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Quantitatively Assessing and Visualising Industrial System Attack Surfaces

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CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY 19<br />

4. Combining other sources of information such as exploit databases <strong>and</strong> Google’s<br />

Geoquery we derive further information.<br />

To comply with our own rule 3, in order to discover devices we don’t scan any systems<br />

directly; instead, we query Shodan [12], a specialised search engine that scans the Internet<br />

for HTTP, FTP, SSH <strong>and</strong> Telnet connectivity.<br />

2.3 Device <strong>and</strong> <strong>System</strong> classification<br />

During the course of this study we have identified systems <strong>and</strong> devices in Shodan’s data<br />

primarily through domain expertise. This requires knowledge of the products, both soft-<br />

ware <strong>and</strong> hardware running in industrial control systems. In practice this can be done<br />

by anyone spending time reading product manuals, but previous experience from these<br />

industries expedites such efforts. However, we specifically reject the use of such knowledge<br />

to obfuscate issues from the reader, therefore an attempt to build a loose taxonomy has<br />

been made. This should explain the general purpose of each ‘type’ of system or device<br />

to the reader. This taxonomy is not an official one, but rather an informal aggregation<br />

of the results into broad categories. Since these products are necessarily as diverse as the<br />

industries they serve, all of our results do not neatly fit into the boxes below. However, the<br />

lists below serve sufficiently to open the debate on the general connectedness of <strong>Industrial</strong><br />

Control <strong>System</strong>s.<br />

2.3.1 Devices<br />

1. RTU – Remote Terminal Unit or sometimes Remote Telemetry Unit. This is a<br />

microprocessor used to transmit telemetry back from the field <strong>and</strong> to control de-<br />

vices in the field. They are often widely geographically dispersed, <strong>and</strong> use diverse<br />

wireless communications accordingly. They can run simple safety logic programs<br />

for redundancy <strong>and</strong> to reduce control delays.<br />

2. PLC – Programmable Logic Controller. These are similar to RTUs, but are more<br />

often deployed without their own power supply <strong>and</strong> using wired communications.<br />

They are more often found on a plant floor or factory, where controllers are close to<br />

the centre of control.<br />

3. PAC – Programmable Automation Controller. These provide very similar functions<br />

to PLCs, but are programmed differently, <strong>and</strong> use an open, modular, architecture.<br />

They typically differ in how they do things from PLCs, but still serve the same<br />

purpose of acquiring data <strong>and</strong> performing process control.

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