Fire Service Earthquake Preparedness - NSW Department of ...

5816 Inspector Glenn Launt 

New South Wales Fire Brigades 

SGE Travelling Fellowship 2000 - Kobe, Japan 

Report into 

Fire Service 

Earthquake Preparedness

5816 Inspector Glenn Launt – New South Wales Fire Brigades 

Report into Fire Service Earthquake Preparedness 

SGE Travelling Fellowship 2000 – Kobe Japan. 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

In October 2000, with the aid of a Travelling Fellowship from the Premier's 

Department and the SGE Credit Union, I was able to travel to Kobe, Japan to study 

how the Kobe City Fire Bureau had reacted to the devastating 1995 Hanshin-Awaji 

Earthquake and what preparedness measures were now in place to mitigate the effects 

of any future disasters. 

As would be expected, a disaster of this magnitude highlighted many problems 

that any fire service would face in similar circumstances. It was my intention to 

investigate the challenges faced by the KFB and highlight any factors which could be 

used to improve our own disaster preparedness. 

The major points noted by the KFB were: 

• Emergency and medical services were overwhelmed by the scope of the 

disaster; 

• As the only firefighting service, the KFB had to put all of it's resources 

into firefighting until the fires were brought under control; 

• Co-ordination and support of incoming rescue teams proved extremely 

difficult; 

• 95% of all rescues were carried out by casual volunteers; 

• Traffic gridlock paralysed the city for several days and this severely 

hampered emergency response; 

• Reticulate water supplies suffered extensive damage; 

• All of Kobe's transport systems were disrupted for several days or even 

weeks; 

• The earthquake impacted most severely on the elderly; 

• The KFB's Helicopters couldn't operate in the initial stages of the 

earthquake because the pilots couldn't get to the aerodrome, thereby 

denying the KFB critical early intelligence. 

In response to these problems, some of the major initiatives of the KFB are as 

follows: 

• Public education and training in disaster reponse has been increased; 

• Increased involvement and preparedness of the KFB Volunteer Corps; 

• Major improvements in the city's water supply system; 

• Upgrading of fire stations with a variety of earthquake protection 

measures; 

• Improved intelligence gathering and surveillance measures; 

• A number of mutual aid agreements to augment emergency response.




FIRE SERVICE EARTHQUAKE PREPAREDNESS 

INTRODUCTION 

Australia is not a country known for it’s earthquakes. We have our fair share of 

other natural hazards: bushfires, storms, floods, drought but not earthquakes. 

However, on the 28 th December 1989, Newcastle sustained the first fatalities, due 

to an earthquake, in Australia’s (recorded) history. 

Was this a single isolated event, unlikely to ever happen again? Or should we 

expect and prepare for earthquakes? 

Fairly cursory research will quickly show that Australia is not “earthquake-proof” 

and, in fact, has many earthquakes every year. The Australian Geological Survey 

Organisation's Australian Seismological Centre in Canberra estimates that, on 

average, the Australian region experiences an earthquake of the size, or larger, than 

the earthquake that hit Newcastle about every ten months (AGSO booklet 1995) 

Up until the 28 th December, 1989, Australia’s earthquakes had occurred in remote, 

unpopulated areas and caused damage to some small towns, but certainly nothing to 

worry us in big cities. It is fair to say that Newcastle has (or should have) changed the 

way we look at earthquakes and the affect they could have our society. 

The New South Wales Fire Brigades, under the Fire Brigades Act, protects 90% 

of the state’s population and property from fire and hazardous materials incidents and 

is responsible for much of the general rescue work in the State. In addition to this, the 

Brigade supports other emergency services in times of bushfire, storms, floods and 

any other events that could impact negatively on the community. 

The Newcastle Earthquake raised many questions for the Brigade: How prepared 

were we to deal with Newcastle? What went well and what could have gone better? 

How should we prepare for future events? Newcastle was unprecedented in Australian 

history, where do we go to learn? 

Since 1994, the Brigade has invested an enormous amount of energy into 

developing a world class Urban Search & Rescue (USAR) capability. This highly 

specialised form of rescue work focuses on rescue from collapsed structures, confined 

space rescue and rescues requiring a high degree of technical expertise. The result of 

the Brigade’s investment came vividly to light at the Thredbo Landslide and the 

Glenbrook Train Disaster and has been put to use at numerous other incidents. The 

N.S.W.F.B. USAR Taskforce has been registered by the United Nations for 

international deployment to assist in disaster situations, particularly earthquakes, 

throughout the Asia-Pacific region. 

What steps can a modern society take to be as prepared as possible to deal with an 

earthquake? How can we, as a Fire Service, reduce the impact of an earthquake on the 

community we serve? 

In 1995 Kobe, Japan was nearly destroyed by a major earthquake. A modern city 

with a modern, well equipped, highly trained Fire Service, in the most earthquake 

ready nation on earth was almost shaken to pieces in 20 seconds. This wasn’t an 

earthquake in a third 

1




world country. Kobe is a city very much like Sydney: a modern port city with a 

sophisticated, cosmopolitan population. 

Five years later, Kobe has been rebuilt and the Kobe Fire Bureau has had time to 

look at itself, at how it preformed after the earthquake and has had the opportunity 

make any changes that they felt were necessary to improve their own preparedness. 

Their experience is an opportunity for us to learn and to improve our own disaster 

preparedness. 

Thanks to the travelling fellowship offered by the Premiers Department and the 

State Government Employees Credit Union, in October 2000 I was able to visit Kobe 

City and Kobe City Fire Bureau to see, first hand, how they recovered from the 

earthquake. The few days that I spent with the Kobe firefighters unearthed a wealth of 

information that, I hope, may, in some way, benefit my organisation and the 

community at large. 

Each snippet of information gained has led to more research, which has, in turn, 

led to more information. The process of learning is on-going and, as more questions 

arise, I now have an avenue of inquiry to Kobe Fire Bureau, which would have been 

impossible to achieve from Australia. 

The following is the result of the opportunity to travel to Kobe and the avenues 

that have opened up because of it. There is a lot more to learn, but we certainly, now, 

have somewhere to look. 

2




EARTHQUAKES 

TECTONIC PLATES & EARTHQUAKES 

Tectonic plates are huge sections of the earth's crust which fit together like a giant 

jigsaw puzzle to form the surface of the earth. These plates float on the molten mantle 

inside the earth and are constantly moving against one another. This movement builds 

up enormous stress at the plate boundaries and, at some point in time, that stress will 

exceed the strength of the rock, which will fail and release the built up energy along a 

fault plane causing what we call an earthquake. 

The boundaries between tectonic (or lithospheric) plates are, geologically, very 

active and, apart from causing most earthquakes, are also dotted with volcanoes. The 

boundary around the Pacific Plate, which encompasses the entire Pacific Ocean, is 

called the Pacific “Ring of Fire” due to the large number of volcanoes situated along 

it. 

Massive upthrusts along plate boundaries result in the formation of mountains 

and, in the oceans, islands. The islands and archipelagos that make up New Zealand, 

the Fiji Islands, Indonesia and Japan, as well as many other smaller islands, are on the 

western boundary of the Pacific Plate. (AGSO 1995) 

INTRAPLATE EARTHQUAKES 

Not all earthquakes occur along plate boundaries. Earthquakes which occur 

within the boundary of one plate are known as “Intraplate Earthquakes”. Intraplate 

earthquakes are less well understood than plate boundary earthquakes and are, 

therefore, unexpected and unpredictable. These are the type of earthquake 

experienced in Australia. (AGSO 1995) 

RESERVOIR INDUCED EARTHQUAKES 

Large dams and reservoirs are known to trigger significant earthquakes. There 

are several reasons for this, the major ones being: 

• Dams are often built in active earthquake areas (the existence of valleys in which 

dams are built is often an indication of seismic activity); 

• The weight of the water causes changes in the stresses on the rock under the dam; 

• Increased groundwater pore pressure decreases the strength of the rock under the 

dam. 

