978-1-4438-4527-4-sample

Recommendations

Info

2 Introduction was wrong with the rules for segregated water fountains in the U.S., for instance, was the fact that they left members of both groups to wonder what they had done to merit such exclusive treatment. One cannot choose a skin color, we might explain. Similar explanations would account for the improvement in attitudes which led to more females being able to enter the workplace. One can now change gender, but not easily, and this does in any event only lead to new questions about that difference. In instances like these, the question is not whether differences exist, but what society ought to make of them. The good news is that many now think that differences should be irrelevant for purposes of choosing employees or allowing people to hydrate. Even the most cynical among us can find some encouragement in the fact that society is taking more responsibility for clarifying the issues related to difference, inclusion, accommodation, and justice. But we are less accustomed to discussing differences that seem to relate to cognitive abilities or behavioral traits, and I will try to say a bit about those here. As an introduction to the essays in this anthology, I want to address the following problem. We take it on faith that it is better to live in a world where no person has to feel excluded, and one suspects, where fewer people need to feel uncomfortable. But the challenge has always been one of knowing how we can make good on such a lofty promise. I will try to pose questions rather than supply answers. I am not convinced that the answers we need exist. My goal is to take a skeptical view, and suggest ways that we might rethink the philosophical side of our labeling routines. If I am correct, we are too casual about the fact that the same person who devotes her life to eliminating discrimination in society can take real offense at being told that she should simply flip a coin to decide on a spouse, or that she should consult tea leaves when deciding whether to share a reading table with two acquaintances. Our reform efforts must include an examination of the ways that we might cite these comparatively "new" differences when we explain who it is that we want to spend time with, who we want to work next to, and how we want our children to choose their friends. We need to do this if we want to respond to what are also relatively new claims of injustice or offense. But allegations about exclusion or injustice have proven to be challenging topics of conversation, let alone reform, in part because the linguistic customs that we use even to discuss these things are themselves prone to misinterpretation and controversy (Agam Segal, 2009). A common way to offend someone in scholarly discussion is to allege that a claim of injustice is in fact trivial. So long as the perceived seriousness of an offense can turn on a disputed interpretation
What’s the Difference? of the language involved, questions about which claims scholars should address will seem to remain wide open. That is especially so because many of the qualities or attributes that mark differences are subject to changing attitudes and interpretations. The continually evolving understanding of what constitutes a difference goes hand-in-hand, of course, with changing interpretations of social justice. This is what give such differences their "newness," and in some cases, their trendiness. A behavioral trait that one person speaks of as a "symptom" might to another person be a feature worth describing in much more positive language. Likewise, behavioral traits that some parents might trouble over will to other parents be looked more positively, to the point that a demand might be made for additional resources on the child's behalf, even while other parents advocated for rules that would keep the children separated. Because there are so many ways that injustice claims can arise over these differences, it should not surprise us that some reformers would, for a brief period anyway, recommend a relativistic position. They would have us agree to disagree, but without anyone claiming possession of the truth. Instead, we would justify our non-judgmental stance on the basis that truth is a slippery concept, or that no one is really sure how to even define the differences in contention. Disputes over what should be done about differences can also lead to a refusal to discuss things any further, with the participants convinced that nothing is to be gained from those who, for various reasons, just don't "get it." We understand the differences well enough, they might argue, and in some cases we can simply ask those who are being labeled as different what they want most (or we can make assumptions about what we think they want.) I'm not sure that we have the luxury of taking up either position. But I am especially skeptical of the first. It would be a mistake with far-reaching consequences if we were to reason that in the midst of this uncertainty about which differences count we should play it safe, treating all claims of injustice or offense as though they are worthy of our attention. That quasirelativistic position would not be nearly as progressive as it first appears, and it would be a poor way to show how sensitive we are to exclusion, offense, or other problems related to differences. We cannot learn to pretend that we do not notice differences; we can only decide what should be done when we notice. This might seem to overlook the prospect that, in our conversations about difference, we could stipulate one or two bedrock values that we think everyone holds. Values that have to do with rationality are traditional candidates in that contest, and have been ever since it seemed necessary to 3
Page 1: Ethics and Neurodiversity
Page 4 and 5: Ethics and Neurodiversity, Edited b
Page 6 and 7: vi Contents Chapter Seven..........
Page 8 and 9: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Earlier versions of
Page 12 and 13: 4 Introduction make one of the most
Page 14 and 15: 6 Introduction Once we recognize th
Page 16 and 17: 8 Introduction they use to self-ide
Page 18 and 19: 10 Introduction labels with. But we
Page 20 and 21: 12 Introduction play. On the contra
Page 22 and 23: 14 Introduction our ability to just
Page 24 and 25: 16 Introduction responsibility, res
Page 26 and 27: CHAPTER ONE NOISE AND METONYMIC THO
Page 28 and 29: 20 Chapter One superior to theirs.
Page 30: 22 Chapter One “transfer of the n

978-1-4438-4527-4-sample

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?