Memorandum of Points and Authorities A. Preliminary - Justice Denied

known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the
Fourteenth Amendment . . .”).) Testimony need not constitute perjury
for it to be false evidence. (In re Pratt (1999) 69Cal.App.4th 1294,
1313-14 (“There is no requirement under the statute [Penal Code
section 1473(b)(1)] that the defendant demonstrate that ‘testimony was
perjured . . .’), quoting, In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408, 424.)
California law applies the same standard of materiality whether or
not the prosecution had knowledge the testimony or other evidence
14
was false. (In re Pratt, 69Cal.App.4th at 1313-14 (“There is no
requirement under the statute [Penal Code section 1473(b)(1)] that the
14
Under federal constitutional law, the standard of materiality
differs depending on whether the prosecution had knowledge the
testimony was false. If the prosecution “knew or should have known”
the testimony was false, it is deemed material “if there is ‘any
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the
judgement of the jury.” (Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103, 96 S. Ct. at 2397.) The
Court in Agurs explained that this strict standard of materiality is
appropriate in cases where the prosecution knew or should have
known the evidence was false because such cases “involve prosecutorial
misconduct” as well as “a corruption of the truth-seeking function of
the trial process.” (Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103, 96 S. Ct. at 2397.)
The prosecution is deemed to have knowledge that evidence is
false if any representative of the state, including police officers, has
such knowledge. (Napue, 360 U.S. at 269 (“false evidence, known to be
such by representatives of the State . . .”); In re Imbler (1963) 60
Cal.2d 554, 566 (“If any representative of the state connected with the
prosecution either gives perjured testimony or knows that other
prosecution witnesses have perjured themselves, the writ [of habeas
corpus] will issue.”)
If the prosecution did not have knowledge the testimony was
false, it is deemed material if “the false testimony could . . . in any
reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury . . .”
(Giglio v. United States (1972) 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L.
th
Ed.2d 104; Hall v. Dept of Corrections (9 Cir. 2003) 343 F.3d 976,
982.)
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