Reservoir induced seismicity is a transitory phenomenon which can trigger an 

earthquake immediately after filling of the reservoir or up to a number of years 

later. (Seismology Research Centre 1998 website) 

3




LIQUEFACTION 

Liquefaction is a phenomena whereby soil which is saturated with water loses 

it's strength and stiffness due to earthquake shaking or other rapid increases in 

water pressure. When an earthquake occurs, the shaking can increase the pressure 

that water in saturated soils exerts on the soil particles thereby breaking the 

contact forces that hold the particles together. When this happens, the particles can 

move freely and the soil will behave more like a liquid than a solid. 

When liquefaction occurs, the soil's ability to support the foundations of 

structures like buildings and bridges is severely reduced. Because liquefaction can 

only occur in soil which is saturated with water, it is most commonly encountered 

in low lying areas near bodies of water such as rivers, lakes, dams, bays and 

oceans. 

Port and wharf facilities are particularly susceptible to damage from 

earthquake induced liquifaction. In addition to the soil's inability to support 

structures, the increased pore water pressure in soils behind retaining walls exerts 

enormous pressure, which can cause wall collapse or even initiate dam failure. 

(University of Washington - Soil Liquefaction website) 

EFFECTS OF LIQUIFACTION DURING THE KOBE 

EARTHQUAKE 

Kobe's port facilities, many of them built on reclaimed land, suffered extensive 

damage due to liquifaction. On Rokko Island (a man-made island) quay walls 

were pushed out 2 to 3 metres and 3 to 4 metre deep depressions called "grabens" 

formed behind the walls. The entire interior of Port Island (another man-made 

island) has settled due to liquefaction of the underlying fill. In most areas, the 

backlands settled by as much as 1 metre. 

The port of Kobe is Japan's major port for importing raw materials. Many of 

it's numerous heavy cranes were badly damaged due to the crane rails spreading 

and settling which caused the buckling of legs at the portal ties, leaving some in 

danger of complete collapse in the event of a strong aftershock. 

Most pile supported structures in the port areas faired quite well, but many 

older structures collapsed due to ground settlement and/or structural failure. 

(Comartin et al. pp.66-72) 

Liquefaction and block sliding - Port Is. Liquefaction damage to Kobe's waterfront 

4




THE RICHTER SCALE 

The Richter Scale, ML, is the most commonly known method of measuring 

the magnitude of earthquakes. It is a logarithmic scale, which means that for each 

unit of magnitude, there is a ten-fold increase in ground displacement. Because 

large earthquakes last longer than smaller ones, there is about a thirty-fold 

increase in the amount of seismic energy released for every unit increase in 

magnitude. 

An ML 1.0 earthquake releases a similar amount of energy as a typical quarry 

blast, while an ML 5.0 releases about the same amount of energy as the bomb 

used at Hiroshima. 

The Richter Scale ML can only be used when the seismograph is within about 

600 km of the epicentre of the earthquake. The ML scale is generally quoted for 

tremours up to 6.0, from 6.0 to about 8.0 and for greater distances, the Surface 

Wave Magnitude MS scale can be used. The most modern scale is the Moment 

Magnitude Scale MW, which can be used for a wide range of magnitudes and 

distances. It gives reaqdings close to ML for earthquakes up to 6.0, close to MS 

for earthquakes up to 8.0 and can accurately measure magnitudes larger than 9.0, 

such as in Chile in 1960 and Alaska in 1964. 

THE MODIFIED MERCALLI INTENSITY SCALE 

The 12 point Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale, used in Australia, measures 

the effect of earthquake waves at the surface and descibes the effect of the motion. 

It can be explained as follows: 

1. Not felt. Recorded by seismographs. 

2. Rarely felt, usually only on the top floors of high buildings. 

3. Felt indoors, like a passing truck. 

4. Windows, dishes and doors rattle. Like a passing train. 

5. Felt by all. Small objects upset. 

6. Books fall off shelves, trees shake, isolated damage. 

7. Difficult to stand. Many poorly built buildings damaged. 

8. Significant damage. Branches broken from trees. 

9. General panic, serious damage, ground cracking. 

10. Most buildings destroyed, rails bent slightly. 

11. Rails bent greatly, pipelines destroyed. 

12. Near total destruction. Objects thrown into the air. 

(Seismology Research Centre website) 

5




EARTHQUAKES IN AUSTRALIA 

Continental Australia is in the centre of a tectonic plate and, therefore, 

experiences intraplate earthquakes. Australia is one of the most active intraplate 

areas in the world. 

Earthquakes in Australia generally occur as a result of horizontal compression, 

which tend to produce uplift, so Australian earthquakes are more likely in areas of 

rising topography like the Eastern Highlands or Flinders Ranges. 

They are comparatively shallow, occurring to depths of about 20-30km. 

Characteristically, shallow earthquakes which result from horizontal compression 

have a low maximum magnitude (about Mw 7.5), may have long fault ruptures 

(up to 100 km), can cause damage at moderate magnitudes, usually display 

surface rupture above Mw 6 and have a high stress drop, giving high amplitude, 

high frequency, short duration motion. By comparison, in subduction (one 

tectonic plate passing under another) zones like Indonesia, earthquakes can occur 

to 700km deep. 

According to the Seismology Research Centre: 

• An earthquake exceeding Mw 7.0 occurs somewhere in Australia every 100 

years or so; 

• A typical site in Australia will be within 50km of an Mw 7.0 earthquake every 

10,000 years or so; 

• Any location in Australia will eventually experience very strong earthquake 

motion. 

EARTHQUAKES IN THE SYDNEY AREA 

HISTORY 

Most of the larger earthquakes, and many smaller events, in the Sydney area have 

occurred on or near the “Lapstone Fault” in the Blue Mountains area to the west of 

Sydney. (Gibson 1998) 

The most significant events recorded are as follows: 

1872 October 18, Jenolan Caves, ML 5.5 

An earthquake on Friday 18/10/1872 at 1850 hours was felt from Jervis Bay in 

the south to Stroud in the north and to Orange in the west. At Bathurst, chairs 

were knocked over, candles shaken from tables and dishes smashed. The 

widespread distribution of low and moderate intensities suggests that the epicentre 

must have been in an unpopulated area, perhaps around the Jenolan caves or north 

of Lithgow, or was deep beneath the surface. 

6




1919 August 15, Kurrajong, ML 4.6 

An earthquake occurred near Kurrajong on Friday 15/8/1919 at 0821 hours. It 

was distinctly felt throughout Sydney and it’s suburbs. It was felt with Modified 

Mercalli intensity 5 at Kurrajong on the Nepean River about 50 klms north west of 

Sydney. Highest intensities were reported from north and west Kurrajong. The 

intensity in Sydney was about MM 3. It was felt by a few people at rest in 

Newcastle. It was roughly located using intensity data near the north end of the 

Lapstone Fault and may have been on that fault or a related fault. 

1961 May 21, Robertson, ML 5.5 

An earthquake of magnitude ML 5.5 occurred near Robertson about 60 klms 

south west of Sydney, on May 21, 1961 at 0740 hours. It is also known as the 

Bowral Earthquake. The maximum intensities in the Robertson-Bowral area were 

about MM 7. The earthquake caused significant damage to buildings in the Moss 

Vale, Robertson and Bowral areas, blocked the Macquarie Pass with rockfalls and 

caused some power failures. The intensity in Sydney was about MM 3. The 

epicentre was within a few kilometres of the present location of Wingecarribee 

Dam, which was completed in 1974. 

1973 March 9, Burragorang, ML 5.5 

An earthquake of magnitude ML 5.5 occurred near the southern end of Lake 

Burragorang, about 30 klms west of Picton at 0509 hours. This is about 70 klms 

south west of Sydney. It is also known as the Picton Earthquake. It caused about 

$500,000 (1973) damage. It has been suggested that the earthquake could have 

been reservoir induced, but it is difficult to prove this. If this was the case, it was 

an example of delayed reservoir induced seismicity. The earthquake’s hypocentre 

was about 12 klms deep and occurred about 12 years after the reservoir filling 

commenced. 

