percent completed and is likely to become operational by
the end of 2001. The dam, equipped with a spillway, has as its main purpose control of the
water level in the Tigris. The spillway will be used allow excess Tigris water to flow into the
distributaries of Al-Majar al-Kabir and Al-Majar al-Saghir (Greater and Lesser Majar). By

controlling the water level of the Tigris in this way, water flowing to the marshes is also
controlled, and could be used to dry them.
There is no Iraqi control over the water flowing from Iranian territory, but there is a
high probability that Iran, owing to its own current water shortages, will at some relatively
near future time undertake projects that will prevent most or all of those waters from crossing
into Iraq. Such a likely contingency does not appear to be taken into account in Iraqi planning.
Fortunately, despite present alarming indications of the negative impact of these local
projects, it is unlikely that their effects can be sustained owing to pervasive gross
mismanagement and inefficiency in the Iraqi water establishment. Most of the drainage and
irrigation projects lose 50% or more of their design capacity because of poor maintenance or
no maintenance at all.
In the circumstances, the full consequences of the local engineering projects on the
marshes can be expected to be temporary and could be corrected in the future – provided there
is a will to do so and that not too much time elapses before remedial actions are taken. It will
take years to restore the water transfer system of the marshes and the costs of restoration will
be high. [See Changes in Wetland Area in Appendix 5]
Potential impact of Turkey’s southeast Anatolia project (GAP)
The fact that so much of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers originate in Turkey gives that nation
a powerful set of levers that Ankara can manipulate in any issues that arise with its
downstream neighbors, particularly Iraq. Since those two rivers constitute Iraq’s life-blood,
obviously whatever Turkey does to them is of profound interest to Baghdad. Hence, the vital
importance of Turkey’s Southeast Anatolia Project – GAP.
GAP is a massive hydro-agricultural development project that will, if completed
successfully, bring under irrigation about 10% of the landmass of Anatolia. Such an ambitious
endeavor will require harnessing the waters of both the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. GAP will
involve dams, reservoirs, hydroelectric power plants, irrigation projects, the creation of new
urban and industrial centers, and internal population migrations together with the necessity of
building a new social infrastructure in the region. The Euphrates part of GAP is well under
way while the Tigris branch is in its earliest stages.
GAP includes 22 dams, 19 hydropower plants, 19 irrigation projects, and 13 large
subprojects, seven of which are devoted to the Euphrates and six to the Tigris. When fully
implemented, GAP is expected to irrigate some 1.7 million hectares of cultivable land and 27
billion kWh/yr of electric power. The original completion date for both the Euphrates and
Tigris River basins is 2013. However, given Turkey’s present serious financial straits and loss
of international credit rating, hitting that target date may be all but impossible. Nevertheless,
Turkey’s very large economic, political, and symbolic stakes in the completion of GAP has
spurred its determination to complete the program as soon as possible. Therefore, GAP’s
potential impact on the marshes must be taken into consideration.
GAP’s major dams on the Euphrates are the Keban with a storage capacity of 30.6
bcm, the Karakaya with storage capacity of 9.5 bcm, and the largest, the Ataturk Dam which
has a storage capacity of 48.7 bcm. (It is of passing interest that when the Ataturk Dam
reservoir was being filled, Turkey, for the first and only time in the known history of the
Euphrates, cut off nearly its entire flow – that is, the discharge was minimal – for 29 days.)
143

144
The total storage capacity of all of the GAP dams on the Euphrates amounts to 90 bcm of
water.
Plans for GAP on the Tigris involve four large dams on the main stem, three on its
tributaries, and 12 smaller pond dams. The total storage volume of the reservoirs created by
these dams would be 14.5 bcm.
GAP, when fully functional, would reduce the downstream flow of both rivers
significantly because not only has irrigation been given a high priority, but also emphasis is
being given to such high water consuming crops as cotton, maize, wheat, barley, and fruits.
The ambitious agricultural goals for GAP require that very large quantities of water be slated
for storage and use. The flow of water from the Euphrates to Iraq after the river passes
through Syria could be reduced to less than 20% of its original volume. Some estimates place
the figures at 4 bcm/yr of water after the completion of GAP as compared to 30 bcm/yr, pre-
GAP.
Not only will the quantity of flow be significantly diminished, so too will be the
quality of the water coming down to Iraq. Because there would be less flow, there would be
less turbidity and more salinity. There also exists the strong probability that Turkey will not
clean up the effects of return flows from agricultural and industrial waters before they flow
southward. Thus, GAP poses a great danger to the marshes of southern Iraq. These conditions,
were they to come to pass, could have a disastrous impact on the marshes from which, in all
probability, they might not be able to recover, especially if the present damage being done is
not checked and reversed soon. [See the Euphrates water balance after GAP in Appendix 6]
Conclusions
Over the past two or three decades, the marshlands have suffered a series of debilitating
shocks from engineering projects, war, mismanagement, and neglect that have caused both
permanent and some temporary (one hopes) damage to the ecology and environment of the
marshes and to the inhabitants, the Marsh Dwellers. Most of the permanent harm done to the
marshes has been caused by developmental hydraulic engineering projects on both river
systems, undertaken principally in Iraq but in Turkey and (to a lesser extent) Syria as well.
The injuries inflicted on the Marsh Dwellers have also come from the aforementioned
projects, but equally – and in some ways more – from the policies of the Iraqi government and
from the conflict with Iran. One must also add the consequences of the Gulf War when in the
aftermath of hostilities the US government encouraged the Marsh Dwellers to rebel against
Baghdad but did virtually nothing to protect or assist them. They were forced to flee the
vengeance of the Iraqi authorities. The condition of life for the Marsh Dwellers was harsh
before their exile in the 1990s. Something of that situation is reflected in the combination of a
high fertility rate accompanied by a 60% infant mortality and a population profile in the 1980s
that revealed 60% of the Marsh Dwellers were under the age of 15. AMAR reports have
pointed out that since 1990 some 20 studies have been produced by various organizations and
individuals on the humanitarian dimensions in Iraq of the Gulf War, but none specifically on
the Marsh Dwellers.
The local projects in the marsh region have had as their main object the reclamation of
the Marshlands for agricultural production. For this purpose, huge areas of the marshes have
been drained, and embankments, dykes, regulators, barrages, dams, and canals have been put
in place. This has prevented the full replenishment of water to the marshes, causing them to

dry out. Adding further insults to the marshes has been the Iraqi government’s policy of using
them for military and political purposes. Food production has been increased by the diversion
of water from the marshes, but at the cost of large portions of the marshes having been
reduced to the brink of extinction and the Marsh Dwellers having been displaced.
Should GAP be fully completed successfully, the diminution of flow downstream
would be so severe in Iraq that the resulting losses of water would damage the marshes
irreversibly. For the present, about 84% of the marshes have been lost and the rest are in
various stages of decline. These losses have extended to the fish and other wild life that
depend on the marshes for their existence. Instead of doing anything to save even a portion of
the marshes, the Iraqi government is actively pursing a deliberate policy of destroying them.
Even taking into account the fact that some of the damage to the marshes will be
temporary because of mismanagement of the hydraulic engineering projects, the obstacles to
any significant future restoration and protection of the marshes are formidable. So too are the
obstacles to the repatriation of those Marsh Dwellers who might choose to return if given the
chance. Some of the key changes that must occur or factors that must be accounted for in
order to create conditions for improvement are:
145
• A new, enlightened government must replace the present regime. Many reputable
analysts of the Iraqi scene predict that in the foreseeable short term, Saddam Hussein
is likely to be succeeded by a ‘Saddam 2’. Even if there is a change for the better,
there is virtually no assurance that the next government would perceive the salvation
of the marshes and their former residents as a high priority compared, say, to
maintaining food security and expanding oil production.
• The marsh issue is demonstrably international. Just as restoration depends on internal
political and social stability, so too must there be stability and cooperation between
Iraq and its immediate neighbors, namely, Turkey, Syria, and Iran – in some respects,
especially Iran. The past and present record of accord among the principal actors
along the Tigris and Euphrates basins does not inspire hope for the future.
• The major reason for the policy of draining the marshes has been to increase much
needed agricultural production. Consequently, the extent to which the marshes might
be restored would be at the expense of irrigated agriculture. That would create a very
difficult political and economic trade-off even for a leadership that might be
sympathetic toward saving the marshes.
• In this context, it should be noted that Iraq’s population growth rate has been in the
3.5 % per annum range, a rate at which the population will double every 22 or 23
years.
• Restoration of the marshes would require the sustained expenditure of very large
sums of money, much design and technology from abroad, research and training with
a view to capacity-building within Iraq for the ongoing, efficient management and
maintenance of the projects involved, and high-quality data collection, analysis,
distribution, and sharing. That endeavor will require time, capital, and considerable
political will.

146
• Underground exploration and tests indicate that oil deposits exist under the
marshes. With the expanding demand for energy and Iraq’s increasing dependence
on oil revenues, the oil factor intensifies the present threats to the marshes. If
significant oil fields were discovered, the fate of the marshes would be virtually
sealed.
• Finally there is the factor of time. The rate at which the marshes are being lost is
precipitous. The felicitous combination of events necessary to save the marshes
may not occur before time has run out on them.
Actions required to save the marshes would perforce result in creating marshes with
ecological, environmental, hydrological, and physical profiles different from those that
existed prior to the technological development of the two river systems. The marshes in their
former natural state will never be again.
From the present perspective it is all but hopeless to expect the marshes of southern
Iraq to endure, except in some very diminished form or trace. Nor, therefore, can it be
expected that their former Arab inhabitants will return. The combined weight of
technological, hydrological, political, economic, and managerial factors militating against
survival is simply too great to conclude otherwise.
However, there just may be an exception to this dark (but realistic and most probable)
conclusion. It may be possible, with international effort and assistance from credible
organizations and with international funding, to save the remnants of at least one of the
marshes as a model ecological, environmental, and wildlife preserve that could attract ecotourists
and environmentalists at some future time.
Saving a marsh: which one?
Of the extant marshes, there are two that would have the greatest chance of a successful
rescue – assuming felicitous political and economic circumstances prevailed. These are al-
Huwaiza and Qurna, but Huwaiza stands out as the obvious first choice. Briefly put, the
reasons for selecting Huwaiza over Qurna are as follows:
• While, as stated, it might be possible to save and restore Qurna, satellite photos
confirm that at present Huwaiza is the more viable and manageable of the two
marshes.
• Qurna has, over many years, been the object of several hydro-engineering projects – a
moat, dykes, and dams. In order to restore and preserve Qurna, the moat and dykes
and dams that control the water that would be essential for the marsh’s restoration
would have to be cut and the water then be redirected to the marsh. Though such a
project is possible from an engineering perspective, it carries many liabilities.
• The project would face more political difficulties at the levels of policy formulation
and decision making than would be involved in restoring Huwaiza.. Moreover,
because the Qurna project would involve undoing several in-place infrastructures, the
cost of removal could exceed $100 million.

147
• Because the Qurna project would be more complicated than Huwaiza, it would be
substantially more vulnerable to the critical time factor. In addition to those problems
cited above, such questions as which of the dams and dykes should be breached and
what kind of timetable would be required, would also be involved. Consequently, the
Qurna project would probably be so time-consuming from the decision phase to
implementation that Qurna marsh could be beyond salvation by the time action is
ready to be taken. At the very least, the cost factor will, in all probability, have
increased significantly.
• Much of the Qurna marshland has been converted to agriculture. It is an established
fact in Iraq (and elsewhere) that once land has been converted to agricultural
production, it is very difficult to restore it to its previous use, whether as a marsh or
otherwise.
• Huwaiza has not yet been reclaimed in any significant degree for agricultural
production. Furthermore, only three low-level earthen dams – built for military
purposes during the Iran – Iraq war – prevent Tigris water from flowing into the
Huwaiza marsh.
• The remains of the Huwaiza marsh are, presently, greater and more alive than those
of Qurna. Huwaiza is therefore a little less vulnerable to the time factor. That is, it can
withstand the shocks of hydro engineering, of drainage, and of neglect for a
marginally longer period of time.
• For all these reasons, Huwaiza is the more rational choice for resurrection and the
creation of an ecological and environmental model in the region.
• However, should an effort be made to save any part of the marshes of southern Iraq,
that undertaking must be rooted in the following proposition: it is highly unlikely that
significant numbers of the former Arab inhabitants of the Marshlands – the ma c adan
– will give up agriculture, or any of the other forms of livelihood they have adopted
since being turned out of the marshes, to assume again their former status. This
prediction is supported, in part, by information gathered by AMAR indicating that
while a majority of the Marsh Dweller refugees want to return to Iraq to take up
agriculture and fishing, they do not want to do so in the marshes.
Can Huwaiza be saved?
While we have maintained that the odds are not good for saving any of the marshes –
certainly not under the current regime – they are not nil. Were AMAR to narrow its focus on
salvaging just Al-Huwaiza Marsh in the Tigris basin, AMAR’s chances of scoring at least one
notable success would increase significantly. In this context, it should be stated that ‘success’
would be measured in relative, even incremental terms. Nevertheless, the importance of the
objective justifies the endeavor, which is not altogether implausible. Setting aside, for a
moment the obstacle of the present political climate in Iraq, and given that Al-Huwaiza marsh

148
has significant intrinsic ecological and environmental value, several arguments can be made
for trying to protect the life of the Huwaiza marsh. Also, there are also several factors that
make such action feasible.
• There is substantially more flow remaining in the lower stretches of the Tigris than in
the Euphrates, whose waters have been almost entirely diverted prior to its southern
reaches; this fact accounts for the devastation of the marshes situated along the
Euphrates basin. Hence, the logic of focusing on the healthiest of the Tigris marshes.
• The Euphrates River is more international than the Tigris; that is, a greater portion of
its flow originates in Turkey than does the Tigris and there is significant extraction
from the Euphrates in Syria before the river crosses into Iraq. It is estimated that
sometime between 2015 and 2020, Iraq could receive only about 4 bcm (billion cubic
meters) of Euphrates water. The current average annual flow into Iraq is between 18
bcm and 20 bcm.
• The Tigris, on the other hand, while also originating in Turkey acquires much of its
flow from within Iraq, an average of about 28 bcm/yr. Tigris water is of better quality
than that of the Euphrates and is managed and controlled entirely by its own
administrative authority.
• Perhaps the most compelling argument for focusing on the Al-Huwaiza Marsh is – as
stated – that it is still extant, viable, and probably the only one for which there is any
real hope of salvation. It receives some of its water from the foothills over the Iranian
border and the bulk of its supply from the Tigris flow in the Kut–Amara region of the
basin. In our view, the Al-Huwaiza offers the AMAR endeavor the best chance of
success.
• AMAR’s experience with the Iranian authorities thus far appears to indicate a
reasonable degree of cooperation which obviously has to do, at least in part, to the
combination of the proximity of the marshes to their borders and to the fact that the
Marsh Dwellers are Shi c i Muslims.
• Based on informal conversations with Turkish authorities and water experts, it is very
unlikely that the Turks could be persuaded to release more water to the Euphrates
solely for the purpose of recovering the marshes, especially in the current drought
conditions. On the other hand, the food argument – that is the need for more irrigation
water downstream – would be a more persuasive negotiating stance both legally and
morally for sending any additional Euphrates water downstream. Were that to
happen, whatever the amount, it could possibly free up an equivalent quantity of
water in the Tigris to feed the marshes – assuming better overall planning and
management on the part of the Iraqi water establishment.
• At the risk of harping, we feel compelled to reiterate the overarching fact – attested
by the latest satellite images – that about 84% of the marshes are already virtually lost
and the remainder are dried up or extremely distressed. We know that the Iraqi

149
government has steadfastly determined not to rescue them. Typifying this attitude has
been Baghdad’s televised claim in June 2001 that unnamed but ‘eminent’ British,
French, Russian, and American experts had recommended draining the marshlands
for conversion to agricultural production.
• Finally, the factor of time must again – and in the circumstances, always – be taken
into account. Barring a minor miracle, the prevailing political, environmental, and
hydrological conditions preclude effective, comprehensive action in time to salvage
even half the pre-existing marshes. Therefore, it makes sense to concentrate on what
is actually possible and to work from there as future conditions permit. That means
doing whatever is possible in the immediate future to save at least the al-Huwaiza
marsh. That would not only be a significant achievement, but a salutary international
example of what might be done in other difficult regions of the world if the will,
leadership, and energy of good people are harnessed to a worthy cause.
Recommendations
• AMAR should seek grants now to produce a viable, cost-effective, phased plan
together with an engineering design for salvaging and protecting what remains of the
Huwaiza marsh. The proposal would, of course, include a feasibility analysis, a timeline,
and periodic evaluation. Such a plan/design could be used to argue the project's
merits and benefits with a view to organizing support for the project, and to raise
funds. To have concrete plans and designs in hand ready for implementation would
certainly dispel any perceived weakness stemming from abstract or theoretical
arguments and strengthen AMAR's case in pressing for its objective.
• Though the chances of success under the current regime are very small, it would be
important to get a head of steam behind an effort that will of necessity require dogged
persistence. It must also be recognized that the endeavor will require international
funding.
• Plan for alleviating the plight of the Marsh Dwellers with the underlying assumption
that most of them will not or cannot return to the marshes or even, perhaps, to
southern Iraq. The first requirement, of course, is to provide them with as much safety
and stability as possible and then assist them to earn a living in rewarding ways.
• Those among them who can be reached by programs that would prepare them for
urban life and work or for modern farming or fishing should be encouraged to
participate. Such endeavors should begin with a survey that would provide a
sociological profile of the group with a view to designing the most suitable programs.
• Whatever programs are devised, the elders or other important personages in the group
should in some way be involved in the planning and organization. Their endorsement
of any undertaking will be important for its success.

150
References
• If possible, emphasis should be placed on providing as much education as possible for
children, including girls, and special training for young adults.
• Look seriously into the possibility of using impounded Iraqi funds in western banks
to achieve major objectives.
1. J. Brasington, AMAR Report 2001: above.
2. P. Buringh, Soils and Soil Conditions in Iraq, Director-General of Agricultural
Research and Projects, Ministry of Agriculture, Baghdad, 1960.
3. AMAR, An Environmental and Ecological Study of the Marshlands of
Mesopotamia, London, 1994.
4. AMAR, Ibid., 1994

Appendix 1
Water balance of the Euphrates River in Iraq
in its natural condition, 1972
Prepared by George Hanna
Industrial and Domestic
Evaporation and Seepage
Groundwater Flow
HABBANIYA
RESERVOIR
ABU
DIBBIS
RESERVOIR
Irrigation
MUJARRAH
CANAL
W ARRARZ CANAL
Industry
D IBBAN CANAL
Irrigation
Industry and Domestic
HINDIYA
BARRAGE
HILLA
DAM
Nassiriyah
EUPHRATES
RIVER
29 bcm/yr
Al-Qain
Drainage
Irrigation
H ADITHA (Q ADISIYA) RESERVOIR
Haditha
Irrigation and Domestic
A L B AGHDADI D AM (PROPOSED)
Hit
Irrigation
Drainage
Domestic
R AMADI BARRAGE
Ramadi
Domestic
EUPH-THARTHAR CANAL
Falluja
F ALLUJA DAM
Hilla
Irrigation
SYRIA
IRAQ
THARTHAR
RESERVOIR
THARTHAR-T IGRIS CANAL
T HE M AIN DRAIN
(S ADDAM R IVER)
Basrah
Qurna
S HATT AL-ARAB A PERSIAN RABIAN GGULF
ULF
T HARTHAR CANAL
TIGRIS
RIVER
Kut
151
50 bcm/yr
Sammara
Baghdad
Amarah

152
Appendix 2
Water balance of the Tigris River in Iraq, 1992
Prepared by George Hanna
THARTHAR
LAKE
Irrigation
THARTHAR-T IGRIS CANAL
THARTHAR-EUPHRATES CANAL
E UPHRATES RIVER
Basrah
Qurna
Irrigation
Domestic
T HARTHAR CANAL
Domestic and Industry
Irrigation
Irrigation
A RABIAN GULF
PERSIAN GULF
S HATT AL-ARAB TIGRIS
RIVER
Seepage and
Evaporation
M OSUL DAM
L OWER MOSUL
DAM
BADUSH
DAM
G REATER Z AB RIVER
L ESSER Z AB RIVER
SAMMARA
DAM
Sammara
Baghdad
KUT
BARRAGE
AMARAH
BARRAGE
Irrigation and Industry
Irrigation
D IYALA RIVER
U DHAIM DAM
(PROPOSED)
DIYALA
WEIR
Irrigation
U DHAIM RIVER
HAMRIN
DAM
B EKHMA DAM
(PROPOSED)
LOWER B EKHMA DAM
(PROPOSED)
DOKAN DAM
Evaporation
DERBENDI
K HAN DAM
IRAQ IRAN

Appendix 3 Mesopotamian marshes – 2000 Landcover Analysis
153

154
Appendix 4
Tigris-Euphrates Major Water Projects
Not to scale
KARAKAYA
KHATA
Adyiman
KEBAN
BIRECIK
KARKAMIS
KRALKIAI-
DICLE
ATATURK
Baziki
T ABQA DAM
TAAF
KEY TO WATER PROJECTS
E XISTING STRUCTURE
INCOMPLETE
Planned
Euphrates River
BATMAN
HADITHA
Tigris River
Saab
Shouher
BAGHDADI
SILVAN
MOSUL
RAMADI
BARRAGE
BADUSH
Garazan
Iliso
Cizre
SAMARRA
BARRAGE
Tharthar
Depression
FALLUJA
Bakma
DOKAN
DAM
BAGHDAD
HARNRIN
DAM
DIYALA
WEIR
KUT
BARRAGE
HINDIYA
BARRAGE
HILLA
Euphrates River
DARBANDIKHAN
DAM
Tigris River
Shatt-al-Arab

Appendix 5
155

156

Appendix 7
Estimated water balance of the Euphrates River in Iraq
after completion of GAP in Turkey, 2015
Prepared by George Hanna
Industrial and Domestic
Evaporation and Seepage
Groundwater Flow
HABBANIYA
RESERVOIR
ABU
DIBBIS
RESERVOIR
Irrigation
MUJARRAH
CANAL
W ARRARZ CANAL
Industry
D IBBAN CANAL
Irrigation
Industry and Domestic
HINDIYA
BARRAGE
HILLA
DAM
Nassiriyah
EUPHRATES
RIVER
4 bcm/yr
Al-Qain
Drainage
Irrigation
H ADITHA (Q ADISIYA) RESERVOIR
Haditha
Irrigation and Domestic
A L B AGHDADI D AM (PROPOSED)
Hit
Irrigation
Drainage
Domestic
R AMADI BARRAGE
Ramadi
Domestic
EUPH-THARTHAR CANAL
Falluja
F ALLUJA DAM
Hilla
Irrigation
SYRIA
IRAQ
THARTHAR
RESERVOIR
THARTHAR-T IGRIS CANAL
T HE M AIN DRAIN
(S ADDAM R IVER)
Basrah
Qurna
S HATT AL-ARAB A RABIAN GULF
PERSIAN GULF
T HARTHAR CANAL
TIGRIS
RIVER
Kut
157
45 bcm/yr
Sammara
Baghdad
Amarah

9
The ecosystem
M. I. Evans
Seven years ago, the Marshlands of Mesopotamia were the subject of a detailed
environmental and ecological desk-study 1 . This concluded that the Marshlands were one
of the finest and most extensive natural wetland ecosystems in Europe and western Asia,
but that their survival beyond the next two decades was in grave doubt.
Upstream of the Marshlands, in the Tigris/Euphrates basin of Iraq, Syria and
Turkey, the past 50 years had seen the construction of numerous dams and barrages, so as
to allow flood control, irrigation and hydroelectric power generation. By 1993, some
results of this river-engineering had been a great reduction in the amount of water
reaching the Marshlands of Mesopotamia each year, a near-complete loss of the seasonal
and year-to-year variation in flow-regime (in particular, the floods of late spring no
longer occurred), and a marked increase in the salinity of the water entering the marshes 2 .
Modelling of the hydrology of the basin indicated that a further major deterioration was
to be expected in the quantity and quality of water reaching the marshes, if all current and
planned hydrological projects were completed and fully developed during the next 10–15
years.
Between 1990 and 1992 the Iraqi government took advantage of the now low and
predictable water flows in the two rivers, and embarked on an intensive programme of
drainage works in the marshes themselves. Analysis of satellite images indicated that, by
early 1994, massive areas of wetland had been drained 3 . The large, permanent lakes of
the marshes between the rivers (the so-called Central Marshes) were now dry, associated
marsh vegetation had died off, the aquatic fauna had also either died or moved to
remaining wetlands elsewhere, and huge numbers of Marsh Dwellers had been forced to
move into refugee camps or settle in Iraqi towns. The drainage clearly facilitated military
control of this former wilderness, and also opened up the area for oil exploration and
extraction.
Between 1994 and 2001, very little new information on this threatened ecosystem
was published or made freely available. Based on modelling studies of the river-basin
hydrology 4 , it seemed likely, however, that the flow of water into the Marshlands would
continue to be reduced, as irrigation expanded and new dams were filled upstream. In
2001, two new studies of the extent of the Marshlands, based on satellite-imagery
analysis, released their results 5 . These made it clear that the Marshlands had all but gone,
having been isolated from the Tigris and Euphrates and then systematically parcelled
with dykes and drained. As of May 2001, only a small remnant marsh remained, on the
Iran–Iraq border, and it was clear that drainage work continued here. The rest of the

159
Marshlands were now a drying-out mudflat with a salt-crust, and the extensive reedbeds
and other vegetation had died and withered away.
Chapter 7 of this report describes the physical parameters of the former
Marshland ecosystem, and the physical changes that took place in recent years, as far as
can be determined. This chapter therefore concentrates on the biological aspects of the
former ecosystem, describing the flora, fauna and habitats. The ways in which the Marsh
Dwellers and wider Iraqi society used, and benefited from, the biological resources of the
ecosystem are then briefly described, and the chapter ends by summarizing the likely
ecological consequences of the post-1990 hydrological works in the Marshlands and
upstream.
The flora and fauna
The flora
An account of the vegetation of the marshes of southern Iraq has been published in
Arabic by the University of Basra 6 . Throughout the wetlands, the emergent vegetation
was dominated by reed Phragmites australis and reedmace Typha angustifolia, with more
local patches of bulrush Schoenoplectus lacustris and giant cane-grass Arundo donax..
Reed dominated the more permanently flooded areas of marsh, reedmace the more
seasonally flooded areas (also heavily grazed or nutrient-enriched areas, e.g. near
villages), with low sedges and rushes (Carex and Juncus spp., Scirpus brachyceras)
forming the ephemeral and salt-tolerant vegetation of temporarily flooded areas 7 . The
clear, mesotrophic waters of the deeper areas of the permanent lakes supported a rich,
submerged, aquatic vegetation, with species such as hornwort Ceratophyllum demersum
(often dominant), eel grass Vallisneria spiralis, pondweed (Potamogeton lucens, P.
natans, P. nodosus and P. pectinatus), water milfoil Myriophyllum, stonewort Chara,
Ranunculus aquaticus, water nut Trapa natans, Polygonum senegalensis, naiads Najas
marina and N. armata, and water fern Salvinia. Water-lilies (Nymphoides peltata, N.
indica, Nymphaea caerulea and Nuphar), water soldier Pistia stratiotes and duckweed
Lemna gibba covered the surface of the smaller lakes and quieter backwaters.
Marshland deltas, where river water feeds into the marshes, had tamarisk Tamarix
and willow Salix trees on their banks, with expanses of grasses, sedges and rushes
(Juncus arabicus, Carex divisa, Paspulum distichum, Scirpus littoralis) along the damp,
slightly saline margins. The nutrients supplied by inflowing river water encouraged the
growth of exceptionally tall and coarse reeds in the seasonally flooded shallows, up to
8 m high and resembling bamboo 8 . Further into the marshes, the sediments and nutrients
were stripped from the river water as it flowed through the vast reed-beds, such that the
centres of the largest marshes (Haur al Hammar and Haur al Huwaiza) were open, with
very clear and nutrient-poor water, completely free of reeds and other emergent
vegetation.
Plankton
The phytoplankton was dominated by diatoms, mainly of the genera Synedra, Tabellaria,
Melosira, Cyclotella and Fragillaria. At least 77 diatom taxa 9 and 101 non-diatom taxa 100
were known from the brackish waters of southern Iraq (the Shatt al Arab and the Haur al
Hammar). A total of 129 algae species and 63 genera were found in the marshes near
Qurna 111 , 122 (72 Bacillariophyta, 28 Chlorophyta, 26 Cyanophyta, two Euglenophyta and

160
one Chrysophyta) – there were also a large number of Desmidiaceae – and 59 algae
species have been documented from Haur Al Hammar (38 Chlorophyta, 19 Cyanophyta
and two Rhodophyta) 133 . Dinoflagellates were also recorded in the marshes 144 , 155 .
The zooplankton in the main marshes was dominated by Cladocera and Rotatoria,
with Cyclops forming a smaller proportion 166 . A survey of the Qurna (Garma) marshes
found 21 genera of zooplankton, belonging to three orders (Ploima, Cladocera and
Copepoda) 177 . Maximum growth of zooplankton was found to occur during the floods of
late spring.
Invertebrates
Very little is known of the undoubtedly rich invertebrate fauna of the marshes.
Chironomid (midge) larvae and dragonfly larvae were common in the lake-bottom
sediments, while oligochaete worms such as Stylaria and Tubifex occurred in moderate
quantities. Dragonflies included Brachythemis fuscopalliata, a species near-endemic to
the Tigris/Euphrates basin that is also considered to be globally threatened (IUCN 2000).
Molluscs included at least seven freshwater gastropod and three bivalve species in the
lower parts of Haur Al Hammar and Haur Al Zikri 188 . At least 55 species of dytiscid
water beetle (Dytiscidae) and 15 species of gyrinid beetle (Gyrinidae) occurred in the
Shatt Al Arab and lakes and marshes of southern Iraq 199 , 200 . Of the 39 butterfly species
(including skippers Hesperidae) recorded from the lowlands of southern Iraq 211 , none are
of global conservation concern, none have a particularly restricted range at the scale of
the Middle East, and none are dependent on the permanent Marshland or aquatic habitats.
Invertebrate species endemic to the marshes are or were likely to exist, with distributions
restricted to the marshes and physiology dependent on the marshes’ continued existence,
but none are well documented at present – they are or were likely to be more frequent
among non-flying groups of invertebrates. With the near-complete destruction of the
marshes, any such species would now be critically endangered.
The commercial penaeid shrimp Metapenaeus affinis was abundant (with
individuals up to 125 mm total length) at its nursery grounds in the inland waters of Iraq,
mainly in the slightly brackish Haur al Hammar, and its seasonal migrations between
there and its spawning grounds at the head of the Gulf have been studied 222 . Immigration
of juveniles to the marshes commenced as the spring floods weakened during May/June,
and emigration of mature broodstock to the sea finished around January/February. The
discharge of the Shatt Al Arab was thus probably an important factor regulating
recruitment. Spawning at sea appeared to occur immediately after emigration.
Fish
The fish fauna of the Tigris/Euphrates basin was summarized in 1994 233 and again in
1996 244 . A total of 52 native primary freshwater fish species (in seven families) occur in
the basin, of which 23 species (44%) are endemic to the basin, 12 of these being members
of the carp family (Cyprinidae); two native secondary freshwater fish (Aphanius spp.) are
also endemic. However, there is no definitive list of the species that occur in the
Marshlands of southern Iraq.
The basin is clearly a centre of speciation, but there are no endemic families, and
the four endemic genera are monospecific and limited to cave fish (Caecocypris,
Iranocypris and Typhlogarra) and a loach (Turcinemacheilus) restricted to the
headwaters. At least 17 non-native primary freshwater species have been recorded at one

