Lying to Enemies - Olena's

Lying to Enemies
Sissela Bok, Lying Chapter 10
Contemporary Moral Problems
Professor Douglas Olena

Chapter Preface
“I discovered in the earliest stages that pursuit of truth did not
permit violence being inflicted on one’s opponent. but that he
must be weaned from error by patience and sympathy.” –
Gandhi

Chapter Outline
Giving Enemies Their Due
Countering Harm
Rules of the Game

Giving Enemies Their Due
135 Lying to enemies serves two purposes.
First, it can divert their maneuvers. If the lie succeeds in making
them think one is too strong to be defeated, or so paltry and
unattractive as not to be worth attacking, it may even keep them
from attacking altogether.
Second, lying can help in the strategy to defeat the enemy.

Giving Enemies Their Due
135 “Lying to enemies is closely related to the lies for survival and
in great crises.”
Such lies appeal, first, to a sense of fairness through retribution.
And “the defense from harm is invoked in all adversary
relationships.”

Giving Enemies Their Due
136 Preview:
“In this chapter, I want to look more carefully at the two
main principles appealed to in lying to enemies:
Fairness
The avoidance of harm

Giving Enemies Their Due
136 Fairness:
“People should receive the treatment that their behavior
merits.”
“Enemies, through their own unfairness, their aggressive acts,
or intentions, have forfeited the ordinary right of being dealt
with fairly.”
“The idea of turning the other cheek to an enemy is
profoundly alien to such intuitive morality.”

Giving Enemies Their Due
137 Machiavelli justified lies to enemies first, because of a belief
“that men are likely to act badly, to pose threats which make it
all right to lie to them in return.”
Second, because some are believed to be bad that they are “less
worthy of truthfulness.”
138 “Third… the adversary is often thought to be outside the
‘social contract’… in any one society.”

Giving Enemies Their Due
138 Using the publicity of reasonable persons, this prejudice
toward the adversary seems hollow.
139 “For the harm from lies to enemies is peculiarly likely to
spread because of this very casual way in which enemy-hood is so
often bestowed.”
Machiavelli allows lies not only as retribution but preemptively.
“No evidence of present hostility is needed; predictions of future
breaches of faith will serve as well.”

Giving Enemies Their Due
139 “Most claims that lies to enemies are justified would not, then
stand up in the face of reasonable scrutiny.”
140 Bok asks the question whether it is necessary to add to the
justification of lies in crises which certainly the overtly hostile or
obviously threatening adversary creates.
“Need there be less of a crisis, or a less immediate one, for lies to
be justified where enemies are concerned?”

Countering Harm
141 If it were justifiable to lie to torturers, “could the same not be
true about lies to prevent those conditions from arising?”
“Even though appeals to retribution and fairness do not excuse
lies to enemies, therefore, appeals to self-defense and to the
prevention of harm may well do so.”
“Honesty ought not to allow the creation of an emergency by the
enemy, when deception can forestall or avert it.”

Countering Harm
142 “Governments build up enormous, self-perpetuating machineries of
deception in adversary contexts. And when a government is known to
practice deception, the results are self-defeating and erosive.”
143 When major social problems require joint effort with the
government and the government is not trustworthy, then…
“Bona fide efforts in the joint interest are thus undercut by the cynicism
and sense of powerlessness which result from the knowledge of largescale
deception.”

Countering Harm
143 “Could the test of publicity weed out all the spurious or biased
excuses, and all those where lies might backfire or cause harm to
general trust, while preserving certain conditions where lies to
enemies are justified?”
“What features of hostile relationships would mark these
circumstances?”

Rules of the Game
143 “A public test would look, first of all, for alternatives.”
Honesty is always preferable to deceit.
144 “Secondly, encounters with enemies where there is a clear
element of crisis must allow for deception, though with the same
caution as in all other crises.
“Whenever it is right to resist an assault or a threat by force, it
must then be allowable to do so by guile.”

Rules of the Game
144 “Finally… a special case might be made for deception in
lawful, declared hostilities, as against tax-evaders or
counterfeiters, or between openly warring parties.”
145 “If we want to produce excuses for lying to someone, these
excuses should be capable of persuading reasonable persons, not
merely some public locked in hostility to a particular group.”

Rules of the Game
145 “When in doubt, tell the truth. It will confound your
enemies and astound your friends.” –Mark Twain