1981 November 15, Appin, ML 4.6 

This earthquake occurred at 0358 hours near Appin, about 50 klms south west 

of Sydney. Intensities of MM 4 were felt over a broad area south west of Sydney, 

but with isolated values of MM 5 in the epicentral area. No damage was reported. 

1985 February 13, Lithgow, ML 4.3 

This earthquake occurred near Lithgow, 100 klms west of Sydney, at 1901 

hours. Intensities of up to MM 7 were reported near the epicentre with minor 

damage to plaster, brickwork, tiles and chimneys. Objects fell off shelves in many 

parts of Lithgow. Total damage was estimated at $65,000 (1985). The intensity in 

Sydney was very low, with only a few people reporting MM 2 or 3. The 

earthquake was felt much further to the west than to the east, suggesting that it 

may have been on a west dipping fault. 

7




1989 December 28, Newcastle, ML 5.6 

The Newcastle Earthquake occurred at 1027 hours and was the first Australian 

earthquake confirmed to have caused fatalities. The earthquake was felt over a 

radius of 300 klms. 

SEISMIC MONITORING 

In 1958 Sydney’s Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board installed 

one of the world’s first seismograph networks designed specifically to record local 

earthquakes. Early seismic monitoring practises generally consisted of seismologists 

using sensitive seismographs to locate earthquakes, delineate active faults, determine 

earthquake magnitudes and estimate recurrence rates, and earthquake engineers using 

strong motion accelerographs to measure the response of structure to earthquake 

motion. Unfortunately, sensitive seismographs reach full scale at about the level of 

ground motion that can just be felt and accelerographs are relatively insensitive and 

trigger infrequently, so after an earthquake occurs it is common to find that they are 

not operating properly. Lack of effective communication between the two groups 

hampered earthquake risk management and emergency response activities. In 1983 

the system was converted to telemetry to provide central recording and analysis. 

Following the Newcastle earthquake, Sydney Water again updated the 

network, to be based on digital data acquisition and an integrated monitoring network 

design. In order to avoid the problems of earlier instrumentation, high dynamic range 

instruments were installed so that seismographs could measure large earthquakes 

without going full scale and strong motion accelerographs could trigger on smaller 

events (Gibson 1998). 

THE EPAR SYSTEM 

“EPAR” is the automated alarm system developed to enhance emergency 

response planning and notification in the event of an earthquake. The acronym stands 

for “Earthquake Preparation, Alarm and Response”. The system has been developed 

to provide seismologists and Sydney Water with automatic, customised notifications 

which include estimated effects and predetermined tasks within minutes of any 

earthquake detected by the network. 

(Gibson, 1998) 

8




THE NEWCASTLE EARTHQUAKE 

At 10.27 am on the 28 th December 1989 a moderate earthquake measuring 5.6 

on the Richter Scale devastated Australia's sixth most populous city. In a matter 

of 5 seconds 13 people were killed, 150 people were injured and 70,000 buildings 

suffered damage. The final bill was approximately $4 billion. Three floors of the 

western wing of the Newcastle Workers Club collapsed, killing 9 patrons. The 

timing, mid-morning in the Christmas holidays, found the club sparsely attended. 

That evening, 2,000 people were expected to attend a concert in the club's 

auditorium. The death toll could have been much higher. (EMA website) 

Map showing the worst affected areas in the Newcastle Earthquake 

NSWFB RESPONSE 

Whent the earthquake struck Newcastle, the N.S.W.F.B Control Room 

suffered extensive damage as well as a loss of power. The emergency generator 

switched on immediately and the Control Room staff were able to maintain 

operations via both the Radio Telephone System and local exchange telephone 

system. The officer-in-charge, Inspector Hunt coordinated operations. 

Following the Newcastle earthquake there were only two fires of any 

significance - A fire at the BHP Steelworks and fire in Tighes Hill Technical 

College. The fire at the steel works was initially handled by BHP's own 

firefighting teams and the school fire was attended by 462 pumper Tighes Hill 

alone. All other N.S.W.F.B. resources in the Newcastle area were committed to 

rescue incidents at a number of locations throughout the city. (Hunt 1990) 

9




THE HANSHIN-AWAJI EARTHQUAKE 

KOBE CITY 

Kobe City is a long, narrow port city situated on a coastal plain in south central 

Honshu (the largest island in the Japanese archipelago). It is squeezed between the 

Rokko Mountains in the north and the Inland Sea to the south. Downtown Kobe is 

only about 4 kilometres wide but the city stretches almost 30 kilometres in width. The 

city, itself, has a population of about 1.5 million, however Kobe is at the western end 

of a vast urban-industrial complex which includes Osaka, 30 kilometres to the east, 

and Kyoto, a further 30 kilometres away to the east. This area, known as the "Kansai 

area", houses 15% of Japan's population, or about 19 million people. (Comartin et al. 

p.11, 1995) 

10 

Kobe, like most large Japanese cities 

has a high density population mostly 

crammed into narrow one and two storey 

dwellings built very closely together with 

little or no separation. Commercial 

buildings are remarkable in that, due to 

high land costs, many are only 3 or 4 

metres wide, but are up to 8 storeys high. It 

was a common joke among Kansai 

businessmen that the land in the Kansai 

area was worth more than Canada! 

At 5.46 am on Tuesday 17 th January 1995 in the middle of a cold Japanese 

winter, an earthquake, measuring magnitude 7.2, almost totally destroyed one of the 

most modern cities in the most advanced, earthquake ready nation on earth. This was 

the largest earthquake to hit Japan since the Great Kanto earthquake of 1923 which 

caused much of Tokyo to be reduced to ashes and killed 150,000 people. 

In the context of Japan's modern technology, strict building codes, highly trained 

emergency services and earthquake ready population, the figures are staggering: 6,000 

dead, 35,000 injured, 180,000 building badly damaged or destroyed and an estimated 

300,000 people left homeless in sub-zero temperatures. 

The direct damage caused by the quake is estimated at over ¥13 trillion (about 

U.S.$147 billion). This was more than the entire Australian federal budget at the time 

and does not include indirect economic effects from loss of life, business disruption 

and loss of production. 

The epicentre was in the Akashi Straits between Kobe City and Awaji Island, 

almost underneath the new Akashi suspension bridge. The earthquake’s occurrence 

meant that the new bridge had to be made 1 metre longer because Awaji Island moved 

that distance away from the mainland. 

(Hills, pp178-217)




BUILDING CONSTRUCTION AND FAILURE 

In Kobe, extensive damage was sustained by a large number of structures of varying 

ages and construction types because of the proximity of affected areas to the plane of 

fault rupture. The Nojima Fault runs directly under the highly developed band of land 

that includes the city of Kobe. While evidence of ground failure due to liquefaction 

was evident in areas of heavy damage, it is considered that ground shaking was the 

predominant contributor to damage of engineered buildings. In many areas severely 

damaged buildings were typically collapsed or leaning in the same direction. This 

pattern was recorded after the 1994 Northridge (California) Earthquake and implies 

that the collapse was triggered by a single pulse or cycle rather than due to 

degradation caused by sustained ground shaking. 

Rough approximations have been made to determine what types of 

construction were worst affected by the earthquake. These are: large 

commercial/industrial buildings and high rise apartments – 5% to 10%, smaller 

commercial and manufacturing buildings – 10% to 20% and the remaining 70% to 

85% were low rise residential properties. (Comartin et al., p. 20) 

COMMERCIAL BUILDINGS 

There are relatively few very tall (above 15 storeys) buildings in the Kobe area 

and these, generally, faired quite well. Moderately sized commercial buildings 

suffered 

serious forms of structural damage 

ranging from the whole structure leaning, to 

“pancake” collapsed floors, total collapse 

and even, in one case, of an entire 9 storey 

building falling over sideways and laying 

intact across a major road. Many small 

commercial/mixed occupancy buildings 

suffered soft first floor collapse due to the 

large number of shops trading from these 

premises. (Comartin et al., pp 25-28) 

An overturned 9-storey shear wall building 

in Chuo Ward, Kobe City 

Partial collapse of a 6-storey 

reinforced concrete building 

in Hyogo Ward, Kobe City. 