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time or another in the basin 255 , having been introduced by man. Some have established
self-sustaining populations in the basin, and may well threaten native species through
competition for food and space, transmission of exotic parasites and diseases from fishfarms
to the wild, clearance of aquatic vegetation used for spawning and feeding, and
churning and muddying of water (especially by exotic carp species).
Particularly vulnerable to ecological changes in the marshes are those species
apparently endemic to the marshes themselves (at least one barbel species, the bunni
Barbus sharpeyi) or to the broader Tigris/Euphrates basin (at least six or seven of the 23
endemics are likely to occur in the lower reaches of the river), and those species that
spawn mainly in the marshes or brackish/estuarial waters (the endemic giant catfish
Silurus glanis and S. triostegus, and the anadromous Hilsa shad Tenualosa ilisha and
pomphret Pampus argenteus). The two cave-fish species that occur in the Iraqi portion of
the basin are considered globally threatened 266 , although this should be reviewed, given
the drastic hydrological changes that have been perpetrated in recent years.
It is likely that the marshes were the main feeding ground and centre of
population for most of the native primary freshwater species that occurred in the lower
reaches of the two rivers, since the area of suitable habitat in the Marshland complex far
exceeded that available in the rivers themselves. A period of rich feeding is usually
required before spawning, in order to reach peak breeding condition, and the marshes
were likely to be a crucial area in this regard. To breed, most of these species migrate
upstream in spring to spawn in the gravelly river-beds where the water flows faster and is
more oxygenated. These long migrations coincide with, and are probably triggered by,
the spring floods that follow the melting of snow in the highlands of Anatolia and the
Zagros range, and that scour and expose the fresh gravel beds. Such floods no longer
occur – whether that impairs spawning behaviour in surviving fish populations is not yet
known.
The endemic barbel, Barbus sharpeyi, differs significantly from its congeners, in
that it spawned in the warm waters of the marshes, laying its eggs on submerged
vegetation during peak flooding in May in shallow, open water less than 75 cm deep.
These quiet waters of the seasonally flooded marshes constituted its sole spawning
grounds, as far as is known. This species may hybridize with the introduced, non-native
Goldfish Carassius auratus, which is well established in the marshes, and fishermen in
neighbouring Khuzistan believe that numbers of B. sharpeyi in the Shadegan Marshes
have decreased following the release of non-native Silver Carp Hypophthalmichthys
molitrix.
Amphibians and reptiles
The amphibian and reptile fauna of the marshes of southern Iraq was summarized in
1994 277 . Little information is available on the amphibians: only one toad and three frog
species are listed for the whole of Iraq 288 . Several authors have commented on the
extreme abundance of frogs in the marshes 299 .
Up to 58 species of reptile have been recorded or are likely to occur in southeastern
Iraq 300 , although knowledge of species’ taxonomy and distribution are still
incomplete. Most of these species are desert-adapted and relatively widespread in the
Near or Middle East, but a number have more restricted ranges, centred on the
Tigris/Euphrates lowlands in southern Iraq: the large, spiny-tailed lizard Uromastyx
loricatus, the as-yet unnamed local population of the lizard Mesalina brevirostris, the

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skink subspecies Mabuya aurata septemtaeniata, the snake subspecies Telescopus
tessellatus martini, and the soft-shelled turtle Rafetus euphraticus. The last-mentioned
species is clearly the most dependent on wetland habitat. It occurs widely in the
Tigris/Euphrates rivers and their major tributaries, but the bulk of its population
(numerically) probably lay within the marshes, and it was considered globally threatened
for this reason 311 .
Other reptile species that were particularly common in the Marshlands included
the Caspian terrapin Mauremys caspia, geckos of the genus Hemidactylus, two species of
skink (Mabuya aurata and M. vittata), lizards of the genera Acanthodactylus and
Ophisops, and a variety of snakes, including the Spotted Sand Boa Eryx jaculus,
Tessellated Water Snake Natrix tessellata and Gray's Desert Racer Coluber
ventromaculatus. The large Desert Monitor Varanus griseus was formerly common in
semi-desert areas adjacent to the marshes, but this species has been heavily persecuted
and is now rare in this region. 322
Birds
The avifauna of the Marshlands was summarized in 1994 333 . About 134 bird species are,
to some extent, dependent on wetland habitats and occurred in Mesopotamia in
significant numbers. Of these, about 42 species were known to have bred in the marshes,
of which at least 31 were waterbirds, but there were no systematic surveys of the marshes
during the breeding season, and what information does exist on the breeding birds of
Mesopotamia dates from the 1950s or before.
Nevertheless, it is likely that significant numbers of four species of global
conservation concern 344 bred in the marshes: Dalmatian Pelican Pelecanus crispus (1–
10% of the regional population), Pygmy Cormorant Phalacrocorax pygmeus (1–10% of
the regional population), Marbled Duck Marmaronetta marmaronetta (40–60% of world
population) 355 and Basra Reed Warbler Acrocephalus griseldis (more than 90% of world
population).
The Marshlands of Mesopotamia are a globally important centre of endemism for
birds, one of only 11 such wetland centres identified worldwide 366 , 377 . Two species, Iraq
Babbler Turdoides altirostris and Basra Reed Warbler Acrocephalus griseldis, breed only
in Mesopotamia 388 , as does the majority of the world population of Grey Hypocolius
Hypocolius ampelinus 399 , 400 ). A further five species are endemic to Mesopotamia at the
subspecific level – Little Grebe Tachybaptus ruficollis iraquensis, Darter Anhinga rufa
chantrei, Black Francolin Francolinus francolinus arabistanicus, White-eared Bulbul
Pycnonotus leucotis mesopotamiae and Hooded Crow Corvus corone capellanus – while
two subspecies, Zitting Cisticola Cisticola juncidis neurotica and Graceful Prinia Prinia
gracilis irakensis, are near-endemic to Mesopotamia, occurring elsewhere only in the
Levant. Clearly, for such a degree of endemism to have developed in a continental (rather
than island) setting – and the endemism is apparent in fish, reptiles and mammals too –
marshland habitats in the lower Tigris/Euphrates basin (including the Persian Gulf during
the lower sea-levels of previous Ice Ages) are likely to be of ancient origin (at least,
millions of years old) and are likely to have persisted for a very long period of time up to
the present, even during the most extreme hyper-arid climatic phases that are known to
have affected the region at the height of the Ice Ages during the last two million years.
Apart from African Darter, two other species are also primarily Afrotropical with
very small and highly isolated populations in Mesopotamia – Goliath Heron Ardea

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goliath and Sacred Ibis Threskiornis aethiopicus – and they may also be genetically
distinct at the subspecies level. These three species appear to be relicts of a warmer,
wetter climatic period, when Afrotropical species were able to flourish further north than
they do today. However, they had become very scarce by the late 1970s, almost certainly
because of direct persecution and increased disturbance. The degradation of the marshes
which has occurred since then will have further depleted the populations of these and
other breeding birds, and the breeding avifauna may now be considerably impoverished.
African Darter and Goliath Heron have not been recorded in Iraq for many years 411 , and it
is likely that these species are now extinct in Mesopotamia.
The lakes and marshes of lower Mesopotamia were one of the most important
wintering areas for migratory waterbirds in western Eurasia. Many species of waterbird,
notably ducks, geese and coots, which breed in the basins of the Ob and Irtysh rivers in
western Siberia, migrate south-west in autumn to spend the winter in the wetlands of the
Caspian region, Middle East and north-east Africa. These birds belong to the so-called
West Siberian–Caspian–Nile flyway – one of the three major flyways for waterbirds in
western Eurasia. The Mesopotamian Marshlands were one of the principal wintering
areas for waterbirds in this flyway, as was amply demonstrated by the five mid-winter
waterbird surveys between 1968 and 1979 422 , 433 , 444 , 455 , 466 . No less than 97 species of
waterbird were recorded during the surveys, including significant numbers of nine
species of global conservation concern (five waterbirds and four raptors) 477 . The number
of waterbirds in Mesopotamia in January 1979 probably amounted to several million
individuals 488 . From the surveys, it was estimated that at least 68 species of waterbird
occurred in globally significant numbers at the wetlands of Mesopotamia.
The five mid-winter waterbird surveys have also confirmed the great importance
of the lowlands of Mesopotamia for wintering birds of prey 499 . Over a thousand raptors of
15 species were observed during the 1979 survey alone, of which at least nine were likely
to occur in globally important numbers. Many of these raptors were largely dependent on
the rich wetland fauna for their prey. In addition to providing regular wintering habitat
for waterbirds and raptors, the wetlands of Mesopotamia also served as a vitally
important refuge for waterbirds when wetlands further north, in the Caspian region and
eastern Turkey, froze over during periods of exceptionally severe weather.
The Mesopotamian Marshlands are also known to have been an extremely
important staging area for a number of species of waterbird on their way between
breeding grounds in the vast taiga and tundra zones of western Siberia and central Asia
and winter quarters along the coasts of Arabia and in eastern and southern Africa. For
these long-distance migrants, the wetlands of Mesopotamia provided a vital staging area
where they could replenish their fat reserves before continuing on with the next leg of
their migration. Such passage migrants included a variety of herons and egrets, Garganey
Anas querquedula and a number of shorebirds, for example Phalaropus lobatus.
Mammals
Until the recent drainage of the marshes, about 40 mammals were thought to occur in and
around the marshes of southern Iraq 500 . Of these, at least two species were endemic to
Mesopotamia – a bandicoot-rat Nesokia bunni, known only from two specimens collected
at Qurna 511 , and Mesopotamian Gerbil Gerbillus mesopotamicus, unusual or even unique
in this desert-adapted genus in its high degree of dependence on water. At least one other
species was endemic at the subspecific level, the Smooth-coated Otter Lutrogale

164
perspicillata maxwelli, a South Asian species that is globally threatened 522 and that is
otherwise found no closer than the Indus valley. Most likely due to over-hunting (for
their skins), neither this nor the other species of otter in the marshes, the Common Otter
Lutra lutra seistanica, has been recorded since about 1978 533 and they are now extremely
rare, if they survive at all 544 . This contrasts strongly with the situation in the 1950s, when
authors all commented on the abundance of otters in the marshes 555 , 566 , 577 .
Few species of mammal are now likely to occur in the area of the marshlands.
Previous authors made numerous references to the abundance of Wild Boar Sus scrofa
throughout the Marshlands 588 , 599 . The boar were said to cause considerable damage to
crops, and were relentlessly persecuted by the Marsh Dwellers for this and religious
reasons. Numbers of Wild Boar had declined notably by the late 1980s, compared to
levels in the early 1970s 600 , and the species may now be extinct, due to the near complete
destruction of habitat. Domestic Water Buffalo Bubalus arnee were abundant throughout
the marshes and were one of the mainstays of the Marsh Dweller economy. There is
evidence to suggest that these animals were first introduced into Mesopotamia in about
3500 BCE 611 . However, there is also archaeological evidence which suggests that the
species was formerly wild in the marshes, before domestication 622 . Remaining water
buffalo cannot now be free-ranged, and are now likely to be tethered in yards in
village/urban settings.
The only other medium to large mammals that were still regularly encountered in
the vicinity of the marshes by the late 1980s were the Small Indian Mongoose Herpestes
auropunctatus, Golden Jackal Canis aureus and Red Fox Vulpes vulpes 633 . Notable
among the smaller mammals was the globally threatened 644 , rare and declining Longfingered
Bat Myotis capaccinii, recorded at Kish and therefore likely to have occurred
within the Marshland area.
The habitats
The wetlands of lower Mesopotamia comprised a mosaic of different wetland habitattypes,
each with its own characteristic flora and fauna. Eight major habitat-types could be
discerned:
• Permanent freshwater lakes, with a rich submergent growth of aquatic vegetation,
and typically with a marginal zone of floating aquatic vegetation such as waterlilies.
• Permanent freshwater marshes, dominated by tall stands of reed Phragmites, reedmace
Typha and sedge Cyperus.
• Rivers, streams, canals and irrigation channels, typically with little emergent
vegetation and steep earth or muddy banks.
• Permanent ponds, mainly man-made irrigation ponds and duck-hunting ponds,
typically with a pronounced drawdown in summer and little emergent vegetation.
• Seasonal freshwater marshes dominated by rushes and sedges, typically occurring
as a broad belt around the edge of the permanent marshes.

• Seasonally flooded mudflats and semi-desertic steppe.
• Irrigated land and seasonally flooded arable land, used mainly for rice, millet,
barley, wheat and sugar-cane, with scattered date-palm gardens.
• Shallow, brackish to saline lagoons, mostly seasonal and often with extensive
areas of salt-bush Salicornia.
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Of these habitats, two were of outstanding importance for their wildlife – the permanent
freshwater lakes and the permanent freshwater marshes. These were much the most
extensive habitat-types in Mesopotamia, comprising the great bulk of the Haur Al
Hammar and Haur Al Huwaiza systems. The lakes and reedbeds were home to nine of the
11 globally threatened species which still occurred in significant numbers in the
wetlands, and at least seven of the nine endemic species, subspecies and isolated
populations that were associated with wetlands. Of these 16 key species of the permanent
lakes and marshes, at least seven were wholly dependent on these habitats. At the same
time, these are the habitats which have been most diminished in extent by the ongoing
river-engineering projects. The six other habitat-types are either not at such serious risk
of diminishment, or have much less significance for wildlife.
Utility of the biological resources of the Marshlands to the Marsh Dwellers and the
wider community
Vegetation
Reeds provided the Marsh Dwellers with their staple building material, from which they
constructed their artificial-island houses, as well as fences, mats, baskets and their
products. To make a dwelling, tall and robust reeds were gathered – these usually
occurred near to the deltas where river water debouched into the marshes (where the
nutrient supply was richest) – and were stacked to dry. Large sheafs were then tightly
bundled to make pillars and beams, which were then assembled into a framework upon
which reed mats were then attached, to form the sides and roof. Traditionally, boats and
rafts were also made from the bundles of dried reeds, but wooden or metal boats were
preferred in recent years, due to their longevity. Mats were manufactured for sale in
nearby villages and towns, as well as being used widely in situ.
The Marsh Dwellers used to burn off the beds of tall and dense reeds during the
winter, when water levels were low and the reed-beds were drier, so as to provide fresh
spring grazing for their water buffalos and cattle. The low growth of sedges, rushes and
grasses that developed in temporarily flooded areas in late spring was also an important
grazing resource. During the rest of the year, the submerged and marginal vegetation was
harvested to feed the Marsh Dwellers’ cattle, sheep and goats, while the water buffalo
ranged freely in the marshes, feeding in the shallower areas.
Fisheries
Fish were always an important component in the diet of the Marsh Dwellers. Favoured
food-fish species that were known or likely to occur in the marshes were the barbels
Barbus spp. – especially shabbout Barbus grypus (up to 200 cm/100 kg) and bunni
Barbus sharpeyi, both known to be of major importance to the Marsh Dwellers – as well

166
as Chondrostoma regium (up to 40 cm/1 kg), Mystus pelusius (up to 30 cm), Sillago
sihama (up to 30 cm), Acanthopagrus berda (up to 45 cm) and Eleutheronema
tetradactylum (up to 180 cm). Until recently, most fish were caught by spearing – an
efficient and effective method if the water is clear – but most Marsh Dwellers latterly
used nets to improve their catch for export to Basra and Baghdad. Annual per capita fish
consumption in Iraq between 1984 and 1986 averaged about 2.5 kg and the total annual
catch from the marshes was more than 14,000 tons during this period, providing 60% of
the national fish catch (including marine species) 655 .
The marine fishery at the head of the Gulf for the penaeid shrimp Metapenaeus
affinis is of significant economic importance to artisanal fisherman in this region –
commercial landings at the two main fish-markets at Basra, during September–November
1985, averaged 1,000 kg/day, and in some years it has comprised up to 40% of the total
annual catch landed in Kuwait. The nursery grounds for this species in the lower marshes
were probably of major importance in sustaining this fishery.
Waterbird hunting
Waterbird hunting occurs commonly at wetlands throughout Iraq. In Mesopotamia,
enormous numbers of waterbirds are or were harvested on a commercial basis and
provided a livelihood for hundreds of people. Such hunting occurred on a massive scale
in the 1950s. It was estimated that shot-guns alone were accounting for about a million
birds a year in Iraq 666 . A wide variety of species were killed by the Marsh Dwellers for
food, including huge numbers of ducks and Coot Fulica atra, but also Little Grebes
Tachybaptus ruficollis, Pygmy Cormorants Phalacrocorax pygmeus, African Darters
Anhinga rufa, Goliath Herons Ardea goliath, Sacred Ibises Threskiornis aethiopicus,
Common Cranes Grus grus, Purple Swamphens Porphyrio porphyrio and godwits
Limosa spp 677 , 688 . Pelicans, although regarded as inedible, were shot for their gular
pouches which were used in drum-making 699 . The Ma'dan often searched for the nests of
Greylag Geese Anser anser and took their eggs to hatch them out under chickens 700 .
Clap-netting was also very widespread in the marshes, and was clearly accounting for
large numbers of birds. It was considered that a heavy toll of waterbirds was being taken
by the professional hunters 711 – as many as 30 geese or 120 ducks and shorebirds could
be trapped in the clap-nets at a single pull 722 .
In a study of a non-Marsh Dweller village at the edge of the marshes, it was found
that waterbird hunting was limited to winter (December–February), and that very few
people other than Marsh Dwellers engaged in it 733 . In this village, only two people out of
120 non-Marsh Dweller families hunted waterbirds for profit (one with nets and one with
a gun). They took mainly Common Teal Anas crecca and Coot. The general lack of
hunting was apparently because selling birds for profit was despised as a Marsh Dweller
occupation.
The market hunting of waterbirds at Haur Ibn Najim, south of Hilla has been
investigated 744 . Hunting pressure in this area was heavy throughout the winter, with the
hunters using shot-guns by day and by night and also nets. It was estimated that over
20,000 ducks and Coots were sold in the markets of Najaf and Shamiya during the winter
of 1967/68, and it was calculated that the hunters were accounting for about 31% of the
ducks and 56% of the Coots which frequented the haur. It was found that local residents,
to a certain extent, made their living out of duck-netting 755 . At that time, there were no
appropriate laws to regulate hunting activity. By 1979, however, the Government had

167
issued new laws banning all hunting in Iraq in order to conserve wildlife, particularly
terrestrial game which had been heavily persecuted in the past 766 . It was clear that these
laws were being widely disregarded in the marshes, at least in the case of duck-netting
which was observed at many localities in January 1979. These and later hunting
restrictions have never been implemented or enforced. Sport-hunting is now organized by
the Government through its ‘Hunting Club’, which is run by one of the members of the
Revolutionary Command Council of Iraq 777 .
Considerable numbers of wildfowl are still taken every year. A minimum of
40,000 ducks and Coots were offered for sale in the markets of Karbala and Najaf in
1990 and 1991 788 . Netting at duck-ponds and irrigation ponds was the main method of
capture. In addition, hunting pressure increased markedly during the last decade because
of the UN trade embargo and the unusually high prices of meat that resulted. There are
reasons to believe that netting has now become an organized business, with some
government officials issuing special permits for large-scale netting.
The ecological impacts of wetland loss
Drainage of the permanent lakes and reed-beds in lower Mesopotamia has almost
certainly resulted in the global extinction of the endemic subspecies of Smooth-coated
Otter, the extinction in the Middle East of African Darter and Sacred Ibis, and the
extinction in Iraq of Pygmy Cormorant and Goliath Heron. Loss of these wetland habitats
is also likely to have caused major declines in the world populations of Iraq Babbler and
Basra Reed Warbler and in the regional population of Dalmatian Pelican, possibly
threatening them with extinction, and is likely to have caused perhaps as much as a 50%
reduction in the world populations of Mesopotamian Gerbil, the endemic subspecies of
Little Grebe, and Marbled Duck. The habitat needs and distribution of the endemic
species of barbel (Barbus sharpeyi) and bandicoot-rat (Nesokia bunnii) are hardly known,
but both are also likely to be at risk of global extinction.
Of the other 66 species of birds occurring in internationally significant numbers in
the marshes, 39 (59%) were to some extent dependent on the large permanent lakes and
reed-beds, and 13 (20%) were wholly or largely dependent on these habitats. Drainage of
the marshes is likely to have had an adverse effect on the populations of all these species,
and is likely to have caused major declines in the regional or flyway populations of White
Pelican (30–60%), Purple Heron (>10%), Little Bittern (>10%), Glossy Ibis (>10%),
Tufted Duck (>20%), Marsh Harrier (>10%), Purple Gallinule (>50%) and Coot (10–
20%).
The other six major wetland habitats in lower Mesopotamia are less of a cause for
concern, for a variety of reasons. The permanent rivers, streams, canals and irrigation
channels are of only limited value for wildlife, relative to the Marshlands. Only 14 of the
species of conservation interest occur with any regularity in this habitat, and half of these
are gulls and terns which occur widely in other habitats. Canalization of the rivers will
result in the loss of some natural river-edge habitats, while the construction of new
irrigation canals could result in a net increase in the extent of the network of permanent
waterways. The overall effect of these changes on the wildlife of lower Mesopotamia is
not likely to be significant.
Many of the man-made irrigation ponds and duck-hunting ponds are of

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considerable importance for passage and wintering waterbirds. It seems unlikely,
however, that the total number and area of these ponds will decrease as a result of the
flood control, drainage and irrigation projects, and indeed there is likely to be an increase
in the number of small irrigation ponds.
Seasonal freshwater marshes are of considerable importance for wintering
waterbirds, especially dabbling ducks, and may be important for a wide variety of
waterbirds during the spring migration season. However, as such marshes generally dry
out in spring or early summer and do not flood again until the following winter, they have
little if any value as breeding habitat or as autumn staging areas for waterbirds. Much of
this habitat has been lost as a result of the flood control, drainage and irrigation projects,
and this could have a devastating impact on the endemic fish Barbus sharpeyi (quite
possibly causing its extinction) and a significant impact on the numbers of some bird
species which are able to over-winter in the Marshlands. For the mobile birds, significant
tracts of this habitat type are likely to survive in areas where the water table remains high
and where the local winter rainfall creates shallow flooding. Unless the drainage
structures are exceptionally effective, it seems likely that large areas of low-lying land,
e.g. the beds of the former lakes, will remain damp and subject to extensive shallow
flooding in winter. Thus bird species which are primarily dependent on this habitat may
not be too badly affected by the drainage of the Marshlands.
The seasonally flooded mudflats and areas of semi-desertic steppe are of
considerable importance for passage and wintering shorebirds and some other waterbirds.
However, as with the seasonal freshwater marshes, these habitats are of negligible
importance as breeding areas or staging areas in autumn. While many such areas will be
lost, others will be created in low-lying areas where complete drainage is impossible.
Both this and the preceding habitat type remain widespread in the Middle East. In
particular, there are large areas of seasonally flooded marshes and mudflats on the
floodplain of the Karun river in neighbouring south-western Iran. Furthermore, there is
some indication that the flood-plain wetlands of the Karun river are far more attractive to
waterbirds than apparently similar areas in lower Mesopotamia.
Irrigated land and seasonally flooded arable land are of some importance for
passage and wintering waterbirds. The extent of this habitat type in the Tigris/Euphrates
basin will increase by a substantial amount as a result of the river-engineering projects,
and therefore some species of waterbird are likely to benefit, most notably some of the
shorebirds. Many other species of waterbird, including geese and cranes, can occur in
large numbers on wet or flooded arable land, providing that suitable roosting and loafing
areas are available and levels of human disturbance and persecution are not too high.
However, the species most likely to benefit from an increase in the extent of arable land
are generally common and widespread bird species and not those which give any cause
for concern.
Shallow, brackish to saline lagoons form a relatively unimportant habitat type in
lower Mesopotamia. Much the most important saline lagoons in Mesopotamia are further
north, in the Baghdad region (e.g. Lake Razazah). Furthermore, this is a habitat-type
which remains widespread in the Middle East and has been least affected by flood
control, drainage and irrigation projects elsewhere. The main brackish to saline lagoons
in the region under consideration are rather isolated systems, such as Haur Suweicha,
unlikely to be affected by the main drainage works.

NOTES
1. E. Maltby, ‘An environmental and ecological study of the Marshlands of southern Iraq’
(London: AMAR Appeal, 1994).
2. Maltby, ‘An environmental and ecological study of the marshlands of southern Iraq’.
3. Maltby, ‘An environmental and ecological study of the marshlands of southern Iraq’.
4. Maltby, ‘An environmental and ecological study of the marshlands of southern Iraq’.
5. The two studies were coordinated respectively by J. Brasington, Dept of Geography,
University of Cambridge, UK [this volume], and by H. Partow of UNEP-Division of
Early Warning and Assessment (see
http://www.grid.unep.ch/activities/sustainable/tigris/marshlands/index.html).
6. A.-R. Akbar, ‘The plants of the marshes’ [in Arabic] (Basra: University of Basra Press,
198x).
7. W. Thesiger, ‘The Marsh Arabs’ (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1954).
8. W. Thesiger, ‘The Marsh Arabs’.
9. G. C. F. Hinton and B. K. Maulood, ‘Some diatoms from brackish water habitats in
southern Iraq’, Nova-Hedwigia, vol. 33, no. 1/2, 1980, pp. 475–86.
10. G. C. F. Hinton and B. K. Maulood, ‘Contributions to the algal flora of Iraq: the nondiatom
flora of the southern marshes’, Nova-Hedwigia, vol. 36, no. 1, 1982, pp. 49–64.
11. H. Pankow, H. A. Al-Saadi, M. F. Huq and R. A. M. Hadi, ‘On the algal flora of the
marshes near Qurna (southern Iraq)’, Willdenowia, vol. 8, no. 3, 1979, pp. 493–506.
12. A. A. Al-Saboonchi, A. R. M. Mohamed and N. A. Barak, ‘A study of phytoplankton
in the Garma marshes, Iraq’, Iraqi J. Mar. Sci., vol. 1, no. 1, 1982, pp. 67–78.
13. A. K. M. Nurul-Islam, ‘Marsh algae from southern Iraq’, Int. Rev. Gesamt. Hydrobiol.,
vol. 67, no. 2, 1982, pp. 245–60.
14. P. V. Georg and C. D. W. Savage, ‘Status of the main waterfowl resorts in Iraq’, Pp.
328–32 in Y. A. Isakov, ed., ‘Proc. int. regional meeting on conservation of wildfowl
resources, Leningrad’ (Moscow: Nauka, 1970).
15. E. Carp, ‘A directory of western Palearctic wetlands’ (Nairobi, Kenya/Gland,
Switzerland: UNEP/IUCN, 1980).
16. Georg and Savage, ‘Status of the main waterfowl resorts in Iraq’.
17. A. A. Al-Saboonchi, N. A. Barak and A. R. M. Mohamed, ‘Zooplankton of Garma
marshes’, Iraqi J. Biol. Sci. Res., vol. 17, no. 1, 1986, pp. 33–40.
18. K. Y. Al-Dabbagh and Y. T. Daod, ‘The ecology of three gastropod molluscs from
Shatt-Al Arab’, Iraqi J. Biol. Sci. Res., vol. 16, no. 2, 1985, pp. 155–67.
19. H. A. Ali, ‘A list of some aquatic beetles of Iraq (Coleoptera: Dytiscidae)’, Univ.
Baghdad Bull. Nat. Hist. Res. Centre, vol. 7, 1978, pp. 11–3.
20. H. A. Ali, ‘Some taxonomic studies on the aquatic beetles of Iraq (Coleoptera:
Gyrinidae)’, Univ. Baghdad Bull. Nat. Hist. Res. Centre, vol. 7, 1978, pp. 15–20.
21. E. P. Wiltshire, ‘The Lepidoptera of Iraq’ (London: Kaye, 1957).
22. S. D. Salman, M. H. Ali and A. H. Y. Al-Adhub, ‘Abundance and seasonal migrations
of the penaeid shrimp Metapenaeus affinis (H. Milne-Edwards) within Iraqi waters’,
Hydrobiologica, vol. 196, 1990, pp. 79–90.
23. Maltby, ‘An environmental and ecological study of the marshlands of southern Iraq’,
Annex 10.
169

170
24. B. W. Coad, ‘Zoogeography of the fishes of the Tigris-Euphrates basin’, Zoology in the
Middle East, vol. 13, 1996, pp. 51–70. See also http://www.fishbase.org
25. B. W. Coad, ‘Exotic fish species in the Tigris-Euphrates basin’, Zoology in the Middle
East, vol. 13, 1996, pp. 71–83.
26.
C. Hilton-Taylor, compiler, ‘2000 IUCN Red List of threatened species’ (Gland,
Switzerland: IUCN, 2000). See http://www.redlist.org
27.
Maltby, ‘An environmental and ecological study of the marshlands of southern Iraq’,
Annex 11.
28.
N. Mahdi and P. V. Georg, ‘A systematic list of the vertebrates of Iraq’ (Baghdad: Iraq
Nat. Hist. Mus., 1969).
29. G. Maxwell, ‘A reed shaken by the wind: a journey through the unexplored marshlands
of Iraq’ (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1957).
30. A. E. Leviton, S. C. Anderson, K. Adler and S. A. Minton, ‘Handbook to Middle East
amphibians and reptiles’ (Oxford, Ohio, USA: Society for the Study of Amphibians and
Reptiles, 1992).
31. Hilton-Taylor, ‘2000 IUCN Red List of threatened species’. See http://www.redlist.org
32. K. Y. Al-Dabbagh, in litt. to M. I. Evans, 1993.
33. Maltby, ‘An environmental and ecological study of the marshlands of southern Iraq’,
Annex 13; see also Annexes 3–9 for information on population sizes of individual bird
species.
34. Hilton-Taylor, ‘2000 IUCN Red List of threatened species’. See http://www.redlist.org
35. K. Al-Robaae, ‘The status of the Marbled Teal in Iraq’, Bull. Threatened Waterfowl
Specialist Group, No. 11, 1998, pp. 31–2. This documents the abundance of the species in
the marshes during the breeding season.
36. ICBP, ‘Putting biodiversity on the map: priority areas for global conservation’
(Cambridge, UK: International Council for Bird Preservation, 1992).
37. A. J. Stattersfield, M. J. Crosby, A. J. Long and D. C. Wege, ‘Endemic bird areas
of the world: priorities for bird conservation’ (Cambridge, UK: BirdLife International,
1998).
38. K. Y. Al-Dabbagh and M. K. Bunni, ‘The breeding habits of the Iraqi Babbler,
Turdoides altirostris (Hartert)’ (Baghdad: Iraq Nat. Hist. Res. Centre Publ. 34, 1981).
39. H. Y. Siman and M. K. Bunni , ‘Young and parental care of the Grey Hypocolius
Hypocolius ampelinus Bonaparte’, Bull. Iraq Nat. Hist. Mus., vol. 8, 1988, pp. 89–111.
40. H. Y. Siman in litt. to M. I. Evans, 1993.
41. K. Y. Al-Dabbagh in litt. to M. I. Evans, 1993.
42. P. V. Georg and J. Vielliard, ‘Waterfowl counts in Iraq: 21 December 1967–18 January
1968’, unpublished notes in files of Wetlands International, 1968.
43. P. V. Georg and J. Vielliard, ‘Midwinter observations on birds of Central and South
Iraq’, Bull. Iraq Nat. Hist. Mus., vol. IV, no. 4, 1970, pp. 61–85.
44. F. J. Koning and L. J. Dijksen, ‘IWRB Mission to Iraq and Syria, December 1972’,
IWRB Bulletin, vol. 35, 1973, pp. 57–62.
45. E. Carp, ‘Waterfowl counts in Iraq’, IWRB Bulletin, vol. 39/40, 1975, pp. 51–5.
46. D. A. Scott and E. Carp, ‘A midwinter survey of wetlands in Mesopotamia, Iraq: 1979’,
Sandgrouse, vol. 4, 1982, pp. 60–76.
47. Hilton-Taylor, ‘2000 IUCN Red List of threatened species’. See http://www.redlist.org

48. E. Carp and D. A. Scott, ‘The wetlands and waterfowl of Iraq. Report on the Joint
Expedition of the International Waterfowl Research Bureau and the University of Basrah,
Iraq: 10th January to 3rd February 1979’, unpublished report in files of Wetlands
International, 1979.
49. Maltby, ‘An environmental and ecological study of the marshlands of southern Iraq’,
Annex 5.
50. Maltby, ‘An environmental and ecological study of the marshlands of southern Iraq’,
171
Annex 12.
51.
H. Khajuria, ‘A new bandicoot rat, Erythronesokia bunnii gen. et sp. nov. (Rodentia:
Muridae) from Iraq’, Bull. [Iraq] Nat. Hist. Res. Centre, vol. 7, no. 4, 1980, pp. 157–64.
52.
Hilton-Taylor, ‘2000 IUCN Red List of threatened species’. See http://www.redlist.org
53.
H. Y. Siman in litt. to M. I. Evans, 1993.
54.
K. Y. Al-Dabbagh in litt. to M. I. Evans, 1993.
55.
Maxwell, ‘A reed shaken by the wind: a journey through the unexplored marshlands of
Iraq’.
56.
R. T. Hatt, ‘The mammals of Iraq’ (Michigan, USA: Univ. Michigan [Misc. Publ. Mus.
Zool. 106], 1959).
57. W. Thesiger, ‘The Marsh Arabs’.
58. W. Thesiger, ‘The Marsh Arabs’.
59. Maxwell, ‘A reed shaken by the wind: a journey through the unexplored marshlands of
Iraq’.
60. K. Y. Al-Dabbagh in litt. to M. I. Evans, 1993.
61. Maxwell, ‘A reed shaken by the wind: a journey through the unexplored marshlands of
Iraq’.
62. Hatt, ‘The mammals of Iraq’.
63. K. Y. Al-Dabbagh in litt. to M. I. Evans, 1993.
64. Hilton-Taylor, ‘2000 IUCN Red List of threatened species’. See http://www.redlist.org
65. FAO, ‘Fishery statistics for the Gulf region’ (Rome: FAO, 1990).
66. Maxwell, ‘A reed shaken by the wind: a journey through the unexplored marshlands of
Iraq’.
67. Maxwell, ‘A reed shaken by the wind: a journey through the unexplored marshlands of
Iraq’.
68. W. Thesiger, ‘The Marsh Arabs’.
69. W. Thesiger, ‘The Marsh Arabs’.
70. W. Thesiger, ‘The Marsh Arabs’.
71. W. Thesiger, ‘The Marsh Arabs’.
72. Maxwell, ‘A reed shaken by the wind: a journey through the unexplored marshlands of
Iraq’.
73. S. M. Salim, ‘Marsh dwellers of the Euphrates delta’ (London: 1962).
74. L. vant Leven, ‘The wildfowl situation of the Euphrates Delta’, Unpublished
manuscript in files of Wetlands International, 1968.
75. N. Alnoori, ‘Iraq’, pp. 110–1 in M. Smart, ed., ‘Proc. int. conference on conservation of
wetlands and waterfowl, Heiligenhafen, Federal Republic of Germany, December 1974’
(Slimbridge, UK: IWRB, 1976).

