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Platonism in mathematics (1935) Paul Bernays - Phil Cmu

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<strong>in</strong> favor of <strong>in</strong>tuitionism.<br />

In addition, one must observe that the evidence which <strong>in</strong>tuitionism uses <strong>in</strong><br />

its arguments is not always of an immediate character. Abstract reflections<br />

are also <strong>in</strong>cluded. In fact, <strong>in</strong>tuitionists often use statements, conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g a<br />

general hypothesis, of the form ‘if every number n has the property A(n),<br />

then B holds’.<br />

Such a statement is <strong>in</strong>terpreted <strong>in</strong>tuitionistically <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g manner:<br />

‘If it is proved that every number n possesses the property A(n), then B.’<br />

Here we have a hypothesis of an abstract k<strong>in</strong>d, because s<strong>in</strong>ce the methods of<br />

demonstration are not fixed <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>tuitionism, the condition that someth<strong>in</strong>g is<br />

proved is not <strong>in</strong>tuitively determ<strong>in</strong>ed.<br />

It is true that one can also <strong>in</strong>terpret the given statement by view<strong>in</strong>g it<br />

as a partial judgment, i.e., as the claim that there exists a proof of B from<br />

the given hypothesis, a proof which would be effectively given. 4 (This is<br />

approximately the sense of Kolmogorov’s <strong>in</strong>terpretation of <strong>in</strong>tuitionism.) In<br />

any case, the argument must start from the general hypothesis, which cannot<br />

be <strong>in</strong>tuitively fixed. It is therefore an abstract reflection.<br />

In the example just considered, the abstract part is rather limited. The<br />

abstract character becomes more pronounced if one superposes hypotheses;<br />

i.e., when one formulates propositions like the follow<strong>in</strong>g: ‘if from the hypoth-<br />

esis that A(n) is valid for every n, one can <strong>in</strong>fer B, then C holds’, or ‘If from<br />

the hypothesis that A leads to a contradiction, a contradiction follows, then<br />

B’, or briefly ‘If the absurdity of A is absurd, then B’. This abstractness of<br />

4 [“. . . c’est à dire comme une <strong>in</strong>dication d’un raisonnement conduisant de la dite hy-<br />

pothèse à la conclusion B, raisonnement qu’on présente effectivement.”]<br />

14

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