CSS 152 MAIN.pdf - National Open University of Nigeria
CSS 152 MAIN.pdf - National Open University of Nigeria
CSS 152 MAIN.pdf - National Open University of Nigeria
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<strong>CSS</strong> <strong>152</strong> INTRODUCTION TO NIGERIA CRIMINAL LAW<br />
These are<br />
i. Intention<br />
ii. Recklessness<br />
iii. Negligence<br />
iv. Accident and<br />
v. Unconsciousness<br />
i. Intention<br />
This can only be derived from the circumstance <strong>of</strong> a particular <strong>of</strong>fence.<br />
Intention here revolves around the issues <strong>of</strong> forseeability and<br />
desirability.<br />
It simply stated that a man intends a consequence <strong>of</strong> his action when he<br />
foresees that it may result in harm and desires that he should do so.<br />
Therefore, desire <strong>of</strong> consequence is the hallmark <strong>of</strong> intention no matter<br />
how vague or unconscious that desire may be.<br />
Thus if for example in the <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>of</strong> burglary as contained in S. 411 <strong>of</strong><br />
the Criminal Code, specific intents is to be proved by the prosecution, it<br />
must be strictly proved in accordance with the law. See for example the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> R. v. Steane (1974) KB 997.<br />
There is however a distinction between the common law rules and<br />
intention can be seen in S. 24 <strong>of</strong> the Criminal Code. At common law,<br />
there is the doctrine <strong>of</strong> transferred malice as is illustrated in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
R. v. Latimer (1886)17 QB 359. In <strong>Nigeria</strong> and particularly under S. 24<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Criminal Code, a person must act dependently on the exercise <strong>of</strong><br />
his will (i.e. with intention) before he can be guilty <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence<br />
charged.<br />
Compare the above case <strong>of</strong> Latimer with another case to wit; R. v.<br />
Pemblition (1874) LR 2 in which the court said that the intent to harm a<br />
group <strong>of</strong> people cannot be transferred to the breaking <strong>of</strong> a window.<br />
a. Intention and Motive Distinguished<br />
Having seen what intention is all about, it is sound to state that motive is<br />
reason for the accused person’s conduct which has induced him to act<br />
unlawfully but which does not form part <strong>of</strong> the metal element <strong>of</strong> an<br />
<strong>of</strong>fence.<br />
Intention therefore must be distinguished from motive, for, according to<br />
the third limb <strong>of</strong> S.24 <strong>of</strong> the Criminal Code, unless otherwise expressly<br />
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