172
76. Carp and Scott, ‘The wetlands and waterfowl of Iraq. Report on the Joint Expedition of
the International Waterfowl Research Bureau and the University of Basrah, Iraq: 10th
January to 3rd February 1979’.
77. K. Y. Al-Dabbagh in litt. to M. I. Evans, 1993.
78. K. Y. Al-Dabbagh in litt. to M. I. Evans, 1993.

10
The Marsh Dwellers in the History of
Modern Iraq
Peter Sluglett
In the middle of the ninteenth century, as part of a lager process of imperial reform and
reorganisation, the Ottoman government attempted to extend its authority to its more farflung
and inaccessible territories, including the mountains of Kurdistan, Lebanon and
Syria, the deserts of Aradle of the nineteenth century, as part of a larger process of
imperial reform and bia, Iraq, and Syria, and the marshes of southern Iraq. Some, perhaps
most, of these areas had never been under more than the nominal control of the central
government in Istanbul for much of almost four centuries of Ottoman rule. The general
framework within which this incorporation began was known as the Tanzimat, a series of
enactments covering such matters as military and administrative centralisation, and
educational and legal modernisation, including the institution of commercial and penal
law codes based on European models. The application of the Tanzimat had begun rather
earlier in the Empire’s European provinces (and in Syria and Anatolia), but it was first
introduced into Iraq by Midhat Pasha, governor of Baghdad between 1869 and 1872. As a
senior administrator in the imperial bureaucracy, Midhat himself had been one of the
leading authors and proponents of the reforms, and was largely responsible for the Law of
Wilayets of 1864, which laid down organisational structures for provincial government
based on his own experience as governor of the Danube provinces.
Given the widespread lawlessness and insecurity in the three Iraqi provinces
(Basra, Baghdad and Mosul), Midhat’s brief tenure of office did not last long enough to
allow for the full implementation of the reforms. Nevertheless, it was significant in
introducing, even if initially only for a short period, the basic principles of the Tanzimat,
including the highly significant Land Law of 1858 1 . The main effect of this was to lay the
foundations of a new property regime which gradually emerged during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, a period in which the various agencies of the world market
were engaged in penetrating and shaping economy and society in Iraq and elsewhere in
the empire to a greater and more fundamentally irreversible extent than ever before.

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Economy and Society in Iraq in the late Ottoman period and under the Mandate and
Monarchy
In broad terms, Iraqi society in the latter part of the nineteenth century consisted of
pastoral nomads, sedentary cultivators, and urban dwellers. As McCarthy says ‘No one,
including the Ottoman government, knew the number of inhabitants of the vilayets of
Baghdad, Mosul and Basra. Ottoman administrative control was never strong enough to
allow the registration of the majority of the populations of the three … vilayets’ 2 . Using
Ottoman estimates, and projecting the figures forward to the first accurate Iraqi census
(1947), he produces figures of 1.30 million for Baghdad province, 1.15 million for Basra
province and 0.83 million for Mosul province around 1900 3 . At this stage, the towns
were extremely small, perhaps 80,000 in Baghdad, 35,000 in Mosul and 25,000 in Basra.
As the 1947 census classifies 71 % of the population as rural and 29% urban 4 , it can be
safely assumed that the rural preponderance was even greater at the beginning of the
century. There was also a general tendency towards sedentarisation and settlement on the
part of the nomadic peoples at this time, encouraged by the Ottoman, British mandatory
and Iraqi governments with the aid of such innovations as motorised transport and the
telegraph, together with the economic inducements (both for the cultivators and – of
course even more so – for their political or socio-economic overlords) in the course of the
gradual transition from a subsistence to a commercial agricultural economy.
Most of the rural population was organised into ‘tribes’, although it has become
clear that this designation should be used more cautiously and in a much more limited
way than was customary among the band of amateur ethnographer/administrators who
came to Iraq in 1914 with the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force 5 . To the British
administrators, mostly young men whose experience was largely confined to Muslim
India, tribes had leaders/shaykhs, who were by definition ‘responsible’ (in a juridical and
fiscal sense) for ‘their’ tribesmen, however far away this expectation may have been from
the political and/or socio-economic realities of early twentieth century Iraq. The
imposition of Ottoman administrative authority had often been accompanied by the cooption
of tribal leaders into state service (perhaps most notably the brothers Nasir and
Mansur al-Sa‘dun of the Muntafiq), and the British continued this practice after their
arrival in 1914.
However, as the young anthropologist Edmund Leach noted in the course of his
fieldwork in Kurdistan in the 1930s, ‘government support for the “chief” frequently gives
that individual a tyrannical authority quite foreign to the ordinary tribal system of
government’ 6 , or, in the words of a British Political Officer in southern Iraq in August
1920, referring to tribesmen recently captured in the rising, ‘… they are miserably
oppressed by their sub-shaikhs, who seem to me to be like feudal barons. Many of them
were small men of no account until we made them powerful and rich’ 7 . Nevertheless,
when directed against a common foe – another tribe or clan, the forces of the state,
Ottoman, British (mandate) or Iraqi, the tribal host long remained a force to be reckoned
with. Until well into the 1930s (and even later) the Iraqi armed forces were no match for
the combined might of the tribes, a feature of the nascent state of which the British, the
Iraqi politicians and administrators, and the tribal leaders themselves, were very well
aware 8 .

175
In the first half of this century, therefore, various important social and economic
processes were under way. The world economy was impinging relentlessly on the lives of
the inhabitants of Iraq, and the rural population was becoming more settled, in the sense
both of gradually ceasing to be nomadic and of practising agriculture more or less
continuously in the same place (rather than shifting cultivation from season to season
within the tribal dira or domain, as had been the custom earlier). In addition, tribal
leaders, and urban moneylenders, slowly became aware that the registration in their own
names of ‘tribal land’, previously, at least in theory, the common possession of the tribe,
was a procedure which would ultimately benefit them very considerably. The tribesmen,
for whom any form of registration or enumeration presented itself as a likely preparation
for conscription and/or taxation, were both suspicious of and averse to such practices, but
could hardly have foreseen that their failure to do so would reduce them from the status
of ‘free cultivators’ to virtual serfs within a single generation, or even within their own
lifetimes. The towns were growing rapidly in size, especially Baghdad and Basra (the
capital and the major port), but also those which had been founded in the late nineteenth
century as market or administrative centres, like Amara, Suq al-Shuyukh or al-Nasiriyya.
Although the process really exploded in the 1950s and 1960s, rural to urban migration
was already well under way by 1945, that is, long before oil revenues had become a
major factor in the Iraqi economy.
As can readily be imagined, one of the effects of this was to produce a dual
society and a dual economy, although some caution against over-generalising is
necessary. On the one hand, there was a relatively educated urban population, many of
whose members were participating almost exclusively in a capitalist economy, however
embryonic; on the other, there was the mass of the rural population, with very little
access to the money economy, ground down increasingly by poverty and appalling living
standards 9 . Between the two there was certainly a great gulf fixed, but in addition, for
reasons which have already been mentioned, the townsmen (both Sunni and Shi‘i) tended
both to despise and fear the rural population, partly because of their uncouthness and
ignorance and partly because of folk or actual memories of tribes attacking cities and
settled populations 10 . A further important factor which set the countryside apart from the
cities was that, while the longer-established urban population was (with certain important
exceptions) mostly Sunni, the rural population of the south was almost entirely Shi‘i, and
thus, in the eyes of the urban Sunnis, of inferior social status.
The Shi‘is of Southern Iraq
To define the situation more precisely, and to avoid some of the pitfalls of Orientalist
essentialism, it was (and remains) the case that neither ‘the Shi‘is’, nor ‘the Sunnis’, were
or should be considered as a monolithic bloc, and that the different social groups within
the two sects often had very contradictory interests. Thus the great landlords of the rural
south, whose estates came into existence as a result of clever exploitation of the Ottoman
land registration procedures under the British occupation and mandate and the
independent Iraqi state (1914–1920, 1920–1932, 1932–1958), were almost all Shi‘is who
were perfectly content to exploit their poverty-stricken Shi‘i fellow tribesmen. There was
also an even more fundamental division, between the urban Shi‘is of Baghdad, Basra, and
the ‘atabat, or Holy Cities, of Kerbala, Najaf, Samarra’ and Kadhimiyya – the latter a
suburb of Baghdad – and the tribal masses in the countryside. Baghdad and Basra were

176
major administrative and commercial centres, and the Holy Cities were lively trade,
teaching and pilgrimage centres, with a permanent core population of traders, teachers
and great religious scholars, and a floating population of students and pilgrims from all
parts of the Shi‘i world, mainly from Iran, Iraq and Lebanon, but also North India 11 .
Yitzhak Nakash has shown conclusively that most of the Iraqi tribes did not
convert to Shi'ism until the end of the eighteenth century or later. Indeed, many of the
tribes now in southern Iraq only arrived from the Arabian peninsula in the nineteenth
century, and gradually converted thereafter as a result of missionary activity among them
directed by the ‘ulama’ of the Holy Cities 12 . Given that most tribesmen were illiterate,
their conversion was in many ways largely symbolic and restricted to the observation of
rituals, including visits to the tombs of the Imams in the ‘atabat, Muharram processions
and the cult of saints, and dovetailed neatly into the celebration of courage and martial
virtues associated with the ‘noble’ nomads from whom they were, or claimed to be,
descended. While the ‘ulama’ could form effective alliances with the great tribal leaders
(as is evident from the risings of 1920 and 1935), it is important that the southern
tribesmen always remained conscious of their Arab origin. While they certainly
converted to Shi‘ism, there is, first, no sense in which they can be represented as religious
fanatics, nor, as has been implied, given the very different worlds which the two groups
inhabited, did they have very much in common with the students, traders, and teachers of
the ‘atabat. Finally, in spite of efforts by the Iraqi regime to demonise them in this way in
the 1980s and 1990s, they never identified themselves with ‘Iran’ or ‘Persians’, since this
was never a part of their own consciousness or oral traditions.
From Mandate to Independence to Revolution, 1920–1958
In November 1914, British Indian forces arrived in southern Iraq from Bombay, and after
many vicissitudes, captured Baghdad in March 1917. After the Ottoman defeat in 1918
the Empire collapsed, and in April 1920 the British and French obtained mandates from
the League of Nations over the remaining former Arab provinces of the Empire, France
acquiring Lebanon and Syria and Britain acquiring Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan. It was
arranged that Iraq and Transjordan should be kingdoms, ruled by Faysal and Abdullah,
the sons of Sharif Husayn of Mecca.
Britain exercised the mandate over Iraq between 1920 and 1932; by the late
1920s, many of her economic and strategic objectives had been secured (particularly the
demarcation of the boundary with Turkey to include the former Mosul vilayet within
Iraq, the award of the oil concession to the Iraq Petroleum Company), and the Royal Air
Force had proved effective in its aerial policing of the remoter parts of the territory. Thus
London was persuaded that the mandate could ‘safely’ come to an end. Nevertheless,
Britain continued to exercise strong influence over Iraqi governments until the revolution
of 1958.
One of the main objectives of British rule in the 1920s was to attempt to extend
the authority of the new regime to the remotest parts of the country, thus continuing a
process begun by the Ottomans in the latter part of the nineteenth century. In this fashion
the Kurds in the mountains of the north, and the Shi‘i tribes in the marshes and elsewhere
in the south, were gradually incorporated into the state, either by suborning or co-opting
their chiefs, or reducing those leaders to a state of powerlessness, often by means of the
RAF. Very often, regions were left to the administration of their ‘traditional leaders’, the

177
tribal shaykhs, which could be, and often was, extremely oppressive. In Kut and ‘Amara,
where some of the largest private estates were created by strokes of administrators’ pens
between the arrival of the British in 1916 and the 1930s, the condition of the peasants
was notoriously wretched, and many of the slum dwellers on the outskirts of the cities of
Baghdad and Basra in the 1940s and 1950s were refugees from these two provinces. In
places where the authority of the tribal leaders had long been in decline, they were
replaced, where possible, by provincial administrators sent out either from Baghdad or
from the provincial capitals. In most case, the extension of ‘government’ was viewed
quite negatively by those on the receiving end, in that taxes, conscription, and other
encumbrances on freedom were imposed where such constraints had either only
intermittently, or in some cases never, been imposed before, and it took some time for
more positive benefits, such as roads, schools and clinics, to arrive. In addition, wherever
and however the process took place, it happened in the comparatively recent past, and,
combined with the massive rural to urban migration of which it was an important cause,
is one of the major factors behind the extreme turbulence of modern Iraq history.
Iraq since 1958: politics and society
On 14 July 1958, the monarchy and many of the other institutions which Britain had
installed in the 1920s and 1930s were violently overthrown in the course of a coup
organised by a group of disaffected military officers. A series of military or military
backed regimes followed one another: ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim (1958-1963), the brothers
‘Abd al-Salam and ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Arif (1963-1966, 1966-1968), Ahmad Hasan al-
Bakr (1968-1979), and Saddam Hussein (1979-present). 13 In general, the history of Iraq
since 1958 has been among the most wretched and unhappy of any third world country,
certainly of most Middle Eastern countries, with an appalling record of systematic human
rights abuse, genocide, and repression, especially since Saddam Hussein’s accession to
power in 1979.
Iraq’s enormous potential as an oil-rich state with a well-educated population and
diverse sources of income (in addition to oil) has been almost completely wasted. Since
oil nationalisation in 1973, the country’s wealth has been frittered away on arms
purchases and (more recently) the development of weapons of mass destruction on a truly
enormous scale. Iraq has suffered appalling losses arising from two entirely unnecessary
and fruitless wars. Fears of imprisonment, torture, execution and other forms of
persecution and repression have resulted in some 15–20% of Iraqis having fled the
country to live outside Iraq; the exiles include many of the country’s best educated and
most talented individuals. It is no exaggeration to say that the situation is a tragedy of
monumental proportions, in which the fate of the Marsh Arabs in the 1990s forms a
significant but far from atypical part.
In broad terms, none of the various regimes which have come to power since
1958 has felt sufficiently confident of its acceptability to the public to be able to hold free
elections. The Iraqi Ba‘th Party first seized power in 1968, and continues to hold power
to this day, but while this statement is superficially correct, it is extremely difficult to
assess exactly what it means. In opposition and clandestinity, Ba‘thist ideology had a
certain limited coherence of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism; as a regime ideology it
has come to mean anything the leadership may want it to mean. At various points over
the past two decades the party has played a key role; at other times the leadership has

178
chosen to dispense with it almost entirely. Its main function, both as party and ideology,
has been to support and applaud the various actions of the leadership, however
contradictory and self-destructive these may be. As far as the regime itself is concerned,
its main purpose seems to be its own survival; it has resorted to all imaginable lengths to
achieve that end, with, it must be said, a considerable degree of success. On the other
hand, longevity should not be confused with stability; there have been constant rumours
of coups and attempted assassinations over the years, perhaps most spectacularly a nearsuccessful
attack on ‘Udayy Saddam Hussein in December 1996.
One of the consequences of the revolution of 1958 was the introduction of a series
of land reforms, whose generally beneficent aims did not compensate for their inherent
defects, which were both fundamental and incremental in nature. The first reforms
confiscated much of the land of the former landlords and distributed it to individual
families and households; subsequent reforms (they were all abandoned in the 1980s)
created peasant cooperatives. In the first place, the peasants were used to managing
cultivation in the old-fashioned way, and although now ‘free’, they no longer had access
to credit – even at the ruinous rates they had been charged in the past. In addition, the
first few years of the reforms coincided with exceptionally severe droughts all over the
Middle East. Furthermore, these failings, combined with Iraq's gradual rise to
comparative prosperity as an oil-rich state, meant that agriculture (even with a degree of
mechanisation) was no longer a particularly attractive occupation as well as no longer
being the only option available. In consequence, the flight from the land which had been
a trickle in the 1930s and 1940s developed into a flood in the 1970s. By 1980, the
rural/urban proportions of the 1947 census had been almost completely reversed; 69% of
the population now lived in the cities, and only 31 % remained in the countryside 14 . One
of the effects of this was that by the late 1980s the labour shortage (and the effects of the
Iran–Iraq war) had led to ‘as many as 1 million migrant workers, predominantly
Egyptians, [working] in Iraq’, large numbers of whom were employed in agriculture 15 .
Pre-revolutionary agriculture had been extensive rather than intensive, and few of
the large landlords had undertaken the drainage works necessary for elutriation (washing
the salts off the soil), which meant that the soil surface in many areas was so encrusted
with deposits that cultivation was impossible without considerable investment in
restoring the soil. In the short term, the decline in agricultural production and
productivity did not matter, given the heady days of the 1970s, but Iraq has paid a heavy
price for the neglect of agriculture by all governments since the mid-1960s, especially
over the last two decades.
Armed with vastly increased resources in comparison with their predecessors, the
various post-revolutionary regimes have also sought to extend their authority as far and
wide as possible, in order to eliminate actual or potential pockets of opposition to their
rule. The most obvious example of this are the Kurds, who were the object of campaigns
which were little short of genocidal in the 1970s, and actually genocidal in the 1980s, but
on a lesser but equally barbaric scale, beginning in the latter 1970s, the regime has
energetically outlawed and persecuted the various clandestine Shi’i movements. This
campaign assumed greater intensity with the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 and the Iran–
Iraq war of 1980-88, in the course of which it became convenient for Saddam Hussein
and his government to portray every Shi‘i as a potential Iranian fifth columnist, or traitor
to the ‘Arab nation’. After several months of house arrest, the leading Shi’i religious
figure of his day, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr and his sister, Bint Huda, were

179
executed in April 1980. Recently, the religious leadership in the Holy Cities has again
come under attack; in 1998 and 1999, three Ayatullahs from the ‘atabat, Murtada
Burujirdi, ‘Ali al-Gharawi and Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr died in ‘accidents’ 16 , not,
apparently, because of any particular acts of commission, but because of their potential to
act as voices or rallying points for the Shi‘i community.
The Marsh Arabs
Until the middle 1990s, when the Iraqi government began the extensive drainage works
which have destroyed much of their traditional homeland, the tribal groups known
collectively as the Marsh Arabs inhabited much of the area extending southwards from
Kut on the Tigris and Hilla on the Euphrates, to Basra on the Shatt al-‘Arab. The area is a
mixture of desert and marsh, and originally covered some 20,000 square miles 17 . In the
rainy season (March–July) some 4,000 square miles would be completely inundated;
during the rest of the year the area was part marsh, part lake, and part dry land, covered
with reeds and bulrushes. The inhabitants of the area, all nominally Shi‘i Muslims, were
members of a number of different tribes (some of whom had subsections located
elsewhere), mostly the Albu Muhammad, the Bani Lam, the Albu Salih, the Bani ‘Isad,
and the Bani Hashsham. Traditionally, villages were formed on small islands, with huts
made of reeds; transport was by canoe or raft, and the area was largely cut off from the
rest of the world around it. For these and other reasons it formed a unique natural habitat,
for its animal and vegetable as well as its human inhabitants, largely unknown to the
world outside.
The only anthropological study specifically devoted to a part of this region, based
on research carried out in 1954-55 and published in 1962, is Shakir Salim’s Marsh
Dwellers of the Euphrates Delta, based on Salim’s doctoral thesis. However, as the title
of the original thesis (rather than the book) suggests 18 , the study is primarily concerned
with the inhabitants of a single village, al-Shubayish (al-Chibaish), a government
administrative centre (markaz al-nahiya) on the south-western edge of the Haur al-
Hammar. This settlement was formerly the seat of the shaykhdom of the Al Khayyun of
the Bani ‘Isad, but partly because of its relative accessibility on the edge of the marshes,
the village and the area around it was fully incorporated into the Iraqi state as early as
1924, following the defiance of Shaykh Salim al-Khayyun and subsequent British air
action against his tribe. This resulted in the shaykh’s capture and imprisonment by the
authorities, and soon afterwards in the official abolition of the shaykhdom. In 1931, the
government gave Shaykh Salim an estate of 9,200 acres in Diyala province, where he
chose to live. His nephew, ‘Abd al-Hadi, was appointed as his ‘customary’ successor, but
in the 1950s (and obviously long before) effective authority rested with the local
Administrative Officer, that is, with the Iraqi state 19 . According to Shakir Salim’s
account, the villagers and ordinary tribesmen had initially welcomed the order and
stability brought by the various government agencies, and the employment and other
opportunities which accompanied their arrival in the area, but ‘[d]uring the last few years
(sc. the early 1950s) there has been … active grievance against the government for the
inadequacy of the administrative machinery and the corruption of village officials’ 20
Shakir Salim classified the inhabitants occupationally into cultivators (of rice,
millet, wheat, barley and vegetables), reed-gatherers and buffalo breeders. Some of the
larger tribes, especially the Albu Muhammad, had members in all three categories,

180
buffalo-breeding being the most socially prestigious. Given its status, it is difficult to
assess how representative of ‘the Marsh Arabs’ the community of al-Shubayish actually
was, but Salim’s descriptions of various aspects of social and economic organisation
(clan, lineage, guest houses, social stratification, family, marriage, and agricultural and
other economic practices) are obviously applicable to the region as a whole. Because of
the isolation of most of the area, it seems reasonable to assume that much of what could
at least superficially be described as ‘traditional society’ remained largely intact at least
until the late 1950s 21 . Some schools, dispensaries, and police posts (at al-Qabab and
Saygal, apart from the ones already located at al-Shubayish in the 1950s) had been set up
in the more accessible areas by the time of Gavin Young’s return visit in 1973. 22
In earlier times, the marshes had provided a natural place of refuge for those
fleeing from conscription, or from the tax-collector, as well as being the home of a
number of highly independent-minded tribes 23 . However, as at al-Shubayish, the system
of air control introduced by the British mandatory authorities in the 1920s 24 meant that
recalcitrant tribes could be and were bombed for various acts of disobedience or for nonpayment
of taxes.. In addition, as has been described above, economic and other
pressures meant that the inhabitants of the rural south began to settle in larger villages or
left the area altogether. Life in the marshes was extremely hard, and as Iraq became
increasingly prosperous during the 1960s and 1970s and even into the 1980s, the lack of
amenities and the harsh environment would have encouraged many marsh dwellers,
particularly educated young people, to leave for the cities. Statistics are hard to come by,
but, adopting a very primitive rule of thumb, if all the inhabitants of particular
administrative units in southern Iraq could be classified as Marsh Dwellers, then in 1947,
when the population of Iraq was about 5 million, there were about 250,000 of them. The
country's population is now (2001) over 20 million, but, as rural to urban migration has
been such a major feature of the last five decades, there were probably no more than
400,000 Marsh Dwellers, maybe fewer, in 1990.
The Marsh Arabs since 1988
The Iran–Iraq war ended in 1988 with something of a stalemate; the Iranians were too
exhausted and demoralised to continue the fighting, but none of Iraq’s objectives had
been achieved, except perhaps the rather nebulous one of containing Iran. It is worth
pointing out that Iraq maintained, or acquired, its ability to do this because of the
sedulous support of the United States and the Soviet Union (and other major powers), all
of whom were exceedingly alarmed at the unknown potential represented by the Iranian
Revolution, and its possible consequences for the Middle East as a whole.
Since 55% of Iraqis are Shi‘is, a large proportion of the conscripts in the war
came from the rural south, but, probably contrary to the regime’s deepest fears, there
were no widespread reports of defections or mutinies on the part of groups of Iraqi Shi‘is
wanting to make common cause with their Iranian co-religionists. Some members of the
religious leadership had left Iraq and sided with Iran, most notably Muhammad Baqir al-
Hakim and the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) in 1982, but
this body’s more or less unquestioning espousal of Khomeini’s doctrine of vilayet-i faqih
has led to its isolation from the current Iranian reformist mainstream led by President
Muhammad Khatami, as well from more moderate Shi‘is in Iraq itself 25 .

181
Although it is extremely difficult to obtain information on what is actually
happening inside Iraq, it was clear at the beginning of 1990 that the regime’s popularity
had reached an all time low, and the economic situation was such that, according to one
source, ‘for the first time under Saddam’s rule, feeding the people became a serious
problem. ’26 Unfortunately, although the difficulties of mobilising are obvious the
opposition was never able to capitalise either on the clear weakening of morale in the
army or on the increasingly sorry state of the economy. At the same time, the regime’s
unreliability and unpredictability were gradually losing it the support of the West, which
was rather belatedly displaying misgivings about Iraq’s capacity (which of course had
long been furnished it by Britain, France, Germany, the United States and others) to
produce and employ weapons of mass destruction. The regime’s answer to the cul de sac
into which it had led the country was the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.
A few days after the cease-fire in the ground war at the end of February 1991,
uprisings against the Iraqi regime broke out both in southern Iraq and in Kurdistan.
Although the ‘rebels’ gained control of large areas between the end of February and the
beginning of March, units of the Republican Guard responded with exceptional brutality,
and were able to regain the upper hand fairly quickly in Basra, Najaf and Kerbala 27 . In
the southern cities, the insurgents captured and killed local Ba‘thist officials, members of
the security services and their families, venting their hatred for the regime upon them.
When the Republican Guard regained control of the southern cities, it carried out
indiscriminate mass executions of the population. Many tanks were painted with the
slogan ‘No Shi‘is [will survive] after today’ (La Shi‘a ba‘d al-yawm), and there was
widespread destruction of Shi‘i shrines and other mosques in the Holy Cities. As many as
300,000 people may have been killed in these operations.
After the risings in southern Iraq, some of the rebels took refuge in the marshes,
which caused the Iraqi regime to lay siege to the area, and movement in and out of the
marshlands was forbidden. Two huge canals were gradually constructed and a number of
rivers diverted, in a deliberate attempt to drain the marshes so as to make them
uninhabitable 28 . It is not entirely clear how far this has been successful, but it is well
known that large numbers of Marsh Dwellers have been forced to flee from the area.
In the autumn of 1998, according to Max Van der Stoel, special rapporteur for
Iraq to the United Nations Commission for Human Rights, Saddam Hussein’s cousin,
‘Ali al-Majid, who had been responsible for the Anfal operations against the Kurds and
others in northern Iraq in 1988 29 as well as attacks on the marshes in the early 1990s,
was in charge of artillery, mortar and ground force attacks in villages and towns in the
provinces of Amara, Basra, Kut and al-Nasiriyya, allegedly seeking out deserters.
Hundreds of arrests were reported, presumably with the objective intimidating the
population by taking hostages, the fate of many of whom is still not known. Van der Stoel
continues:
As part of this campaign of repression against the inhabitants of the southern
marsh region, reports indicate that government forces have burned houses and
fields while other houses have been demolished by bulldozers. Some reports
indicate that villages belonging to the Al Juwaibiri, Al Shumaish and Al Musa
and Al Rahma tribes were entirely destroyed. Following the burnings, soldiers are
said to have forcibly expelled inhabitants from the burnt areas. Government forces
are also said to have confiscated entire villages and community lands with some

182
of them being turned into military outposts. Finally, government forces have
reportedly cut the water supply to certain areas, affecting the population, livestock
and agriculture. These combined measures have reportedly led to the forced
relocation of entire families to other regions, in particular along the border with
the Islamic Republic of Iran. 30
It may be that the damage done so far to the eco-system is irreversible; in any case, if the
new hydraulic works were to be abandoned immediately, it would take many years for
the area to recover. The tragic fate of the Marsh Dwellers forms yet another doleful
chapter in the history of the crimes against humanity perpetrated by this appalling and
utterly ruthless regime. Suffice it to say by way of conclusion that the introduction of
democratic accountability and the rule of law in an Iraq after Saddam Hussein has been
overthrown are vital for the national integration and revival of the country that he and his
henchmen have ruined for the past three decades: the longer this is delayed, the harder the
achievement of that integration and revival will be.
NOTES
1. See Albertine Jwaideh, ‘Midhat Pasha and the Land System of Lower Iraq’, in Albert
Hourani (ed.), St. Antony’s Papers: Middle Eastern Affairs No. 3, London, Chatto and
Windus, 1963, pp. 105–136, and her ‘Aspects of Land Tenure and Social Change in
Lower Iraq during Late Ottoman Times’, in Tarif Khalidi (ed.), Land Tenure and Social
Transformation in the Middle East, Beirut, American University of Beirut Press, 1984,
pp. 333–356. For a more general socioeconomic overview see Marion Farouk-Sluglett
and Peter Sluglett, ‘The Transformation of Land Tenure and Rural Social Structure in
Central and Southern Iraq, c. 1870-1958’, International Journal of Middle East Studies,
15,1983, pp. 491–505; for a historical overview see Hala Fattah, The Politics of Regional
Trade in Iraq, Arabia and the Gulf 1745-1900, Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1997.
2. Justin McCarthy, ‘The Population of Ottoman Syria and Iraq 1878-1914’, Asian and
African Studies, 15, 1, 1981, pp. 3-44. See also the estimates by Muhammad Salman
Hasan, ‘The Growth and Structure of Iraq's Population 1867-1947’, Bulletin of the
Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics, 1958, pp. 339-352 . McCarthy’s
calculations are based on the Ottoman salnames and censuses.
3. Unfortunately the census data (in which, as McCarthy stresses, women, children and
the nomadic population were regularly and significantly undercounted) does not permit
an accurate or distinct assessment of the urban population, since the provincial capitals
were not counted separately from the qada in which they were located. For a broader
picture of the population of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, see Kamal Karpat,
Ottoman Population 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics, Madison, WI,
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.