11




SINGLE FAMILY RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS 

The majority of typical family homes in the Kobe area consist of one or two 

storey timber framed, tiled roof buildings with very little separation from adjoining 

houses. Many homes lack internal load-bearing walls, having light framed partion 

walls instead. Many older homes are built on isolated stone or concrete pad footings 

which are inherently less stable than reinforced strip-footings. Like many of the 

mixed occupancy buildings, many private homes have a ground floor shop which led 

to soft storey collapse. Earlier construction used no waterproofing to protect internal 

timber members and many collapsed buildings showed evidence of extensive dry rot, 

which may have contributed to the structural failure. 

A residential section of Higashinada Ward which suffered extensive damage 

A major contributor to structural failure and, consequently, death and injury is the 

traditional use of very heavy roof tiles on buildings with light timber frames. This 

type of roof is very effective against the seasonal typhoons, which the Japanese know 

will come, but has proved to be extremely unstable in the event of an earthquake 

(which may never come). The inertia of the heavy tiled roofs imposed large stresses 

on the walls, which suffered deformation, cracking and eventual collapse. The lack of 

internal load bearing partitions meant that the external walls lacked bracing or 

damping. Houses built in this fashion often collapsed into a pile of rubble. This type 

of total destruction triggered fires from broken gas pipes which spread rapidly, 

forming conflagrations which destroyed entire blocks. 

(Comartin et al., pp 36-37) 

12




THE FIRES 

The Kobe earthquake occurred early in the morning and therefore many people 

were 

cooking breakfast at the time. Gas is commonly used for cooking and the earthquake 

resulted in numerous broken gas pipes and mains. Fires ignited due to a number of 

causes; electrical arcing of downed power lines, domestic electrical faults, overturned 

heaters, flammable goods falling onto lit stoves, candles falling over and so on. The 

gas leaks fed the fires and the timber buildings ignited easily. Damaged water supplies 

hindered firefighting and the fires spread quickly, totally destroying some areas. 

In the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, which destroyed much of Tokyo, 

150,000 people died, mainly due to the fires, which were fanned by strong winds 

which whipped the fires into firestorms. It is considered fortunate that the weather 

was calm following the Kobe earthquake. 

Firefighters finally brought the fires under control after two days. 

Map showing burned area (in square metre) from the fires following the earthquake 

Source: Yomiuri Shimbun (newspaper) 

13




A section of Nagata Ward, totally burnt out by the fires which followed the 

earthquake 

14




RESCUE 

According to Masayoshi Matsumoto, 1 st Assistant Chief of General Affairs 

Department of the Kobe City Fire Bureau, following the Kobe earthquake, the Kobe 

Fire Bureau, faced with over 150 fires threatening to turn into conflagrations and 

being the only authority with the power to fight the fires, put all of their resources into 

firefighting. 

Initially, the job of rescuing those trapped in the rubble was left to police, the 

military and the citizens themselves. When the fire situation was stabilised, the Fire 

Service began putting resources into the rescue effort. The Kobe Fire Bureau has 11 

rescue appliances and 63 rescue specialists, however, in the context of the number of 

structures destroyed by the earthquake, it was clear that it would take an enormous 

amount of personnel and resources to conclude the rescue phase of the operation. 

Rescue resources in the form of Japanese and international rescue teams began 

arriving in Kobe in the days following the earthquake. On the ground, their services 

were sorely needed, but at the strategic level, the influx of such a large and diverse 

group of operatives, with a variety of needs, caused considerable logistical difficulties 

for the emergency management authorities. It is an issue that would certainly arise in 

the case of an earthquake in Sydney and it would require careful pre-planning to 

manage efficiently. 

As far as rescue goes, the bottom line was that, according to KFB statistics, 

95% of all rescues were carried out by casual volunteers. 

(Interview October 2000) 

15




KOBE CITY FIRE BUREAU 

The Kobe City Fire Bureau is responsible for all firefighting, 

hazmat, rescue and emergency medical incidents within the city's 

boundaries (about 550 sq klms). All cities in Japan are responsible for 

their own Fire Services, although inter-city training and mutual aid 

agreements are common. 

BUDGET 

The KFB's 1999-2000 budget was ¥18,021,443,000 (approximately 

AUS$350,000,000) 

PERSONNEL 

The Bureau has 1,423 personnel, which is comprised of 633 firefighters, 63 

rescue technicians, 61 correspondents, 266 ambulance officers, 163 fire prevention 

officers, 92 commanders and 145 general affairs staff. Firefighters work a rotating 24 

hour roster. 

FIRE STATIONS 

Kobe City is divided up 

into nine administrative areas 

or "wards". In general terms, 

each ward has a main Fire 

Station (which may have 

more than a dozen 

appliances) and several 

Branch Stations (generally 

having a pumper and an 

ambulance). In total, the 

Bureau has an Administrative 

Headquarters, 11 main fire 

stations and 17 branch 

stations. 

(Kobe Fire Bureau 

information booklet, 2000) 

16




APPLIANCES 

Small Pumpers x 31 Medium Pumpers x 5 Heavy Rescue x 6 

Super Pumpers x 9 Heavy Tankers x 11 Hose Layers x 9 

Note: The above three appliances make up one Bulk Water Supply Unit 

50 metre TTL x 3 15 metre TTL x 7 Lighting Vehicles x 2 

& 30 m TTL x 3 

Squirts x 1 Support Vehicles x 1 

The Bureau also has: 

5 x Tank Cars 

11 x Trailer Pumps 

6 x Pump/Rescues 

16 x Hazmat Vehicles 

1 x Foam Tender 

33 x Ambulances 

Note: It is normal practise to have 37 pumps, 28 ambulances & 6 rescue units available 

17




VOLUNTEER CORPS 

The Bureau has a large civilian volunteer corps of approximately 4,000 

members. The role of the volunteer corps is to respond to local emergencies to 

carry out initial firefighting activities, lead residents to safety and to give 

directions to arriving emergency vehicles. Generally, the volunteer Brigades are 

in areas which are in excess of 20 minute response times from professional 

Brigades. 

Volunteer Fire Corps carrying out a water discharge drill 

(Kobe Fire Bureau Information Booklet, 2000) 

18




MARINE FIREFIGHTING 

SUIJO FIRE STATION 

Kobe City Fire Bureau employs two fire boats from the Suijo Fire Station 

located on the north shore of the man made "Port Island" which is approximately 

one kilometre offshore of downtown Kobe. 

Suijo Fire Station is a large, multi-purpose station which, as well as the fire 

boats, houses 16 fire fighting vehicles. The appliance inventory includes four 

pumpers, two hazmat vehicles, one lighting truck, one 10,000 litre tanker, one 

30m Turntable Ladder, two ambulances and four other cars and vans. Total staff is 

93 personnel. 

The station's 

jurisdictional area 

includes the port of Kobe 

(95 sq klms), the 

harbours man-made 

islands (Port Island - 8.2 

sq klms and Rokko Island 

- 5.8 sq klms) and 

reclaimed foreshore area 

and some mainland areas. 

A third island, just south 

of Port Island, is 

currently under 

construction and will be 

used for Kobe City's new 

domestic airport. A 

fourth man-made island 

is also planned south of 

Rokko Island. 

(Kobe Fire Bureau) 

19




1. "KUSUNOKI" 

FIRE BOATS 

Kusunoki is a 133 tonne heavy firefloat built in 1982. It's dimensions 

are: length 26.2m x width 6.5m x depth 3 m. It has a top speed of 17.6 

knots (32.6 kph) and a cruising speed of 16 knots (29.7 kph). It can carry a 

maximum of 25 people. 

