Engaging Sociology

Thursday 4 April 2013 at 15:30 - 17:00
THEORY 2 OXFORD SUITE
Brock, T. Durham University
Social Movements, Critical Realism and the Ethics of Academic Knowledge Production
This paper contributes to the debate on ethics and research in social movement studies. I address this debate from
the position of an academic; not an activist. I argue that it is possible to provide ethical, that is, socially responsible,
knowledge about social movements. To do this, I examine the differences between social movement academic and
activist forms of knowledge production. Turning to Gramsci's work on the ‗Theory of the Intellectual', I ask; why is it
difficult for an academic to provide knowledge for a social movement? In order to answer this, I consider the limits
of academic intellectual autonomy. I argue that critical distance, a luxury of the academy, is at odds with the 'case
propositions' that motivate movement activism. I then consider why academic knowledge might only ever offer
'intellectual figleaves' to social movement activists and argue that activists are engaged in the minutiae of the
moment; they create knowledge for political action. In contrast, academics act within the boundaries of the
University; their intellectual autonomy is shaped towards creating knowledge about others. This distinction has left
critics of the academy concerned with the ethical implications of academic knowledge. In turning to critical realist
philosophy, the paper explores how academic knowledge might be directed by a sense of social responsibility. I
argue that by engaging with the 'experiential artefacts' of the movement, that is, those historical materials of
archival research, we can understand the structural conditions that give rise to social injustice.
Bouzanis, C. University of Edinburgh
For 'an epistemology without a knowing subject' or for 'a social ontology with an epistemic agent’?
Logical Positivism has frequently argued for objective and impersonal knowledge, the foundation of which is
premised on experience as independent of scientist's beliefs, interests and values. In this way scientific method
and results were supposed to be neutral. Yet, several post-positivist accounts have pointed to the crucial role of
theory in the formation and appreciation of the 'facts' which are thus considered as ideational and theory-laden. But
in the case of social scientific inquiry, it is not only that the 'data' and the 'variables' of scientific investigation are
interpreted through the lenses of a theoretical framework. It is also because the social scientist is a constituent part
of her object, as Roy Bhaskar's 'transcendental realism' (1979) partially concedes, that we are in need of a social
ontology – a general theory which intends to settle questions about the relations between social structure and
agents as well as the relations between the knowing subject and society as a whole.
This paper argues for the idea that a social ontology should conceptualize the knowing subject as another agent
who influences and is influenced by society. And this means that the broader object of investigation that is, social
institutions and social structures, is not only conceptualized through a generalized ontological scheme but its own
constitution is theory-dependent. These ideas will lead us to the conclusion that social theory should account for an
epistemic agent whose capacity for self-creation and social transformation would be congruent with the idea that
there are no stable 'facts' in social life and that substantial social research should get rid of any 'positivistic' or
'naturalistic' nomological and methodological residue.
Shuker, L. University of Bedfordshire
Realist and Narrative Evaluation: CMO Configurations as Stories
What do realist and narrative evaluations have in common? The aim of this paper is to draw on examples and
discussion of narrative evaluation to argue that realist evaluation has an affinity with the use of stories in evaluative
research. In particular it is argued that the context-mechanism-outcome configurations produced by realist
evaluators are analogous to stories, and that this analogy might support their effective use in dissemination. The
limits to any relationship will also be discussed with reference to the role of the researcher, the purpose of
evaluation and the primacy of theory building in realist research. It is argued that realists could learn much from
narrative researchers' belief in the powerful role of stories in social life in terms of the design, analysis and
dissemination of evaluative research - even if their philosophical positions are are ultimately incommensurable.
Cruickshank, J. University of Birmingham
After Correspondence: From Critical Realism To 'As-If Realism' And Beyond
For critical realists empirical research has to be based on an ontological theory because without such a theory the
explanations of empirical phenomena developed will misconstrue the causal processes at work. The necessary
condition for the justification of an ontological theory is internal coherence and the sufficient condition is a
relationship of correspondence between the theory which sets out the defining features of social reality and that
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