4. See Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: a
Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba‘thists
and Free Officers, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1978, pp. 35, 40.
5. It is impossible to do justice to this complex topic here; see Henry Munson Jr., ‘The
Mountain People of Northwest Morocco: Tribesmen or Peasants ?’, Middle Eastern
Studies, 1981, 17, pp. 249-255; Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (eds.), Tribes and
State Formation in the Middle East, London, I. B. Tauris, 1991; Paul Dresch, Tribes,
Government and History in Yemen, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993.
6. Edmund Leach, Social and Economic Organisation of the Rowanduz Kurds, London,
University of London Press, 1940, p. 19.
7. Major H. C. Pulley, Political Officer, Hilla, to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 6 August
1920; India Office Records, L P & S 10, 4722/18/1920/8/6035, quoted Peter Sluglett,
Britain in Iraq 1914-1920, London, Ithaca Press, 1976, note 43, p. 257.
8. As will be described below, the crucial factor which tipped the balance of forces in the
authorities' favour was the use of aeroplanes; see Sluglett, op. cit., Chapter VII, ‘Defence
and Internal Security; the Role of the R. A. F.’; J. L. Cox. ‘ " A Splendid Training
Ground”: The Importance to the Royal Air Force of its Role in Iraq, 1919-1932’, Journal
of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 13, 1984, pp. 157-184; David Omissi, Air
Power and Colonial Control; the Royal Air Force 1919-1939, Manchester, Manchester
University Press, 1990.
9. In 1953 a British medical expert described the average Iraqi fallah as a ‘living
pathological specimen’ and estimated normal life expectancy at between 35 and 39 years.
Professor M. Critchley quoted in Rony Gabbay, Communism and Agrarian Reform in
Iraq, London, Croom Helm, 1978, p. 29.
10. Again, a certain circumspection is necessary; the Great Iraqi Revolt of 1920 was, at
least in part, a tacit alliance between (Sunni) city and (Shi‘i) countryside against the
British occupation.
11. For a recent description of the educational and social organisation of the Holy Cities
in the nineteenth century, see Meir Litvak, Shi‘i Scholars of nineteenth-century Iraq: the
‘ulama’ of Najaf and Karbala’, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
12. cf. ‘The Wahhabi attacks on Karbala’ and Najaf [c 1800-1812] reinforced the
sectarian identity of the Shi‘i ulama and increased their motivation to convert the tribes ...
the sack of Karbala’ and the attacks on Najaf exposed the vulnerability of the Shi‘i ulama
in Iraq, lacking as they did a tribal army which could be mobilised against such a threat to
the very existence of the two cities.’ Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq, Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 28.
13. For a general narrative account of this period, see Hanna Batatu, op. cit., see also
Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq since 1958: from Revolution to
183

184
Dictatorship, 3rd edition, London, I. B. Tauris, forthcoming (2001),
14. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, op. cit., p. 246.
15. J. S. Birks, I. J. Seccombe, and C. A. Sinclair, ‘Labor Migration and Labor
Organization in the Arab World’ in Michael Adams (ed.), Handbooks to the Modern
World: The Middle East, New York and Oxford , Facts on File, 1988, p. 727.
16. See US Department of State, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq,
pp. 4, 10, 14, February 25, 2000.
17. For the geographical/geophysical origins of the area in antiquity, see Steven W. Cole,
‘Marsh formation in the Borsippa region and the course of the Lower Euphrates’, Journal
of Near Eastern Studies, 53, 2, 1994, pp. 81-103.
18. S. M. Salim, Marsh Dwellers of the Euphrates Delta, London, Athlone Press, 1962.
The title of the thesis (supervised by Daryll Forde and Mary Douglas at University
College London), is ‘Economic and political organisation of Echchbyash [al-Shibayish],
a marsh village community in southern Iraq’, 1954-55. According to Forde’s introduction
to the book, Salim himself was born and grew up in Amara, an administrative centre on
the Tigris in the vicinty of the marshes he describes. There is a valuable study of an area
adjacent to, but not part of, the marshes; Robert A. Fernea, Shaykh and Effendi:
Changing Patterns of Authority among the El Shabana of Southern Iraq, Cambridge,
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970.
19 cf. ‘There was no government agent in the village until 1893, and the only authority
recognised throughout the whole region was that of the shaikh’. Salim, op. cit., p. 27. See
also pp. 30-42.
20. Ibid., p. 40.
21. There are various travel accounts: see the early Fulanain (S and S. E. Hedgcock),
Hajji Rikkan, Marsh Arab, London, Chatto and Windus, 1927; Stephen Hedgcock was a
British Political Officer who lived in the area with his wife in the 1920s. Probably the
best-known account is that of Wilfred Thesiger, who lived in the area more or less
continuously between 1951 and 1958: The Marsh Arabs, London, Longmans, 1964.
Thesiger introduced both the naturalist Gavin Maxwell and the Observer journalist Gavin
Young to the area during that time. See Gavin Maxwell, A Reed Shaken by the Wind,
London and New York, Longmans, Green, 1957 (based, according to Gavin Young, on
‘some weeks’ stay there in 1956). Young’s account, illustrated with stunning photographs
by Nik Wheeler, is based primarily on his visits to the area in the 1950s and on briefer
return visits between 1973 and 1976: Return to the Marshes: Life with the Marsh Arabs
of Iraq, London, Collins, 1977. Somewhat ironically, ‘H. E. Sayyid Tariq Aziz, who
made it possible for me to go back to [the Marshes]’ appears on the book’s dedication
page. .
22. Young, op. cit., pp. 189-202, 219-221.

23. In the autumn of 1967, a splinter group of the Iraq Communist Party (the ICP-General
Command, let by ‘Aziz al-Hajj) conducted a brief and ineffectual guerrilla campaign
based in the marshes.
24. For a description of similar operations in a neighbouring area in 1923-1924 (Samawa,
to the west of the southern edge of the marshes), see Sluglett, op. cit., pp. 265-69.
25. Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp.
246-47; Joyce N. Wiley, The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Shi‘as, Boulder CO and London,
Lynne Rienner, pp. 73-100.
26. Falih ‘Abd al-Jabbar, ‘Why the Intifada Failed’ in Fran Hazelton (ed.), Iraq since the
Gulf War: Prospects for Democracy, London, 1994, pp. 97-117.
27. See Ofra Bengio, ‘Iraq’s Shi‘a and Kurdish Communities; from Resentment to
Revolt’ in Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin (eds.), Iraq’s Road to War, St Martin’s, New
York, 1993, 51-66.
28. See Hamid al-Bayati, ‘Destruction of the Southern Marshes’ in Fran Hazelton (ed.)
Iraq since the Gulf War: Prospects for Democracy, London, Zed Press, 1994, pp. 141-
146.
29. Tripp, op. cit., pp. 244-246; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, op. cit., Chapters 8 and 9.
30. Max Van der Stoel, report to 55th session of the United Nations Commission
Human Rights, 26 February 1999, paragraph 17.
185

11
The International Context of Iraq from
1980 to the Present
Peter Sluglett
In August 1975, Iraq had concluded the Algiers Agreement with Iran, which fixed the
boundary between the two states in the Shatt al-Arab at the thalweg, or deepest median
point in the waterway. In return, Iran agreed not to support the Kurdish groups in
northern Iraq in their struggle against the Iraqi government. This ushered in a degree of
cordiality in the relationship between Baghdad and Tehran for the next four years, which
lasted until the fall of the Shah in February 1979. At this point, relations became strained.
Each state accused the other of attempting to undermine its authority, the Iraqis pointing
to Iranian appeals to Iraqi Shi‘is to overthrow the regime, and the Iranians accusing the
Iraqis of fomenting rebellion in Khuzistan-Arabistan. The clandestine Iraqi al-Da‘wa
party and its unofficial leader Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr hastened to show their support for
the new regime in Iran; in a congratulatory telegram to Khomeini, al-Sadr expressed the
opinion that ‘other tyrants have yet to see their day of reckoning’ 1 . In November 1979,
Iraq warned Iran that the latter would have to ‘revise’ the Algiers agreement, give up the
three Gulf islands, and provide self-rule for its Arab, Kurdish and Baluch minorities. In
September 1980, after a series of border incidents over the previous months, Saddam
Hussein invaded Iran
Despite logistical and other difficulties, the Iraqi armed forces managed to hold
their own fairly successfully until the spring of 1982. In this they were aided by the
strength of Iraq’s foreign exchange reserves and the weaknesses and divisions within the
main opposition groups. In addition, only a very few Iraqi Shi‘is, mostly from the
traditional religious families of the Holy Cities, actually went over to the Iranian side.
While the Iraqi regime was widely feared, even hated, at home, the prospect of its
replacement by something akin to the Islamic Republic of Iran at the time was apparently
at least equally, if not more, unpalatable to most Iraqis. Of the other Middle Eastern
states, only Syria and Libya declared themselves for Iran. Jordan came out clearly on
Iraq’s side, and Kuwait effectively replaced Basra as Iraq’s major port. In addition, the
Gulf states and Sa‘udi Arabia had begun to provide Iraq with very considerable loans
after the war began 2 .
In September 1981, the Iranians drove the Iraqis back from Abadan, and Saddam
Hussein called for a one month cease-fire to coincide with Ramadan, which the Iranians
rejected. By March 1982, Khomeini had turned the war into an Iranian national crusade,
with Saddam Hussein the Great Satan who had to be cast out. After May 1982, Iraq only
held on to a very few enclaves in Iran, immediately west of Dezful and around Qasr-i

187
Shirin, and by the autumn most of the fighting had shifted to the Iraqi side of the frontier.
In July 1982 Iranian forces penetrated to the outskirts of Basra, but the Iraqis managed to
prevent them advancing further, with enormous loss of life on both sides.
While the Iraqi regime was never able to make the kind of moral capital out of the
conflict that its enemy was able to utilise so effectively, the shift of the war to Iraqi
territory had two major consequences. In the first place, although the Iraqi regime had
started the war, it could now present itself as being on the defensive, and call for a
closing of ranks against the threat of external invasion. Secondly, the Soviet Union, Iraq’s
main arms supplier, which had apparently taken umbrage at Iraq’s decision to launch the
war without consulting it, was no longer able to remain aloof and resumed supplies in the
course of 1982. For obvious reasons, the United States also tended to support Iraq against
Iran. On 27 October 1984 the two countries resumed full diplomatic relations, although
this was largely a formality because links between the two had been close for years, and
the United States interests section of the Belgian Embassy in Baghdad had been one of
the largest missions in the capital 3 .
Nevertheless, by the beginning of 1984 the Iranians were still firmly entrenched
in the marshlands on the Iraqi side of the Shatt al-Arab. At that stage the conflict became
‘internationalised’ as both sides, particularly Iraq, started attacking oil tankers in the
Gulf, and the ‘tanker war’ continued intermittently during 1984 and 1985. At the same
time, in an attempt to avoid being forced to a humiliating defeat at whatever cost, the
Iraqis resorted to the use of poison gas against Iranian forces 4 . In February 1986, the
Iranians, clearly bent on not ending the war until Iraq was defeated and Saddam Hussein
overthrown, massed their forces for a daring surprise attack on Fao, across the Shatt al-
Arab. However, although Fao was occupied, there was no further advance into Iraq.
In terms of foreign relations the war had the effect of increasing Iraq’s
dependence on the West and the West’s conservative Arab allies, including Egypt and
Jordan. For the benefit of his Arab audiences, Saddam Hussein attempted to link Iran and
Zionism, so that the war was ‘an international Zionist conspiracy aimed not only at Iraq
but at the entire region’ 5 . On the other hand, part of the price that Iraq was prepared to
pay for United States support was a considerable modification of its sabre-rattling on the
Arab-Israeli conflict. A few days after the resumption of relations with the United States
in 1984, Tariq ‘Aziz declared on American television that his country would support ‘any
just, honourable and lasting settlement between the Arab states and Israel’, and went on
to say that ‘Iraq does not consider itself to be a direct party to the conflict, because Israel
is not occupying any part of Iraqi soil’ 6 . However, given Iraq’s previous record of
vigorously denunciatory inaction in this sphere, such pronouncements were perhaps less
remarkable than they seemed.
The Political and Economic Impact of the War on Iraq
For the first two years of the war the regime still had sufficient funds at its disposal to be
able to insulate Iraqi society from most of the shortages and rationing that normally
accompany military mobilisation. This was possible partly because, at least as far as the
international financial community was concerned, the economy was in a reasonably
healthy state before the war started, and partly because some of Iraq’s principal clients,
particularly in France and Japan, came to be owed so much money that the extension of
further credit seemed the only guarantee that their debts would eventually be repaid 7 . By

188
1983, however, the pinch was beginning to be felt. The cost of living rose sharply, the
dinar was devalued, and ceilings were set upon the remittances that the two million
foreign workers in the country could send home. By August 1983 Iraq’s foreign reserves
had fallen from $30 billion (late 1980) to $3 billion, and the country was almost entirely
dependent on handouts from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.
However, apart from the human tragedy involved, there were few compelling
pressures to end the war. Iran managed to export sufficient oil to service its military
machine until the very end of the conflict, while Iraqi exports picked up after the opening
of the pipeline across southern Turkey. In addition, the 1980s were a period of major
crisis for the world oil industry, with severe and constant downturns in price. Between
1979 and 1983 oil production in the whole Gulf area dropped from 21.3 million barrels a
day to 11.3 million barrels a day 8 , so it was not greatly in the interests of producers or
consumers of oil that the war should be brought to an end.
The Last Two Years of the War: 1986-1988
By the middle of 1986, the tremendous losses sustained by both sides had reached
something of a stalemate where both contenders were bogged down in entrenched
positions with no end in sight. In October 1985 Saudi Arabia had decided to increase its
own oil exports in order to drive the price of oil down in attempts both to service Iraq and
to cripple the Iranian economy. Saudi exports increased from an average of 2 million
barrels a day to an average of 4.5 million barrels a day, and the price of oil dropped from
$27 per barrel in 1985 to $15 per barrel in early 1986 9 . By 1987 Iran and Iraq began to
make serious attempts to destroy each other’s oil export facilities, and Iraq made
sustained if generally unsuccessful attacks on tankers carrying Iranian oil. In addition the
fear of an Iraqi collapse and its wider repercussions in the region virtually forced Iraq’s
Arab neighbours to commit themselves more unequivocally to its support, especially after
the Iranian offensive against Basra in January–February 1987, and the ‘War of the Cities’
which accompanied it.
Following Iraqi raids on Iranian oil terminals in August 1986, Iran began to step
up its attacks on Kuwaiti tankers. The effect of this was to align the United States even
more firmly on the Iraqi side and throughout the rest of the war American naval vessels
made frequent attacks on Iranian shipping and Iranian oil installations, working in close
coordination with Iraq. In August 1987, Iraq and the United States signed a five-year
economic and technical agreement, accompanied by $1 billion worth of food aid. At the
same time, the United States and many other Western countries were covertly supplying
Iraq with sophisticated weapons through third countries, including providing the means to
manufacture chemical and biological weapons (Germany 10 ) or making it possible in other
ways for Iraq to buy them either directly or through third countries, generally in
contravention of their own laws and regulations 11 .
On 20 July 1987, after considerable international pressure, the United Nations
Security Council passed Resolution 598, which called for an end to the war and promised
the establishment of a commission of enquiry to determine which of the parties was the
aggressor. Iraq accepted the resolution; Iran prevaricated. However, although evidently
greatly weakened, Iran still retained the capacity both to inflict serious damage on Iraq,
and also to occupy Iraqi territory. In the spring of 1988 Iran launched an offensive in
northern Iraq with the assistance of the PUK and the KDP, capturing the city of Halabja

189
on 15 March. The next day the Iraqi air force bombed Halabja with poison gas, causing
some 5,000 deaths among the civilian population and the flight of over a hundred
thousand Iraqi civilians to Iran and Turkey 12 . In April and June Iraqi forces again used
chemical weapons to recapture Fao and Mehran. By this time Iranian resistance was
crumbling, and the government in Tehran was further demoralised by the apparently
accidental shooting down of an Iranian passenger airliner by an American cruiser at the
beginning of July; on 18 July Khomeini announced that the Iranian government would
accept Resolution 598.
The Political and Military Situation after the War
The human and economic costs of the war were staggering. Western sources estimate
nearly 400,000 dead, roughly a quarter Iraqi and three-quarters Iranian, and perhaps
750,000 wounded. Mofid calculated that the total cost of the war was $452.6 billion to
Iraq and $644.3 billion to Iran, based on a combination of ‘damage to the infrastructure;
estimated oil revenue losses; and the estimated GNP losses’. 13 In spite of the fact that Iraq
was under no serious pressure to repay its debts at the end of the war, the extent of its
indebtedness in August 1988 certainly complicated the transition from a wartime to a
peacetime economy. Apart from the debt, Iraq’s annual food imports amounted to at least
$3 billion (roughly half coming from the USA and half from Turkey). The annual cost of
imports for civilian, military and reconstruction purposes was estimated at around $11
billion for the early 1990s. However, one very far-reaching consequence of the war was
that Iraq emerged a much more substantial military power than it had been in 1980. In
1979-80 the Iraqi army numbered some 190,000 men: by 1987-88 it had more than
quintupled, to around 1 million 14 . In addition, Iraq had built up an important armaments
industry, whose products included a surface-to-surface missile based on the Soviet Scud,
developed with Egyptian and Argentinian assistance. By 1989-1990 the scale of military
production was beginning to give rise to serious international concern as it became
known that Iraq was manufacturing chemical weapons and sophisticated missiles, and not
far from acquiring the means to produce nuclear weapons. The essential components of
all of these had been provided by firms in Western Europe and the United States.
This immense military build-up ultimately served to ensure that Saddam
Hussein’s position was greatly consolidated by the end of the war. He used the ‘victory’
over Iran to make explicit claims to the leadership of the Arab world, expressed in his use
of Arab nationalist imagery, his carefully staged appearances in traditional Arab dress
symbolising his transcendence of the frontiers of Iraq, and his rediscovery of Islam.
Nevertheless, his domestic power base during and after the war consisted almost entirely
either of members of his own extended family, or of those who had in some sense been
incorporated into it by marriage or by long association with him.
Prelude to Invasion
Although Iraq’s economic situation after the war was certainly bad, it was not desperate,
given the country’s very substantial oil reserves. Prudent housekeeping, tight control of
imports, and checks on government spending would have brought about gradual
economic recovery, provided that there was no disastrous collapse in the price of oil.
However, such policies were not adopted; while the rebuilding of the cities, the

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infrastructure and industry was certainly an important target, $5 billion per year was
allocated to rearmament over the period 1988-89, and $2.5 billion to reconstruction,
which included such prestige projects as ‘victory’ monuments and a new presidential
palace 15 . Hence the ‘desperateness’ of Iraq’s financial position was more an expression of
Saddam Hussein’s priorities than an objective fact.
At the same time, the various efforts to restructure the economy led to steep price
rises and a rise in the cost of living generally, and inflation was estimated at 45 per cent
for 1990. Private capital had responded to the various privatisation measures by
speculative rather than sustained investment, which meant that the rich got richer and the
middle and lower classes got poorer. Also, the cuts that had been imposed on the
bureaucracy since 1987 had led to high unemployment, making rapid demobilisation
extremely difficult. All these factors combined to produce a deep sense of dislocation and
insecurity among those sections of the population who had grown used to the state
providing them with secure employment and subsidising most essential items of
consumption throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Saddam Hussein made it clear
immediately after the war that the reconstruction of the country, and particularly of
Basra, would inevitably be very costly, and that sacrifices and belt-tightening would be
necessary. In addition, having abandoned the commitment to socialism and social
welfare, which had been central to Ba‘th ideology, Saddam Hussein now cast around for
new means of creating the tensions in which nationalism could thrive while reaffirming
his devotion to pan-Arabism and the Arab nation.
Early in 1990 a combination of factors came together to enable the Iraqi leader to
project himself as ‘embattled’ once more. In February the New York based organisation
Middle East Watch released a scathing denunciation of Iraq’s human rights record 16 ; in
March the execution (on charges of espionage) of the 32-year-old British journalist
Farzad Bazoft, occasioned widespread verbal condemnation of Iraq in the Western
media; in April a scandal erupted over the so-called Iraq supergun and later over the
discovery of essential parts for nuclear weapons in the baggage of Iraqi travellers passing
through Heathrow. Iraq’s neighbours were also accused of betraying Iraq or the interests
of the Arab nation; early in 1990, Iraqi officials were lobbying the Gulf rulers to lower
their oil production and also to push up oil prices to around $20 a barrel. At the same
time Saddam Hussein was determined to provide Iraq with access to a deep water
anchorage on the Gulf. Iraq was confined to the port of Umm Qasr and the shallow
narrows at the head of the Gulf; Saddam Hussein was casting his eyes on the Kuwaiti
islands of Bubiyan and Warba, which could provide a useful alternative harbour. In the
spring of 1990 he raised the stakes by demanding access to the islands and also by
resuscitating Iraq’s claim to that part of the Rumayla oilfield that ran from southern Iraq
into northern Kuwait. He also castigated Kuwait for allegedly having the temerity to
demand repayment of some of Iraq’s debts and for having been instrumental in the
campaign to keep oil prices low. In July 1990 part of the Iraqi army was sent to the
border, and on 2 August, when Kuwait refused to give in to these demands, Iraq invaded,
and subsequently annexed, Kuwait.
The Invasion of Kuwait and its Aftermath
Reaction to the invasion on 2 August 1990 was swift. In broad terms, no Arab state
supported Iraq, but some, notably Jordan and Yemen, and for especially opportunistic

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reasons, Yasir Arafat and the PLO, hesitated to condemn the action outright. On a
broader international level, the United Nations Security Council quickly passed a number
of resolutions condemning Iraq. On 7 August President Bush ordered an immediate airlift
of American troops to Saudi Arabia to defend it from possible Iraqi attack. Turkey and
Saudi Arabia closed the pipelines running across their territories from Iraq. Arab and
Asian guest workers began to pour out of Kuwait across Iraq towards the Jordanian
border, where they were crossing at the rate of 10,000-15,000 a day during August and
September.
Over the next weeks and months Iraqi troops killed large numbers of
Kuwaitis indiscriminately; they also rounded up all Iraqis in Kuwait (many of whom
were political refugees) and took them into custody. Several thousand Kuwaitis were
arrested and many have not been seen since. Hospitals and other public buildings were
stripped of their equipment, and looting of property and attacks on civilians became
commonplace. The price of oil rose steadily, from about $20 per barrel before the crisis
began to above $40 by mid-September 1990; neither Iraq nor Kuwait was exporting oil.
In some parts of the Arab world, especially Jordan and the Occupied Territories and some
of the towns of North Africa, there was great popular ferment, and widespread support
for Saddam Hussein, because of what was perceived as his brave defiance of the West
and its local clients (among whom, it should be underlined, Saddam Hussein himself had
been prominently numbered until very recently). Anti-American and anti-Western feeling
rose to new heights; ever alert to trends which he might turn to his own advantage,
Saddam Hussein called for a jihad against the ‘enemies of Islam’. However ill the notion
of Saddam Hussein fighting a holy war of ‘Islam against unbelief’ suited the facts, his
defiance of the United States certainly gained him a good deal of knee-jerk support in the
Arab and Muslim worlds.
At the end of November, the United Nations, under great pressure from the
United States, issued Resolution 678, which authorised member states to use all
necessary means to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991. During the
autumn of 1990, the United States put together an anti-Iraq coalition of some 30 states,
including Egypt and Syria, almost all of which sent token detachments to Saudi Arabia.
When Saddam Hussein failed to respond to Resolution 678, the United States and its
allies began to bomb targets within Iraq, causing large numbers of civilian deaths and
considerable damage to the country’s infrastructure. Iraq retaliated by launching Scud
missiles at targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia. About fifteen Israelis died in Tel Aviv from
causes attributable to the missile attacks; Israel did not retaliate. After some five weeks of
bombing, a ground offensive was launched on 24 February, which ended with the rout
and destruction of much of the regular Iraqi army on 27 February, when a cease-fire was
declared; Iraqi troops had been driven out of Kuwait the previous day.
The Aftermath of the Gulf War
It has been estimated 17 that the invasion and the war (that is, the period between 2 August
1990 and 27 February 1991) resulted in at least 100,000 deaths among the military and
the civilian population and some 300,000 wounded. As many as 2.5 million people were
displaced (in the sense of being forced to leave, or leaving, their homes and places of
work); over $170 billion in property and infrastructural damage was caused in Iraq,
perhaps $60 billion worth in Kuwait, excluding the environmental effects of the

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sabotaging by Iraq of over 700 Kuwaiti oil wells. Of course, given that the cease-fire
after the war with Iran was only a little over two years old in August 1990, the effect of
this additional self-inflicted wound on an already ailing Iraqi economy was even more
damaging than these figures suggest.
A few days after the cease-fire in the ground war at the end of February 1991,
uprisings against the Iraqi regime broke out in southern Iraq and in Kurdistan. By 4
March Kurdish forces had taken Sulaimaniyya, and by 24 March were in control of most
of Kurdistan, including the towns of Arbil and Kirkuk. In the south, although the ‘rebels’
gained control of large areas between the end of February and the beginning of March,
Republican Guard responded with exceptional brutality, and it was able to regain the
upper hand fairly quickly in Basra, Najaf and Kerbala 18 . The insurgents had captured and
killed local Ba‘thist officials, members of the security services and their families, venting
their hatred for the regime upon them. When the Republican Guard regained control of
the southern cities, it carried out indiscriminate mass executions of the population. As
many as 300,000 may have been killed in these operations.
In the last week in March, Iraqi helicopters and troops launched raids on Kirkuk
and other Kurdish cities. A mass exodus of Kurds to the Iraqi borders with Turkey and
Iran began; by the end of April there were about 2.5 million refugees, both Kurds and
southerners. Iran admitted the refugees immediately, Turkey was eventually persuaded to
do so. In April 1991 ‘safe havens’ (a military exclusion and no-fly zone north of latitude
36° N) were set up in the Kurdish areas, enforced by Britain and the United States. In
time, although the area was subjected to an economic blockade from the south, this
arrangement permitted the emergence of a de facto Iraqi Kurdish autonomous area.
In general, Western policy towards Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War was
vacillating, confused and lacking any long-term vision for the future. The Kurdish and
Shi‘i rebellions had certainly been encouraged by the United States and its allies, but the
coalition forces offered no assistance to the rebels, giving rise to suspicions of the ‘true
intentions’ of the United States and its allies 19 . Saudi Arabia and Turkey expressed
unease over any covert or overt American support which might strengthen either the
Shi‘is (and, behind them, as was widely canvassed at the time, Iran) or the Kurds, whom,
while it became politically impossible not to help because of the widespread television
coverage of their plight, it was equally important to contain.
Sanctions and the United Nations Inspections
United Nations Resolution 661, passed on 6 August 1990, froze Iraqi financial assets
abroad and banned imports and exports, allowing only medical supplies and foodstuffs to
be imported without restrictions. The original sanctions regime was modified after the
cease fire in April 1991; although Iraq was still not allowed to export oil, it was permitted
to import foodstuffs and ‘materials and supplies for essential civilian needs’ (Resolution
687). All restrictions would be lifted if Iraq complied with four principal conditions; the
identification and elimination of its weapons of mass destruction; the demarcation of its
frontier with Kuwait and acceptance of Kuwaiti sovereignty; the release of Kuwaiti and
other nationals held in Iraq, and the establishment of a Compensation Commission which
would assess war damage and pay for it by a levy of 30 per cent on Iraqi oil revenues. At
the time of writing (April 2001) Iraq has only complied fully with the second of these

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conditions, the recognition, under great international pressure in November 1994, of the
frontier with, and the sovereignty of, Kuwait.
At least in theory, the severity of the sanctions was designed to be considerably
reduced by the provisions of Resolutions 986 (14 April 1995; accepted by Iraq in January
1996) and 1153 (20 February 1998), which permitted Iraq, under United Nations
supervision, to sell first $2 billion net (Resolution 986) and then $5.26 billion gross,
$3.55 billion net (Resolution 1153) worth of oil in exchange for food every six months –
that is, the mechanisms were to be reviewed every six months. Resolution 1153 also
accepted the principle that some of the money (up to $300 million) could be used for
replacement and repair of the oil facilities. In October 1999, the Security Council raised
the ‘revenue cap’ to $8.3 billion. For what the comparison is worth (since it does not take
population change and price fluctuations into account, nor the considerable costs of
replacing worn or damaged infrastructure), Iraq exported $10.7 billion worth of oil in
1985, a year in which its government spent $13.9 billion on arms purchases 20 .
In fact, attempts to introduce oil-for-food arrangements had been continually
rejected by Iraq as an intrusion on its sovereignty. It is true that these earlier efforts had
insisted on a fair degree of on-site monitoring, and also required Iraqi acceptance of the
presence of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM, the United Nations
weapons inspectorate), set up in May 1991. What Iraq had held out for before January
1996 (when it reluctantly accepted Resolution 986), but could not obtain, was the
comprehensive lifting of sanctions. This was not made more likely by continuing
revelations of the extent of Iraq’s nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons arsenals,
which were brought to light both by Iraqi defectors and by the work of UNSCOM itself.
The regime clearly felt it important enough to sacrifice the well-being of its people in
order to maintain this capacity.
Inevitably, the effectiveness and feasibility of the inspection exercise were
frequently challenged by those of Iraq’s ‘friends’ who were eager for the sanctions to be
brought to an end. The fact that laboratories for manufacturing chemical or biological
weapons were highly portable added to the ‘looking-for-a-needle-in-a-haystack’ nature of
UNSCOM’s task. In addition, the good faith of UNSCOM’s work was greatly
compromised with the disclosure early in 1999 that Scott Ritter, one of the American
inspectors, had been regularly passing details of his findings to both Israel and the CIA 21 .
In December 1999 a new body was set up, UNMOVIC (United Nations Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission), consisting of a team of diplomats with only
one representative each from the United States and the United Kingdom. So far, Iraq has
not allowed UNMOVIC to enter the country.
Kurdish Politics since 1991
The creation of the ‘safe haven’ in the Kurdish areas in 1991 led to the creation of a de
facto Kurdish autonomous region, which followed a line from the Turkish border to the
Iranian border, passing south of the towns of Zakho and Arbil and west of Chamchamal
and Kifri. Elections were held in May 1992; the closeness of the vote resulted in Mas’ud
Barzani of the Kurdish Democratic Party and Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan being asked to act as joint leaders of the political entity that emerged, the
Kurdistan Regional Government. In fact, neither leader ever participated personally in the
government, and the relief agencies took some time to give it de facto recognition, on the

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general grounds that they felt bound to deal with what might be misleadingly described as
the legitimate government in Baghdad.
The Kurdish Regional Government’s difficulties were compounded by a series of
problems, personal, regional, national and international. In broad terms, the two leaders
presided over followings that were largely defined by region and in addition they had
been brought up in very different ideological schools. Barzani could be said to represent
the ‘traditional tribal’ face of Kurdistan, while Talabani and his father-in-law Ibrahim
Ahmad claimed that they represented a more progressive political line. Ahmad in his
time, and Talabani subsequently, had always been critical of the political judgment of
Mas’ud Barzani’s father Mulla Mustafa, had tried to find common ground with the Ba‘th
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and had been extremely wary of Mustafa Barzani’s ties
with the United States and the Shah.
The bitter rivalry between the two men and their followers has more than once
seriously threatened the survival of the autonomous region. Armed clashes broke out
between the KDP and the PUK in the spring of 1994 to capture (albeit temporarily)
Halabja, Khurmal and Panjwin. This episode was followed by further bloody clashes at
the end of the year, in spite of attempts by France and the United States to broker an
agreement. Negotiations between the parties were conducted in Paris in late July 1994
(and again in Drogheda in August 1995), but this did not stop outbreaks of bitter fighting
between the parties over the next three years. Inevitably, such actions lost the Iraqi Kurds
a great deal of the international support which they had attracted over the years, as well
as causing major interruptions in the relief effort. A particular bone of contention
between the KDP and the PUK was the fact that the KDP, by virtue of the location of
most of its supporters, was, and remains, in control of the border crossing from Turkey
(near Zakho), which was used by between 700 and 1,000 trucks a day. Hence it was able
to levy customs duties on all incoming goods, and thus to monopolise a major source of
revenue, which it kept for its own purposes rather than remitting to a central treasury.
In the summer of 1996 matters escalated in such a way as to threaten the very
existence of the Kurdish autonomous region. At Talabani’s invitation, Iranian troops
entered the area controlled by the PUK, and Barzani called for assistance from Baghdad
to remove them. Forty thousand Iraqi troops were sent to Arbil, which they managed to
capture from the PUK with the assistance of the KDP. The Iraqis went on to dislodge the
PUK from Sulaymaniyya, although Talabani recaptured the latter town by the end of
October. After the capture of Arbil, Iraqi intelligence sought out and executed opponents
of the regime who had taken refuge there, together with some of those attached to a rather
rudimentary organisation funded by the CIA, which, it had been rather quixotically
hoped, would overthrow the regime in Baghdad. Iraqi forces retreated, but the message,
at least for the time being, was clear; no independent entity can survive in Kurdistan as
long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, given the intense and apparently endemic
factionalism of those who control the region.
Shi‘i Politics since 1991
One of the more persistent misconceptions about Iraqi politics (at least in the sense that it
long acted as a major influence on American policy-makers) has been the belief there is a
fundamental ‘from-time-immemorial’ division between ‘sunnis’ and ‘shi‘is’, and that a
principal objective of ‘the Shi‘is’ is the creation of an Islamic state in Iraq which would

195
have a close relationship with Iran. A far more meaningful division is the one between
the Takriti power-holders and the majority of the disenchanted and disenfranchised
population, both Sunni and Shi‘i. Most Iraqi Shi‘is consider themselves Iraqi Arabs first
and foremost (as is clear from the experience of the Iran–Iraq War), and deeply resent the
ghettoisation to which successive regimes have subjected them.
In spite of forming over half the population, the Shi‘is have always been
discriminated against by Iraqi governments, especially under the Ba‘th. This began most
clearly with the mass expulsions of Shi‘is in the 1980s on the grounds of their supposed
‘Iranian origin’, and culminated in the terrible revenge taken by the Republican Guard
after the intifada in the South in 1991 and the subsequent forcible uprooting of a
substantial proportion of the population of the southern marshes in the 1990s 22 . Partly as
a result of Iraqi air and ground attacks on the South and the virtual genocide being waged
against the Marsh Arabs, the Western allies imposed a no-fly zone south of 32° N at the
end of August 1992.
Human Rights in Iraq 23
Human rights in Iraq have been routinely abused for most of the period since the Ba‘th’s
assumption of power in the late 1960s, apart from a lull in the later 1970s when it was
necessary to reach an accommodation with the Communists. In its first period in office
(February-November 1963), the Ba‘th was a partner in a government responsible for the
perpetration of the most terrible acts of violence hitherto experienced in the post-war
Middle East 24 . David McDowall’s Modern History of the Kurds, the two volumes of
collected essays edited by Fran Hazelton for the London-based CARDRI (Campaign
Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq) in 1986 and 1994, and, perhaps
most graphically, Samir al-Khalil/Kanan Makiya’s Republic of Fear 25 and Cruelty and
Silence, have devoted considerable space to the atrocities which the Iraqi regime has
committed against its people throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Since the invasion of
Kuwait (but much more sporadically throughout the long honeymoon between Iraq and
the United States which preceded it), the US Department of State’s annual Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for Iraq and the reports of the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) make depressing, often horrifying, reading.
In brief, the rule of law does not exist in Iraq. Detention, imprisonment, torture
and executions are routine and arbitrary. According to Amnesty International in 1997,
hundreds of thousands of individuals have disappeared in Iraq since the early 1980s.
Occasionally their families are told to come to prisons and mortuaries to collect their
bodies. In August 1994, Law 109 prescribed branding and amputation of ears and/or
limbs for deserters, draft dodgers and car thieves 26 ; doctors were obliged to carry out
these procedures or be subject to the same penalties themselves. There is no freedom of
association and no elections apart from occasional referenda to confirm the president in
office. Criticism of the president, or suggestions of dissatisfaction at the way the country
is run, are capital offences. Max van der Stoel served as Special Rapporteur on Iraq for
the UNCHR between 1992 and November 1999. The following excerpts from his report
to the fifty-fifth session of the Commission on 26 February 1999 speaks for itself:
At the beginning of 1992, the Special Rapporteur concluded that the gravity of the
human rights situation in Iraq had few comparisons in the world since the end of

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the Second World War. The Special Rapporteur regrets that since then he has had
no cause to change his view. The prevailing regime in Iraq has effectively
eliminated civil rights to life, liberty, physical integrity, and the freedoms of
thought, expression, association and assembly; the rights of political participation
have been flouted, while all available resources have not been used to ensure the
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. Indeed, the Special Rapporteur
has concluded that the politico-legal order in Iraq is not compatible with respect
for human rights and, rather, entails systematic and systemic violations
throughout the country …
The established State structure, based on an omnipresent State party, the
absence of a short-, medium- or long-term democratic project, and the fact that
there is no institution capable of controlling the abusive exercise of power all lead
the Special Rapporteur to conclude that the Iraqi people do not enjoy, and will not
enjoy in the foreseeable future, respect for their human rights. …
Today, almost eight years after the establishment of his mandate, the
Special Rapporteur notes that almost none of the recommendations contained in
his earlier reports have been adopted by the Government of Iraq. The Government
has also failed duly to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur … by not replying to
any of the communications he has sent to the Government, … and by refusing to
accept the stationing of United Nations human rights monitors in Iraq.
At the time of the Gulf War, and on several occasions since, various humanitarian
organisations who wish to bring an end to the sanctions have alleged with some
bitterness, and with some justice, that the United States and its allies demonised , and
continue to demonise, Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime in order to justify first the
Gulf War, and then the sanctions and their continuation. It is perfectly clear that the
United States and its allies, as well as the former Soviet Union and its allies, effectively
built up this vicious regime by supplying it with sophisticated weaponry and the means to
manufacture weapons of mass destruction throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, and that
almost all outside governments turned a blind eye to the Iraqi regime’s extraordinarily
evil nature until just before the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.
Nothing can change these facts, and it may be that, one day, some member of a
future United States administration will feel it necessary to make some sort of public
amends for this in the way that has been done for the United States’ role in ensuring the
survival of a highly unpopular monarchy in Iran in 1953, and the overthrow of the elected
government in Chile in 1973. Nevertheless, however devastating the effect of the
sanctions may be, and however cruelly the people of Iraq may suffer from their effects,
Saddam Hussein’s reign of terror and the monstrous crimes committed against the people
of Iraq long before and during the sanctions are facts which are equally ineluctable.
Saddam Hussein may not be the murderer of quite so many as Hitler, or Pol Pot, or
Stalin, but the extremes to which he has reduced his country by insisting on maintaining
himself and his regime in power means that it is in precisely that grisly gallery that his
portrait deserves to hang.