It has two 15,000 litres/min single stage volute pumps, 6,000 litres of 

foam concentrate which is fed into the pumps through an automatic 

proportioning system, 600 litres of oil dispersant, four electrically operated 

5,000 litres/min and one 3,000 litres/min water cannons. It has eighteen 

65mm discharge outlets and two 100mm suction inlets for salvage 

purposes. 

2. "TACHIBANA" 

Tachibana is a 46 tonne light fire boat built in 1991. It's dimensions: 

length 23m x width 5.5m x depth 2.5m. It's top speed is 29.2 knots (52.6 

kph) and it's cruising speed is 22 knots (39.6 kph). It can carry 17 people. 

It has two 11,000 litres/min single stage volute pumps, two automatic 

foam proportioning systems, two 1,800 litre foam concentrate tanks, two 

200 litre/min oil disperal units, 25 x 20 litre drums of dispersant, one 5,000 

litre/min and two 3,000 litre/min water cannons. 

Tachibana Kusunoki 

20




HELICOPTERS 

Kobe Fire Bureau employs two Kawasaki BK117B helicopters ( Kobe I and 

Kobe III) used for firefighting and rescue purposes. They each have a top speed of 

247 km/h and a range of 540 km. The rescue hoist has a capacity of 270 kg and it has 

a 600 litre bucket for fighting forest fires. 

The Kobe Fire Bureau first acquired helicopters in 1972. 

21




PROBLEMS FACED IN KOBE 

WATER SUPPLY 

Kobe, like most other larger Japanese cities has, in addition to a reticulated water 

supply, 968 underground 40,000 litre concrete water tanks or "cisterns" for the 

provision of water for firefighting purposes. Generally located under street 

intersections, these have been constructed all over Japan specifically for the type of 

situation confronted by Kobe City firefighters following the 1995 earthquake. 

Kobe's reticulated water supply is gravity fed from 30 reservoirs. Of these, 22 

have dual tanks, with one tank having a seismic shut-off valve so that, in the event of 

an earthquake, the tank's contents are saved for firefighting. In this event, all 22 

valves operated properly, conserving 30,000 cubic metres of water, however the water 

could not reach the hydrants because of an estimated 2,000 breaks in the underground 

piping. 

Due to the large number of fires that broke out over the ensuing two days the 

system of cisterns proved inadequate in preventing the spread of the fires. In all, water 

for firefighting was available for 2 to 3 hours. 

Attempts to draft and relay water from the fire boats was inadequate because 

of the relatively small diameter hose used in Kobe (50mm and 65mm). 

Residents were seen fighting the fires with bucket brigades using sewer water. 

An interesting fact, which became obvious when viewing the city from the air, 

is that there are virtually no private swimming pools in Kobe and very few public 

pools. The N.S.W.F.B. Static Water Supply program has highlighted the value of 

swimming pools as a firefighting resource, but it certainly doesn't apply to Japan. 

Nine days 

after the earthquake, 

367,000 households 

still had no water 

supply and, in 

heavily affected 

areas, citizens were 

advised to plan for 

having no water 

supply for up to two 

months. 

Citizens queue for water (Nishinomiya Ward) 

22




TRANSPORT 

Since Kobe City is squeezed into a narrow corridor between mountains and 

the sea, all of it’s transport options, road, rail, subways and expressways, were 

concentrated into areas that were severely damaged by the earthquake. All city streets 

were choked with traffic and blocked by fallen debris. 500 metres of the Hanshin 

Expressway, the major traffic artery through the city, fell over sideways. The resultant 

chaos meant that emergency vehicles found it almost impossible to penetrate the 

gridlock. This situation persisted for several days after the earthquake. Access to 

heavily damaged areas was not adequately restricted and emergency traffic into these 

areas was severely hampered. Traffic control was neglected and many photographs of 

damaged areas show people and vehicles moving freely around severely damaged 

unstable buildings. 

The Hanshin Expressway 

Twisted rail lines 

23




The following is a list of other difficulties identified by the Kobe Fire Bureau: 

• On duty firefighters couldn't contact their families. A notification system has now 

been implemented. 

• Off duty firefighters, when recalled to duty, couldn't get to fire stations or were 

involved in assisting their own families and neighbours. 

• Around 170 fires broke out as a result of the quake and it took 2 days to control 

them 

because of access and water supply problems. 

• Damage to fire stations hampered response. Four Fire Stations: Fukiai, Ikuta, 

Suijo 

sub-branch and Aoki, were destroyed by the earthquake. 

• Residents converged on local fire stations in search of assistance and equipment 

• Residents in city areas were unaware of the circumstances and probable location 

of their neighbours, which was a contributing factor in casualty rates and resource 

allocation. In the more rural areas on Awaji Island the communities were much 

more closely knit and the status of elderly and other vulnerable residents was 

much easier to ascertain. 

• Arriving rescue teams were uncoordinated, often unheralded and tended to 

congregate at Fire HQ only to be redeployed to areas they had already passed 

coming into the city. This confusion resulted in many lost hours traversing the 

congested city. 

• Traffic was in gridlock for several days after the earthquake. 

• Fire vehicles staged in streets caused local traffic problems and resulted in many 

complaints. 

• Rapid fire spread through areas of old, tightly packed timber buildings. 

• Japanese houses are traditionally constructed with timber frames and very heavily 

tiled roofs to withstand the seasonal typhoons. These types of houses collapsed in 

great numbers and caused many deaths. Kobe Fire Bureau estimates that 90% of 

deaths were caused by building collapse. 

24




• Many electrical fires broke out in the hours and days after the quake as electrical 

supply authorities came under immense public pressure to reconnect power 

supplies. Many of these fires began in damaged buildings which had been 

evacuated after the earthquake and were subsequently unoccupied when the power 

came back on. 

• There were concerns that there would be widespread outbreaks of disease due to 

contaminated water supplies and broken sewer pipes, but these were limited due 

to the fact that it was mid-winter in Japan and temperatures were near freezing. 

• Helicopter surveillance was considered essential in the early hours of the disaster. 

The helicopters were available and ready to fly but there were great difficulties in 

getting the pilots to the aerodrome. The helicopter base is located on a man-made 

island and areas of reclaimed land such as these sustained considerable damage. 

• Hospitals and other health services were totally overwhelmed. Many hospitals in 

Japan use a "Just-in-Time" delivery system and only had one or two days supply 

of consumables (Hill p. 184). 

• International rescue teams from a variety of sources and with a variety of 

capabilities were "forced onto" local authorities through pressure from 

governments and this caused major logistical and strategic problems. For example, 

language problems caused great difficulties and, in many cases, incoming teams 

had to be housed and fed locally, further burdening already stretched local 

resources. 

• Hazmat incidents not detected until damaged buildings were re-occupied. 

• Despite widespread criticism of authorities for not accepting offers of assistance 

from foreign rescue organizations, I got the distinct impression that, at the 

strategic level, it was still unwelcome, mostly for the reasons outlined above. 

However, in interviews with rescue personnel, the feeling was that the more 

resources made available the better. 

• The earthquake impacted most severely on the elderly. Apart from their physical 

vulnerability, the elderly often slept downstairs in their children's houses. "More 

than half the dead were aged over sixty and the largest single demographic group 

was women in their seventies. One of the great shortages in the refuges where the 

survivors huddled was of adult diapers" (Hills pp. 185). 

25




FIRE SERVICE INNOVATIONS 

MINIFLOATS 

As a part of the Kobe earthquake response, ships at anchor were used 

extensively for the storage of supplies and for provision of relief and recovery 

facilities. Limitations in the use of this system became apparent in shallow waters 

where the ships were not able to get close enough to the shore to be fully utilised. In 

response to this problem the Japanese Department of Transport is constructing three 

Floating Counter Disaster Bases or "Minifloats" at a cost of approximately AUS$15- 

20 million each. The floats are about the size of a football field. One float will be 

maintained in Tokyo Bay, one in Ise Bay (Nagoya) and one in Osaka Bay. The 

technology used in the construction of the floats is the same as that used for larger offshore 

sites used for airports. These are commonly called "megafloats". 

