The Summa Theologica, St. Thomas Aquinas - ldwilkersonministries

Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda by Thomas Aquinas 717
Whether Daring Is a Sin?
Objection 1: It seems that daring is not a sin. For it is written (Job 39:21) concerning the horse, by which
according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi) the godly preacher is denoted, that "he goeth forth boldly to meet armed
men [*Vulg.: 'he pranceth boldly, he goeth forth to meet armed men']." But no vice redounds to a man's
praise. Therefore it is not a sin to be daring.
Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9), "one should take counsel in thought, and do
quickly what has been counseled." But daring helps this quickness in doing. Therefore daring is not sinful but
praiseworthy.
Obj. 3: Further, daring is a passion caused by hope, as stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2) when we were treating
of the passions. But hope is accounted not a sin but a virtue. Neither therefore should daring be accounted a
sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 8:18): "Go not on the way with a bold man, lest he burden thee with his
evils." Now no man's fellowship is to be avoided save on account of sin. Therefore daring is a sin.
I answer that, Daring, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 55), is a passion. Now a passion is sometimes
moderated according to reason, and sometimes it lacks moderation, either by excess or by deficiency, and on
this account the passion is sinful. Again, the names of the passions are sometimes employed in the sense of
excess, thus we speak of anger meaning not any but excessive anger, in which case it is sinful, and in the same
way daring as implying excess is accounted a sin.
Reply Obj. 1: The daring spoken of there is that which is moderated by reason, for in that sense it belongs to
the virtue of fortitude.
Reply Obj. 2: It is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking counsel, which is an act of reason. But to wish to
act quickly before taking counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful; for this would be to act rashly, which is a vice
contrary to prudence, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 3). Wherefore daring which leads one to act quickly is so far
praiseworthy as it is directed by reason.
Reply Obj. 3: Some vices are unnamed, and so also are some virtues, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 7;
iv, 4, 5, 6). Hence the names of certain passions have to be applied to certain vices and virtues: and in order to
designate vices we employ especially the names of those passions the object of which is an evil, as in the case
of hatred, fear, anger and daring. But hope and love have a good for this object, and so we use them rather to
designate virtues.
SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 127, Art. 2]
Whether Daring Is Opposed to Fortitude?
Objection 1: It seems that daring is not opposed to fortitude. For excess of daring seems to result from
presumption of mind. But presumption pertains to pride which is opposed to humility. Therefore daring is
opposed to humility rather than to fortitude.
Obj. 2: Further, daring does not seem to call for blame, except in so far as it results in harm either to the
daring person who puts himself in danger inordinately, or to others whom he attacks with daring, or exposes
to danger. But this seemingly pertains to injustice. Therefore daring, as designating a sin, is opposed, not to
fortitude but to justice.