Iraqi Politics since 1991
197
Iraqi politics some ten years after the end of the Gulf War remains very much as it was
before the invasion of Kuwait; a despotic, beleaguered ruler running a state which he has
impoverished to the utmost degree. Since the Ba‘th Party has been in power (at least in
theory) since 1968, and Saddam Hussein himself in sole charge since 1979, no effective
alternative authority with instant recognition or appeal has been able to build itself up
outside, or of course inside, the country. There is no exiled Lenin, no imprisoned
Mandela, to take over the leadership. For many Iraqis in 1990-91, the invasion of Kuwait
was a time of great excitement and anticipation; at last the tyrant had overreached
himself, and would get his comeuppance. Such views were dismissed by Arab
nationalists of various hues, who, with a blithe disregard for their hero’s more than
ambiguous past, saw Saddam Hussein’s defiant posturing as a major step towards the
realisation of the Arab nation, or the liberation of Palestine, or whatever fantasy most
appealed to them. On the whole, Iraqis knew better, having lived under the Ba‘th for the
previous twenty-two years. Sadly, since Desert Storm and the failure of the risings which
followed, the opposition has given the impression of being driven from pillar to post,
unable to unite around a common goal, and splitting into ever smaller groupuscules.
The regime itself has not been without its problems. Coup attempts, and attempts
on the lives of key figures, have been regularly reported, in January, February and June
1992, in September and November 1993, March, May and June 1995, and June and
December 1996. There have also been a number of embarrassing high level defections,
perhaps the most spectacular being the departure to Jordan, with their husbands and
children, of two of Saddam Hussein’s daughters in August 1995. One of the sons-in-law
was Hussein Kamil al-Majid, formerly Minister of Defence and Military Industries, who
was presumably able to give his debriefers in Amman accurate details of the regime’s
military capacity. In an act of quite extraordinary folly the two sons-in-law decided to
return to Iraq with their families in February 1996; they and several other members of
their family were shot the next day .
Inevitably, the upheavals within previously loyal and reliable tribes, the
defections, and a degree of family feuding have contributed to reducing Saddam
Hussein’s support base, although not sufficiently to cause him to lose control. In the
middle years of the war with Iran the regime began to turn towards the market economy,
partly in an attempt to promote ‘efficiency’ but also to disencumber itself of parts of the
massive (and costly) state sector. At this stage the bureaucratic backbone of the state
enterprises was composed of party members and officials, who gradually found
themselves either demoted or unemployed. At the same time, the regime seemed to be
assiduously courting the tribes, and almost to have forsaken the Ba‘th party. However, in
the dire social and economic circumstances of the late 1990s and early 2000s, the party
seemed to be enjoying something of a return to favour, earning praise for its attempts to
monitor prices and for overseeing the fair distribution of supplies. Baram has pointed to
the recent promotion of some older party loyalists, including some associated with
Saddam Hussein and the Ba‘th since the time of his attempt on the life of ‘Abd al-Karim
Qasim in 1959 27 . However, the president apparently continues to rely on his ‘kitchen
cabinet’ of old cronies who have always been at his side: Tariq ‘Aziz, his mouthpiece to
the rest of the world, ‘Izzat al-Duri and Taha Yasin Ramadan.

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Conclusion
Saddam Hussein has shown enormous agility in resisting and countering threats to his
personal rule. On the other hand, it is extremely hard to discover how Iraq is actually run
on a day-to-day basis, how the bureaucracy functions, how essential services are
maintained, and so forth. It is difficult to guess whether the very straitened circumstances
of the Iraqi population would greatly or rapidly change with the lifting or greater
modification of sanctions, although the regime’s credibility might be dangerously
strained if sanctions were eased and everyday life did not significantly improve. Of
course, given its monopoly of coercion, it is also possible that lifting sanctions would
enable the regime to rebuild its military capacity rather than bring any substantial
measure of relief to the Iraqi people.
What is certain is that there will be no internal peace and reconciliation in Iraq
until Saddam Hussein and his henchmen cease to be in power. There are no particularly
compelling reasons to suggest that this will happen soon; the president is sixty-three, and
although rumours abound, he has no known health problems. Saddam Hussein’s eldest
son ‘Udayy’s unpredictability and physical disabilities following an assassination attempt
in 1996 make him an unlikely successor. In addition, given the generally strained
relations between father and son, it seems improbable that ‘Udayy would be his father’s
nominee, or, even if he was, that he would be acceptable to any group which might take
over after his father. This said, the regime rests on very fragile foundations.
It is a grim scenario, and there is little to be optimistic about. However, the notion
that dictatorship is better than anarchy, and that Iraq would somehow disintegrate after
the fall of Saddam Hussein, is both misleading and unhelpful. The possibility that Turkey
might grab Iraqi Kurdistan and/or that Iran might grab the Shi‘i south is almost too
bizarre to need further comment. In addition, the idea (if it ever had any value) that the
continuing presence of Saddam Hussein functions as a vital check on any regional
adventurism on the part of the Iranians seems increasingly unconvincing, especially given
the clear indications that the Iranian government is moving cautiously towards seeking an
accommodation with the United States.
Finally, Iraq after Saddam Hussein would be unlikely to continue to pose a threat
to the security of the rest of the region. However it is effected, the ending of the present
regime in Baghdad is an essential ingredient for peace and stability not only in Iraq, but
in the region as a whole. The greatest shortcoming of Desert Storm was surely that it had
no clear objectives, and came to an end before any definite settlement had been reached.
Given the United States’ past record, it is hard to accept the pious handwringings of
officials to the effect that the administration would somehow have exceeded its brief if
General Schwarzkopf had been allowed to impose a more abject surrender. Since that did
not happen, it cannot be stressed sufficiently that the introduction of democratic
accountability and the rule of law in an Iraq after Saddam Hussein would act as the most
powerful factors for national integration: the longer this is delayed, the harder the
achievement of that integration will be.

NOTES
1. Guardian, 28 February 1979.
2. See Dilip Hiro, ‘Chronicle of the Gulf War’, Merip Reports, No 125/ 126, July/
September 1984, pp. 3-14, here p. 6; Financial Times, 9 February 1983, 24 August 1983.
Most of the aid at this stage came from Saudi Arabia; see Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, 2 April 1985.
3. Thus ‘For the first nine months of the current fiscal year beginning October 1 1979
US food imports to Iraq totaled $251 million ... Although Iraq has not maintained
diplomatic relations with the United States since 1967 ... the expansion of trade has
advanced strongly since about 1974’. New York Times, 30 September 1980. The same
article mentions that US exports to Iraq rose from under $50 million in 1973 to about
$420 million in 1979.
4. Two United Nations missions were sent to the area to investigate allegations of the use
of chemical weapons, the first between 13-19 March 1984 and the second between 26
February-3 March 1986. The second mission published its report on 14 March 1986.
5. BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), 8 January 1983.
6. al-Nahar (Beirut), 2 December 1984.
7. ‘The basic problem regarding the continuing credit arrangements with Iraq was that in
order to induce Iraq to make the interest payments and capital due in respect of existing
indebtedness, it was judged necessary to offer some quantity of new credit’. Report of the
[Scott] Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and
Related Prosecutions, Vols I and 2, London, 1996, quoted Sarah Graham-Brown,
Sanctioning Saddam : the Politics of Intervention in Iraq, London, I.B. Tauris, 1999, p. 4.
8. Exxon Background series, ‘Middle East Oil and Gas’, 1984, p. 5
9. Another reason for Saudi Arabia’s production increases was that it had decided to
regain its past share of the market. See Dilip Hiro, The Longest War : the Iran-Iraq
Military Conflict, London, Grafton, 1989, pp. 213-215.
10. For the role of German firms in supplying chemical weapons see David McDowall, A
Modern History of the Kurds, London, I.B. Tauris, 1996, pp. 361-67.
11. For examples of such deals, see the Scott Report, op. cit. In the course of CIA
hearings in 1993 it emerged that the US government had effectively (and illegally) loaned
Iraq $5bn in 1985 through the office of the Atlanta branch of the Italian Banca Nazionale
di Lavoro.
12. Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence; War, Tyranny, Uprising and the Arab World,
London, Jonathan Cape, 1993 p. 164.
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200
13. Kamran Mofid, The Economic Consequences of the Gulf War, London, Routledge,
1990, pp. 87-88, 127-128, 135-140.
14. For details of arms manufacture, see Economist Intelligence Unit, Iraq : Country
Report, No 4, 1988, No 2, 1989.
15. For the most famous of these, see Samir al-Khalil, The Monument: Art, Vulgarity and
Responsibility in Iraq, London, al-Saqi Books,1991.
16. Later published as a book; David A. Korn, Human Rights in Iraq, New Haven, Yale
University Press, 1990.
17. Joost Hilterman, Middle East Report, July 1991.
18. See Ofra Bengio, ‘Iraq’s Shi‘a and Kurdish Communities ; from Resentment to
Revolt’ in Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin (eds.), Iraq’s Road to War, New York, St.
Martin’s, 1993, 51-66.
19. The confusion is captured in Fouad Ajami, The Dream Palace of the Arabs, New
York, Vintage, 1999, pp. 179-84.
20. United States Energy Information Administration, Monthly Report on Iraq, December
1999.
21. See Scott Ritter, Endgame: Solving the Iraqi Problem – Once and For All, New
York, Simon and Schuster, 1999.
22. For details, see Hamid al-Bayati, ‘destruction of the Southern Marshes’ in Fran
Hazelton (ed.), Iraq since the Gulf War: Prospects for Democracy, London, Zed Press,
1994, pp. 141-146.
23. This section has been compiled from various US Department of State Country
Reports and the Reports to (and meetings of) the United Nations Commission for Human
Rights.
24. See Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq since 1958: From Revolution to
Dictatorship, London, I..B. Tauris, 1990, Chapter 3.
25. McDowall, op. cit.; CARDRI, (Campaign Against Repression and For Democratic
Rights In Iraq), Saddam’s Iraq: Revolution or Reaction?, London, 1986; Hazelton (ed.),
op. cit. An updated edition of Republic of Fear with a new introduction was published in
1998 (Republic of Fear: the Politics of Modern Iraq) with Kanan Makiya (rather than the
pseudonymous Samir al-Khalil) as the author.
26. The law was published in al-Thawra on 26 August 1994. Makiya, op. cit., p. ix.
27. Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.
267.

12
Statistical Outline of the Situation of the
South Iraqi Refugees in Iran, including
the Marsh Dwellers
Jérôme Le Roy
Methodological note
As with many refugee populations around the world, and in the context of a country, the
Islamic Republic of Iran, where there were once 4 million refugees and where about 2
million remain, quantitative analysis is a very risky business – even the simple task of
numbering refugees is difficult. AMAR is fortunate to have access to a very good sample
of South Iraqi refugees in the refugee camps in Iran. In this case any number quoted is
accurate within plus or minus 10%. Medical and other statistics taken from this
population are also reasonably accurate. It is much harder, however, to provide accurate
numbers for non-camp refugees and the figures we quote should be seen as estimates
only.
Even the UNHCR local mission does not have an exact picture of the number of
refugees as their terms of reference include documented refugees and therefore exclude
squatters, illegal (non-documented) refugees from their count. AMAR’s evaluation is that
there are, in spite of efforts to document them, still about 10% undocumented refugees.
Additionally, the situation is not frozen as the demographic balance is heavily positive
and the migratory balance, while stable, still involves a few repatriations and a few
arrivals.
Another difficulty is that the differentiation between Marsh Dwellers and other
south Iraqi Shi‘ite refugees is not easy to make. First of all, the mandate of AMAR is to
help those in greatest need without distinction from a humanitarian standpoint, and then
because it is difficult to differentiate between a farmer in a dry area in the vicinity of the
marshes and a Marsh Dweller who was also farming in the marsh area without extensive
interviews.
The flows of refugees since 1990
Control of the South Iraqi marshland area by the central authority, whichever it was, has
proven difficult over the last few hundred years from the Ottoman Empire to Saddam
Hussein. The marshes were the traditional refuge of opponents, smugglers and fugitives.

202
During the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s, the marshes are known to have provided shelters
for a number of army deserters, for example. The marshes have also been used as a transit
area (smuggling has been a traditional activity there for ages) between Iraq and Iran. It
has also been one of the possible ways out for those Iraqi who were fleeing the various
dictatorial regimes in their countries.
The first massive flow of refugees through the Marshlands occurred during and
after the crushing of the Iraqi uprising in March-April 1991, in the aftermath of the Gulf
War and the liberation of Kuwait. An estimated 60,000 refugees fled Iraq to Iran in 1991,
while unknown numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), maybe 30,000,
remained in the marshes in Iraq.
The year 1992 saw the peak of a massive depopulation effort of the Marshlands,
including deportations inside Iraq and the systematic destruction of villages and
settlement in the Marshlands. A continuous flow of another estimated 20,000 refugees
crossed the border at that time.
The drainage of the Marshlands and the depopulation operations were nearly
complete in 1993 and 1994. 8,000 more refugees arrived at the last remaining crossing
point, Himmet, at the end of a rudimentary causeway crossing the border in 1993 and
5,000 more followed in 1994. The border was then sealed off and the number of crossborder
transit ceased to be significant as of 1995.
It is impossible to estimate the loss of life due to the fighting, destruction and
deportations in the south Iraqi Marshlands. We can deduct from the number of refugees
who arrived wounded or maimed at the border and from testimonies that there was very
large loss of life in the area.
As of today, there are an estimated 95,000 South Iraqi Shi‘ite refugees in Iran. An
estimated 40,000 of these 95,000 refugees are Marsh dwellers. Marsh people were among
the last to leave Iraq and some of them were taken to three camps where they form a large
majority of the population. Otherwise it is estimated that the marsh people form around
20% of camp population and 50% of the squatter population, particularly in areas close to
the border.
Locations
45,000 refugees are located in 11 refugee camps. The majority of the camps are located
in the Khuzistan province of Iran, around the city of Dezful. Other camps are located in
the very dry areas of the Fars province and in the mountains of the Luristan and Arak
provinces, halfway between Dezful and Tehran. Another camp has recently been opened
in the Zanjan province, halfway between Tehran and Tabriz (see table and chart below).

Location Number of
refugees
Of which
Marsh
Dwellers
(estimates)
1. Camps
Ashrafi-Asfahani (Khuzistan) 13,000 *
Mutahari (Khuzistan) 2,700 *
Beheshti / Dezful (Khuzistan) 1,200 *
Ansar (Khuzistan) 7,500 *
Beethet (Khuzistan) 3,500 *
Ketwend (Khuzistan) 3,500 2,000
Jahrom (Fars) 5,500 3,000
Servistan (Fars) 2,300 2,300
Azna (Luristan) 3,000 *
Ibrahim-Abad (Arak) 2,600 *
Soltanyeh (Zanjan) 400 *
Total in camp refugees 45,200 15,000
* An estimated 8,000 Marsh Dwellers live among the 35,000 population of 8 camps
2. Non camp
South Khuzistan (Khorramshahr, Abadan,
Shadigan areas)
4,000 2,000
Ahwaz (Khuzistan) and area 12,000 6,000
Western border areas of Khuzistan (towns of 13,000 12,000
Huwaiza, Bustan, Susangerd, Hamidia and vicinity)
Shush 1,000 1,000
Others (in Khuzistan and elsewhere) 20,000 4,000
Total non-camp refugees 50,000 25,000
Grand Total 95,200 40,000
Most of the squatter areas subdivide into 5 to 10 specific settlement in that area,
where the refugees have grouped themselves, having sometimes moved out of Iraq by
clusters of families and resettled in Iran as a loose social group.
The Marsh people distinguish themselves as the poorest among the poor within
the population of southern refugees.
Specifically, the Marsh Dweller refugee population is characterised by
• Low income, usually between 0.2 and 0.8 dollars a day per capita, well below the
World Bank’s absolute poverty threshold.
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204
• High birth rate. While the average refugee birth rate is already well above the Iranian
national average (1.8%), the marsh people’s birth rate is usually 20% to 30% higher
than the average south Iraqi refugee population.
• Poor general health status, due to the poor quality of the medical infrastructure in the
Marshlands of Iraq. This induces a high crude death rate (around 4%) and high infant
mortality rate (stabilises between 30 and 40%).
• Low level of education, which is made worse by the low level of enrolment in schools
of the refugee children.

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13
The Liability of the Regime for the
Human Rights Violations in the
Marshlands of Southern Iraq
Adel Omer Sharif
This section focuses on the liability of the Iraqi President and his regime for the
grave violations of human rights they committed against the people and the
environment of the Marshlands of Southern Iraq throughout the last decade 1 . It
therefore intends to discuss the wrongful acts of the Iraqi officials during this
period and the various possible available options to establish their responsibility.
The rule of law, at national and international levels
In today’s world, wrongful acts affecting human beings should not be tolerated.
Peaceful cohabitation of different peoples necessitates recognition of the rule of
law. The rule of law requires that acts of the State, as well as individual
behaviours, are in line with previously set legal rules regulating such acts and
behaviours, at both national and international levels. Any violations of these rules,
therefore, should be punished, so a continuation of peaceful order in the
community can be maintained 2 .
The massive violations of human rights committed by the Iraqi regime
The Iraqi case presents a blatant example of how human rights are still being
violated today, and urges the international community to play a role in intervening
in this painful scenario. The liability of the Iraqi regime for its wrongful acts in the
Marshlands of Southern Iraq could, in fact, be established within the parameters of
both national and international laws. The first step in addressing this situation is to
look carefully at the Iraqi government’s policies and actions in the southern part of
the country, and then proceed to investigate how far such policies and actions are
inconsistent with law, at both national and international levels. Once these policies
and actions have been examined, one can afterwards logically discuss how the
responsibility of the Iraqi regime can be established under law. How liable

208
institutions and persons can be made accountable. How damages caused to the
environment as a result of such polices can be dealt with. And, how the violation
of human rights can be redressed 3 .
The topic of the responsibility of the Iraqi regime, it should be mentioned,
is not an unfamiliar one. It was among those topics already addressed in the earlier
AMAR report of 1994 4 . The focus of that report, however, was given to rules
governing State responsibility in international law 5 .
It is, in fact, widely recognized that the Iraqi regime’s policies in the
southern part of the country during the last few years have led to severe violations
of human rights and the environment, including genocide and crimes against
humanity 6 . Because the current political regime in the country is autocratic and
repressive by nature 7 , its systematic abuse of power and violations of human rights
have regretfully caused grave damages to the human beings and the environment
in breach of rules of the international law of human rights. This includes, although
certainly not limited to, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the
Stockholm Declaration of 1972 and the Rio Declaration of 1992. In addition, they
have affected the people’s right to live in an appropriate environment, granted by
judicial rulings, and the principle of State responsibility for oppressive
environmental damages, recognized by the rules of State responsibility in
international law. Moreover, they exceed the level of torture prohibited by the
United Nations Convention on the Prevention of Torture 1984, and also violated
Protocol 1 (1949) and Protocol 2 (1972) attached to the four Geneva Conventions 8 .
The accountability of Iraqi officials under international law
Principles of international law are not directly concerned with acts and behaviours
of individual human beings, but rather are directed towards, and focused on, those
acts and behaviours of members of the international community, including States
and international organizations. Nonetheless, international law has recently
developed to recognize the international criminal responsibility of individuals,
with regard to certain offences, without requiring an existence of individual
international personality 9 . This was evident in the works of Nuremberg
International Military Tribunal 10 , and the works of other subsequent international
tribunals, such as the International Criminal Court of Former Yugoslavia and that
for Rwanda 11 . All of these tribunals have recognized the international criminal
responsibility of individuals and assuring its universality 12 . More interestingly, in a
very recent development, this responsibility has gained universal recognition when
the Statute for the establishment and jurisdiction of the permanent International
Criminal Court (ICC) was open for signature in Rome, Italy, on the 30 July
1998 13 . The treaty establishing the Court recognized, within various provisions,
the principle of international criminal responsibility of individuals for war
crimes 14 . Such developments, undoubtedly, suggest that the individualization of
international criminal responsibility, as to war crimes, is now a settled principle
guaranteed by a peremptory norm (jus cogens) of international law. As a
consequence, today, any person, in any given country, and regardless of his/her
status or official position, who in any way commits or participates in a

commission of war crimes, should be held responsible for such wrongdoing.
Hence, he or she should be brought to justice in accordance with the legal rules
regulating criminal responsibility in both national and international jurisdictions.
Iraqi officials enjoy no immunity under international law with respect to
their crimes in the Marshlands
Prevailing norms of international law today, with regard to criminal
responsibility, do not exempt crimes of perpetrators who hold governmental or
official positions from accountability. Article 7 of the London Charter for the
Nuremberg Tribunal – which is regarded as a model for codification of criminal
responsibility rules under international law – clearly stated that ‘the official
position of defendants, whether as head of States or responsible officials in
Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from
responsibility or mitigating punishment’. In light of this tendency, the Nuremberg
judgement went on to assert that ‘the principle of international law, which under
certain circumstances, protects the representative of State, cannot be applied to
acts which are condemned as criminal by international law. The authors of these
cannot shelter themselves behind their official position in order to be freed from
punishment in appropriate proceedings’. Other recent international instruments,
such as the Statute of the International Criminal Court for former Yugoslavia 15 ,
and that of the International Criminal Court for Rwanda 16 , have also incorporated
international law norms on the direct responsibility of the official persons and
command responsibility. This is also the case in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court 17 .
Iraqi officials, including Saddam Hussein, do not, therefore, enjoy any sort
of international immunity with regard to their criminal offences towards their
people and neighbouring countries. They should be held accountable for such
wrongful acts with regard to both military and civilian chain of commands 18 .
Superiors and subordinates, in accordance with codified norms of command
responsibility in international law – as stipulated in the 1977 Protocol I Additional
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions – should be criminally and disciplinarily
responsible ‘if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to
conclude in the circumstances at the time, that the subordinate was committing or
was going to commit such a breach, and if they did not take all feasible measures
within their power to prevent or repress the breach’.
How far has the Iraqi regime violated human rights?
It has become obvious that the violations of human rights committed by the Iraqi
regime with regard to the Marshlands in southern Iraq have not been confined to
Iraqi territory and people, but extend to a neighbouring country, Iran, onto which
the Marshlands border. Hence, when thinking of and talking about an effective
way to handle the severe impacts of such violations, both national and
international options should be considered. But if we are to look into the serious
possibility of invoking international law, and most probably international
jurisdiction, we will first have to prove whether the Iraqi regime’s actions in the
Marshlands are consistent with or in contradiction to the rules of international law.
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The Iraqi damages to the Marshland dwellers and environment are not
tolerated under international law
When discussing the State responsibility for its environmental wrongful
acts within its territory, two fundamental objectives, pulling in opposing
directions, should always be considered:
• that States have sovereign rights over their natural resources; and
• that States must not cause damage to the environment.
These objectives are set out in the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 (Principle 21)
and Rio Declaration of 1992 (Principle 2). They provide that States have (in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law) the sovereign right to exploit their own resources, pursuant to
their own environmental (and developmental 19 ) policies, and the responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction 20 .
States, therefore, are allowed – within limits established by law – to
conduct or authorize such activities as they choose within their territories,
including activities which may have adverse effects on their own environment. But
they are not allowed to cause damage to human beings and to other States and
areas beyond their jurisdiction.
Iraq has unequivocally breached this latter obligation. The prevailing facts
suggest that the unbearable implications of the severe damage in the southern part
of the country, a result of the policies of the political regime, have extended to
areas beyond national jurisdiction affecting human rights both inside the country
and outside. As explained in the earlier AMAR study of 1994, because a
significant portion of the Huwaiza Marshes, east of the Tigris, lie in Iranian
territory, the draining of the Mesopotamian wetlands by Iraq are likely to impact
on the environmental integrity of Iran. The wetlands, whilst politically divided by
an international border, are in fact a single hydro-geomorphic unit. The possible
infringement of Iranian rights caused by the eventual drainage project might
permit Iran to claim that Iraq’s actions violate the general rules of State
responsibility in international law 21 .
Iraqi violations constitute war crimes
War crimes may be defined as acts committed ‘in violation of the laws or customs
of war’ 22 , or in violation of the international humanitarian law. Crimes affecting
the environment during the time of war are certainly included in this broad
definition of war crimes. The Nuremberg Tribunal Charter (Article 6-b) almost
assured this understanding when it provided that wanton destruction of cities,
towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity constitute war
crimes for which international criminal responsibility is established. Several other
international instruments, including the 1949 Geneva Convention IV relative to the
protection of civilian persons during the time of war and the 1977 protocols I and
II additional to Geneva Conventions of 1949, codified customary international law

on the protection of the environment during the armed conflict times. Further, the
Enmond Convention (1977) prohibits any acts, activities or operations bearing
widespread, long-lasting or severe effects ‘as the means of destruction, damage, or
injury’ to any State party to the Convention, or to the environment, whether in
times of peace or armed conflict. Protection of the environment, as has been
recognized and regulated in international law, extends to all environmental
aspects, including historic and cultural dimensions 23 .
Because it is evident that Iraqi authorities in Saddam Hussein’s regime,
during and after times of armed conflict, have deliberately committed a wide range
of illegal acts that fit within the definition of war crimes in international law – and
because these wrongful acts have led to severe violations of human rights and
environment, particularly within the southern part of the country and beyond its
territory as well – the Iraqi officials, including Saddam Hussein and his
subordinates who played a role in this disaster, should be held accountable for
their commission of or participation in these war crimes.
How can the Iraqi regime violations be addressed?
With the existence of such numerous and gross violations of human rights, one
must think logically of the best available approach through which this deteriorated
situation can be addressed.
Primarily, it is not sufficient for other States to politically condemn the
policies of the Iraqi regime in the Marshlands (for example, through the
resolutions already passed in the USA and the UK). Usually, such condemning
resolutions have no do binding force and merely serve as non-binding
recommendations. What is obviously needed is a substantive remedy that ensures
several basic demands. Firstly, the remedy has to cease the inhuman activities of
the oppressive regime in Iraq. Second, it has to bring those who caused severe
human rights violations in Iraq and neighbouring countries to justice. And thirdly,
it has to redress the injured States and individuals for their losses, injuries and
violated rights.
Perhaps these various objectives are most likely to be attained through a
court system mechanism. If we are to be able to bring the whole-related issues of
the war crimes committed by the Iraqi regime before a trustworthy judicial system
– wherein judges are independent and impartial and guarantees of fair trial are
ensured – then, the potentiality of achieving our goals will definitely be high.
However, one has to realize from the start that, due to the repressive nature
of the Iraqi regime, it is very unlikely that national courts and national jurisdiction
in Iraq, at the time being, will be able to enforce this issue. The accountability of
the perpetrators and the remedies for the victims, therefore, are best sought outside
the Iraqi national jurisdiction.
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Iraqi jurisdiction
Theoretically, national courts in Iraq may entertain jurisdiction over the wrongful
acts of Saddam Hussein and his subordinates in the Marshlands. The reality,
however, as we should be aware of by now, is that this assumption is far from
being useful due to the pressures that could be imposed upon the judiciary by the
autocratic regime in the country 24 . Hence, we should ignore this option.
The recognition of national courts’ jurisdiction in this case carries a unique
opportunity for injured people to file claims of compensation against the Iraqi
regime, hence produces useful results. But, as we have just seen, it is very unlikely
that this issue can be handled within the national court system in Iraq.
Can the liability of the Iraqi regime be established before Iranian courts or courts
of other countries?
Iranian jurisdiction
An international border, as we have already seen, politically divides the
Marshlands in Southern Iraq. However, they are still a single hydro-geomorphic
unit. This definitely led to infringement of Iranian rights as a result of the drainage
project, which permits Iran to claim that Iraq’s actions violate the general rules of
State responsibility in international law and constitute international crimes. There
are four principles in international law supporting the concerned State’s right to try
perpetrators of crimes within its territory; namely, the territorial, the protective, the
passive personality and the universality principles 25 .
The territorial principle grants States original jurisdiction to determine the
legal rules – including those related to criminal activities – applicable within their
territories and appurtenances; and hence recognizes the concerned State’s right to
bring to account whoever commits a crime within its territory. The protective
principle provides that States should have the right to define what they consider
threats or violations of their national interests, and exercise jurisdiction over such
violations. The passive personality principle permits States the right to try aliens
for acts harmful to nationals. And finally, the universality principle presumes that
a court of law, in any State, shall have the right to try any person, regardless of
his/her nationality, if he/she is accused of committing crimes against the
international public order and international law.
In the light of these principles, one can easily recognize that the
jurisdiction to try the perpetrators who committed crimes in the Marshlands is, in
fact, a universal one; that means it is conferred upon courts in all States. As a
result, and since part of the destruction of Marshlands and violations of their
dwellers’ basic rights have taken place in the Iranian territory, Iranian courts may
then entertain jurisdiction over such crimes in accordance with the national legal
rules prescribing international crimes.