It is planned that, in the event of another earthquake, a float will be towed by 

tugboats to the disaster site where it will be used for a variety of uses such as a 

helicopter base, transport and storage of food, water or other supplies, or as an 

evacuation/operations centre. Each of the floats is allocated a "response area" within 

it's immediate area, however the three floats are not identical and can be used in 

isolation or together in a variety of formations to suit the needs of the day. 

When not being used for disaster relief, the floats are used as fixed wharves 

for passenger ships (Department of Transport booklet). 

An artist's impression of the Tokyo Bay Minifloat 

26




Japanese fire authorities 

have determined that, in the 

case of a major earthquake, 

many people will be isolated 

without normal services for an 

extended period of time. A 

figure of 72 hours is often 

quoted. Kobe Fire Bureau's 

own statistics showed that 95% 

of all rescues were carried out 

by the local residents 

themselves. 

PUBLIC EDUCATION & TRAINING 

Public training and disaster education is a major part of the Fire Service's 

counter disaster plans and is a part of everyday life for the citizens. Fire Service 

throughout Japan conduct large scale community training days on a given Sunday 

every month. This involves assembling at a suitable training area, such as a school 

yard, and setting up smoke mazes, conducting basic fire fighting classes, teaching first 

aid, home preparation and general public safety education. 

It is the experience of Japanese Fire Services that 

public education and training in disaster preparedness 

alone can be ineffective. In order to expand and improve 

training throughout the community the fire services are 

working with relief organisations, such as meals on 

wheels, and service clubs, such as Rotary. They hope 

that by doing this, the community will be in a better 

position to work together in times of disasters. 

(Interview with 1 st Assistant Chief Masayoshi Matsumoto) 

27




FIRE STATIONS 

Fire stations built since the earthquake have both passive and active protective 

measures included in their designs. Because Japanese cities tend to have a lesser 

number, but much larger, fire stations than we do in Australia, consideration must be 

given to counteracting the natural frequency of the building when it is shaken by an 

earthquake. To do this, the longer stations include heavy buttress-type columns 

throughout the open engine bay areas. 

A more sophisticated 

anti-quake device was the 

fitting of seismic buffers 

into the foundations of the 

building. These consisted of 

what could be compared to a 

pile of coins wrapped in 

rubber. The sideways 

movement of the ground is 

absorbed by the plates 

sliding over one another by 

up to 300mm in any 

direction. The buffers could 

also absorb up and down 

movement up to about 

50mm. 

The cost of fitting this particular type of buffer was quoted at about 5% of the total 

cost of the construction. 

The dampers pictured above and the 

bracing shown to the right are part of the 

earthquake-proof construction used in Chuo 

Fire Station in downtown Kobe. 

Because of it's resistance to earthquake 

damage, the station is also configured as a 

disaster control centre with extensive facilities 

including sleeping quarters and laundry 

facilities for extended operations. 

New stations are built with: 

• Flexible pipe fittings to reduce breakage, 

• Roofs designed to gather and store 

rainwater for firefighting purposes, 

• 72 hour power generators, 

• Solar hot water systems 

28




WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS 

Following the damage to water mains and the inadequacy of the existing 

cisterns to meet the demands of fighting the fires following the earthquake, the 

government and Fire Bureau has implemented a comprehensive plan aimed at 

overcoming future water supply problems: 

1. Construction of 100,000 litre cisterns (at a cost of approximately AUS$1.5 to 2 

million each); 

2. The deployment of 11 bulk water supply units which consist of a 10,000 litre 

tanker, a 5,000 litre per minute pumper and a hose layer (see page 17); 

3. Provision of 100 mm hose, carried by the hose layer, to overcome the reported 

problems with insufficient water volume from relays from the fire boats. 

4. Water mains are being strengthened, particularly near disaster shelters and on 

access routes to hospitals; 

5. To increase the viability of rivers as static supplies, intake pits and access roads 

have been constructed; 

6. Subterranean cisterns for storage of drinking water; 

7. Underground water tanks for multi-storey buildings. 

OTHER INNOVATIONS 

• Mutual Reinforcement Agreements with neighbouring cities; 

• Additional rescue, firefighting and EMS squads have been deployed; 

• An increased number of radio bands; 

• City surveillance cameras have been upgraded to allow uninterrupted operation, 

even if the normal power supply is cut off; 

• The helicopters have been fitted with satellite video cameras for real-time 

transmission to control centres and on-scene monitors; 

• A mutual aid agreement has been developed with taxi companies to provide 

intelligence on damage throughout the city via the taxi radio bands; 

29




• Agreements have been reached with private companies to provide non-emergency 

ambulance services in the case of major disasters to free official ambulances for 

serious cases only; 

• Increased Volunteer Corps training and involvement; 

• Fostering "Disaster Prevention/ Welfare Oriented Communites" (Public Education 

& Training); 

• A program has been developed whereby service stations take an active role in 

disaster mitigation by providing fuel, lending equipment, distributing disaster 

prevention information and providing intelligence. Approximately 200 service 

stations have signed up for the program; 

• Scientific attempts to develop systems whereby fire can be extinguished with a 

greatly reduced water supply; 

• The "Kobe City Fire Spread Simulation System" which is a computer program 

which can map the fire spread patterns for each building in the city; 

• "Quake-Activeted Breakers" which automatically shut off power supplies at a predetermined 

earthquake intensity. 

("The Fire Department's Key Initiatives after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake", 

Kobe City Fire Bureau) 

30




N.S.W.F.B. STANDARD OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES - 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, SECTION 19. 

S.O.G. no 19 outlines procedures to be implemented in the event of a catastrophic 

occurrence like an earthquake. My research has highlighted some facts which may be 

worthy of inclusion in the S.O.G. to enhance preparedness and firefighter safety: 

• In the event of an earthquake, appliances should be moved out of the engine bays 

because even a large earthquake may be a precursor to an even larger event or 

series of aftershocks soon after; 

• Section 1.4.8 instructs stations to conduct a "rapid drive through assessment" as 

soon as possible via a predetermined route. 

In an article published in the American "Firehouse" magazine in December 1989 

(p. 48) by San Francisco Assistant Chief Frank T. Blackburn, this practise is 

described as a "fundamental error". It states that "Companies" (firefighting crews) 

"either will be called immediately to an emergency or respond on their own to the 

first emergency encountered". He goes on to state that "the Fire Department's 

function is "firefighting and other emergency response, not intelligence 

gathering". 

If a drive through assessment is considered practical, it should be advised that, 

following an earthquake, any such predetermined route should avoid passing over 

or under bridges. Damaged bridges may appear sound but could collapse under 

the weight of a fire appliance. This is particularly important with bridges spanning 

bodies of water, due to the effects of liquefaction on saturated soils supporting 

bridge foundations; 

• Guidelines for determining the best predetermined reconnaissance route should be 

considered. For example, carrying out assessment of hospitals, schools, nursing 

homes, static water supplies etc. Guidelines may need to be varied depending on 

the time of day, the time of year or season. 

• Section 1.3.10 recommends "innovative solutions" be found in regard to food and 

fuel shortages for operational activities. This section should be clarified, with 

some practical solutions being offered. 

• A section outlining suggested protocols for off-duty firefighters could be included 

to avoid confusion and maximise recall efficiency; 

• If a tremor is felt whilst driving in a fire appliance, then it should immediately be 

moved to the side of the road, away from walls, power lines and overpasses and 

personnel should remain in the vehicle until the tremor has passed; 

31




• Following a tremor, firefighters in fire stations should immediately turn off stoves 

and shut off gas and electricity supplies until it can be determined that the building 

is safe. It is also recommended that at fire stations with gas connected, an 

appropriately sized wrench (if required to shut off gas) may be permanently 

attached to the gas valve by a short length of chain; 

CONCLUSION 

I saw little in Japan to suggest that, as a response agency, the N.S.W.F.B. is 

less than first rate. The Japanese Fire Services are abundantly funded and 

equipped and are obviously very professional organisations. In terms of 

equipment, appliances, personnel and training there were many similarities 

between the Japanese model and what we have here in N.S.W. In some respects, 

we may even hold certain advantages over the Japanese services. For example, we 

have a large number of stations, appliances and other resources under a single 

command structure rather than the city-based model used throughout Japan. When 

we get our people on the ground, whatever is asked of them will, invariably get 

done, and done to a very high standard. But in some respects we are doing our 

operational firefighters a great disservice. 

