Colonel BORMAN. Sir, I would be remiss if I did not admit that I ani ...

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206 APOLLO ACCIDENT There has been some criticism as you know that there are, or were too many NASA personnel - and not enough - outside experts on the Review Board. What would have been the effect of bringing in more non-NASA experts in your jud ment ? Dr. THOMPSON. k my opinion it would have been rather difficult. If Dr. Van Dolah does not mind my referring to his indoctrination into the system required to pursue a review of this magnitude without familiarity with it, I am sure he will agree that at times lie became very impatient with the system because it seemed to get in the way of progress, but the system is the one thing, paperwork, the direction to people, is one of the major elements that makes a program like this possible, that makes it possible to organize efforts on a large scale with people on a 24-hour basis and a 7-day week basis and that system at times gets in the way of uick steps, but if we did not have people who mere conversant with P t iat, I am afraid we would have been verywould have felt frustrated and probably would have had a lot of trouble with them. Senator CANNON. When you say “had a lot of trouble with them,“ do you mean just delaying your decisidns or- Dr. THOMPSON. I think it would- Senator CANNON. Or impeding pro res? nr. TIIOMPSON. I think they wou f: d hare felt frustrated and felt dissatisfied with the lack of progress. Senator CANNON. We are not concerned here with what the members might have felt. We are concerned with what the Board might find and might have found and what they can report to this committee and to the public. Dr. THOMPSON. We acquired a great many experts to work with the Board. We canvassed the whole country and we got an extremely responsive effort from experts in all areas wherever we looked for help, and some volunteered their help and were very helpful, and I don’t think, in any way, we suffered from lack of expertise in the areas that we pursued because the country as a whole seemed to be very, very interested in contributing anything that they could. The heads of-well, the president of MIT, and the other colleges, offered to help and did contribute. We got help, expertness from the FAA, the CAB. We employed the expert mistance of the Naval Research, one of the Naval Research’s most active people on fire. I don’t see how we could have gotten much better help than we had. Colonel RORMAN. Sir, don’t you think really it is safe to say that regardless of who composed the Board, the findings and determinations and recommendations would probably not have been materially changed. Is that what you are getting at ? Senator CANNON. That is what I am trying to get at. If that is your conclusion, I am very happy to have it, Colonel. Do you agree with that, Doctor? Dr. THOMPSON. I think that we were able to do an adequate job with the people that we had and with all the help that we got and I don’t see how we could have much improved our capability. Senator (”ANNON. And you had all the expert help you needed according to your testimony. Dr. THOMPSON. Expert help from any source we asked for help, we got it.
- - APOLLO ACCIDENT 207 Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Before Senator Curtis starts, will you please review the statements by panel No. $)-Design Review Panel-on page D-9-6 and give us some statement this afternoon because in that report the panel speaks of design deficiencies. It says: "Some areas of wiring exhibited what would be referred to as rat nests." I think those are pretty strong words and you might have something to say. Senator Curtis? BELIEVES FIRE DUE TO ERROR IN JUDGMENT Senator CURTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Did this fire occur because of a wrong decision or decisions made by our space scientists? Dr. THOMPSOX. I don't think it was a particular decision that caused it. I think it was a situation as has been pretty clearly 'described that resulted in it but I don't see any particular dec'ision that caused it. I don't see how we could identify it beyond what we have already described in that connection. Senator CURTIS. What I want to know is this. Was the error or shortcoming, if there were such, in the field of scientific decision, of oiir space scientists, or was it in the area of executing what our space scientists said slioulcd be done? Dr. TIIOMPSON. I think it was an error in judgment in identifying how great the risk was with what we saw there and as Colonel Borman has said, he knew about those things and the risk that apparently lay there had not revealed itself to the point that. people thought it was too great to undertake the flight. Senator CURTIS. Well, maybe I have. not stated my question very well but what I am trying to get at is this. Was the plan scientifically wrong or was the shortcoming in executing the plan ? Dr. THOMPSON. There was nothing wrong with the plan that I know of. As far as being scientifically mong, I don't think there \ws anything wrong in that sense. It was simply the execution, detailed execution that resulted in this event. Senator Cmms. Do you concur in that, Colonel l3orman ? Colonel BORMAN. Yes, sir. Senator CURTIS. I believe you stated that you mere aware of defects or roblems in wiring prior to going on this board. 8olonel BORMAN. Yes, sir. I mas on the backup crew for the sister ship to Spacecraft 012 and there were problems in wiring. I must point out there are problems in the development of every vehicle. Senator CURTIS. I understand. Colonel BORMAN. And these were normal problems. ASTRONAUT WOULD NOT HESITATE TO ENTER SPACECRAFT Senator Cunms. Now, would you have entered that spacecraft on this morning of the accident if your turn had been called? Colonel BORMAN. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact,- Senator Cmms. Would you have had any hesitancy? Colonel BORMAN. No, sir.
Page 1: APOLLO ACCIDENT 205 Colonel BORMAN.
Page 5 and 6: APOLLO ACCIDENT 209 As I pointed on
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Page 11 and 12: - APOLLO ACCIDENT 215 one indicated
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Page 21 and 22: APOLLO ACCIDENT 225 Senator SMITH.
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Page 25 and 26: APOLLO ACCIDENT 229 (2) safety, (3)
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Colonel BORMAN. Sir, I would be remiss if I did not admit that I ani ...

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