Jurisdiction of courts in other countries
There is a possibility that courts in other concerned countries may also entertain
jurisdiction over such crimes in light of the broad meaning of these four flexible
principles of international law. This will allow concerned States and injured
persons to seek criminal proceedings against Iraqi officials and also file claims of
compensation against them before the court invited to exercise this jurisdiction.
Practical difficulties
The reality, however, is that many clearly seen and potentially unforeseen
impediments could possibly preclude the process of bringing the Iraqi convicted
persons before either Iranian courts or courts of any other countries who may
claim jurisdiction over the indictment. Impediments related to the enforcement of
the judicial decisions, in both criminal and civil claims areas, remain the
predominant difficulty in this respect.
A more pragmatic solution for this problem, therefore, should be thought
of in order to achieve international justice. The international justice system and
international jurisdiction are perhaps the best path through this puzzling situation
and provide remedies for the states concerned and injured individuals as well.
Difficulties in establishing responsibility
it may sound relatively easy to call for the establishing of the Iraqi regime
responsibility for its wrongful acts in the Marshlands. But, in fact, the procedure is
extremely difficult. What makes it troublesome are practical realities that prevent
the establishment of the Iraqi regime’s responsibility on both national and
international levels.
On the national level, the current political position in the country within its
constitutional framework makes it impossible to establish the responsibility of the
ruling powers for any of their wrongful acts. At the apex of legal order comes the
interim Constitution of the country (adopted in 1990) which theoretically provides
for the protection of almost all basic human rights. Logically, Iraqi courts should
entertain jurisdiction over all violations committed by Saddam Hussein’s regime
which has affected the Marshlands and the people. But constitutional commands
and legislative provisions regulating State responsibility, in reality, are usually
viewed, in any tyranny government, as theoretical concepts rather than binding
rules. What supports this view is the fact that the national judiciary cannot, in fact,
be independent within the existence of such an authoritarian, repressive regime in
the country 26 . Therefore, it is very unlikely that the Iraqi regime could effectively
be held responsible, at the national level, in accordance with national legal
instruments and court systems.
As to the responsibility on the international level, a problem also exists
within the prevailing rules of international law today. International law
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214
distinguishes, within the rules regulating State responsibility, between substantive
rules on the one hand, and procedural rules on the other.
In the Iraqi case, no doubt those severe violations of human rights and
destructive drainage policies on the Marshlands infringe upon various substantive
rules specified by treaties, international agreements and customary international
law. These rules, as we have already seen, require States, while exploiting their
own natural resources, not to cause damage to the environment that belong either
to them or to any other States. They also require them to protect, respect and not to
treat their citizens and other residents in an inhuman manner, either in times of
peace or war 27 .
The predominant difficulty, however, belongs to the procedural rules of
responsibility in international law. It would have been ideal if a procedural
mechanism was provided for in the United Nations Security Council resolution
No. 687 (1991), or any consequent resolution, to try the Iraqi regime for
violations of human rights and damage to the environment. The existing
procedural rules, unfortunately, do not allow, and perhaps make it impossible, to
hold the Iraqi regime responsible for its wrongful acts in the Marshlands of
southern Iraq. It is uncertain that such responsibility could be established under
the UN resolution No. 687 (1991) in accordance with which Iraq was held
responsible for direct loss damages and injuries resulting from its illegal invasion
of Kuwait. The reason for this is that damages caused by drainage polices do not
directly result from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and, therefore, are not governed
by said resolution No. 687 (1991).
Similar problems arise with some other international agreements in the
area, such as the Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection
of the Marine Environment (1987). In accordance with this Convention (Article
XXV), the settlement of any disputes between the contracting parties should be
done through negotiation or any other peaceful means of their own choice. If this
does not work out, the dispute should be submitted to the Judicial Commission for
the Settlement of Disputes. Unfortunately, the contracting parties have not yet
chosen the members of this commission, which means there is no possibility of
bringing any allegations against Iraq before such an unworkable mechanism.
Any other available means will not provide a proper solution which can
overcome the existing procedural difficulties, unless a binding international
agreement, or resolution, is reached to move the process ahead.
It is also difficult to be optimistic and anticipate the possibility of referring
the case to the newly established International Criminal Court (ICC) 28 . The ICC
will not be empowered to try the Iraqi regime crimes for two reasons: that the
Convention establishing the court has not yet come into force, and that this court
will try only acts committed following its establishment 29 .
The possibility of establishing an ad hoc tribunal
What can be done, therefore, to move this complicated process positively ahead is
to exercise firm pressure, on both regional and international levels, to bring the

perpetrators before international justice embodied in an ad hoc international
tribunal.
The establishment of such tribunal seems to be the best way to bring
Saddam Hussein and his subordinates before international justice for their war and
environment crimes. The tribunal may be established pursuant to treaty concluded
by the concerned and injured States. Alternatively, one may also envision that a
UNSC resolution, similar to those of former Yugoslavia and Rwanda international
criminal tribunals, will be passed to establish such court under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter 30 . The first option is, in fact, a difficult one to achieve for various
political reasons related to the countries concerned that may urge most of them to
abandon this idea. Even if these countries managed to reach an agreement on
establishing the court, this process will certainly take a long period of time before
the hope of establishing the court and bringing the war criminals to justice can be
realized.
Perhaps it would be appropriate, therefore, if a new resolution is passed by
the UN establishing a specialized court (similar to the international criminal courts
for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda) to try the Iraqi regime for crimes against the
people and environment since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
Nonetheless, power balances in the UNSC today do not allow for such a
resolution to be easily reached, as there is no majority in support of this view.
Permanent State members are divided into two groups, wherein the USA and the
UK are on one side against the Iraqi regime, while France, China and Russia
(together with a considerable number of non-permanent State members) are on the
other side and increasingly supporting Iraq. The supporting countries used to have,
and actually do still have, trading and commercial relations and interests in Iraq.
Any further outside pressures on the existing regime in the country will definitely
affect these relations negatively. At the time being, it is therefore very unlikely
that the Iraq regime can, procedurally, be held responsible in light of the prevailing
balances in the UNSC.
Efforts to establish the tribunal should be continued
The previous difficulties should not, however, affect our true belief in justice and
the necessity of holding to account any person when he or she violates the
people’s rights. The existing difficulties, which might appear somewhat
discouraging, should not prevent us from proceeding to international justice. This
will definitely require us to exert more intensive efforts, at both national and
international levels, to facilitate the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal for Iraq. If
we manage to achieve this goal, the Iraqi case in general, and the Marshlands case
in particular, will then be administrated within the applicable peremptory norms of
international law. This will allow for international justice, at the end, to prevail,
and this is, in fact, the actual goal of our mission.
NOTES
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216
1. The liability or responsibility theme is, in fact, so vital and serves as a good base to
conduct further inquiries and studies on the more general topic of the Marshlands in
Southern Iraq.
2. State responsibility, including criminal responsibility, is now a well-established
principle in international law. The international community has always expressed
its concern on this issue and paid it a great deal of attention. At the United Nations
level, as an example, the International Law Commission (ILC), in its 48th session,
adopted a set of 20 articles constituting the draft code of crimes against the peace
and security of mankind and commentaries thereto. The draft code regulated, inter
alia, the origin of international responsibility, including the responsibility of a State
for its internationally wrongful acts, the international crimes and their
consequences. Article 53 provided that ‘an international crime committed by a
State entails an obligation for every other State’. By virtue of this text, the ILC
report commented, obligations are imposed on all States and the involvement of all
States is believed to reflect the interest of all States in the prevention and
suppression of international crimes which, by definition, impair ‘fundamental
interests of the international community’. The report added that the obligations here
are both negative and positive.
In the first category, there are obligations of non-recognition and obligations to
refrain from assisting the wrongdoing State. These reflect an already well
established practice. ‘The requirement of non-recognition can be seen, for example,
in Security Council resolutions on Rhodesia (e.g. Security Council resolution
216(1965)) and on Kuwait (e.g. Security Council resolution 661 (1990))’. The
obligation not to aid or assist a wrongdoing State finds reflection in Security
Council resolutions on South Africa (e.g. Security Council resolution 301 (1971),
418 (1977) and 569 (1985)) and on Portuguese Assistance to a State committing a
crime would itself be an unlawful act, and is therefore properly prohibited.
In the second category, the report added, are the positive obligations to
cooperate with other States in carrying out their obligations and in any measures
they may take to eliminate the consequences of a crime. All these obligations rest
on the assumption of international solidarity in the face of an international crime.
They stem from a recognition that a collective response by all States is necessary to
counteract the effects of an international crime. In practice, it is likely that this
collective response will be coordinated through the competent organs of the United
Nations – as in the case of the resolutions referred to above. It is not the function of
the present draft articles to regulate the extent or exercise of the constitutional
power and authority of Charter organs – nor, in view of Article 103 of the Charter,
is it even possible to do so. But apart from any collective response of States through
the organized international community, the ILC believes that a certain minimum
response to a crime is called for on the part of all States. Article 53 is drafted so as
to express this minimum requirement, as well as to reinforce and support any more
extensive measures which may be taken by States through international
organizations in response to a crime.
The ILC report is available online. See:
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/1996/96repfra.htm.

3. In a recent resolution (E/CN.4/2001/L.19) on the situation of human rights in
Iraq, approved with a roll-call vote of 30 in favour, to 3 against and with 19
abstaining, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (57th session on 18
April 2001) noted with dismay that there had been no improvement in this
situation; so strongly condemned the systematic, widespread and extremely grave
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the Government
of Iraq, resulting in all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broadbased
discrimination and widespread terror. Also, the Commission called upon the
Government of Iraq to abide by its freely undertaken obligations under international
human rights treaties and international humanitarian law to respect and ensure the
rights of all individuals within its territory, and to put an end to all summary and
arbitrary executions and to ensure that capital punishment would not be imposed
for crimes other than the most serious and would not be pronounced in disregard of
international standards. In addition, the Commission requested the Government of
Iraq to bring the actions of its military and security forces into conformity with the
standards of international law, in particular those of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights…etc.
For further details, see:
http://209.50.252.70/English/rights/180401_UNGAonIraq.htm
4. The 1994 report examined the implications of international environmental law for
the development of the Tigris-Euphrates river basin by the drainage of the marshes
in Southern Iraq. The examination was divided into two conceptual sections: the
first dealt with principles of State responsibility for harm to extraterritorial
environmental resources, and in particular the trans-boundary impacts of the use of
watercourse; the second discussed principles for the conservation of natural
resources located within the sovereign territory of a State and which are of common
international concern because of their biological characteristics and which are
therefore subject to principles of international law designed for their protection.
See: Part Six, p.153/p.166.
5. Almost all specialized studies in this area do not pay attention to the rules of
responsibility at national level, despite the vital importance of this approach. If a
serious assessment of this responsibility is really what we need to arrive at, then
binding rules in both national law and international law should be consulted.
6. The Iraqi political regime is widely known to be oppressive to its people and
others. Over the years, it has continued to commit human rights violations within
the country and beyond its territories as well. Political power in Iraq – in
accordance with the country report on human rights practices in Iraq 2000, released
by the United States Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor February
2001 – lies exclusively in a repressive one-party apparatus dominated by Saddam
Hussein and members of his extended family. ‘The provisional Constitution of
1968 stipulates that the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party governs Iraq through the
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which exercises both executive and
legislative authority. President Saddam Hussein, who is also Prime Minister,
Chairman of the RCC, and Secretary General of the Regional Command of the
Ba'th Party, wields decisive power. Saddam Hussein and his regime continued to
217

218
refer to an October 1995 nondemocratic ‘referendum’ on his presidency, in which
he received 99.96 percent of the vote. This ‘referendum’ included neither secret
ballots nor opposing candidates, and many credible reports indicated that voters
feared possible reprisal for a dissenting vote. Ethnically and linguistically the Iraqi
population includes Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans, Assyrians, Yazidis, and Armenians.
The religious mix is likewise varied and consists of Shi'a and Sunni Muslims (both
Arab and Kurdish), Christians (including Chaldeans and Assyrians), Jews (most of
whom have emigrated), and a small number of Mandaeans. Civil uprisings have
occurred in recent years, especially in the north and the south. The Government has
reacted with extreme repression against those who oppose or even question it. The
judiciary is not independent, and the President may override any court decision.
The Government's security apparatus includes militias attached to the President,
the Ba'th Party, and the Interior Ministry. The security forces play a central role in
maintaining the environment of intimidation and fear on which government power
rests. Security forces committed widespread, serious, and systematic human rights
abuses’.
This report is available online. See:
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/nea/index.cfm?docid=787.
7. More details are contained in the above-mentioned US country report on human
rights practices in Iraq for the Year 2000. The report deliberately showed that the
Iraqi Government's human rights record remained extremely poor. Citizens do not
have the right to change their government. The Government continued to execute
summarily perceived political opponents and leaders in the Shi'a religious
community. Reports suggest that persons were executed merely because of their
association with an opposition group or as part of a continuing effort to reduce
prison populations. The Government continued to be responsible for
disappearances and to kill and torture persons suspected of – or related to persons
suspected of – economic crimes, military desertion, and a variety of other activities.
Security forces routinely tortured, beat, raped, and otherwise abused detainees.
Prison conditions are extremely poor. The authorities routinely used arbitrary arrest
and detention, prolonged detention, and incommunicado detention, and continued
to deny citizens the basic right to due process. The judiciary is not independent.
The Government continued to infringe on citizens’ privacy rights. The Government
severely restricts freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, religion, and
movement. The UN Commission on Human Rights and the UN General Assembly
passed resolutions in April and November, respectively, criticizing the
Government's suppression of these freedoms. Human rights abuses remain difficult
to document because of the Government's efforts to conceal the facts, including its
prohibition on the establishment of independent human rights organizations, its
persistent refusal to grant visits to human rights monitors, and its continued
restrictions designed to prevent dissent. Denied entry to Iraq, the Special
Rapporteur bases his reports about the Government's human rights abuses on
interviews with recent émigrés from Iraq, interviews with opposition groups and
others that have contacts inside Iraq, and on published reports. Violence and
discrimination against women occur. The Government has enacted laws affording a
variety of protections to women; however, it is difficult to determine the practical

effects of such protections. The Government neglects the health and nutritional
needs of children, and discriminates against religious minorities and ethnic groups.
The Government severely restricts trade union rights. Child labour persists, and
there were instances of forced labour. See:
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/nea/index.cfm?docid=787.
8. Reports and statements on human rights violations in Iraq are uncountable in their
quantity and most of them are rich in their content. An example of this would be
one of the frequent statements delivered by Mr. Max van der Stoel, the Special
Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, on the situation
of human rights in Iraq. This is the statement he delivered before the fifty-third
session of the UN Commission on Human Rights on April 11, 1997. In this
statement, he explained that since 1991, the record of the Iraqi government has,
unfortunately, been one of long-standing, wide-spread and systematic violation of
human rights. The politico-legal order in Iraq is, indeed, at the root of this situation.
That is to say that the violation of human rights in Iraq is not only systematic, but it
is also more fundamentally systemic. In the absence of any change in the politicolegal
system, it is not surprising therefore to hear about continuing violations of
human rights throughout the country. While violations are to be found with regard
to all types of human rights, they are particularly evident with regard to civil and
political rights and also with regard to the rights to food and health. Fundamentally,
there is no Rule of Law in Iraq with all power concentrated in the hands of the
President who (through a complex, vast and infamous security apparatus which he
controls) conducts life in Iraq as he wishes. In short, no political dissent is allowed:
freedom of opinion, expression, association and assembly do not exist in Iraq. This
results in widespread violation of the rights to liberty and to personal security.
The statement is available online. See:
http://209.50.252.70/English/rights/rights.htm.
Further, recent, and fairly similar statements of Mr. Max van der Stoel on the
situation of human rights in Iraq are also available online. For his statement on the
31st of March 1999, see:
http://209.50.252.70/English/rights/990331VanDerStoelReport.htm
9. Some writers, however, require a connection between the kind and degree of this
responsibility and the kind and degree of the concerned international personality.
Hence, according to them, there can be no international responsibility without
international personality comparable in kind and degree.
See, as an example: Sunga L., ‘Individual Responsibility in International Law
for Serious Human Rights Violations’, in volume 21 of the series of International
Studies in Human Rights, p. 139.
10. The historical judgement of the Nuremberg Tribunal was delivered on the 30th
of September 1946, and is available online. See:
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/.
11. The two tribunals were established pursuant to United Nation Security Council
resolutions: 827 (1993) and 955 (1994), respectively.
12. There has been a serious debate, however, among international law jurists on the
way that individualization of international criminal responsibility was achieved.
219

220
This extends to the role played by the Nuremberg tribunal in this respect.
Consequently, it extends to whether this individualization was mainly introduced
by the London Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals (the 8th of August 1945) in accordance to which the tribunal was
established; and therefore, had, or had not, been part of any treaty law or customary
international law before this agreement was concluded. Some writers did, in fact,
attribute the individualization principle to the London agreement and deny any role
for the tribunal in this process.
See: Kelsen, ‘Will the Judgement in the Nuremberg Trail Constitute a Precedent
in International Law?’ 1 International law Q. 161 (1947).
13.
Full text of the Statute and further helpful information are available online. See:
http://www.un.org/law/icc/.
14.
Article 1 of the Statute explained that the Court shall have (complementary to
national criminal jurisdiction) the power to bring persons to justice for the most
serious crimes of international concern. War crimes, in accordance with Article 5
and Article 8 of the Statute, fall within the complementary jurisdiction of the Court.
15.
See: Article 7 of the Statute. The indictment of Radovan Karadzic, former
President of Bosnian Serb Administration, and Ratko Mladic, Commander of the
Army of the Administration, made frequent reference to command responsibility in
international law.
16.
See: Article 6 of the Statute.
17.
See: Articles 24 and 25 of the Statute.
18.
See: T. Wu and Y. Kang, ‘Criminal Liability for Actions of Subordinates, the
Doctrine of Command Responsibility and its Analogues in the United States Law’,
Harvard International Law Journal 83 (1997) p.272, p.291.
199.
Added in Rio Declaration.
200.
See: Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, volume I
(1995)186.
21.
See: The draft consultative bulletin of the 1994 AMAR study, An Environmental
and Ecological study of the Marshlands of Mesopotamia, edited by Edward Maltby,
p.155.
22.
This is the definition that was adopted in the London Charter for Nuremberg
Tribunal.
23.
The protection meant here undoubtedly extends to the Marshlands. This is
simply because the Marshlands are essential for the maintenance of a unique
cultural heritage. They bear global importance for wildlife and biodiversity. They
are important natural resources for Iraq and for the people beyond Iraq’s frontiers.
They are significant in the maintenance of environmental equality, and they are a
rare and critically threatened wetland landscape within a desert environment. See:
http://www.amarappeal.com/about5.htm
24.
It was reported that the judiciary in Iraq is not independent, since the government
recognizes the existence of only one authority in the society, which is exercised by
the Revolutionary Command Council and sub-divided into legislative,

administrative and judicial functions. The President may override any court
decision.
See: ‘Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Iraq’, the
UNHCR, Centre for Document and Research, Geneva (ISSN-10208410), June
2000, p.8.
25. More details can be found in Brownlie I., Principles of Public International Law,
4 th edition (1990) p. 300.
26. The Constitution provides in its Article 60(a) that ‘the judiciary is independent
and is subject to no other authority save that of the law’.
27. See: Stockholm Declaration 1972, Rio Declaration 1992, Universal Declaration
of Human Rights 1948, and Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide 1951.
28. Article 5 of the Rome Statute defines the crimes that fall within the jurisdiction
of the court. It provides that:
‘ 1. The jurisdiction of the court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole. The court has jurisdiction in
accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes:
(a) The crime of genocide;
(b) Crimes against humanity;
(c) War crimes;
(d) The crime of aggression.
2. The court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a
provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and
setting out the conditions under which the court shall exercise jurisdiction with
respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations’.
29. Article 11 of the Rome Statute provides that:
‘1. The Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry
into force of this Statute.
2. If a State becomes a party to this Statute after its entry into force, the Court may
exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into
force of this Statute for that State, unless that State has made a declaration under
article 12, paragraph 3’.
There might be, however, slight possibilities before State parties to the Rome
Statute to resort to the court under certain circumstances, but these are very slight
and not effective at the time being.
30. Jurisdiction over war crimes, human rights violations and the environment to be
vested in this court are to be defined in the establishing instrument.
221

14
Water Rights and International Law
Joseph W. Dellapenna
1. The failure to create an international regime for the waters of the two rivers
When the entire basin of the Euphrates and most of the basin of the Tigris were part of
the Ottoman Empire, there could be no international disputes over the Euphrates and
there appear to have been few or no international disputes between the Ottoman and
Safavid Empires (modern Turkey and Iran) regarding the Tigris. Although several treaties
that attempted to define the boundary between the Ottomans and the Safavids between
1847 and 1914 did deal, not altogether clearly, with a boundary line in the Shatt al-Arab,
even these treaties were not concerned with consumptive uses of water. 1 The British
conquered Mesopotamia during World War I; after the war, it was partitioned between a
British Mandate over Iraq, a French Mandate over Syria, and a residual portion left to
Turkey, creating the present state structure in the basin. Even after the division of
Mesopotamia among three states, no serious disputes arose until Syria announced its
plans for the dam at Tabqa in 1974. 2 Before then, the uses of the several states simply
were not sufficiently competitive for them either to attempt to codify their relations
relative to water or to enter into serious disputes over water. The ensuing dispute between
Iraq and Syria over the Tabqa Dam in 1974 focused attention on the law of the rivers in a
way never before attempted. Turkish projects and proposals have further accentuated this
attention.
During the Mandate period, the British and the French did include promises to
consult over their uses of the rivers, and established a consultative committee for this
purpose. 3 A series of agreements between France and Turkey simply promised equal
access without really addressing how the waters were to be shared. 4 Rather than
establishing a regime for the twin rivers, these highly general agreements signaled the
utter lack of interest in either Syria or Turkey in developing the waters of the Euphrates
and the Tigris at that time. Iraq, however, was vitally interested.
This pattern gave rise to a 1946 treaty (replacing a 1930 treaty to similar effect)
between Iraq and Turkey in which each promised not to change the flow of the Euphrates
without the consent of the other. 5 Turkey consented to Iraq’s construction of dams in
Turkey to regulate the flow of the rivers in Iraq. 6 Arguably, the effect of these treaties
was Turkish acceptance of an Iraqi vested right to receive water for its then established
uses. Iraq never constructed the works in Turkey authorized by the 1946 treaty, perhaps
because Iraq was unwilling to have its major water control facilities located outside its

223
borders. A meeting of representatives of the three states in 1965 signaled only the demise
of the treaty system. In follow-up bilateral talks, Syria expressly rejected any recognition
of vested rights by Iraq. 7 No new agreement replaced the earlier treaties and each state
began to construct new works without the consent of the other parties.
Two consultative committees met intermittently, and eventually, in 1983, the two
consultative committees were merged into a Trilateral Commission on the Tigris and the
Euphrates. 8 That Commission, which has met sporadically, has been strictly limited to
technical matters. None of the three states has attempted to involve the Trilateral
Commission in their political disputes regarding the Euphrates or the Tigris. 9 Between
1946 and 1990, the three states did not enter into any formal treaty relative to their shared
waters. With the abandonment of any claims they might have had under the earlier
treaties, the states have, in fact, no formal agreement allocating the waters of the two
rivers.
2. The customary international law of transboundary waters applied to the two
rivers
International law is in many respects still a relatively primitive legal system; that is, a
system lacking centralized institutional structures for law-making and law-enforcing. It
relies instead on the decentralized processes of self-help, agreement, and custom.
International law is so primitive that some question whether it deserves to be called law
at all. 10 The question arises because most people envision law as arising from a
legislative act formally creating a highly determinate rule enforced by a policeman on the
corner who will ‘take you in’ if you violate the ‘law’. This model in fact does not explain
how ‘law’ actually works.
How is customary law made?
Consider the mundane example of traffic laws. In the United States, nearly everyone
drives faster than the legal speed limit. There could never be enough police to compel
people to drive at or below the legal speed limit. The best the government can do is to
keep most people driving not very much faster than the speed limit through selective
enforcement targeted at those who drive really fast. Yet no one would be allowed to
defend against a prosecution for speeding on the basis that the law is not effectively
enforced or that the designated speed limit is not the law.
Contrast traffic lights. If nearly every one were to disregard stoplights, the laws
proscribing driving through those lights could no more be enforced than speed limits. Yet
in the United States people seldom ignore stoplights. When only a few violate a rule, a
small number of police are adequate to enforce the rule against the violators. Most people
do not drive through stoplights because that is more dangerous than speeding, and would
be suicidal if nearly every one did so. Yet most people perceive it as anti-social behavior;
they condemn it as illegal, and not simply as stupid. This social sense of legitimacy
makes law effective as law, even without clear rules or vigorous official enforcement.
Only because a legal rule is regarded as obligatory can a measure of coercion be attached
to it; a legal rule is not obligatory because of coercion. 11

224
International law operates on much the same basis, but without the superstructure
of specialize institutions (executive, legislative, and judicial) with which we are familiar
in modern national legal systems. To conclude from this lack that the international system
does not have law confuses particular institutional arrangements with what law really is
and how it really operates. Those institutions are often useful, and perhaps even
necessary, in large communities. Corresponding institutions may yet develop for an
international system with increasing numbers of states and other participants. Yet the
absence of those institutions no more indicates an absence of law in the international
system than the absence of those institutions indicated the lack of law in pre-industrial
societies the world over. 12
The creation of customary international law
In the absence of treaty, international law arises through a process of claim and counterclaim
that produces an explicit or implicit agreement of the participants to the
controversy. 13 States on both sides of a controversy usually refer to international law as a
primary justification of their claims and their practices, knowing full well the difference
between appeals to law and appeals to morality. Diplomats often express this difference
at appropriate points in their discourse. Reference to law ties the customary practice to a
sense of legitimacy, and constitutes the practice as law in a highly decentralized and
institutionally undeveloped system like international law. 14 A consistent pattern of
behavior joined with the sense that the practice is legally obligatory (the opinio juris)
creates customary international law. 15
Customary international law frequently remains ill defined and uncertain. Proving
that a practice has crystallized as customary international law and the precise content of
any such custom is difficult, requiring research into the professed reasons for state
practices in often obscure sources. For this reason, states and international tribunals have
recourse to the learning of leading scholars (termed ‘the most highly qualified publicists’
in the Statute of the International Court of Justice) to search out what customary
international law actually is. 16 Numerous sources of state practice and of evidence of the
reasons for that practice are available. A widespread pattern of treaties or other
international agreements, 17 votes in international assemblies, 18 or decisions by
international courts or international arbitrators 19 can all demonstrate that a practice
thought to be legally binding is so widely followed that it has become a rule of customary
law binding even on states that are not parties to the treaty or proceedings. Even
unilateral actions of states can demonstrate that a particular state embraces a particular
customary rule of law. 20
Customary international law empowers international actors by legitimating their
claims while also limiting the claims they can make. Yet even when a norm of customary
international law has been determined with some certainty, customary forms of
enforcement (through claim and counterclaim among states) ultimately come down to the
law of the vendetta. Despite its institutional limitations, however, customary international
law has worked fairly well when there were only a few participants in the international
community and their wants were relatively simple and straightforward. Today customary
international law operates without controversy in many areas. 21 The institutional
limitations of international law have always been felt most seriously during major crises.

