A U.S. South China Sea Perspective: Just Over the Horizon

diplomatic isolation is the physical distance its military forces would have to travel to defend Itu
Aba in the Spratlys.
Taiwan’s military has benefited from decades of U.S. arms sales and support, and
consequently has amassed more combat power than any other ASEAN member. Its defense
budget is more than US$8 billion annually, larger than any ASEAN country. However, this force
is for the defense of Taiwan itself and the shifting of forces over 900 miles (1,448 km) to the
southwest to protect Itu Aba in the Spratlys would constitute a major calculated risk as China’s
forces lie less than 100 miles (161 km) across the Taiwan Strait. Furthermore, Taiwan’s
ambiguous international status complicates its ability to take military action.
Before China had amassed significant economic and military power, Taiwan had
attempted to lead the South China Sea dispute to a peaceful conclusion. In 1995 President Lee
Teng-hui urged twelve nations to revoke their claims and invest in the multinational South China
Sea Development Company with the profits used for infrastructure development in ASEAN
countries. The idea did not find many supporters and was never pursued. However, Taiwan’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently released a statement “that Taiwan advocates developing the
resources of the [South China Sea] in conjunction with other countries based on the principles of
shelving disputes and promoting peace and reciprocity.” 44
China has been courting Taiwan for the last three years to work together to uphold
China’s sovereignty in the South China Sea. 45 China does not have any allies in the region to
support its sovereignty claims and may feel it needs a coalition to refute the diplomatic activities
and claims of Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines. Yet, Taiwan has determined that its strong
relationships with the United States, Japan and ASEAN are too valuable to be risked by taking
China’s side in the dispute.
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