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Quantitatively Assessing and Visualising Industrial System Attack Surfaces

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<strong>Quantitatively</strong> <strong>Assessing</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Visualising</strong> <strong>Industrial</strong> <strong>System</strong><br />

<strong>Attack</strong> <strong>Surfaces</strong><br />

Éireann P. Leverett<br />

Supervisors: Dr. Frank Stajano & Prof. Jon Crowcroft<br />

Summary<br />

Any industrial control systems connected to the Internet are naturally exposed to online<br />

threats such as viruses, Denial of Service <strong>and</strong> targeted application or machine compromise.<br />

These threats may come from those seeking to inflict mischievous damage, make money, or<br />

sabotage national infrastructure remotely. Best practice, <strong>and</strong> indeed national regulatory<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards such as NERC-CIP, m<strong>and</strong>ates a strict electronic security perimeter, particularly<br />

since few devices used in control systems support default authentication 1 . Despite that,<br />

even though many utilities claim to comply with NERC-CIP, we have located on the<br />

Internet many industrial control devices available for connection.<br />

Examining results over a two year time window through the specialised historical search<br />

engine Shodan, we located, identified <strong>and</strong> categorised more than 7500 such devices—<br />

HVAC systems, building management systems, meters, <strong>and</strong> other industrial control de-<br />

vices or SCADA servers (supervisory control <strong>and</strong> data acquisition). In conjunction with<br />

information from exploit databases, this could be used to carry out remote attacks on se-<br />

lected devices or identify networks for further reconnaissance <strong>and</strong> exploitation. Malicious<br />

actors might already be doing this.<br />

To level the playing field for utility security professionals intent on re-perimeterisation,<br />

we built a visualisation tool that finds exposed systems on the Internet, visualises them<br />

on a time-dependent world map based on their city geolocation <strong>and</strong> presents details of<br />

potentially applicable remote exploits. This allows defenders to assess their attack surface<br />

<strong>and</strong> prioritise the required interventions in a timely manner. We expect it will also be<br />

useful to auditors called upon to evaluate whether a utility complies with the required<br />

security st<strong>and</strong>ards.<br />

1 Evidence supporting this claim can be found within the dissertation.

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