225
A fully developed institutional framework is essential for any region facing increasingly
desperate water shortages. Customary international law, by itself, is unable to solve the
resulting contentious problems over transboundary water resources. 22 Yet even for the
managing of transboundary water resources, the pattern of state claim and counterclaim,
and of state behavior intended to make such claims remains consistent and in general
terms is entirely predictable. So are the ultimate outcomes.
3. The customary international law of transboundary waters
Only riparian states, states along the boundary of which, or through which, a river flows,
have any legal right to use the water of a river. 23 Otherwise, the patterns of international
claim and counterclaim initially diverge sharply according to the riparian status of the
state making the claim. The uppermost-riparian state initially claims ‘absolute territorial
sovereignty’, 24 claiming the right to do whatever it chooses with the water regardless of
its effect on other riparian states. Downstream states generally open by claiming a right to
the ‘absolute integrity of the river’, 25 claiming that upper-riparian states can do nothing
that affects the quantity or quality of water that flows down the watercourse. Of course,
neither claim can prevail, although the process of negotiating or otherwise arriving at a
solution could require decades.
The solution is a concept of ‘restricted sovereignty’ now generally referred to as
the rule of equitable utilization. 26 Under this rule each state recognizes the right of all
riparian states to use some water from a common source and the obligation to manage
their uses so as not to interfere with like uses in other riparian states, allowing each state a
‘reasonable share’ of the water.
Equitable utilization has been applied in international judicial and arbitral
awards, 27 adopted in innumerable treaties, 28 and supported by the near unanimous
opinions of the most highly qualified publicists. 29 Finally, the principle was endorsed by
the United Nations General Assembly as the dominant norm in the Convention on Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. 30
4. Claims and counter-claims relating to the two rivers
Without either formal agreements or effective multilateral machinery for the international
sharing of the waters of the two rivers, the states sharing the Mesopotamian basin have
been left to the informal processes of claim and counter-claim that forms the method of
customary international law. The result has been some oral agreements, the meaning of
which, and even the existence of which, are disputed between the parties, in reference to
the Euphrates. No promises have been made regarding the Tigris.
In 1964, Turkey promised to assure a flow of 350 m 3 /sec of water in the
Euphrates. 31 During the Tabqa Dam dispute, Turkey increased its promised releases to
450 m 3 /sec. 32 Eventually, Syria also agreed to release an additional 200 mcm (million
cubic meters) a year from Lake Assad to ameliorate the Iraqi complaints, but insisted that
it did so as an accommodation and not because of any legal right in Iraq. 33 Syria’s legal

226
position during the disputes with Iraq over the Euphrates took the form of the classic
claim of absolute sovereignty, ignoring its position down river from Turkey on both the
Euphrates and the Tigris and down river from Lebanon on the Orontes.
In 1990, Turkey’s Prime Minister pledged to assure a flow of the Euphrates of
500 m 3 /sec through the recently completed Ataturk Dam, 34 a rate of flow that could allow
only about 9,000 mcm annually to flow down to Syria and Iraq, far below what those
states were using. Turkey also considers this promise a matter of accommodation, and not
a legal obligation, even though the promise was included in a bilateral agreement
between Syria and Turkey signed in 1987. 35 Turkey has not entirely lived up to this
promise, but then neither has Syria lived up to its promises in the same agreement not to
allow anti-Turkish activities (by the Kurdish Workers Party) on Syrian soil. 36 Turkey has,
on at least one occasion, released water from the dam to maintain the flow at 500 m 3 /sec.,
thereby delaying the filling of the reservoir. Turkey has also virtually closed down the
Euphrates for one winter month in 1990 and again during the Gulf War, reducing the
flow to 125 m 3 /sec in order to accelerate the filling of the reservoir behind the Ataturk
Dam. 37 Iraq and Syria protested vigorously the small amount of water in the Euphrates,
rejecting Turkish claims to absolute sovereignty. 38
Iraq’s claim to the absolute integrity of the river was consistent with its approach
toward its other neighbors, particularly Syria. Syria was embarrassed by its earlier claims
of absolute sovereignty in water disputes with downstream neighbors, and continued to
do so vis-à-vis Iraq, Israel, and Jordan, yet Syria demanded a ‘reasonable share’ of the
flow of the Euphrates against Turkey. 39 As the proposed guaranteed flow was adequate
to meet Syrian needs (if Syria disregarded any obligation to deliver water to Iraq), Syria
did not persist in its objections.
Iraq has gone further than Syria, demanding that Turkey respect the absolute
integrity of the river, or at least that Turkey cause ‘no harm’ to established uses
downstream. 40 Iraq faces a real possibility of a near exhaustion of the Euphrates as a
source of water by Syria and Turkey; it therefore has had no option but to continue its
objections to Turkey’s activities. The seriousness of the difficulties facing Iraq was made
clear when Iraq and Syria signed an agreement on April 16, 1990, to share whatever
water reaches Syria from Turkey on the basis of 42 percent to Syria and 58 percent to
Iraq. 41 If optimistic estimates of Syria receiving 15,000 mcm of water in the Euphrates
were realized, this agreement would reduce Iraq’s present usage from the river by about
half. 42 Syria would lose nearly half of its planned usage as well, and if actual deliveries
were to fall below this level, the outcome would be even worse for Iraq and Syria. None
of this takes account of the fact that, increasingly, the water reaching Syria and especially
Iraq will be degraded return-flows of ever poorer quality, or that something like 5,000
mcm must remain in the Euphrates if one is to maintain any sense of ecological
integrity. 43 These figures raise real questions about how seriously Iraq can rely on the
Syrian promise when Syria continues with plans to increase its use and when the relations
between Iraq and Syria are so hostile in other respects.
Iraq faced an even greater risk when Turkey proposed to sell water to nations
outside the basin of the two rivers. The proposal to export water from the upper
Euphrates to nations outside the watershed of the river generated major regional

227
opposition, particularly from Iraq. 44 At the very least, such exports demonstrate that
Turkey does not need the water it is storing from the Euphrates, and thus that Iraq and
Syria’s ‘equitable shares’ should be larger than Turkey would concede to them. Even
exporting the water from other rivers rather than directly from the Euphrates would not
seriously undermine Iraqi arguments, as they could legitimately argue that directly or
indirectly Euphrates water will be used to replace the exported water. 45 As a result of
these concerns, the Iraqis demand that the water flowing in the Euphrates at the Syrian-
Turkish border be increased from 500 m 3 /sec. to 700 m 3 /sec. 46
Even apart from its proposals for selling water, Turkey has found itself caught
between its development desires and its need to appear to be a ‘good neighbor’ as it seeks
membership in the European Union. 47 Turkey thus has consistently portrayed itself as a
peaceful state seeking a cooperative result with its co-riparians based upon technical
solutions. 48 Turkey’s claimed legal position, however, belies such a posture. In particular,
the Turks claim that the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers are ‘transboundary’ rivers rather
than ‘international’ rivers, and thus not subject to the rule of equitable utilization. 49
Turkey claims absolute sovereignty over its ‘transboundary rivers’ before they across the
border, analogizing to the absolute ownership of oil by states where oil fields are
located. 50 Turkey also would restrict negotiations to the main stem of the river, ignoring
the contributions of any tributaries, basing this position on principles adopted at the
Congress of Vienna in 1815.
Turkey’s legal claims contradict the customary international law of transboundary
waters. 51 The Vienna Congress principles deal only with freedom of navigation, and not
with the allocation of water to consumptive uses. 52 Even the analogy to oil does not hold
up, as it ignores the obligation of ‘equitable pooling’ imposed upon transboundary oil
fields. 53 The Turkish position must be considered flat out wrong.
Turkey adopted such a dubious legal position because its position in any dispute
resolution focusing on equitable utilization is bound to be weak. Turkey has abundant
sources of water other than the Euphrates and the Tigris; those two rivers comprise only
about 45 percent of the total water resources available to Turkey. 54 In contrast, those
rivers comprise about 80 percent of the water resources of Syria, and 98 percent of the
surface waters available to Iraq. 55 In light of these facts, Turkey cannot validly claim the
lion’s share of the water from those two rivers, whether for its own consumption, for sale
to other nations, or to replace other waters to be sold to the other nations. 56 On the other
hand, Iraq in particular cannot claim a vested right to continue its highly inefficient
water-use practices. 57 Nor should Turkey have to bear the entire cost of building the
necessary facilities to assure adequate water supplies to Iraq and Syria, although those
two states have not expressed any willingness to pay part of the cost of adapting Turkey’s
facilities to their needs. 58 Ultimately, the needs of the entire fertile crescent can only be
met by the sort of regional management arrangement. 59
5. The Rights of ‘Peoples’ to Water
Traditional international law considered only the rights of nations in their relationships
among themselves. Increasingly since World War II, however, international law includes
within its scope the rights of individuals, ‘peoples’, and other collective groups. 60 As part

228
of this movement, international increasingly imposes obligations on states towards the
people who are citizens of or reside in their nation as well as towards obligations toward
other states. 61
Often these obligations take the form of the recognition of human rights as
obligatory on states. Initially human rights addressed the rights of individuals only, 62 but
increasingly these rights address the rights of ‘peoples’. 63 While there is no precise
definition of a ‘people’, the idea captured in this word is a group of people who share a
common identity – based on language, culture, and religion – and accept that they have a
common future. 64 There are two ‘peoples’ in Iraq that arguably have interests and needs
distinct from those of the government in Baghdad – the Kurds, and the Marsh Arabs.
This is not the place to consider the full range of issues that arise from the claim
that the Kurds or the Marsh Arabs constitute separate ‘peoples’. Here we can only briefly
consider the rights, if any, those ‘peoples’ regarding the internationally shared fresh
waters. For the Kurds in northern Iraq, realizing those rights would not be such a
problem. The Kurds already control the Iraqi dams in their territory, and being upstream
from Baghdad, they are in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the government. 65
Unfortunately for the Marsh Arabs, their position is just the opposite.
Increasingly international law recognizes the rights of ‘indigenous peoples’ to
maintain their traditional lifestyles. 66 Central to this right is the right to sufficient water to
assure the ecological integrity of the water sources on which the ‘people’ depends. 67 As
already noted, some have estimated this as requiring that at least 5,000 mcm must remain
in the Euphrates if one is to maintain any sense of ecological integrity. 68 International law
also recognizes a right to development. 69 While the precise content of a right to
development remains disputed, some have found in it a right to the water necessary for
the receiving community to develop and flourish. 70 Altogether, these various principles
present a compelling case for the recognition of a legal right of Marsh Dwellers to the
water necessary to restore, maintain, and develop the water-based systems on which their
culture and their economic life has traditionally depended. Whether such a legal right can
be realized in the primitive institutional structure of international law remains to be seen.
6. Toward integrated management
The problem is how to allocate equitably the waters of the two rivers, especially of the
Euphrates. The existing informal agreements arguably do so, with Turkey promising to
deliver 500 m 3 /sec. on the Euphrates at the Syrian border, and Syria promising to Iraq not
to consume more than 42 percent of the water that arrives at its border with Turkey. 71 Yet
none of the states treat the agreements as final or definitive. Given the pressures of
population growth, wasteful and extravagant usage of water, the as yet largely
unrecognized need of water to assure some level of ecological integrity, and mutual
hostility, a final and definitive determination of the equitable shares of Iraq and Syria will
not be easy to achieve. 72
Even if the states were to agree to a partition of the waters, this would be a less
than optimum solution. With each nation undertaking to store and develop its own share
of the waters, excessive storage capacity will probably be built in the region. Leaving

229
aside excessive storage capacity, there will be excessive and unnecessary evaporation
losses because so much of the storage capacity will be built on the hot, dry plains of Iraq
with the reservoir spreading over a large surface area, rather than in the relatively cool
and narrow gorges of Turkey. 73 In addition, each nation will build diversion and drainage
works that are either duplicative or reciprocal, i.e., with roughly parallel canals carrying
water in the same direction or on opposite directions on either side of a border, when a
single canal (or perhaps no canal at all) would achieve the same or similar value with far
less economic and environmental costs than would be under the unilateral approach to
water management that results from partition. All of this is without considering the
likelihood of cheating and the difficulty of monitoring compliance under a partitioning
approach, not to mention the rigidity of the system in the face of impending global
warming. 74 Finally, such an approach is likely to exacerbate the tendency to ignore the
water needs of sustaining natural ecosystems, such as in the marshes in southern Iraq.
With each country feeling constrained to fully develop its ‘share’, none is likely to view
water left in the river as anything other than a waste.
The restricted sovereignty approach to internationally shared waters rests
ultimately on the concept of an international drainage basin as a coherent juridical and
managerial unit, a concept widely supported by naturalists, engineers, and economists. 75
The notion gives rise to the concept of integrated, basin-wide management of water
resources transcending national (and other) frontiers. The United Nations has endorsed
this principle at just about every opportunity. 76 This goal, the avoidance of the
inefficiencies, and the other problems inherent in partition, can only be avoided by
creating a regional water management authority including (at the least) Iraq, Syria, and
Turkey, with appropriate recognition of the rights of ‘peoples’ living in those states yet
not accorded the status of states. It would be better, but not essential, to include Iran,
given its relation to the Tigris River. A regional relationship involving at least the three
active riparian states (Iraq, Syria, and Turkey), is easy to envision but would likely be
extraordinarily difficult to realize given the hostilities between or even within these
states. 77 Enlarging it either to the west (Iran) or to the southwest (Israel, Jordan, Lebanon,
Palestine) would be even more difficult. Only the extreme need likely to emerge as global
warming becomes a reality is likely to overcome this hostility, if it does not prompt
‘water wars’ instead.
On the positive side, one can note that the four riparian states (Iran, Iraq, Syria,
and Turkey) all share a common legal and cultural tradition regarding their approach to
water management issues derived from the traditional Islamic law, the shari‘a. Indeed,
the very word shari‘a literally means ‘the path to the watering place.’ 78 Shari‘a allocates
community water among users and calls upon water users from time to time to maintain
the communal water system. 79 That all potential participants share a tradition of
centralized management of water for the benefit of the entire community suggests that
integrated management on a regional basis could be accepted by the several nations. In
addition, despite the hostilities between and within these nations which might lead one to
expect fighting rather than sharing to be the normal response to water crisis, there is in
fact considerable evidence that water is simply too important to fight over. 80 Each nation
should recognize that it will receive significant benefits from the integrated management
scheme. 81 If they do so, they can be expected to discover the necessary steps to

230
accommodate themselves to the requirements of the cooperative or integrated
management arrangement. All that is required is some political imagination and the
political will to place the needs of the community ahead of the needs of the political
leadership of the community.
NOTES
1
Protocol of Constantinople, signed 17 November 1913, Persia-Turkey, reprinted in
(Iraqi) Ministry of Foreign Aff., Iraqi Letter to the Secretary-General, 29 November
1934, 1935 League of Nations Official Journal 16, App. 2 (‘Iraqi Letter’); Treaty of
Erzerum, reprinted in 101 Clive Parry, Consolidated Treaty Series 86; & in Iraqi Letter,
App. 1. See Joseph Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers and the Lands Between: Mesopotamia
and the International Law of Transboundary Waters’, Brigham Young University Journal
of Public Law, volume 10, 1996, pp. 213-61, at p. 236; Kaiyan Homi Kaidobad, ‘The
Shatt-al-Arab River Boundary: A Legal Reappraisal’, British Yearbook of International
Law, vol. 56, 1985, pp. 49-109.
2
See the text at notes 32-33.
3
Convention on Certain Points Connected to the Mandates of Syria, the Lebanon,
Palestine, and Mesopotamia, signed 23 December 1920, France-United Kingdom, art. 3,
22 League of Nations Treaty Series (‘LNTS’) 353. Hasam Chalabi & Tarek Majzoub,
‘Turkey, the Waters of the Euphrates and Public International Law’, in J.A. Allan &
Chibli Mallat eds., Water in the Middle East: Legal, Political and Commercial
Implications, pp. 189-235, at p. 193 (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1995).
4
Final Demarcation Protocol of Commission on the Turco-Syrian Frontier, signed 3 May
1930, France-Turkey, cl. 2, United Nations, Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions
Concerning the Utilization of International Rivers for Other Purposes than Navigation,
no. 94, ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (1964) (‘United Nations, Legislative Texts’); Treaty of
Friendship and Good Neigborliness, signed 30 May 1926, France-Turkey, art. 13, 56
LNTS 194; Agreement with a View to Promoting Peace, signed 20 October 1921,
France-Turkey, art. 12, 14 LNTS 177. See Dellapenna, ‘Two Rivers’, pp. 237-38.
5
Protocol Relative to the Regulation of the Waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, signed 29
March 1946, Iraq-Turkey, arts. 4, 5, 37 United Nations Treaty Series (‘UNTS’) 280. See
Dellapenna, ‘Two Rivers’, p. 238.
6
Protocol Relative to the Regulation of the Waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, art. 6.
7
Dellapenna, ‘Two Rivers’, p. 238.
8
Nurit Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East p. 162 (London:
Routledge, 1994); Dellapenna, ‘Two Rivers’, pp. 238-39; George Gruen, ‘Recent
Negotiations over the Waters of the Euphrates and Tigris’, in Glenn Stout & Radwan Al-
Weshah eds., Proceedings of the International Symposium on Water Resources in the
Middle East: Policy and Institutional Aspects, pp. 100-07, at p. 104 (Urbana, IL:
International Water Resources Association, 1993).
9
Gruen, ‘Recent Negotiations’, pp. 100-01.
10
Robert MacLean, ‘Does Anyone Still Ask the Question: “Is International Law Really
Law?” ’, Juridical Review, volume 1991, pp. 230-49.

11 Arthur Goodhart, English Law and the Moral Law 17 (London: Stevens, 1953). See
also Dellapenna, ‘Two Rivers’, pp.239-41; G.G. Fitzmaurice, ‘The Foundations of the
Authority of International Law’, Modern Law Review, volume 19, 1956, pp. 1-13.
12 Michael Barkun, Law without Sanctions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968);
Victor Li, Law without Lawyers (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978).
13 Myres McDougal & Norbert Schlei, ‘The Hydrogen Bomb Test in Perspective: Lawful
Measures for Security’, Yale Law Journal, volume 64, 1955, pp. 648-710.
14 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, pp. 31-32 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 4 th ed. 1990); Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law, pp.
51, 88 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971); Karol Wolfke, Custom in Present
International Law, pp. 52-56, 160-68 (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2 nd rev. ed. 1993).
15 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1) (b).
16 Ibid, art. 38(1)(d). See also Dellapenna, ‘Two Rivers’, pp.241-43.
17 Brownlie, Principles, pp. 11-14.
18 Ibid, pp. 14-15, 30-31.
19 Ibid, pp. 19-24.
20 Ibid, p. 5.
21 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave, pp. 25-26, 47, 89-98, 320-21 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2 nd ed. 1979); Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory
and Practice (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1995); Ian Brownlie, ‘The Reality
and Efficacy of International Law’, British Yearbook of International Law, volume 52,
1981, pp. 1-8.
22 Joseph Dellapenna, ‘Treaties as Instruments for Managing Internationally Shared
Water Resources: Restricted Sovereignty vs. Community of Property’, Case Western
Reserve Journal of International & Comparative Law, volume 26, 1994, pp. 27-56.
23 United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, art. 4, approved 21 May 1997, UN Doc. No. A/51/869 (‘UN Convention’).
See generally Dellapenna, ‘Two Rivers’, pp.244-45.
24 Stephen McCaffrey, ‘Second Report on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses’, UN Doc. A/CN.4/348, [1986] II Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, pp. 88-144, at pp. 105-10; Albert Utton, ‘International
Streams and Lakes Generally’, in Robert Beck ed., Waters and Water Rights, ch. 49
(Charlottesville, VA: Michie Co., 1991); § 49.02(1).
25 Utton, ‘International Streams’, § 49.02(2).
26 UN Convention, art. 5; McCaffrey, ‘Second Report’, at 110-33; Dellapenna, ‘Two
Rivers’, pp.245-50; Utton, ‘International Streams’, § 49.02(3).
27 The Danube River Case (Hungary v. Slovakia), 1997 ICJ No. 92; The Territorial
Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the Oder River, [1929] P.C.I.J., ser. A,
No. 23, p. 27; The Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), 24 I.L.R. 101 (1957).
28 Dellapenna, ‘Treaties’; Utton, ‘International Streams’, § 49.03(a).
29 E.g., Brownlie, Principles, pp. 271-76; Janos Bruhàcs, The Law of Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993); Eyal Benvenisti
& Haim Gvirtzman, ‘Harnessing International Law to Determine Israeli-Palestinian
Water Rights: The Mountain Aquifer’, Natural Resources Journal, volume 33, 1993, pp.
543-67; Chalabi & Majzoub, ‘Turkey’; Tiyanjana Maluwa, ‘Towards an
231

232
Internationalization of the Zambezi River Regime: The Role of International Law in the
Common Management of an International Watercourse’, Comparative and International
Law Journal of South Africa, volume 25, 1992, pp. 20-43; Stephen Schwebel, ‘The Law
of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses’, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/348, [1982]
II Yearbook of the International Law Commission pp. 65-198, at pp. 76-82; Utton,
‘International Streams’.
30 UN Convention, arts. 5, 7.
31 Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 161; Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers’, p. 250.
32 Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 161.
33 Ibid, at 161-62; Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers’, pp. 226-29.
34 Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 162; Chalabi & Majzoub, ‘Turkey’, pp. 207-
08, 215; Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers’, pp. 229-32, 250-51; Gruen, ‘Recent
Negotiations’, p. 280; Shahim Tekeli, ‘Turkey Seeks Reconciliation for the Water Issue
Induced by the Southeastern Anatolian Project (GAP)’, Water International, volume 15,
1990, pp. 206-16, at p. 210.
35 Chalabi & Majzoub, ‘Turkey’, p. 213; Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers’, pp. 251-52;
Gruen, ‘Recent Negotiations’, pp. 101-03, 105-06.
36 Gruen, ‘Recent Negotiations’, pp. 102-03.
37 Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 128, 162; Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers’, pp.
251-52; Gruen, ‘Recent Negotiations’, at 105.
38 Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 123; Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers’, p. 252;
Gruen, ‘Recent Negotiations’, at 101; Tekeli, ‘Turkey Seeks Reconciliation’, p. 211.
39 Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 123; Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers’, p. 252.
40 Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 123; Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers’, pp. 252-
54; Gruen, ‘Recent Negotiations’, pp. 101, 105.
41 Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 149, 162; Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers’, pp.
252-53; Gruen, ‘Recent Negotiations, p. 100.
42 Chalabi & Majzoub, ‘Turkey’, pp. 204, 208; Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers’, p. 253.
43 Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 149-50; Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers’, p.
253.
44 Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers’, pp. 233-35, 253-55; Gruen, ‘Recent Negotiations’, p.
282.
45
Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 132; George Gruen, ‘Contribution of Water
Imports to Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Peace,’ in Jad Isaac & Hillel Shuval eds., Water
and Peace in the Middle East, pp. 273-300, at pp. 282-83 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1994);
Boaz Wachtel, ‘The Peace Canal Project: A Multiple Conflict Resolution Perspective for
the Middle East’, in Isaac & Shuval, Water and Peace, pp. 363-74, at pp. 365-67.
46
Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, p. 162; Chalabi & Majzoub, ‘Turkey’, at 207;
Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers’, p. 254; Gruen, ‘Contribution of Water Imports’, p. 282;
Gruen, ‘Recent Negotiations’, at 104; Tekeli, ‘Turkey Seeks Reconciliation’, p. 210;
Wachtel, ‘Peace Canal Project’, at 366-67.
47
Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 163, 167; Tekeli, ‘Turkey Seeks
Reconciliation’.
48
Özden Bilen, Turkey and Water Issues in the Middle East (Ankara: GAP, 1997); Kliot,
Water Resources and Conflict, p. 163; Özden Bilen, ‘A Technical Perspective on
Euphrates-Tigris Basin’, in Ali Íhsan Bagis ed., Water as an Element of Cooperation and

Development in the Middle East, pp. 81-100 (Ankara: Hacettepe University, 1994);
Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers’, pp. 254-55; Tekeli, ‘Turkey Seeks Reconciliation’, p.
214.
49
Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 162-63; Chalabi & Majzoub, ‘Turkey’, at
209-12; Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers’, p. 255; Gruen, ‘Recent Negotiations’, at 101;
Yüksel Ínan, ‘Legal Dimentions (sic) of International Watercourse (Euphrates and
Tigris), in Bagis, ed., Water as an Element of Cooperation, pp. 223-37.
50
Chalabi & Majzoub, ‘Turkey’, at 208-09, 212-13, 215, 226 n.113; Gruen, ‘Recent
Negotiations’, at 101.
51
UN Convention, art. 2(A); International Law Association, The Helsinki Rules on the
Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, arts. 2, 3 (Rep. of the 52 nd Conf., adopted at
Helsinki, 20 August 1966); Chalabi & Majzoub, ‘Turkey’, pp. 215-29; Dellapenna, ‘The
Two Rivers’, pp. 255-57; Gruen, ‘Recent Negotiations’, at 101.
52
Georges Kaeckenbeeck, International Rivers 37-61 (New York, Oceana Publications,
[1919] 1959).
53 Rainer Lagoni, ‘Oil Deposits across National Frontiers’, American Journal of
International Law, volume 73, 1979, pp. 215-43; Alberto Székely, ‘The International
Law of Substantive Transboundary Hydrocarbon Resources: Legal Limits to Behavior
and Experiences for the Gulf of Mexico’, Natural Resources Journal, volume 26, 1986,
pp. 733-68; Alberto Székely et al., ‘Transboundary Hydrocarbon Resources: The Puerto
Vallarta Draft Treaty’, Natural Resources Journal, volume 31, 1991, pp. 609-52; Albert
Utton & Paul McHugh, ‘On an Institutional Arrangement for Developing Oil and Gas in
the Gulf of Mexico’, Natural Resources Journal, volume 26, 1986, pp. 717-32.
54 Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 134-35, 150; John Kolars, ‘Water Resources
in the Middle East’, in Eric Schiller ed., Sustainable Water Resources Management in
Arid Countries: Middle East and North Africa pp. 103-19, at p. 117 (Urbana, IL:
International Water Resources Association, 1992).
55 Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 138, 143, 150.
56 Ibid, pp. 150, 171-72.
57 Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 146, 150, 158, 163-64; Walid Saleh,
‘Development Projects on the Euphrates’, in Abdel Majid Farid & Hussein Sirriyeh eds.,
Israel and Arab Water pp. 69-74, at pp. 73-74 (London: Ithaca Presss, 1985).
58 Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 163-64.
59 Chalabi & Majzoub, ‘Turkey’, at 227-29; Bilen, ‘Technical Perspective’; John Kolars,
‘Managing the Impact of Development: The Euphrates and Tigris Rivers and the Ecology
of the Arabian Gulf-A Link in Forging Tri-Riparian Cooperation’, in Bagis, ed., Water as
an Element of Cooperation, pp. 129-53; Tekeli, ‘Turkey Seeks Reconciliation’, p. 215;
Ilter Turan, ‘Politics of Water and the Role of Regional Organizations: The Middle East’,
in Stout & Al-Weshah, Proceedings, pp. 152-58. See generally Utton, ‘International
Streams’, § 49.08.
60 Danzig Railway Officials (Poland v. Danzig), PCIJ, Series B, no. 15 (1928), reprinted
in 4 Int’l L. Rep. 287; Brownlie, Principles, pp. 67-69, 553-602; Werner Levi,
Contemporary International Law: A Concise Introduction pp. 50-51 (Boulder, CO,
Westview Press, 2 nd ed., 1991); Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Corporations in and under
International Law (Cambridge, Grotius Publiccations, 1987); Malcolm Shaw,
International Law pp. 178-81 (Cambridge, Grotius Publiccations, 3 rd ed. 1991).
233

234
61 E.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 (III), 10 December 1948
(vote: 48-0, 8 abstentions); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, GA Res. 2670, Dec. 9, 1948, UN Doc. A/810, p. 174; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 2200, 16 December 1966, 21 GAOR
Supp. 16, UN Doc. A/6316, 999 UNTS 171 (‘ICCPR’); International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, GA Res. 2200, 16 December 1966, 21 GAOR
Supp. 16, UN Doc. A/6316, 993 UNTS 3 (‘ICESCR’); Henry Steiner & Philip Alston,
International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2 nd ed., 2000).
62 E.g., Philip Jessup, ‘Responsibility of States for Injuries to Individuals’, Columbia Law
Review, volume 46, 1946, pp. 903-28; Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The Subjects of the Law of
Nations’, Law Quarterly Review, volume 63, 1947, pp. 438-60.
63 James Crawford, ed., The Rights of Peoples (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988).
64 E.g., ICCPR, art. 1; ICESCR, art. 1; Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO Convention 169), 27 June 1989, reprinted in
International Legal Materials, volume 28, 1989, pp. 1382-92; Convention Concerning
the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal
Populations in Independent Countries (ILO Convention 107), 26 June 1957, 328 UNTS
274; Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or
Linguistic Minorities, GA Res. 47/135, 18 December 1992, 47 UN GAOR no. 49, UN
Doc. A/47/49; Catherline Brölman, René Lefeber, & Marjoleine Zieck, eds., Peoples and
Minorities in International Law (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993); Steiner & Alston,
International Human Rights, pp. 1301-04; Gregory Fox, Self-Determination in the Post-
Cold War Era: A New International Focus?’, Michigan Journal of International Law,
volume 16, 1995, pp. 743-81; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘National Self-Determination Today:
Problems of Legal Theory and Practice, International and Comparative Law Quarterly,
volume 43, 1994, pp. 241-69; Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Indigenous Peoples in International
Law’, American Journal of International Law, volume 92, 1998, pp. 414-57; Diane
Orentlicher, ‘Separation Anxiety: International Responses to Ethno-Separatist Claims’,
Yale Journal of International Law, volume 23, 1998, pp. 1-78.
65 The Kurds could also claim to be a ‘people’ with rights to water in Syria and Turkey,
although there their position would not be so advantageous. Kliot, Water Resources and
Conflict, pp. 125, 165; Terje Tvedt, ‘The Struggle for Water in the Middle East’, in
Schiller ed., Sustainable Water Resources Management, pp. 13-29, at pp. 17-18.
66 E.g., UN Convention, art. 20; International Law Association, ‘Rules on the
Relationship between Water, Other Natural Resources and the Environment’, art. 1(a)
(Rep. of the 59th Conf., Belgrade 1980) UN Convention on the Protection and Uses of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, signed at Helsinki, 17 March
1992, arts. arts. 2(2)(b), 2(5)(c), 2(7). 3(1)(f), (g), UN Doc. E/ECE/1267; Agreement on
the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, signed 5
April 1995, Cambodia-Laos-Thailand-Vietnam, arts. 3, 7, reprinted in International
Legal Materials, volume 34, 1995, pp. 864-80; Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, Prs. 2, 7, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (1992).
67 E.g., Rio Declaration, Prs. 10, 22; UN Convention on Biological Diversity, Diversity
Convention, 5 June 1992, arts. 8(j), 10(d), UN Doc. DPI/1307, reprinted in International
Legal Materials, volume 31, 1992, pp. 818-41.

68
Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 149-50; Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers’, p.
253.
69
Declaration on the Right to Development, GA Res. 41/128, 4 December 1986 (vote:
146-1). See also Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA Res. 3281
(XXIX), UN Doc. A/9631 (1974); Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order, GA Res. 3202 (S-VI), UN Doc. A/9559 (1973);
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, GA Res. 3201
(S-VI), UN Doc. A/9559 (1973); Declaration of UN Development Decades, GA Res.
2626 (XXV), 24 October 1970; GA Res. 2552 (XXIV) (1969) (Declaration on Social
Progress and Development); David Forsythe ed., Human Rights and Development:
International Views (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1989); UN Secretariat, The
International Dimensions of the Right to Development as a Human Right, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1334 (1979); UN Secretariat, Regional and National Dimensions of the Right to
Development as a Human Right, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1421 (1980).
70
Charles Bourne, ‘The Right to Utilize the Waters of International Rivers’, Canadian
Yearbook of International Law, volume 3, 1965, pp. 187-264, at pp. 192-95; Stephen
McCaffrey, ‘A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International Implications’,
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, volume 5, 1992, pp. 1-24.
71
See the text at notes 34-38, 41-43.
72
Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 100-72, 270-72; Chalabi & Majzoub,
‘Turkey’, pp. 213-14; Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers’, pp. 257-58; Gruen, ‘Recent
Negotiations’.
73
Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict, pp. 122, 136. More than half of the current
evaporation losses already occur in Iraq.
74
Joseph Dellapenna, ‘Adapting the Law of Water Management to Global Climate
Change and Other Hydropolitical Stresses,’ Journal of the American Water Resources
Association, volume 35, 1999, pp. 1301-26; Gretta Goldenman, ‘Adapting to Climate
Change: A Study of International Rivers and Their Legal Arrangements’, Ecology Law
Quarterly, volume 17, 1990, pp. 741-802; A. Dan Tarlock, ‘How Well Can International
Water Allocation Regimes Adapt to Global Climate Change?’, Journal of Land Use and
Environmental Law, volume 15, 2000, pp. 423-49.
75
Ludwik Teclaff, The River Basin in History and Law (Buffalo, NY: W.S. Hein, 1967);
Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers’, pp. 258-59; Stephen McCaffrey, ‘International
Organizations and the Holistic Approach to Water Problems’, Natural Resources
Journal, volume 31, 1991, pp. 139-65; Utton, ‘International Streams’, § 49.09; Xue
Hanqin, ‘Relativity in International Water Law’, Colorado Journal of International
Environmental Law and Policy, volume 3, 1992, pp. 45-57.
76
Report of the United Nations Water Conference, Mar del Plata, 14-25 March, 1977, at
53, U.N. Doc. No. E.77.II.A.12 (recommendations 90, 91); Colombo Declaration, U.N.
Doc. No. St./ECAFE/Ser.F/19, at 61 (1962). See also Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers’, pp.
258-59.
77
Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers’, pp. 259-61. For examples of how this might be done,
see Nurit Kliot, Deborah Shmueli, and Uri Shamir, Institutional Frameworks for the
Management of Transboundary Water Resources (Haifa: Water Research Institute,
Technion, 1998); Joseph Dellapenna, ‘Designing the Legal Structures of Water
235

236
Management Needed to Fulfill the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles’,
Palestine Yearbook of International Law, volume 7, 1994, pp. 63-103.
78 Chibli Mallat, ‘The Quest for Water Use Principles: Reflections on Shari’a and
Custom in the Middle East, in Allan & Mallat eds., Water in the Middle East, pp. 127-37,
at p. 128.
79 Yahya ben Adam (A. Ben Shemesh ed.), Kitab al-Kharaj p. 55 (Leiden: Brill Press,
1967); A.M.A. Maktari, Water Rights and Irrigation Practices in Lahj: A Study of the
Application of Customary and Shari’ah Law in South-West Arabia. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1971); Mallat, ‘The Quest for Water Use Principles’. See
also Dellapenna, ‘The Two Rivers’, pp. 259-60.
80 Dellapenna, Treaties, pp. 27-33; Aaron Wolf, ‘Conflict and Cooperation along
International Waterways’, Water Policy, volume 1, 1998, pp. 251-65.
81 O. Al-Jayyousi & G. Abu-Lebdeh, ‘Evaluating Potential Water Conflict along the
Euphrates River: Strategies for Cooperation, in Stout & Al-Weshah, Proceedings, pp. 84-
85

15
A Personal Testimony
Amir Hayder
The wound is very deep, painful and perpetual. Upon the smallest touch it bleeds again.
I was born and brought up in a large old established family in Baghdad city with a
great and excellent family relations and values. My father’s cousin is a famous Arabic
poet and has a monument in one of Baghdad’s squares till now; my mother’s cousin was
a minister in the Iraqi government in the 1950s. I finished my secondary schooling with a
high and excellent degree, which allowed me to enter the medical school in the
University of Baghdad, from which I finished with an MB ChB degree with distinction in
1981. This allowed me to be appointed as a medical doctor in the Medical City Teaching
Hospital in the centre of Baghdad.
My family’s own tragedy – I say ‘own’ because most of Iraq’s families have their
different tragedies following the coming of the Ba’ath party to authority in Iraq in 1968 –
started in 1977 when my younger brother was arrested during a religious ceremony.
Being a Shi‘a family, politically independent, and not affiliated to the Ba’ath party were
the main reasons for our family’s tragedy. My younger brother at that time was only 17;
he was released after two weeks of intensive interrogation and torture to be followed by
endless torment. After that the Iraqi security forces put our family under siege using
frequent interrogation and continuous investigations.
In November 1980, during his second year of study for an Electric Engineering
BSc degree in Sulaimaniyya University, my same brother was rearrested again and held
incommunicado till now. We do not know anything about the reason for his arrest, nor
where he is or his fate. We tried by all available means to find him or discover anything
about him, but we failed. The more we enquired about him the more we faced
humiliation and torture until we were forced to deny him. In the meantime, the security
forces were subjecting us to continuous emotional and physical torture, our house was
searched many times without a warrant and we were threatened with arrest and even
death.
All these events forced my family members to flee our home country Iraq. My
father and older siblings fled Iraq one by one to avoid suspicion. My broken hearted
mother stayed behind longer, hoping to see or find out about her detained son mentioned
above. My youngest brother and I stayed behind too; I was in my final year at medical
school and stayed to look after my mother, and my youngest brother was too young to
leave his mother. A few weeks later, travelling abroad from Iraq was restricted due to the
Iraqi–Iranian war and ordinary Iraqi people were not allowed to leave the country.
During that period and over the following few years, the living circumstances in
Iraq concerning the three of us had become extremely difficult and unbearable,

