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What is Scientific Progress?

What is Scientific Progress?

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The strategy <strong>is</strong> to argue that once we have granted a notion of approximate truth, then certain<br />

relevant propositions will have full truth (e.g. those of the form ‘approximately p’). Since such<br />

propositions are fully true, they are potentially knowable should the right ep<strong>is</strong>temic conditions be<br />

met, and the objection in (O) does not apply.<br />

We can accept with Psillos and Niiniluoto that in many cases we need a notion of approximate truth<br />

without agreeing that there are no relevant propositions that can be characterized as fully true, as<br />

(O) implies. If p <strong>is</strong> approximately true, then the proposition q, that p <strong>is</strong> approximately true, <strong>is</strong> itself<br />

true, not merely close to the truth. Th<strong>is</strong> <strong>is</strong> legitimate, since if ‘planets travel in ellipses’ <strong>is</strong> a<br />

scientific proposition, then so <strong>is</strong> ‘approximately, planets travel in ellipses’. Even if p <strong>is</strong> not true and<br />

so not knowable, q (q = approximately p) might well be knowable. 6<br />

One might have a conception of scientific theories whereby ‘approximately p’ <strong>is</strong> not a theory even<br />

if ‘p’ <strong>is</strong>. After all it <strong>is</strong> ‘p’ that will be used in explaining and predicting, not ‘approximately p’. The<br />

first point in response <strong>is</strong> that th<strong>is</strong> <strong>is</strong> irrelevant to the defence of the cumulative knowledge account.<br />

The latter says that scientific progress <strong>is</strong> the growth of scientific knowledge. <strong>Scientific</strong> knowledge<br />

will (locally) grow when any scientific proposition becomes known, even if that proposition <strong>is</strong><br />

strictly speaking not a theory. Since not all scientific propositions are theories, our conception of<br />

theories <strong>is</strong> irrelevant. Furthermore, it <strong>is</strong> not clear that ‘approximately p’ <strong>is</strong> not a theory and cannot<br />

be used in explanation and prediction. I have taken ‘approximately p’ as equivalent to ‘p <strong>is</strong><br />

approximately true’. An objector may suggest that whereas ‘p’ <strong>is</strong> about the world, ‘p <strong>is</strong><br />

approximately true’ <strong>is</strong> a higher-order proposition about p, and for th<strong>is</strong> reason <strong>is</strong> not a theory. Space<br />

does not permit a full d<strong>is</strong>cussion of th<strong>is</strong> point which will draw upon <strong>is</strong>sues in the theory of truth.<br />

Suffice to say that minimal<strong>is</strong>ts about truth will happily regard ‘p <strong>is</strong> approximately true’ as a<br />

20

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