Moderate Republicans in the Conservative Rise - Andrew Kilberg

Moderate Republicans in the Conservative Rise
The Ripon Society, 1962-1982
By
Andrew G.I. Kilberg
A Senior Thesis Submitted to the History Department of Princeton University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts
Princeton, New Jersey
April 6, 2010

This thesis represents my own work in accordance with University regulations.
____________________________________________
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
For me, the senior thesis has been a culmination of not only my time at Princeton,
but also my fourteen years at the Potomac School and countless experiences both in the
classroom and out. For as long as I can remember, I have been fascinated by both history
and politics, and I am grateful for the opportunity the Department of History has given me
to pursue the convergence of these two disciplines.
Professor Sean Wilentz has advised me for a year and a half now, first on my
quixotic quest to prove the importance of the private rooms of the United States Senate, and
more recently on my harebrained endeavor to reveal the important contributions moderates
made to the conservative Republican ascendancy. Without his guidance, this thesis would
have been sorely wanting of effective argument. His humor, wit, and patience kept me
levelheaded throughout the process.
The scholar and author Geoffrey Kabaservice has been an indispensable help. His
willingness to discuss my ideas and point me in the direction of important sources was vital
to the timely completion of this thesis.
To the Riponers, both those with whom I spoke and those I did not, thank you for
inspiring me. Your example is one I can only hope to equal. My parents, Riponers both,
have been incredibly patient in reading my drafts and talking through my ideas. Their
support, love, and unflagging patience have carried me through not only the last seven
months, but also the last twenty-two years.
Though I wrote much of this thesis in my carrel on the B Floor of Firestone Library,
it was 13 Prospect Avenue, the Princeton Tower Club, that kept me sane. Jim’s sandwiches
and late night Haven runs; formals and Wednesday nights; deckparties and lawnparties; twobounce
games on the basketball court and terrible on-demand horror movies; political kids
and theater kids—PTC is indescribably more. Three years of PTC residents and regulars
have left me with a formidable arsenal of memories. To my eleven comrades: thank you for
the best year of my life.
Zach, Kolt, Allie, Cyrus, Daniel, and Trevor: thank you for listening to me rant and
rave about my thesis, even though you weren’t here. Sam, you inspire me more than you
know with your dedication to your friends and with your sense of duty and service.
And, Julia, thank you for coming into my life.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction………………………………………………………………………..... 5
Chapter One: The Early Years, 1962-1966……………………………………... 14
Pre-1964: Defining Ripon’s Liberalism………………………………………… 15
1964 Election……………………………………………………………………. 20
The Aftermath of 1964: Election ’64 and the Black Voter…………………….... 27
“Third Force”: the Republican Governors Association……………………….... 30
Filling the “Research Gap”…………………………………………………….... 36
Federal Tax Revenue Sharing………………………………………………….... 39
Ray Bliss and the RNC………………………………………………………….. 42
John Lindsay and the Cornerstone Project……………………………………… 44
China and the Draft…………………………………………………………….... 45
Expansion, Reorganization, and an Institutional Role…………………………... 47
Chapter Two: Maturity and Middle Age, 1967-1974………………………………. 49
1968 Primaries…………………………………………………………………... 50
The Urban Papers………………………………………………………………... 58
1968 General Election…………………………………………………………... 60
Into the Nixon Administration…………………………………………………... 62
Early Ambivalence Towards Nixon…………………………………………….. 65
Domestic Policy Successes…………………………………………………….... 79
Instead of Revolution……………………………………………………………. 71
Gilder’s Daycare Editorial………………………………………………………. 72
A Ripon President? ……………………………………………………………... 75
1972 Election……………………………………………………………………. 77
Watergate………………………………………………………………………... 83
Ripon’s Decline Through the Ford Administration……………………………... 86
Chapter Three: Old Age and Rebirth, 1975-1982…………………………………... 89
1976 Election……………………………………………………………………. 89
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Organizational Decline………………………………………………………….. 96
Supply-Side and the 1978 Capital Gains Tax Cut………………………………. 99
Jack Kemp and Empowerment………………………………………………….. 103
1980 Election……………………………………………………………………. 104
Supply-Side and the 1981 Tax Cuts…………………………………………….. 110
Rick Kessler and Ripon’s Transformation………………………………………. 112
Epilogue…………………………………………………………………………….. 117
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………... 127
Primary Sources…………………………………………………………………. 127
Secondary Sources………………………………………………………………. 140
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INTRODUCTION
In 2008, Republican Christopher Shays lost his bid to continue representing
Connecticut’s 4 th District in the United States House of Representatives. Shays was the last
Republican member of the House from New England, the last vestige of moderate
Republicanism left in the lower chamber. 1 His defeat was the culmination of the decades-
long reshuffling of geographical alignment and the strengthening of ideological difference
between the two great American political parties, what the journalist Ronald Brownstein has
termed “the Great Sorting Out” of politicians into two highly polarized factions. 2
By most accounts, the Republican reformation dates back to the presidential
candidacy of Barry Goldwater in 1964. The strident conservative Goldwater lost
overwhelmingly to the liberal incumbent President Lyndon Johnson, but the Arizonan
proved that a true conservative could win the Republican nomination, a feat which had not
been accomplished since Herbert Hoover’s run for reelection in 1932. An invigorated
conservative movement arose, building an ideological platform off of the foundations of
William F. Buckley’s National Review, which started publication in 1953, and Russell Kirk’s
influential book The Conservative Mind, which also came out in that year. 3 Embracing the
white backlash against civil rights and the breakdown of social order in the 1960s, the well-
funded movement created an institutional structure through which it would catapult the
former actor and Governor of California, Ronald Reagan, to the presidency in 1980. Young
think tanks, such as the Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute, and revived old
1
Raymond Hernandez, “Northeast Republicans Lose Precious Ground in Washington,” New York Times, 5
November 2008, 15.
2
Ronald Brownstein, The Second Civil War: How Extreme Partisanship Has Paralyzed Washington and
Polarized America (New York: Penguin, 2007), 175.
3
Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1953).
5

