The Summa Theologica, St. Thomas Aquinas - ldwilkersonministries

Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda by Thomas Aquinas 528
this reason, exempt in any way from the care of their parents; for this care is subject to human law, which
takes into account that which is of most frequent occurrence.
Accordingly we must say that boys or girls who have not reached the years of puberty and have not attained
the use of reason can nowise bind themselves to anything by vow. If, however, they attain the use of reason,
before reaching the years of puberty, they can for their own part, bind themselves by vow; but their vows can
be annulled by their parents, under whose care they are still subject.
Yet no matter how much they be capable of guile before the years of puberty, they cannot be bound by a
solemn religious vow, on account of the Church's decree [*Sext. Decret. cap. Is qui, de Reg. et transeunt. ad
Relig.] which considers the majority of cases. But after the years of puberty have been reached, they can bind
themselves by religious vows, simple or solemn, without the consent of their parents.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument avails in the case of children who have not yet reached the use of reason: for
their vows then are invalid, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: The vows of persons subject to another's power contain an implied condition, namely, that they
be not annulled by the superior. This condition renders them licit and valid if it be fulfilled, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument avails in the case of solemn vows which are taken in profession.
TENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 10]
Whether Vows Admit of Dispensation?
Objection 1: It would seem that vows are not subject to dispensation. It is less to have a vow commuted than
to be dispensed from keeping it. But a vow cannot be commuted, according to Lev. 27:9, 10, "A beast that
may be sacrificed to the Lord, if anyone shall vow, shall be holy, and cannot be changed, neither a better for a
worse, nor a worse for a better." Much less, therefore, do vows admit of dispensation.
Obj. 2: Further, no man can grant a dispensation in matters concerning the natural law and in the Divine
precepts, especially those of the First Table, since these aim directly at the love of God, which is the last end
of the precepts. Now the fulfilment of a vow is a matter of the natural law, and is commanded by the Divine
law, as shown above (A. 3), and belongs to the precepts of the First Table since it is an act of religion.
Therefore vows do not admit of dispensation.
Obj. 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is based on the fidelity which a man owes to God, as stated above (A.
3). But no man can dispense in such a matter as this. Neither, therefore, can any one grant a dispensation from
a vow.
On the contrary, That which proceeds from the common will of many has apparently greater stability than that
which proceeds from the individual will of some one person. Now the law which derives its force from the
common will admits of dispensation by a man. Therefore it seems that vows also admit of dispensation by a
man.
I answer that, The dispensation from a vow is to be taken in the same sense as a dispensation given in the
observance of a law because, as stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 6; Q. 97, A. 4), a law is made with an eye to that
which is good in the majority of instances. But since in certain cases this is not good, there is need for
someone to decide that in that particular case the law is not to be observed. This is properly speaking to
dispense in the law: for a dispensation would seem to denote a commensurate distribution or application of
some common thing to those that are contained under it, in the same way as a person is said to dispense food
to a household.