Where we are lagging behind is in preparation. Not so much in preparation of 

our own organisation, but in doing our part to ensure that the community is 

prepared to deal with a disaster such as an earthquake. When our firefighters 

respond to a pan-urban catastrophe, they will be faced with an unprepared, 

expectant and, for the most part, helpless population. Emergency services will be 

overwhelmed for days, or even weeks if even a moderate earthquake hits 

metropolitan Sydney. Many people will be left to their own devices, possibly 

without shelter, power, water, transport, food or medicine for an extended period 

of time. 

We can't prevent an earthquake, or even predict when or where one will occur 

but we, as a fire service, can certainly play a major role in minimising the impact 

of an earthquake by educating and training the community to help itself in times 

of dire need. 

Three of our "critical capabilities for success" - understanding community 

needs, promoting community safety and minimising the impact of emergency 

incidents - may be better served by what we teach others to do rather than by what 

we do ourselves. 

32




RECOMMENDATIONS 

MAJOR RECOMMENDATION 

In the days following the Kobe earthquake, engineers from the Earthquake 

Engineering Research Institute, Oakland, California surveyed the damage and 

observed and noted the activities occurring in Kobe. In their assessment of the 

emergency response to the disaster they state that "Our observations confirm the 

often-repeated warning that citizens should be prepared to be largely on their own 

for the first 72 hours after a disaster" (Comartin et al p. 75). Undoubtedly, 

communities in New South Wales could face similar circumstances in the event of 

a major disaster and their needs are no different to those of the people of Kobe. 

It is recommended that the Government of New South Wales, in concert with 

the New South Wales Fire Brigades and other Government departments and 

agencies such as the State Rescue Board, State Emergency Services, the 

Department of Health, the Department of Education and the Police, takes a proactive 

role in public education and training of the community in disaster 

preparedness. A comprehensive program which meets the requirements of our 

communities needs to be developed and applied so that disaster preparedness 

becomes a normal part of daily life. The N.S.W.F.B., already conducting public 

and corporate fire safety programs, may be strategically placed with appropriate 

expertise and resources, to facilitate such a program. 

I further recommend that models such as the Los Angeles Fire Department's 

"Community Emergency Response Team" (C.E.R.T.) program (see appendix II) 

or the San Francisco Fire Department's "Neighbourhood Emergency Response 

Team" (N.E.R.T.) program be evaluated for their suitability and a report be 

submitted to Government as soon as practicable. 

The LAFD CERT program was operative during the 1994 Northridge 

Earthquake and evaluation of the concept's effectiveness in a major disaster has 

now been tested and evaluated. The results of the evaluation would indicate the 

necessity and viability of such programs in large urban centres. 

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS 

• Category III USAR training be prioritised to ensure that sufficient senior officers 

are available for management roles in times of disaster. 

• All New South Wales Fire Bigades firefighters be trained up to category 1 USAR 

level; 

• Take steps to minimise the effect of earthquakes on fire stations and fire crews, as 

simple as applying recommended practises for ordinary households in earthquakeprone 

areas (see appendix III) 

33




• The N.S.W.F.B. produce and distribute earthquake preparedness leaflets as a part 

of public education programs; 

• If practicable, N.S.W.F.B. Communications Centres be included in the automatic 

seismic warning system, "EPAR". If we can determine the location and size of an 

earthquake quickly, estimates of it’s effects can be made to assist in the initial 

response; 

• A GPS positioning system could be introduced in order to establish the 

whereabouts of all appliances in the event of total communications failure; 

• Mobile phones be provided for all appliances to: 

(a) Provide a secondary means of communication if the radio system fails, and 

(b) Gives firefighters an opportunity to establish the status of their own families - 

this was a serious problem in Kobe 

• A system be developed whereby on-duty firefighters can determine the well-being 

of their own families in times of major disasters (see above); 

• As previously stated, the Kobe experience showed that after an earthquake 

residents will go to their local fire station in search of assistance. Since the crew 

would have already been responded or carrying out reconnaissance and would be 

absent, it is recommended that fire stations be issued with signs to redirect 

members of the public to appropriate relief centres; 

• Consideration be given to recommending that an emergency relief centre network 

based in local primary schools be considered; 

• Emergency ration packs be issued to all fire stations - see S.O.G 19, section 

1..3.10 

34




APPENDIX I 

RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN 

RISK MANAGEMENT CONTEXT STATEMENT 

1. STRATEGIC CONTEXT 

The N.S.W.F.B’s strategic role in the event of a major earthquake is determined 

by: 

• Legislative responsibilities. 

Under the Fire Brigades Act 1989, the N.S.W.F.B is responsible for all 

fires in fire districts, all land based hazardous materials incidents and 

hazardous materials incidents on inland waterways. 

Under the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act, the 

N.S.W.F.B provides primary and secondary accredited rescue units 

throughout the State and specialist technical rescue capabilities for Urban 

Search & Rescue. 

The State emergency response plan known as “Displan” provides for 

the N.S.W.F.B to carry out it’s duties as detailed above. 

• Public Perception and Expectation 

The public expects that the N.S.W.F.B will carry out it’s 

responsibilities in a professional manner and will support other emergency 

services in response to any event that has a significant negative affect on 

people, property or the natural environment in N.S.W. 

• The organisation's responsibility to protect the Government of the day 

from avoidable criticism with regard to emergency response. 

35




2. ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT 

The goals and objectives of the N.S.W.F.B and it’s physical resources and 

capabilities provide for a significant role in disaster mitigation and response. 

The New South Wales Fire Brigades Annual Report 1999/2000 states: 

• OUR PURPOSE 

"Our purpose is to enhance community safety, quality of life and 

confidence by minimising the impact of hazards and emergency incidents 

on the people, environment and economy of N.S.W." 

• OUR SERVICE 

• "Our highly skilled firefighters use their expertise and experience to 

educate others in preventing and preparing for emergencies." 

• "Our firefighters and support staff provide reliable, rapid help in 

emergencies – 24 hours a day, 7 days a week." 

• "Our firefighters specialise in emergencies involving fire, hazardous 

materials, motor vehicle accidents, building collapse and other 

dangerous situations." 

• "We save lives and reduce the number of injuries caused by these 

emergencies." 

• "We minimise damage to the environment, property and the State’s 

economy." 

• "In partnership with the community and other emergency sservices, we 

plan and train for the emergencies we all hope will never happen." 

• OUR 10 CRITICAL CAPABILITIES FOR SUCCESS 

"Understanding community needs" 

"Promoting community safety" 

"Minimising the impact of emergency incidents" 

"Developing our professional workforce and improving safety" 

"Working with other organisations as partners" 

"Managing resources and logistics efficiently and effectively" 

"Using information to learn and improve our services" 

"Making fair, reasonable decisions" 

"Implementing good ideas and better technology" 

"Leadership and planning" 

36




• STRATEGIC LOCATION AND CAPABILITIES OF OUR 

RESOURCES 

3. RISK MANAGEMENT CONTEXT 

• To protect the organisation’s human and material resources and maintain 

operational capabilities. 

• To help the community to prepare for and recover from major disasters 

through public education and training. 

• To prepare the organisation to respond to major disasters in an effective 

and efficient manner. 

• To protect the organisation's reputation and public standing 

• To protect the organisation from criticism and accusations of negligence, 

incompetence or mis-management. (Radio commentators' (largely 

unjustified) attacks on the SES and Major Horrie Howard, following the 

Sydney hailstorms, were a graphic example of what could happen) 

• Every firefighter in every fire station in N.S.W has a role to play 

RISK EVALUATION 

Any negative effects on the general public, property in N.S.W., the State's 

economy, the State's natural environment, the Government of N.S.W. and the New 

South Wales Fire Brigades are to be considered in assessing a proper and reasonable 

response to the risk of a major earthquake in the Sydney Basin. 

The effect that a major earthquake can have on a modern city was graphically 

illustrated on 17 th January 1995 in Kobe. Every facet of modern life is, if not totally 

destroyed, severely disrupted. The effects could continue to be felt for decades. The 

question we must ask ourselves is this: Could a major earthquake occur in the Sydney 

region? The Newcastle Earthquake was a definite near miss. All of the preceding 

information in this report is aimed at identifying the risk and it's potential 

consequences. The NSWFB cannot prevent an earthquake, but it can certainly plan to 

reduce the impact of one. 

37




QUALITATIVE & QUANTITIVE MEASUREMENT OF LIKELIHOOD 

Geophysical analysis and regional history indicate that the chances of a significant 

seismic event occurring in the Sydney area is very rare. However, the consequences 

of such an event are likely to be catastrophic. 

By applying the process of evaluation outlined by the NSWFB Risk 

Management Summary Sheet, it would be reasonable to conclude that the catastrophic 

consequences of such an event would indicate that senior management attention is 

warranted. 

In a cost versus outcome analysis if, at the very least, a public education and 

training program is instigated and an earthquake does occur, then it could be 

reasonably argued that the Government had made a positive, pro-active effort to 

reduce the impact of the event on the community through public empowerment. 

If such an event never occurs, the Government has still made important, 

beneficial, on-going partnerships with the community at relatively small cost 

The benefits of such relationships, even in the absence of a major event, would 

be highlighted often in reponse to smaller, local events. 

38




APPENDIX II 

C.E.R.T. TRAINING 

When a disaster strikes, denied immediate professional assistance in meeting 

life saving and life sustaining needs, families, neighbours and workmates will 

spontaneously endeavour to help each other. Following the Mexico City Earthquake 

100 untrained volunteers died trying to rescue people trapped in destroyed buildings. 

People will always go to the assistance of those around them in times of emergency, 

however a high number of casualties among volunteers is preventable through training 

and education. 

In 1985, the Los Angeles City Fire Department, acknowledging that, in the 

event of a major disaster like an earthquake, that emergency services would be 

overwhelmed for up to 72 hours, developed and implemented the Community 

Emergency Response Team concept. 

C.E.R.T. training provides the primary benefits of: 

• Educating citizens about what to expect from emergency services following a 

disaster; 

• Delivering the message that the citizens themselves have an important role to 

play in preparing for disasters and mitigating their consequences; 

• Providing citizens with critical life saving and safety skills; 

• Providing auxilliary first reponder units which can offer immediate assistance 

until emergency services arrive. 

C.E.R.T. training also provides a range of secondary benefits such as 

enhancing the relationship between the Fire Service and the community and 

providing a forum whereby community needs can be ascertained. 

In the United States the C.E.R.T. concept has been adopted by The Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and The Emergency Management Institute 

(EMI) and, since 1993 when the training was made available nationally, communties 

in the states of California, Washington, Oregon, Florida, Missouri and Kentucky have 

had access to C.E.R.T. training. 

teams. 

The LAFD program now has tens of thousands of members and hundreds of 

(The above information was taken from the extensive C.E.R.T. websites of the LAFD 

and FEMA) 

39




APPENDIX III 

BASIC PRE-EARTHQUAKE PRECAUTIONS 

• Secure water heater, refrigerator and top-heavy items to wall studs; 

• Secure overhead lighting fixtures; 

• Store heavy items and breakables on lower shelves; 

• Fasten shelves to wall studs; 

• Isolate flammable and hazardous materials and chemicals; 

• Put latches on cupboard doors; 

• Consider using film on windows to prevent shattering; 

40




BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1999/2000 Annual Report, New South Wales Fire Brigades, New South Wales 

Government 

Blackburn, F. T., Scawthorn, C. & Neil, J. 1989, "Earthquake Preparedness for Fire 

Departments", Firehouse Magazine, December 1989 pp. 36-52. 

Boughton, G. 1995, Effects of Earthquakes on the Built Environment, paper presented 

at Earthquake 1995 - WA State Emergency Service Seminar-Workshop, Perth. 

Bukowski, R.W. & Scawthorn, S.E. 1994, 'Earthquake and Fire in Japan: When the 

Threat Became a Reality', NFPA Journal, May/June 1994, pp. 89-96. 

Comartin, C., Greene, M. & Tubbesing, S. (eds) 1995, The Hyogo-Ken Nanbu 

Earthquake, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Oakland, California. 

'Dams & Earthquakes', Seismology Research Centre, 

http://www.seis.com.au/Basics/Dams.html 

Department of Primary Industry and Energy 1995, Earthquakes, Australian 

Geological Survey Centre, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. 

'Don't Ignore the Need for Earthquake & Disaster Preparedness', Los Angeles City 

Fire Department, 2000. 

'Earthquake Awareness for Australians', Emergency Management Australia, 

http://www.ema.gov.au/ema-eq04.htm 

'Earthquake Effects', Seismology Research Centre, 

http://www.seis.com.au/Basics/Effects.html 

'Earthquakes in Australia', Seismology Research Centre, 

http://www.seis.com.au/Basics/EQAust.html 

'Earthquake Location', Seismology Research Centre, 

http://www.seis.com.au/Basics/Location.html 

'Earthquake Size', Seismology Research Centre, 

http://www.seis.com.au/Basics/Size.html 

'Great Kansai Earthquake', Asahi Shimbun, 1 February 1995, Asahigraph Publication. 

41




Hills, B. 1996, Japan - Behind the Lines, Hodder & Stoughton, Sydney. 

Hunt, A., 'Statement in the Matter of the Newcastle Earthquake', New South Wales 

Fire Brigades, 20/2/1990 

Ingleton, J. (comp. & ed.) 1999, Natural Disaster Management, Tudor Rose Holdings 

Limited, London, England. 

'Kobe Earthquake', Athena Curriculum, 

http://www.athena.ivv.nasa.gov/curric/land/kobe.html 

McCue, K. 'Seismic Hazard Mapping in Australia, the Southwest Pacific and 

Southeast Asia', Australian Geological Survey Organisation. 

Plimer, I.R. 1989, 'How, When, Where and Why an Earthquake Occurs', Newcastle 

Herald, 30 December, p. 11. 

Reid, T. 1995, "Kobe Wakes to a Nightmare", National Geographic, vol.188, no. 1, 

July 1995, pp 112-136. 

Scawthorne, C. (ed) 1984, The Anticipated Tokai Earthquake: Japanese Prediction 

and Preparedness Activities, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, 

Oakland, California. 

Segawa, T. 1994, 'The Anatomy of Disaster', Fire Engineers Journal, December, 

1994, pp. 30-32. 

Stuart, H.J. 1993, The Earthquake at Newcastle, N.S.W., Australia - 1989, paper 

presented to the Victorian Combined Emergency Services Seminar, La Trobe 

University, Melbourne, November. 

'The December 28, 1989 Newcastle Earthquake', EQE Journal, 1990, San Francisco. 

'The Fire Department's Key Initiatives after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake', 

Kobe City Fire Department, 2000. 

'The January 17, 1995 Kobe Earthquake. An EQE Summary Report', EQE International, 

http://www.eqe.com/publications/kobe/kobe.html 

University of Washington 1998, Liquefaction Website, 

www.ce.washington,edu/˜liquefaction/html/main.html 

42




'What is an Earthquake?', Seismology Research Centre, 

http://www.seis.com.au/Basics/Intro.html 

'Why Monitor Earthquakes?', Seismology Research Centre, 

http://www.seis.com.au/Basics/Why.html 

43

Fire Service Earthquake Preparedness - NSW Department of ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?