238
emotionally and physically, day after day and month after month, with continuous
harassment and threats from the security forces for the above reasons and for the added
reason that the rest of my family was abroad.
One evening in April 1984, while I was back home on a week’s leave from
compulsory military national service, I was arrested by five armed men in civilian
clothing who were driving two cars in a main street; they had forced me to stop my car.
Without saying anything, they started punching and kicking me everywhere, handcuffed
me and pushed me into one of their cars. Then they drove me blindfolded and handcuffed
to a place that I discovered later was one of the security forces’ headquarters buildings in
Baghdad.
During that evening, another unforgettable long chapter of torture and suffering
began. I was taken straight into the interrogation room; a few people were there. While I
was still blindfolded and handcuffed, one of them started to accuse me and make various
charges: for instance, that I am affiliated to the Da‘awa party against the ruling Ba‘ath
party, that I carry explosive materials and distribute them to Da‘awa party members, that
I deliver regular medical treatment to injured Da‘awa party members in secret places, and
that my brothers abroad are politically active against the ruling Ba‘ath party, as well as
the fact that I have a brother who is a political detainee.
When I strongly denied the above charges – I really did not have anything to do
with them or the Da‘awa party, and told them I did not have any contact with my brothers
abroad – they released my hands from the handcuffs, but I remained blindfolded. They
stripped me completely naked and handcuffed me again, but this time with my hands
behind my back.
Then they lifted me up in standing position on to a wheeled metal table and
attached the chain of the handcuffs to a hook in the ceiling, then pushed the wheeled table
from underneath my feet away. So, suddenly I was suspended in the air by my wrists
handcuffed behind my back, with a feeling of excruciating pain in my shoulders, upper
arms and wrists. At the same time one person started pulling my legs down exerting more
pressure on my shoulders and wrists and other persons began beating me up on all parts
of my head and torso using fists, rubber truncheons and a wooden club. While I was
hanging, beating was interrupted by electric shocks applied by means of clamps attached
to sensitive parts of my body including my ears, kidney regions and genitals.
The above methods of torture carried on during the first night for nearly four
hours, with resting periods of about five minutes, during which they pulled the wheeled
table underneath my feet to let me stand on it, for every half hour of torture. During the
resting periods the interrogating officer repeatedly asked me to confess or otherwise they
would torture me to death. After that session of interrogation and torture I was
handcuffed to the metal banisters of a staircase for the whole night and next morning;
everybody was kicking me as they went up and down the stairs while I was still
blindfolded.
The torture sessions in the interrogation room continued in this way for a second
and third day, but during the third session, while I was suspended in the air, a strong and
heavy person held my left shoulder and pulled it forcefully downwards; I felt as if my
upper arm had been torn from the rest of my body. When they released me from the
ceiling hook and off the table after the third session, I failed to move a muscle in my
body and was completely paralysed, numb and semiconscious. Afterward, two guards
carried me to a basement in the building and handcuffed one of my hands to a rail

239
purposely built there. There were more than fifty other detainees in that basement, all
handcuffed to the rail. I was covered with bruises and tender everywhere for a long time,
and my upper limbs remained paralysed for about three months. There was not enough
space in that basement for us all to sleep at the same time, so we took it in turns to sleep.
I was locked in the basement for nearly fourteen months and I was not allowed to
leave it except for the interrogation sessions, and was permitted to go to the toilet only
three times a day, each for a maximum of one minute. During those 14 months, I was
interrogated and tortured about sixty times, each for a period of 30–60 minutes, and I was
not allowed to ask any questions. Also I was threatened repeatedly with the arrest and
torture of my mother and youngest brother (they had already been arrested but I did not
find out about it for another two years). During this period our health was dreadful: we
only showered or shaved twice, and were given only one gown each for the whole period.
We slept rough on the bare floor and were all suffering from head and body lice. We
were also completely cut off from the world beyond the basement – for instance, we did
not have access to or see any newspaper, magazine, radio, TV, telephone or even
anybody who would talk to us about what was happening outside the building.
Early one morning during June 1985, unexpectedly, I and another 51 detainees,
most of them in their early twenties or late teens, were taken upstairs to have a shave and
a shower. We were given new gowns and then we were driven from the security forces’
headquarter building, blindfolded and handcuffed to another detainee, in closed vans.
After an hour’s driving we arrived at another place where our eyes were uncovered; we
knew this was the ‘Revolution Court’ in Abo-Ghraib, west of Baghdad. In that court, on
the same day, all 52 detainees underwent a single mass trial that did not take more than
two hours. We were not allowed to defend ourselves apart from confirming our names
and saying ‘Innocent’ or ‘Guilty’. Despite most of us, myself included, saying we were
innocent of the fictitious accusations, the alleged judge of the Revolution Court sentenced
27 of us to death by hanging with confiscation of all properties. The other 25 detainees,
including me, were sentenced to life imprisonment with confiscation of all properties.
Our group of 25 persons was transferred, in one van, directly from the above court
to the ‘Al-Khasah’ (Special Charges) section of Abo-Ghraib prison. Here we were
distributed into twenty rooms in a two storey building that was already full of political
prisoners. These rooms were 4 by 4 metres with a tiny en-suite lavatory, and contained
more than fifty persons. To sleep at night, we had to sleep on our sides and stuck to each
other. We were also secluded from the outside world and did not see anybody apart from
the guards who brought us the meals three times daily. I was kept for a full year in this
room with great suffering and without seeing or contacting any relatives or friends, but
with comparatively less torture than during my earlier imprisonment in the security
forces’ building.
In June 1986, I was transferred on my own, back to the security forces’
headquarters in Baghdad. I was kept in solitary confinement for about three weeks
without being physically tortured or interrogated, but I was worried to death that they
were going to do so again. After that I was taken, handcuffed and on my own, from the
headquarters building in Baghdad and driven by two armed security guards for about five
hours deep into the western Iraqi desert to a large prison near the Iraqi–Saudi border.
In the new prison, where there were two thousand detainees, I saw to my surprise
that my youngest brother was detained there. I knew from him for the first time that he
and my mother were actually arrested on the same day of my arrest in April 1984. Both

240
of them remained in custody for nine months in a building at the security forces’
headquarters in Baghdad, suffering ill treatment and torture, after which my mother was
released, but he was separated from her and transferred to this prison in January 1985. In
this prison I was allowed, for the first time since my arrest, to be visited once a month by
my mother and other relatives. From this prison my youngest brother and I were
transferred to other prisons, finally ending up in the headquarters buildings again, from
which we were released in February 1989.
After that, living conditions in Iraq, despite my release, were difficult, risky and
almost unbearable. I had to report fortnightly to the security forces’ headquarters in Iraq,
where they were always asking me to inform them about what was going on; they
continually threatened me with re-arrest if I did not show full cooperation. It was also
very difficult to be employed in a decent job with my history of political detention; any
job had to be preceded by the approval of the security forces, and I was banned from
travelling abroad. All these led my youngest brother and I to think seriously, and we
decided to flee my home country secretly after securing a valid passport for my mother to
travel abroad, which she was allowed to do so in the spring of 1990.
In February 1991, and during the Allies’ bombing of Iraq in the Gulf war, my
youngest brother and I escaped an attempted arrest by the security forces. We left
Baghdad for an area near the border with Iran called Khanakeen/Qasr-i-shirin, carrying
only our legal documents and whatever cash we could carry in our pockets. We left every
other thing behind. After one failed attempt to cross the border into Iran we succeeded in
crossing at night as part of a group of seven people during the last week of February
1991, with the help of local people.
On that dark and freezing night, after a couple of hours’ fast walking eastwards
towards an Iranian border town called Khasrawy, we had a tragic accident. A landmine
left over from the Iraq–Iran war exploded, amputating one person’s leg and injuring the
rest of us with multiple shrapnel. We were in the middle of nowhere, with one of us
bleeding to death and the rest suffering from multiple burns and wounds. We had one of
the longest and most horrific nights of our lives walking through minefields and trying to
find the nearest Iranian. After another two hours of walking, we found an Iranian border
patrol soldier who kindly, after little interrogation, believed our story and called
ambulances that took us to the nearest hospital where we received treatment. We were
taken later to a small camp on the boarders in Khasrawy, but our main casualty who had
lost a leg and suffered severe loss of blood was kept in hospital.
In that small camp in Khasrawy, where there were hundreds of Iraqi refugees, we
were kept for about two weeks in a tent in a cold freezing weather and underwent routine
investigations and interrogations to make sure that we were not spies for Saddam. Then
we were transferred into large camps in the north west of Iran in an area called Salas-
Baba-Jani in Bakhtaran, where there were tens of thousands of Iraqi refugees. Although
we had sympathetic treatment from the Iranian authorities, there were great shortages of
clothes, blankets, food, medicines, shelters and general household needs. We were kept in
this large camp in Salas-Baba-Jani for about six weeks. Then we were given two weeks’
leave from the camp after being sponsored by a relative was living in Tehran.
We stayed in Tehran with the relatives and carried on renewing the leave from the
camp every two to four weeks. In the meantime I was allowed to practise medicine in
Iran, where I got a temporary job in a hospital, and I was able to contribute towards the
medical care of over a hundred of the thousands of Iraqi refugees in Iran. Those refugees

241
were forced to leave their villages, towns and cities during the attempt of Iraqi
government loyalist forces to retake cities after the March 1991 uprising. The regime had
used helicopters to attack unarmed civilians, firing indiscriminately into residential areas
and also following and attacking them as they fled from their cities towards the borders
with Iran. The loyalist forces were executing young people on the streets, in homes and in
hospitals; rounding up suspects, especially young men, during house-to-house searches,
and arresting or mass shooting them without any charges or trials. My aim also was to
contribute towards the medical care of the thousands of Shi‘a seized in the Iraqi marshes
along the southern border with Iran. These people were a mixture of the original
inhabitants and others who fled during the uprising. They lacked adequate food, hygiene
and medical care and were at risk from Iraqi military operations in the area.
The golden opportunity came to me when I joined Emma Nicholson as translator
and medical advisor during her visit to the area at the beginning of the autumn of 1991.
Emma Nicholson is the only western politician who bothered to visit the Shi‘a deep in the
Iraqi Marshlands along the southern border with Iran, where she gathered the first hard
evidence about the reality and the scale of the tragedy. During the same visit she attended
the house of the Iraqi wounded in Ahwaz where she met Amar, the 11 year boy who has
sustained full thickness burns to his face, neck, hands and other parts of his body after
being bombed with his family by the Iraqi government’s loyalist forces in March 1991.
The AMAR International Charitable foundation was set up in 1991 to provide aid for
refugees from the Iraqi Marshlands who had fled to southern Iran, for which I am a
medical advisor.
In January 1992 my youngest brother and I arrived in the United Kingdom after
been granted a settlement to reunite our family through an application to the UNHCR in
Tehran. I pursued my career in medicine in the UK, passed my qualifying medical
examinations to be registered as a medical practitioner in the United Kingdom, and
received a high postgraduate degree from the Royal College of Surgeons of England. I
now practise as a consultant emergency doctor in the United Kingdom, and I am still a
voluntary medical advisor to the AMAR International Charitable foundation.

16
The Southern Iraq Marshlands Project:
What it Means
Emma Nicholson
In many ways the contents of this multi-disciplinary report are unique. They are a
reminder of the former glory of the lower Mesopotamian Marshlands. The Marsh
Dwellers are the proud descendants of Sumerians, Babylonians, Persians and Arab Bedu.
They have lived by growing rice and dates, raising water buffalo, fishing and weaving
domestic products from reeds. Around them a richly diverse ecosystem – home for fish,
migratory birds, pelicans, herons and flamingo – has remained in relative equilibrium for
centuries, in spite of the fact that it has been one of the first areas ever used by mankind
for extensive irrigated agriculture.
Part of the uniqueness of this comprehensive Report lies in the complexity of the
subject. Access to the Marshlands is very difficult because of obstacles set up by both
man and nature. In the last ten years I have visited the Iraqi Marshlands six times and
have seen the suffering of the people at first hand. Much of this Report – in particular the
chapters of Christopher Mitchell and Professor Peter Sluglett – documents the recent
tragic history of the Marsh Dwellers. The environmental effects of preventing the waters
of the Tigris and Euphrates from reaching the Marshlands have been overwhelming, with
disastrous ecological, social and human consequences. Scarcity of water has led to
salinisation of the land. Michael Evans’ detailed chapter shows how the prospects for
wildlife look grim. Professor Alexander Tkachenko’s chapter shows how the economic
future looks equally bleak.
The situation of the health of the southern Iraqi Marshlands has to be seen in the
context of Iraq as a whole. It was reported to the European Parliament on 26 February
2001 that about two million Iraqi children were registered as suffering from severe
malnutrition. These children are unlikely ever to achieve their potential intellectual and
physical growth. Infant mortality is high. Diseases that were under control or had been
eliminated – such as tuberculosis, malaria and typhoid – have re-emerged. Ill health
associated with pregnancy and deaths in childbirth has increased. Iraq that used to have
an excellent health service now has inadequate healthcare. The country’s civilian
infrastructure has been degraded. Social problems are aggravated by Iraq’s economic
isolation.
Where do we go from here? The United Nations has attempted to monitor the
situation. UN Security Council Resolution 688, passed on 6 April 1991, called on “the
Iraqi government to provide free access to United Nations and non-governmental

243
humanitarian agencies to all parts of the marshes so that essential humanitarian assistance
can be provided.” And in January 1995 the European Parliament passed a resolution
“characterising the Marsh Arabs as a persecuted minority whose very survival is
threatened by the Iraqi government.” The Iraqi government’s treatment of the Marsh
Dwellers was described as “genocide”. Furthermore the United Nations Human Rights
Commission passed a Resolution which called for an end to military operations and
efforts to drain the Marshlands. Fine words, but nothing better captures the daily horror
for the Iraqi than the words spoken by Rend Rahim Francke at the Hearing of the
European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee on 26 February 2001:
The Iraqi regime is unique in the world in that it is a regime at war with its own
people. Low intensity warfare is a fact of life everywhere south of Baghdad. The
army and Republican Guard, the traditional seat of regime support, have
witnessed some dozen coup plots in the past ten years, leading to hundreds of
executions. To the south of Baghdad, since the crushing of the uprising of 1991,
the regime has mounted an unremitting assault on the population, burning
villages, killing people and deporting families. The Kurds, who endured decades
of war with the regime, are temporarily spared this conflict, but who knows for
how long.
The crimes committed by the regime cover every conceivable area of
crimes against humanity as defined by the Hague Tribunal and the Charter of the
International Criminal Court. I will not list the catalogue of crimes but I do want
to draw attention to the systematic, institutionalised rape of women, usually as a
method of male punishment and intimidation. A woman detainee has described
her own gang rape in prison as a spectator sport. As you are well aware, the
Hague Tribunal only recently declared rape to be a form of torture and a crime
against humanity . . .
Saddam Hussein is lethal to the Iraqi people. His presence is incompatible
with any concept of peace in the Middle East. He will fan the flames of hatred and
revert to war again whenever the world relaxes its vigilance. Ultimately, he is a
threat to Europe and an outrage to the values of human conduct that civilised
people adhere to.
The countries of Europe must not be complacent about Saddam Hussein
and his regime, but must acknowledge his criminality and his danger to their own
security and their values. Consider that there are hundreds of thousands of Iraqis
who have fled and are still fleeing to Europe to escape Saddam’s terror.
European countries, in their own self-interest and in the interest of
humanity, must lead in condemning Saddam and promoting change in Iraq.
Professor Adel Omer Sharif and Professor Joseph W. Dellapenna have in this report
documented Iraq’s international legal obligations and offences. Iraq signed up to the
international Convention on the Rights of Children in 1944, but has not signed any
United Nations declaration or convention on torture, genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity.
There is enough circumstantial evidence of crimes against humanity to warrant
the constitution of an International Penal Tribunal. There has been ample evidence of the
use of chemical weapons in the north. In the centre the regime’s security apparatus holds

244
the area in a vice-like grip. In southern Iraq the army, the Ba‘th Party and the security
forces hold firm control during the day but at night the area is almost out of control.
In short, we are observing the destruction of a whole country, potentially one of
the richest in the world with its tantalising combination of skilled manpower, water and
oil. As a federal country with substantial decentralisation all its different cultural traits
could be preserved and grow. What can we do?
In the short and mid term we must support organisations like AMAR and others
that are working for the relief of the suffering of the Iraqi people.
In the longer term the issues are too complex for any one charity or a group of
charities to deal with. There are political and legal considerations that are the concern of
the Iraqi people both inside and outside Iraq as well as the international community. The
present regime has to be held accountable for international crimes. A priority for a
successor regime should be the physical restoration of a substantial part of the
Marshlands, together with adequate infrastructure services. We should seek to restore the
rights of one of the world’s most ancient minority tribes and provide the opportunity for
the Marsh Dwellers to return. This may require the removal of key engineering works
and the release of the water from upstream dams.
Southern Iraq should become a safe haven for the Shi‘ite minority and the Marsh
Arabs. Consideration should be given to designating the Marshlands as a national
heritage site, with its potential for tourism. We should do all we can to foster the
structures of civil society not only in the Marshlands but also in the whole of Iraq. There
are four million Iraqis in exile. Many are in Europe and the United States, but a great
number are in neighbouring countries – Jordan, Iran, Syria, the Gulf states. They have
skills and talents and will be the core of the reconstruction and rehabilitation of a post-
Saddam Iraq. Planning for the new Iraq will need study, commitment and will. But it is
all possible and should complement the more political work of a successor government
and the international and regional political organisations. That is the next important step.

Appendix:
The Survey Questionnaire
Jérôme Le Roy
A sample survey of Marsh Arab refugees was conducted on 4 and 5 May 2001 by a group
of five enumerators (four Iraqi and one Iranian).
The group was supervised by the Manager and Senior Medical Advisor of AMAR
Iran, Messrs Salman-Manesh and Cheragchi-Bashi. The questionnaires were
administered in Arabic
The survey covered 400 refugee households in two camps, Jahrom and Servistan
(Fars province) which are known to host a very high proportion of refugees coming from
the South Iraqi Marshes. Both household level data (n=400) and individual levels data
(n=1,099) were collected. The individual level demographic data are presented in the
demographic chapter. This appendix describes Household level responses to a mix precoded
and open-ended questions covering a wide rage of topics (socio-economic,
attitudinal, aspirational).
A systematic coverage was done in Servistan and an estimated 80% of the camp
population was covered. In Jahrom, were refugees of different origins can be found, only
the refugees from the South Iraqi Marshes were covered.
Heads of families were asked by AMAR clinic managers to come to the clinics to
be interviewed. This methodology was used in order to avoid potential disturbance in the
camps, related in particular to the need to enter refugees’ dwellings. It is not believed to
have caused any bias.

246
1. Origin (geographic, tribal) and reason for departure.
When you lived in Iraq, was your house in the Marshlands, on the edge of the
Marshlands or outside, on dry land?
In the Marshlands 56.8%
On the edge of the Marshlands 36.8%
On dry land, outside the Marshlands 6.5%
Did your grandparents live in the Marshlands, on the edge of the Marshlands or
outside, on dry land?
In the Marshlands 61.5%
On the edge of the Marshlands 32.5%
On dry land, outside the Marshlands 6%
When you were living in Iraq, did your household live in?
City 1%
Town 21.3%
Village 30.5%
Don’t know / No answer 47.3%
Name the village and nearest Town..
Pending to a ,more precise and detailed geographical analysis, the first results are as
follows. Only 30% of the heads of household have responded to the question. These
replies indicate clusters of households in or around a number of towns that are known to
be administrative centres for the region of the marshes, and in particular:
• Chebayesh on the Euphrates, halfway between Qurnah and Nassiryah.
• Hwair on the Euphrates near Qurnah
• Madina east of the Tigris between Qurnah and Amara
• Mdaina (unlocated)
There are also smaller number of households in the vicinity of Qurnah, Nassiryah, Basra
and Amara. Seventy per cent of the heads of household responded to the question on their
village of origin, quoting more than 60 villages, some of them very difficult to locate and
others with ambiguous names (there are more than 10 places named “Kut” in the area).
However, several villages emerge as major population centres such as Saigal (inside the
Central Marsh, 50km north-west of Qurnah, Sabbagieh and Um Schwaich. The level of
detail of the reply warrants a more detailed analysis with pre-1990 cartography and
experts of the region.

Were you forced to leave Iraq?
Yes 99.0%
No 0.5%
No Answer 0.5%
What tribe do you belong to?
Abadi 4%
Amari 7%
Asadi (Bani Assad) * 11%
Bazooni * 6%
Fartus * 6%
Hallaf 5%
Hilfi 12%
Himadawi 5%
Iwochi 5%
Mussawi 4%
Saadi 8%
Sheganba * 9%
Other Tribes 18%
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Discussion
These data reveal a society which is stable (less than 5% of the refugees have moved
from the marshes to the edge of the marshes in two generations), rural and clustered in
relatively small communities (only 1% of the refugees declares that they lived in cities,
while one third says they lived in villages). On the location itself, the data confirm that
the population sample is, almost in its totality, composed of people who lived
geographically in the marshlands. They belong in their majority (82%) to a group of 12
tribes. 4 of these tribes are well identified in Wilfred Thesiger’s book, The Marsh Arabs
(which further confirms the origin of the sample).
• The Bani Assad, or Asadi, are a tribe located around and south of the Euphrates, in
what is known as the Hammar (or southern) Marsh.
• The Fartus and the Sheganba were located in the Qurnah (central) Marsh, between the
Tigris and the Euphrates.
• The Bazooni are a pastoral tribe living on the edge of the marshes, to the north-west
of the central marsh.

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2. Economy
When you were living in Iraq, did you or anyone in your household … ?
Yes No Don’t Know /
No Answer
Fish 82% 16% 2%
Hunt 49% 49% 2%
Farm 66% 32% 2%
Cultivate any crops for food 58% 39% 3%
Use reeds 75% 23% 2%
Keep animals or birds 78% 21% 1%
Work for a wage 2% 95% 3%
Question asked to those who said they were cultivating crops: While you were living
in Iraq, which crops did you and your family cultivate? (several replies possible).
Rice 37%
Barley 13%
Wheat 18%
Date palms 21%
Other 34.7%
None of these 31%
Don’t know 1%
For those who answered “other” at question above: others (by decreasing
percentage of occurrence, several replies possible):
Tomatoes 38%
Water Melon 27%
Other Melon 18%
Other Vegetables 13%
Raqi 3%
Okra 2%

249
For those who answered that they were using reeds: What use did you and your
family make of the reed harvest? (several replies possible)
Animal fodder 62%
Boat/raft building 14%
House-building 77%
Building mosque/ public places 51%
Articles for sale, e.g. mats, baskets 59%
Don’t know / no reply 1%
For those who answered that they were keeping animals or birds: What animals or
birds did you or your family keep? (several responses possible)
Buffaloes 54%
Cows 54%
Chicken 11%
Sheep 7%
Ducks 3%
Geese / Swans 3%
Turkey 2%
For those who answered they were working for a wage: What job or jobs did you or
your family do that earned a wage?
The small number of replies not statistically valid. The minority of people working for a
wage divided itself between mechanics / maintenance workers, drivers and builders.
What types of transport did you and your family regularly use when living in Iraq?
(several answers possible)
Motor Boat 75%
Non-powered boat 71%
Land vehicles (car/ bus/motorcycle) 29%
Bicycle 6%
Animal 2%
None of these 2%

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Discussion
The very high proportion of households using boats (75% had motor boats and 71% nonpowered
boats; however the proportion of households that had at least a boat of any
category reaches 94%) shows the resilience of the traditional lifestyle of the Marsh Arabs
until the late 1980s as well as its adaptation to the environment.
While the traditional rafts made of reeds seem to have given way to equally
traditional but sturdier wooden boats (only 14% of households still used reeds for raft
building), the rest of the reed using traditions seems to have remained very strong, in
particular for private house (77%) and mudhif building (51%). The role of young reeds
for animal fodder remained very high (62%).
Donkey or horses, the other traditional transport mode, never made its way to the
marshes. The area has been affected by modernity, however, as boats are now motorised
and cars and motorcycles have appeared among the families who lived near the cities and
on the edges of the marshes.
Rice remained the privileged crop (37%) both because of its suitability to the
marshlands, and because of its essential role in the marsh Arabs’ diet.
In terms of cattle, the water buffalo (54%) still occupied a strong place in the
landscape but cows (probably due to better yields) were raised by the same proportion of
the sample population (54%). Other animals remain relatively marginal.
Last, this civilisation remained largely pastoral with only a very small proportion
of people working for a wage (2%).
Analysis of lifestyle
It is tempting to analyse the economic sub-groups in more details in order to discover, in
particular, if the traditional lifestyle of the Madans had survived in a large part of the
population until the late 1980s.
If one defines crudely the traditional lifestyle of the Madans as revolving around
both the use of reeds and the water buffalo, our statistics show that no less than 46%of
our sample correspond to that model, which is a high proportion.
Another economic subgroup could be those habitants of the region who cultivated
other crops such as tomatoes and watermelon. The two lifestyles appear to be largely
incompatible as only 16% of the total of the two groups were doing both reed and
buffaloes, and other crops as well, while 84% was doing either one of the other.
Pending to further analysis, this tends to suggest the existence of a “near-marsh”
population that would have moved from reeds and buffaloes to irrigated farming of
vegetables. Their belonging to the marsh ensemble is confirmed by the fact that nearly all
of them still had at least one boat.
This analysis tends to be confirmed by the fact that some tribes (Abadi, Hallaf,
Hilfi, Iw Ochi) had large proportions of their members cultivating crops, while others
(Amari, Bani Assad, Fartus, Sheganba) have dominant proportions of people raising
buffaloes and using reeds.
There is clearly a need for more in-depth socio-economic and ethnologic analysis.

Recent Changes
251
What changes, if any, took place in transport routes and means of transport in the
years that affected you or your family before you left Iraq? (open question)
All transport routes destroyed by the drainage of the marshes 45%
Water transport routes destroyed by drainage of the marshes, but land 6%
transport unaffected
Water transport routes destroyed by drainage of the marshes and land
transport destroyed as well
All transport destroyed by bombing 3%
All transport destroyed by Iraqi regime 5%
All transport deteriorated (unspecific) 10%
No changes 21%
Transport improved 3%
Don’t know 3%
Total 100%
I would like you to think about how conditions changed for you and your family in
the 1980s and 1990s, before you left Iraq. Did they increase or decrease, or did they
stay about the same?
Increase
d a great
deal
Increase
d a little
Stayed
the same
Decrease
d a little
4%
Decrease
d a great
deal
Don’t
know /
not
applic.
The cultivated area 0% 0.5% 5.3% 1.3% 79.3% 13.8%
Crop harvests 0% 0.8% 3.3% 1.5% 80.8% 13.8%
The area under reeds 0% 0% 1.3% 0% 89.5% 9.3%
Reed harvests 0% 0% 1.3% 0.3% 90% 8.5%
Productivity of farmed
animals/birds
0.3% 0% 2.0% 1.5% 88.3% 8%
Fishing catches 0% 0% 0.8% 1.5% 91.7% 6%
Catches from hunting 0% 0% 0.3% 1.5% 91% 7.3%
Dairy Production (milk,
cheese etc)
0% 0% 2.5% 1.3% 88.5% 7.8%

252
I would like you to think about how water supplies changed for you and your family
in the 1980s and 1990s, before you left Iraq. Did they improve, get worse, or did they
stay about the same?
Improve Stay the
same
Get worse Don’t
know
Drinking water 0.8% 4.8% 92.0% 2.5%
Running water for washing 0.3% 4.8% 91.5% 3.5%
Water for waste disposal 0% 3.5% 72.9% 23.6%
Water for farming/ livestock 0% 3.8% 93.2% 3.0%
Discussion
Water is central to every aspect of this population’s life and the statistics show how a
drastic reduction of the water supplies due to drainage has had dire consequences.
A crushing overall majority of refugees (73%) mentions some sort of
deterioration of their transport system, while those who thought there were no change
(21%) or that transport improved (3%) are a minority. Interviews revealed that the reason
for absence of change or improvement was the proximity of a large city. The presence of
army checkpoint preventing people from travelling to a city have also been mentioned in
a few cases.
Another highlight is the high proportion of refugees (55%) whose answer
included a specific reference to the destruction of water transport by the drainage of the
marshes.
But there is also an overwhelming majority of refugees who describe the lack of
water in all aspects of their economic and personal life. This is particularly true for the
disappearance of fishing and hunting (91%) and the water for washing, farming and
livestock and drinking (above 90%).
This clearly shows how water drainage could be used as a political and military tool
to force the people out of their land.
3. The future
Which of the following would you most like to happen for you and your family in
the future?
Stay in Iran 8.3%
Return to Iraq 31.9%
Go elsewhere 52.8%
Don’t know 7%

Preferred destination of those who replied “go elsewhere” to question above:
Australia 40%
Sweden 16%
Denmark 7%
Other developed countries 15%
Anywhere 19%
Don’t know 3%
253
For those who replied “return to Iraq” to question above: What changes would need
to take place before you would consider returning to Iraq? (open question)
Death or departure of Saddam Hussein 79.1%
Return of peace 13.2%
Disappearance of Saddam Hussein Regime and water in the 7.7%
marshes
For those who replied “return to Iraq” to question above: If you did return to Iraq,
where would you like to live?
Return to original area 62.2%
Return to original area if there is water 4.5%
Go to a city 27%
Not return to original area 2.7%
Any area with work available 0.9%
Don’t know 2.7%
For those who replied “return to Iraq” to question above: If you did return to Iraq,
what would you like to do for a living?
Agriculture / Farming / Fishing / Animal raising 60%
Same work as before 22%
Anything 3%
Don’t know 15%
Discussion
The statistics of refugees wishes for the future partly confirm field observations. Only a
minority wants to stay in the host country, while 32% want to return to Iraq and 53%
wishes a third country resettlement, preferably in Australia and Scandinavia (Australia is

254
reputed to be a country if immigration and there have been a few cases of resettlement in
Sweden that have given rise to hopes in that direction).
For those who want to return to Iraq, the precondition is very clearly a change of
regime and in no way would substantial numbers of refugees return while Saddam is still
in power. Interestingly, the political question is more important than the water issue as a
condition for return. Most of the potential returnees have very simple objectives, to go
back where they came from and resume farming there.
This is paradoxically a reason to be optimistic as large numbers of refugees are
willing to go back in the marshes and try to return to their previous life as much as
possible. While a complete return to status quo ante is never totally possible, these people
would still be willing, water permitting, to repopulate the marshes in the future.

Notes on Contributors
Professor Gholam Ali Afrooz is a former President of the University of Tehran. He is an
authority on the education of children with special needs.
Dr James Brasington is Lecturer in Geography at the University of Cambridge.
Dr Mohammed Taghi Cheragchi-Bashi is a Senior Advisor to AMAR in Iran and in
the Iranian Ministry of Health.
Dr Peter Clark OBE is a freelance consultant on Middle East cultural matters and
translator of modern Arabic literature.
Dr Ernestina Coast is a Lecturer in the Department of Social Policy at the London
School of Economics.
Professor Joseph W. Dellapenna is Professor of Law at the Villanova School of Law,
Pennsylvania.
Michael Evans is an ornithologist specialising in the Middle East at BirdWatch,
Cambridge.
Dr George Hanna is a consultant on water issues and has carried out research on Middle
East irrigation.
Amir Hayder is an Iraqi living outside his country but hoping to return in happier times.
Jerome Le Roy is Director of the AMAR International Charitable Foundation, London.
Sean Magee is Publishing Director at Politico’s Publishing and a former editor at Victor
Gollancz.
Christopher Mitchell is a film maker and is currently an Executive Producer of
Documentaries at OR Media, London.
Professor Thomas Naff of the University of Pennsylvania has written on Ottoman
history and on Middle East environmental issues.
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne MEP is First Vice-Chairman of the European
Parliament Committee for Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and
Defence Policy.
Hassan Salman-Manesh is Manager of the AMAR office, Tehran. He was Director
General of Public Health in the Iranian Ministry of Health.

256
Professor Paul Sanlaville of the University of Lyon has written many articles and books
on the historical geography of the Middle East.
Judge Dr Adel Omer Sharif of the Supreme Constitutional Court Cairo has written on
legal aspects of human rights in the Middle East.
Professor Peter Sluglett is Professor of Middle Eastern History at the University of
Utah. He has written books on modern Iraqi history.
Professor Alexandre Tkachenko is a specialist in Middle East economics, based at the
Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow.