the neosentimentalist argument against moral rationalism

More documents

Recommendations

Info

3. the neosentiMentalist aRGuMent aGainst MoRal RationalisM: soMe CRitiCal oBseRVations massimo reichlin università Vita-Salute San raffaele, milano from focal lesions in the prefrontal cortex seem to be the living evidence of the theoretical possibility of amoralism (roskies 2003) and therefore show the fallacy of the conceptual internalism of the rationalistic view; d) the cultural fitness of emotively laden rules explains why certain rules do survive throughout human history and are largely accepted: this makes the objectivist explanation of moral “progress” offered by the rationalist view redundant. in other words, the partial and progressive overlap between moral codes can be explained by the similarity between our affective reactions; we simply happen to evolve such sentiments and there are no deeper moral facts that might vindicate moral objectivism. in what follows, i will suggest some reasons to believe that the very fact that nichols’ sentimentalist view is much more plausible and attractive than Haidt’s weakens his attack against moral rationalism, limiting its efficacy to radical or extreme forms of ethical rationalism. in order to assess nichols’ basic points, let us distinguish between i) the initial experience of morality which is found in children and which emerged phylogenetically at a certain point in the evolution of the species homo and ii) the much more complex experience of morality that is found in healthy adult humans. nichols’ research concentrates on level i): it aims to account for those basic judgments which he calls core moral judgments. a direct and easy way to defend moral rationalism would obviously be to deny that such judgments — that, according to many moral psychologists are found in three-year old children—are in fact authentic moral judgments. We might say that the moral faculty presupposes a much larger mastery of moral concepts and of complex moral reasoning and that, therefore, the data from moral psychology do not undermine moral rationalism. however, nichols appropriately notes that children’s moral judgments resemble the adults’ ones in many ways; moreover, a considerable part of our daily normative experience is in fact based on those same mechanisms that are at work in core moral judgments. it seems sensible, then, to accept these judgments as integral to the moral capacity and to find in them the essential elements contributing to moral judgments in adults. nonetheless, the fact that core moral judgments depend on emotive reactions at level i) does not necessarily imply a sentimentalist explanation of level ii); that is, it does not demonstrate that emotive reactions to the others’ suffering are the decisive element of the moral capacity, as it is possessed by adults, or that all moral judgments 166
the neosentiMentalist aRGuMent aGainst MoRal RationalisM: soMe CRitiCal oBseRVations massimo reichlin università Vita-Salute San raffaele, milano depend on the concern mechanism. in effect, although nichols considers highly implausible that the concern mechanism should have a merely evolutionary role, so that adult moral judgment could function in its total absence, he deems just as much dubious the “on-line hypothesis”, according to which the making of a moral judgment would always presuppose the activation of the affective mechanism: thanks to the normative theory, it seems very likely that adult moral judgments can often be made without any such activation. thus, even accepting that the emotive mechanism of concern is essential for the starting of the moral faculty (nichols’ point a), we need to have a clearer view of the relationship between this mechanism and the normative theory in order to see whether the model of the sentimental rules can count as a refutation of moral rationalism (nichols’ point b). now, both elements seem necessary, according to nichols: the ability to feel certain emotive reactions is a necessary presupposition of the moral judgment—since individuals with congenital frontal lesions never acquire the moral capacity; but the emotive reactions are not in themselves sufficient to characterize morality and to distinguish it from other normative spheres. in fact, on the one hand, in cases of natural disasters, or of human interventions causing suffering with a view to larger benefits (for example, in the medical field), we can observe emotive reactions similar to those linked to core moral judgments, but no moral judgment is generated. on the other hand, nichols’ experiments themselves show that prohibitions relative to disgusting behaviour, which are reinforced by strong emotive reactions, acquire the same weight of moral prohibitions, even though common sense clearly distinguishes between the two kinds of prohibitions. (nichols 2002a). this suggests that the emotions are insufficient to distinguish the moral from the non moral sphere, and that the normative theory does not simply embody those emotive reactions. as a matter of fact, some non moral prohibitions relative to disgusting behaviour may be supported by negative emotions that are even stronger than those relative to some moral prohibitions, for example those tied to rules of justice and fairness in distribution, or those relative to promises: however, our normative theory considers the second as a clearly distinct kind of violation, and one much more serious than the first. it seems therefore highly plausible to say that the normative theory that structures our emotive reactions reflects a relevant work of rational reflection as well. it is not the case that our set of rules simply expresses our emotions; it also reflects the work of rational reflection, a work which can partially shape 167
Page 1 and 2: massimo reichlin università Vita-S
Page 3: 2. the neosentiMentalist aRGuMent a
Page 7 and 8: the neosentiMentalist aRGuMent aGai
Page 13: the neosentiMentalist aRGuMent aGai

the neosentimentalist argument against moral rationalism

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?