stalwarts, such as the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Hoover Institute, helped
to popularize innovative, conservative ideas and provided the movement with intellectual
heft. Upset by Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford’s policy of détente with the Soviet Union
and flabbergasted by the feminist demands of the 1970s, Reagan led the conservative
ascendancy in the 1980s, redefining the Republican Party, and indeed the whole country, in
the process. 4
But it’s not that simple. In hindsight, it is easy to see the conservative movement
marching from the National Review in 1953 to Goldwater in 1964 to the reaction against
Roe v. Wade in 1973 to Reagan’s election in 1980. Yet, Lyndon Johnson beat Goldwater
with over 60% of the popular vote in 1964. Yes, AEI’s William Baroody advised the
Goldwater campaign, but the think tank remained small through the rest of the 1960s and
into the 1970s. 5 Heritage, the most successful of the conservative think tanks, did not even
come into existence until 1973, and Cato did not appear until 1977. 6 The “New Right” did
not get going until the later part of the 1970s. 7 Furthermore, a close look at Nixon’s
presidency reveals that moderate Republicanism was not dead or defeated after Goldwater’s
candidacy. In fact, it was reinvigorated and emboldened in many ways. Thus, Nixon’s
presidency successfully blended a southern strategy with appeals to moderate Republicans.
While he made law-and-order a calling card of his administration and opposed busing as a
means to desegregate schools, Nixon actually was a progressive president in his domestic
4
The journalist and sometime-political adviser Sidney Blumenthal wrote an excellent book, originally
published in 1986, on the “rise of a conservative elite” (xix). The Rise of the Counter-Establishment: The
Conservative Ascent to Political Power (New York: Union Press, 1986.
5
Blumenthal, Counter-Establishment, 35 and 97.
6
Heritage Foundation, “About,” http://www.heritage.org/About; Cato Institute, “About Cato,”
http://www.cato.org/about.php.
7
Julian E. Zelizer, “Seizing Power: Conservatives and Congress Since the 1970s,” in The Transformation
of American Politics: Activist Government and the Rise of Conservatism, ed. Paul Pierson and Theda
Skocpol (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 111.
6

policy initiatives. His domestic agenda included forcing the integration of construction
unions, creating the Environmental Protection Agency, and setting new regulatory
workplace standards, among other things. While he expanded American military operations
in Vietnam into neighboring Laos and Cambodia, he pursued détente with the Soviet Union
and took the first step toward normalizing relations with communist China. Conservative
Republicanism did eventually triumph, but the moderates played a significant role in shaping
what it was to become.
An influential and often forgotten fixture of the GOP’s moderate wing was the
Ripon Society. The founders of the society first met casually and almost accidentally.
During his senior year at Wesleyan University in 1960-61, Emil Frankel took a trip to
Cambridge, Massachusetts to meet Bruce Chapman, an undergraduate at Harvard University
and co-founder with George Gilder, another undergraduate, of Advance, a moderate
Republican political magazine. Frankel was interested in moderate Republicanism in the
tradition of Teddy Roosevelt, and ended up writing an article for Advance in 1961. But for
him the more important part of that trip was whom he met. Through Chapman, Frankel
met Jack Saloma, Tim Petri, and Gene Marans. These four, along with Lee Huebner, Ned
Cabot, John Price, and a few others, would form the core of a new group they were to name
the Ripon Society after Ripon, Wisconsin, the birthplace of the Republican Party. 8
After graduating from Wesleyan in 1961, Frankel studied at Manchester University in
England as a Fulbright Scholar. While in England, he learned about the Bow Group. 9
Founded in 1951, Bow was a collection of young, university educated Conservatives, who
sought to promote fresh and innovative ideas from within the British Conservative Party.
8 Emil Frankel, Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 23 June 2007.
9 Ibid.
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“They founded the Bow Group to counter the Tories’ image as the ‘stupid party’,” James
Barr wrote in his 2001 history of the group. Barr continued:
Nowhere was that image stronger than in the universities, from which they had only
recently graduated. The Left was intellectual, exciting and eclectic; the Right was
hobbled by constant reference to an image of pre-war Conservative Government as
‘a paradise for profiteers and hell for everyone else’. 10
Bow aimed to reinvigorate the Conservative Party by putting a premium on new, innovative
policy ideas. Frankel found Bow intriguing and saw parallels between the Tories and the
Republicans. Both were outmatched in the realm of policy creativity by the opposing party
and had a tendency to fight yesterday’s battles. When he returned to the United States to
attend Harvard Law School, he and Saloma, who was a junior professor of political science
at MIT, decided to pursue the creation of an American Bow Group at Harvard “to
counteract that image” of the GOP as “the stupid party.” 11
Frankel and Saloma invited a select group of Harvard graduate students to a dinner
meeting at the Harvard Faculty Club on Wednesday, December 12, 1962, with Professor
Morton Halperin as host. 12 The new group’s objectives were
to influence Republican party policy through research and publication… to redefine
the range of political debate to favor the expression of a progressive or constructive
Republican point of view… to activate and mobilise [sic] young professional and
business people of liberal Republican persuasion… to change the image of the
Republican party from one of reaction to one of action, to that of a party capable of
providing mature and responsible leadership in solving the problems of the twentieth
century…. 13
The first two research projects proposed were on American policy regarding China and “The
Negro, the Southern voter, and the Republican Party.” Finding commonality in their
10
James Barr, The Bow Group: A History (London: Politico’s, 2001), 3.
11
Frankel interview with Kabaservice.
12
Ripon Society, “Agenda, Dinner Meeting at the Harvard Faculty Club,” 12 December 1962, Ripon
Society Papers, Box 1, Folder 28, Carl A. Kroch Library, Cornell University.
13
Ripon Society, “Summary Minutes, Dinner Meeting at the Harvard Faculty Club,” 12 December 1962,
Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 28.
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vigorous support of civil rights and their distrust of Goldwater’s brinksmanship towards the
Soviet Union, these young Republicans set out to oppose conservatism and promote fresh
ideas within the GOP.
Despite a chronic lack of money, the new society quickly carved an institutional role
for itself as a sort of think tank for hire, working for moderate Republican politicians.
Through its newsletter/magazine, the Ripon Forum, the society published policy papers on
domestic and foreign issues, encouraged the Republican Party to actively court black voters,
and warned the party not to pursue a southern strategy. The society’s research groups
worked closely with the Republican Governors Association, individual governors, senators,
representatives, and mayors. The group developed several in-depth policy proposals,
including articulate calls for the unconditional sharing of federal tax revenues with state and
local governments and for a negative income tax to help the poor. The proposals tended to
support the use of decentralization, the free market, and well-placed tweaks of the tax code
to accomplish liberal societal goals.
Richard Nixon’s election in 1968 gave the Ripon Society its first taste of power in
the executive branch. As part of his strategy of coalescing the GOP around himself, Nixon
brought at least fifteen Riponers into his first administration. 14 Once there, they significantly
influenced and impacted Nixon’s domestic agenda, helping to bring many moderate policy
proposals, such as revenue sharing, to fruition.
While its members influenced the Nixon Administration from within, the Ripon
Society itself began to decline. As the original generation of Riponers moved into
government or on to other pursuits, the society lost its dynamism and entered a long period
14 Geoffrey Kabaservice, “Ripon and the First Year of the Nixon Administration (1969),” Unpublished
Manuscript, 1-2; John Topping, Interview with author, 6 November 2009.
9

of irregular leadership. Drastic changes in domestic political and cultural issues beyond civil
rights for blacks, embodied above all in the rise of the “second wave” feminist movement,
divided the once cohesive society by exposing latent differences between members over
policy. Nixon himself, as truly neither a moderate nor a conservative, split the society, which
as a whole viewed the President with ambivalence. Plagued by financial difficulties, lacking
strong leadership or a clear vision, and waging a war on the way the Republican National
Committee apportioned delegates to the national conventions, the society drifted through
the Ford and Carter years.
Some of Ripon’s members, however, were busy promoting a new idea: supply-side
economics. Two Riponers, Richard Rahn and Mark Bloomfield, were integral to the early
promotion of the theory, and a former editor of the Forum, George Gilder codified supply-
side’s philosophical underpinnings in an influential book, Wealth and Poverty. At the same
time, empowerment ideas, such as Jack Kemp’s plan for “enterprise zones,” made their way
into the conservative Republican agenda.
By the time of Reagan’s inauguration in 1981, the Ripon Society was in shambles.
Conservatism had triumphed and the society was barely functioning. A Washington insider
named Rick Kessler took over the organization and successfully rebuilt it, but as a vehicle for
connecting society members with Congressmen. The policy orientation was gone.
The Riponers of the 1960s and 1970s went on to occupy positions all across the
political spectrum. Where they landed seems to depend on which group of issues has most
animated them. Some embraced social conservatism; many others did not. Many today are
active Republicans, while some are independents or Democrats. Considering this diaspora,
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what significant impact, if any, did the Ripon Society have on the resurgence of the
Republican Party?
None of Ripon’s major domestic policy initiatives became sustained laws; the
Republican National Committee rebuffed Ripon’s battle to reform the process of allocating
delegates to the national conventions; the party succeeded with the very strategy of appealing
to the conservative South that Ripon was formed to oppose; and overall, despite the
Goldwater debacle in 1964, the party moved decisively to the right in the 1970s and after.
Yet, Ripon still had an important impact. By championing civil rights and arguing against a
southern strategy, they helped to weaken the relatively new formulation of the GOP as the
anti-black party and keep a significant number of moderate Republicans loyal to the party
through the end of the twentieth century. By articulately developing and promoting
domestic policies which advocated decentralization and self-empowerment—policies which,
in the 1960s, were consonant with the moderate and even liberal wings of the party—Ripon
ironically helped lay the foundation for a host of conservative policies on housing
(“enterprise zones”) and welfare (incentivizing employment) along with supply-side
economics. And, by insisting on serious discussion of government and policies—both goals
and means—they helped turn the right into an intellectual force that recast the Democrats as
the party of no ideas.
We must remember that conservatism was defeated in 1964. “Unwelcome in the
‘mainstream media,’ [conservatives] could easily have retreated into an alternative universe
and limited their conversation to preachments aimed at the like-minded few,” the journalist
Sam Tanenhaus has written. “They rejected that course, electing instead to seize whatever
openings they could to join the larger quarrels, adapting their voices to the idioms and
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vocabulary of the day…. They rejected extremism for centrism, purism for pragmatism,
revanchism for realism.” 15 Or, as Bruce Chapman described it, William F. “Buckley and his
circle eventually understood… that the extremism on the right was embarrassing to
conservatism…. And, they appreciated that all sorts of extremism more or less resemble
each other.” 16 Conservative Republican thinking was aided by a host of early Riponers who
contributed ideas, many distilled from early Ripon writings, and who generally participated in
the debates of the time. Debate between the two competing wings of the party fostered the
production of innovative ideas, which, when brought before the electorate, contributed to
the GOP’s electoral success. It was the moderate wing that began this policy revival. Ripon
was writing policy papers in the mid-1960s, long before the major conservative think tanks
gained serious national political influence. During the late 1960s and 1970s, it was
moderates like the Ripon Society which updated the policy lexicon of the Republican Party.
Without them, the conservative Republican ascendancy may never have happened.
12
***
The Ripon Society between 1962 and 1982 is best understood in three stages: the
early years, 1962-66; maturity and middle age, 1967-74; and old age and rebirth, 1975-82.
Chapter One explores Ripon’s early stages with an emphasis on the group’s support for civil
rights, policy and political work, and organizational growth. Chapter Two follows the
society during the Nixon and Ford Administrations with an eye on how Ripon and Riponers
influenced domestic policies, how the rising feminist movement began to divide the society,
and how Nixon himself impacted the group. Chapter Three narrates Ripon’s organizational
floundering in the late 1970s, the society’s relationship with the new supply-side movement,
15 Sam Tanenhaus, The Death of Conservatism (New York: Random House, 2009), 13.
16 Bruce Chapman, Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 8 December 2009.

the adoption of empowerment policies by the conservative wing of the GOP, and Ripon’s
revitalization under Rick Kessler. The Epilogue draws conclusions about Ripon’s impact on
the conservative Republican ascendancy between 1962 and 1982.
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CHAPTER ONE
The Early Years, 1962-1966
Civil Rights, Federalism, and an Institutional Role
After its founding in December 1962, the Ripon Society spent most of 1963 holding
meetings and researching position papers. Beginning in the fall of 1963, however, many
Ripon members campaigned on behalf of Nelson Rockefeller in the Republican primaries
against Barry Goldwater. Civil rights was the primary motivating issue for these graduate
students. It was 10 years after the landmark ruling Brown v. Board of Education declared
segregated schools unconstitutional, yet the country—and the federal government—had
been excruciatingly slow to enforce desegregation. Attracted by the Republican Party’s
rhetoric of individualism and self-empowerment and the party’s anti-slavery history, these
young men believed that the GOP was the proper vehicle for progressive change.
After Goldwater’s nomination in July 1964 in San Francisco, the society decided to
research and write a report repudiating an electoral strategy that relied upon the southern
white backlash to desegregation. Published in 1965, Election ’64 united the Ripon
Society—underscoring civil rights as the both the society’s catalyst and glue. In 1965 and
1966, however, the society enlarged its focus beyond the issue of civil rights, and began to
establish itself as a mini-think tank. Beginning in 1965, the society started publishing a
newsletter, the Ripon Forum. Working with moderate Republican politicians, Ripon became
a paid research group, attracting the attention of the media and gaining influence
disproportionate to its small size. As 1966 ended and the kickoff to the next presidential
campaign loomed, the Ripon Society had managed to carve out a small institutional role for
itself within the Republican Party.
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Pre-1964: Defining Ripon’s “Liberalism”
For the Ripon Society, “liberal” and “progressive” meant actively supporting federal
action on civil rights. To Ripon, the word “conservative” brought with it segregationist
implications. And it was Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater who did more than arguably any
other Republican to push the “conservative” label in a pro-segregationist—and anti-civil
rights—direction.
Yet, Goldwater’s broad definition of conservatism did not conflict with the guiding
principles of the Ripon Society. Goldwater believed not only that the Constitution protects
and enables governance by the states on many if not most issues, but also “that essentially
local problems are best dealt with by the people most directly concerned,” as he wrote in
Conscience of a Conservative in 1960. 1 A conservative, Goldwater claimed, is one who
understands “that each member of the [human] species is a unique creature…. Only a
philosophy that takes into account the essential differences between men, and,
accordingly, makes provision for developing the different potentialities of each man can
claim to be in accord with Nature.” 2 Conservatives believe above all else in the primacy of
individuals—a primacy that is best protected and developed by the decentralization of
power.
Yet, Goldwater saw no legal problem with the segregationist South. “I deny,” he
wrote, “that there can be a conflict between States’ Rights, properly defined—and civil
rights, properly defined.” 3 He argued that the 14 th Amendment “does not require the States
to maintain racially mixed schools” and “that the Constitution does not permit any
1 Barry Goldwater, Conscience of a Conservative (Sheperdsville: Victor, 1960), 29.
2 Ibid., 11-2.
3 Ibid., 31.
15

interference whatsoever by the federal government in the field of education.” 4 Ripon, on
the other hand, saw the 14 th Amendment, together with the other Reconstruction
Amendments, as explicit federal bulwarks against racial discrimination. Goldwater took an
extreme conservative legalistic view not only of civil rights, but of federal programs that
coerced state action through promises of federal monies. His zeal to protect the states
overwhelmed any argument of the need for the federal government to step in to protect
legally and constitutionally guaranteed civil rights, which he interpreted as “human rights”
that were not “incorporated in the law” and thus “not enforceable by the instruments of
civil law.” 5
Ripon believed in the primacy of the individual just as Goldwater did. But, the
society also believed that civil rights for blacks were protected by the federal Constitution
and therefore demanded active federal protection. Under that reading, the Ripon Society
was a “conservative” institution. But, as considered within the conservative party, they
endorsed a relatively liberal interpretation of legal limits and the implications of the civil
rights debate. It is important to remember that the Ripon brand of “liberal” or
“progressive” Republicanism in the mid-1960s was not a repudiation of Republican
principles, but rather, in the eyes of Riponers, a validation.
The passion of Riponers for civil rights was in part a result of the times. The youth
of the 1960s, of which they were a part, were overwhelmingly more concerned about the
rights and welfare of minorities and the poor than were their parents. 6 The Ripon
generation was much more likely to become activists for a cause, and the social activist
4 Ibid., 34.
5 Ibid., 32 and 33.
6 According to Ripon, “‘Nearly half’ of the parents interviewed in an earlier poll said they would object to
Negroes living next door but only ‘just over a quarter’ of their children had similar objections.” William E.
Wessels, “The Young Americans: A Message for the Grand Old Party,” in The Ripon Papers, 1963-1968,
ed. Lee W. Huebner and Thomas E. Petri (Washington: National Press, 1968), 16.
16

movement of the 1960s was itself intrinsically related to the fight for civil rights. “If the
activists of the 60’s have traceable roots, they are in the Civil Rights movement,” Riponer
William E. Wessels wrote in 1966.
Since Martin Luther King’s successful boycott of the segregated buses in
Montgomery, Alabama, and the first ‘sit-in’ at a Greensboro, North Carolina, lunch
counter, thousands of students have joined organizations which usually have only
two things in common: a refusal to accept their parents’ excuses for the world as it
is, and an almost evangelistic sense of their mission to reform society. 7
Riponers were predominantly from the Northeast and Midwest, traditional bastions of
reformist Republicanism. They were young law school students, academics, and
professionals, whose sense of the importance of social action was inculcated not only in the
community, but also in elite educational institutions. And while the Democratic Party was
broadly seen as the locus of active social change, these young people were uncomfortable
with that party’s emphasis on progress through direct federal programs. They were more at
home in the Republican Party’s traditional emphasis on the individual—“free soil and free
men.” 8 As such, Ripon did not oppose governmental solutions to domestic problems;
rather, the society supported policies that harnessed the free market and decentralization as
solutions which empowered individuals and localities and pushed people in the right
direction. Ripon was not a “liberal” group in the Democratic sense, but neither did they
belong to the “conservative” side of the spectrum. Ripon should be properly identified as a
“moderate” group.
“We began meeting, because we tired of apologizing to the world of ideas for being
Republicans,” a Riponer remembered, “and to fellow Republicans for being interested in
7 “Young Americans,” The Ripon Papers, 16.
8 “A Declaration of Conscience,” The Ripon Papers, 11.
17

ideas.” 9 As youths, Riponers had a distinct sense of how the civil rights issue was defining
their generation—and how the Republican Party needed to actively address the issue if they
were to appeal to the youth generation, which the Democrat President John F. Kennedy had
so energized. The Riponers in the mid-1960s, however, were all male graduate students.
Though Harvard had a formal relationship with Radcliffe College, university life was not
truly coeducational. For instance, Yale University, which hosted one of the first Ripon
chapters, did not accept women undergraduates until 1969. 10 Women would join the group
as the decade progressed—a change that impacted Ripon just as the feminist movement
changed the whole of American politics.
It was a talented, dynamic group. Emil Frankel, who brought the idea for the Ripon
Society back with him from his time as a Fulbright Scholar in England, was from
Connecticut. 11 Jack Saloma was born in New York City but grew up in Weymouth,
Massachusetts. A graduate of MIT, he attended graduate school at the London School of
Economics as a Fulbright scholar before receiving his Ph.D. in political science from
Harvard. He was working as a junior professor at MIT when Ripon was founded. 12 Gene
Marans grew up in a Jewish household in Montana before attending Harvard College and
then Harvard University. 13 John Price spent his early years on Long Island before it became
a land of commuters. His mother grew up on a farm in Iowa and his father came from the
West Virginia coal-mining region. The moderate Republican “temperament” of his parents
rubbed off on him—his father led Eisenhower’s Office of Defense Mobilization from 1959-
9
Thomas E. Petri and J. Eugene Marans, “Ripon at Twenty-Five,” Ripon Forum, 24:1 (February 1988), 21.
10
Yale University, “History,” http://www.yale.edu/about/history.html.
11
Frankel interview with Kabaservice.
12
J. Eugene Marans, Interview with author, 16 March and 3 April 2010; Lindsey Gruson, “John S. Saloma,
48; Specialist in Politics Started Ripon Group,” New York Times, 8 July 1983, B7.
13
Marans interview with author.
18

60. Price attended the small Grinnell College in Iowa before Harvard Law School. 14 Lee
Huebner’s parents both taught high school in Sheboygan, Wisconsin, a town on the shores
of Lake Michigan and north of Milwaukee. While in college at Northwestern University in
Chicago, Huebner noticed that among college Republicans, “[t]here was a real sense that
with Eisenhower leaving office… perceived as the rather tired leader of a rather tired group,
the energy was all with the Republican right.” Huebner had met Tim Petri when they were
young at the Wisconsin Boys State summer program at Ripon College, and they ran into
each other at Harvard in the fall of 1962 when Huebner was a graduate student in history
and Petri was at the law school. It was Petri who summoned their shared Wisconsin roots
and suggested to name the fledgling group “the Ripon Society.” 15 Doug Bailey grew up in a
Republican-voting family in Cleveland before he matriculated at Colgate University. After
spending a few years of the 1950s stationed in Germany while in the Army, he went to
Boston to attend Tufts University’s Fletcher School, eventually moving to Harvard to assist
Henry Kissinger. 16 Peter Wallison grew up in Queens, the son of Jewish, New Deal
Democrat teachers. After paging in the overwhelmingly Democratic House of
Representatives in high school, Wallison decided he was a Republican. While a Harvard
undergraduate, he met Petri and Marans and became president of the Harvard Young
Republicans, though he did not join Ripon until he was at Harvard Law School. 17 Bill
Kilberg, the father of the author of this thesis, grew up in Bath Beach, Brooklyn, just a few
blocks from Gravesend Bay and a few houses from Funzi Tieri, the infamous mob boss of
the 1970s. Kilberg’s father worked for the New York Port Authority as an electrical
14 John Price, Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 20 July 2007.
15 Lee Huebner, Interviews with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 11 April 2007 and 24 November 2009.
16 Douglas Bailey, Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 22 March 2007.
17 Peter Wallison, e-mail to author, 2 April 2010.
19

engineer, while his mother worked for a fuel company and managed several commercial
development projects. After attending the Industrial and Labor Relations School at Cornell
University, Kilberg began Harvard Law School in the fall of 1966.
Later in the decade, a few women joined the group. Bobbie Kilberg (née Greene),
the author’s mother, grew up in the Forest Hills neighborhood of Queens, the daughter of
an accountant and an office manager for an accounting firm. Both her parents were Jewish;
her father was a Republican, while her mother was an Independent. 18 After attending Vassar
College, she went to Yale Law School, where she became involved in Ripon’s New Haven
chapter. She married Bill Kilberg in the fall of 1970. Tanya Melich’s father was an
enterprising Republican politician in Utah, who ingrained his immense respect for Abraham
Lincoln in his daughter. Tanya attended the University of Colorado before graduate school
at Columbia University. Melich was active in Republican politics from a young age—she
was a page at the 1956 national convention—and her experience in New York introduced
her to the northeastern wing of the GOP. 19
It was as diverse a group as could possibly be found at Ivy League graduate schools
in the 1960s. The Riponers’ moderate Republicanism came from different roots, but in
1964 their energies converged on opposing the presidential candidacy of Barry Goldwater.
1964 Election
Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963 hit the nation hard, and Ripon was no
exception. The President’s death prompted the society’s first public statement, “A Call to
Excellence in Leadership,” which was released on January 3, 1964. Establishing publicly that
18 Bobbie Kilberg, e-mail message to author, 1 April 2010.
19 Tanya Melich, Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 13 February 2007.
20

the new group believed that a “moderate course of progressive Republicanism” would give
“the Republican party the best chance to build a durable majority position in American
politics,” the society argued that Kennedy’s death “means that the center is once again
contestable.” 20 To the early Ripon members, the Democratic Party was the party of
cumbersome, centralized federal solutions and was heavily dependent on the South. On the
other hand, the Republican Party was the party of Lincoln and individual empowerment.
Kennedy’s death opened the door for a new generation of Republicans to take back the
center of the political spectrum, protect civil rights, and lead the country progressively into
the future. The “Call to Excellence” gained the attention of some prominent leaders in the
party, including former President Dwight Eisenhower and Michigan Governor George
Romney. 21
When President Kennedy was shot in November 1963, a group of Riponers,
including Emil Frankel, Ned Cabot, John Price, and Gene Marans, were gathered with other
graduate students at Harvard University planning a trip to New Hampshire to campaign for
New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller. Rockefeller, whom many Riponers favored in the
1964 presidential election, was a manifestation of moderate northeastern Republicanism:
progressive and with an elite air about him. Furthermore, as a member of the wealthy
Rockefeller clan, he had the money with which to campaign against the rising Goldwater
movement within the GOP. Though they postponed their trip because of Kennedy’s death,
most of the group that met that day in November did go to New Hampshire later and
20 “A Call to Excellence in Leadership,” Ripon Papers, 1963-1968, 5-6.
21 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Walter Thayer, 23 January 1964, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 177; George
Romney,“Statement by Governor Romney for Use in Ripon Society Brochure,” Undated, Ripon Papers,
Box 3: Folder 177.
21

campaign door-to-door for the Rockefeller. 22 Moreover, in January and February 1964, a
group of Harvard Law School students, including Ned Cabot, followed Goldwater while he
campaigned in New Hampshire, asking him pointed questions on China, Social Security, and
the Soviet Union. They called themselves the “Truth Squad.” 23 While civil rights was
Ripon’s prime motivating issue, the group’s opposition to Goldwater was not completely
based on his support for states’ rights. Goldwater’s brinksmanship unsettled Riponers, as
did his baiting over China’s probable admission into the United Nations. Ripon was
certainly anti-communist, but like many Americans in 1964, the society believed Goldwater’s
inflammatory rhetoric was dangerous. Ripon’s activism during the primaries was limited and
“was certainly not intended to be a formal ‘Ripon activity,’” Frankel said, and most of
Ripon’s work did come, in fact, after the nomination. 24
Kennedy’s assassination also had an unintended consequence: it put Ripon’s biggest
competitor in the moderate Republican market out of business. Founded at Harvard in
1960 by undergraduates Bruce Chapman and George Gilder, Advance was a moderate
Republican magazine with significant financial backing. The magazine moved to D.C. in
1962. 25 Chapman and Gilder, however, had bet their success on the November 1963 issue,
which was a feature on how the GOP could beat Kennedy in the 1964 presidential election.
The Kennedy assassination made mass distribution of the issue politically impossible. Out
of money, Advance closed up shop. “If that hadn’t happened, I don’t think there would
have been a Ripon Society,” said Lee Auspitz, who would later become Ripon president. 26
Of course, Ripon had been founded in 1962, but Advance’s demise cleared the playing field.
22
Frankel interview with Kabaservice.
23
Robert J. Samuelson, “‘Truth Squad’ of 10 Law Students Trails Goldwater in N.H. Primary,” Harvard
Crimson, 5 February 1964.
24
Frankel interview with Kabaservice.
25
Chapman interview with Kabaservice.
26
J. Lee Auspitz, Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 21 October 2006.
22

It is questionable whether two moderate Republican organizations started at Harvard within
a few years of each other could have both survived.
Ripon member Lee Huebner also took on a research project for the primary
campaign of Representative Charles McCurdy “Mac” Mathias, who was running for
reelection in Maryland’s 6 th District. Mathias had a primary challenger in L. Brent Bozell,
brother-in-law of the young conservative Ivy League firebrand William F. Buckley, Jr., an
editor for Buckley’s conservative magazine National Review, a former speechwriter for
controversial Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy, and co-founder of the conservative
Young Americans for Freedom. 27 Bozell also used his speechwriting skills to ghostwrite
Barry Goldwater’s Conscience of a Conservative in 1960. 28 Huebner holed up in
Harvard’s Widener Library, read all of Bozell’s old writings, and passed on what he found to
the Mathias campaign. 29 It was an early example of effective opposition research—a tactic
that has become central to modern American political campaigns. And Mathias won.
Marred by his divorce two years earlier and remarriage, Rockefeller’s campaign
faltered as the Goldwater machine painted the New Yorker as an elitist womanizer. 30
Despite the attempt by moderate Pennsylvania Governor William Scranton to step up and
head off Goldwater, it was clear as the summer unfolded that the Republican National
Convention in San Francisco in the middle of July would nominate the strident Senator from
Arizona. 31
Ripon was shocked that the party of Lincoln would nominate an implicitly pro-
segregationist candidate. On July 4, 1964, Independence Day and nearly 100 years after
27 David Stout, “L. Brent Bozell, 71, a Champion of Conservatism,” New York Times, 19 April 1997, 48.
28 Lee Edwards, “A modern Don Quixote fought the good fight,” Insight on the News, 9 June 1997,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_n21_v13/ai_19469428/.
29 Huebner interview Kabaservice.
30 Lewis L. Gould, Grand Old Party (New York: Random House, 2003), 360.
31 Ibid., 360-1.
23

Lincoln’s renomination for the presidency in 1864, the society issued “A Declaration of
Conscience from Ripon, Wisconsin.” Harkening back to the GOP’s roots, Ripon
proclaimed that “[t]oday America stands at another point of great moral and physical crisis.”
Comparing the bloody conflict over the spread of slavery into Kansas in 1854 to the brutal
suppression of peaceful demonstrators in the South, Ripon asserted that “[o]nce again the
conscience of America – and especially young America – has been struck.” 32 “A Declaration
of Conscience” was a direct challenge to Goldwater, who had voted against the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 just days before. In the Riponers’ opinion, Goldwater had “disqualified himself
to be the leader of the party of Lincoln.” 33
“A Declaration of Conscience” was one of the most scathing and eloquent
repudiations of Goldwater by fellow Republicans. Many Republicans thought it went too far
in its criticism of the party’s probable presidential nominee. For instance, Representative
Bob Michel, who would later be the Republican Leader in the House for fourteen years
(1981-1994), sent a particularly snippy letter to Jack Saloma on July 7. 34 On the other hand,
Michel’s letter was a sign that party leaders were noticing Ripon, even if they did not agree
with the society.
Goldwater did not run an explicitly anti-black or anti-civil rights campaign. Yet,
while he voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because he was concerned that the act
breached constitutional protections of federalism, Goldwater did nothing to assuage the
justified fears of moderates and liberals within the Republican Party, many of whom ended
32
“A Declaration of Conscience,” 10 and 12.
33
Ibid., 12.
34
“Highlights in the Career of Robert H. Michel,” Dirksen Congressional Center, 2006,
http://www.dirksencenter.org/print_michel_bio.htm; Robert H. Michel to John S. Saloma, 7 July 1964,
Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 2.
24

up voting for President Johnson. 35 Goldwater’s acceptance speech at the San Francisco
convention on July 16 underscores his failure to mellow his image. “Balance, diversity,
creativity - these are the elements of Republican equation,” he claimed as a throw-out line to
the moderates and liberals. But the paragraph before was an implicit defense of his vote
against civil rights. “Our towns and our cities, then our counties, then our states, then our
regional contacts - and only then, the national government,” he said. “That, let me remind
you, is the ladder of liberty, built by decentralized power.” 36 Ripon would later argue
strongly in favor of decentralization in several different areas of domestic policy, but when it
came to civil rights the group held strongly to a belief in federal action. At least one
Riponer, Doug Bailey, heard Goldwater’s acceptance speech in person in the Cow Palace
arena. Bailey, who had been at the meeting which founded the society, had been “in effect
the number two person on the foreign policy side in the Rockefeller research operation,”
and it was through this job that he met John Deardourff, with whom he would later start the
political consulting firm Bailey, Deardourff & Associates. Bailey and Deardourff traveled to
San Francisco with the Rockefeller team. Bailey vividly recalled the crowd’s reaction when
Rockefeller took the stage to give his scheduled speech to the delegates: “The venom of the
booing and the hatred in people’s eyes really was quite stunning.” 37
Judging that Goldwater’s defeat was as close as possible to a sure thing, Ripon began
what would be called “Project Election ‘64”—a detailed report repudiating the election
strategy and electability of conservative Republicans and Goldwater in particular. 38 The
society was prepared to capitalize upon Goldwater’s upcoming defeat in order to try to
35
Bart Barnes, “Barry Goldwater, GOP Hero, Dies,” Washington Post, 30 May 1998, A1.
36
Barry Goldwater, “Goldwater’s 1964 Acceptance Speech,” Washington Post,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/daily/may98/goldwaterspeech.htm.
37
Bailey interview with Kabaservice.
38
Ripon Society, “Summary Minutes, Dinner, Business, and Discussion Meeting,” 7 December 1964,
Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 28.
25

everse some of the election’s most negative connotations—most notably the relationships
between the GOP and black voters and the GOP and the Deep South. Ripon’s work on
this project resulted in two major publications in two years: Election ’64: A New Mandate
(published in 1965) and Southern Republicanism and the New South (published 1966). The
society also distributed several statements soon after the election of 1964 and again after the
election of 1965. As a whole, these publications and public statements argued strenuously
for moderation both on local and national tickets, especially when it came to civil rights and
what they saw as a nefarious southern strategy.
During the time between Goldwater’s nomination and election day in November,
Ripon steered clear of official negative comments on Goldwater, and instead focused on the
campaigns of those whom they supported. On October 28, 1964, the society released to
newspapers its list of 75 endorsements. All the men who received Ripon’s support
supposedly were “competent, responsible, and experienced candidates; but more than this
they are outstanding representatives of the best traditions and ideals of the Republican
Party.” They all helped affirm Ripon’s “belief that the Republican party is potentially a more
flexible instrument [than the Democratic Party] for governing this great nation in the
decades ahead.” Civil rights clearly was the vital issue in deciding whom to endorse.
Tellingly, only two candidates in the South received an endorsement: Winthrop Rockefeller,
who was running for governor of Arkansas; and John J. Duncan, who was running for
Congress out of the 2 nd District of Tennessee. All in all, the list resembled a who’s-who list
of moderate Republicans in 1964: Senators Hugh Scott (Pennsylvania), Kenneth Keating
(New York), and Hiram Fong (Hawaii); Congressmen John Lindsay (New York), Alphonzo
Bell, Jr. (California), Fred Schwengel (Iowa), and Charles Mathias (Maryland); and
26

Governors George Romney (Michigan), John Chafee (Rhode Island), and John Volpe
(Massachusetts). Many others made the list—those were just the notables at the time. 39
Lee Huebner did head out on the campaign trail—as an aide to Richard Nixon. The
former Vice President flew around the country, campaigning for Goldwater and the
Republicans. “Even though I opposed Goldwater, I was in a sense campaigning for him by
being aboard that airplane,” Huebner recalled. This was the “first round of [Nixon’s] ’68
presidential campaign.” Nixon, having lost narrowly to Kennedy four years earlier, was
rebuilding his image and earning support within the party by campaigning hard for
Republicans regardless of ideology. 40
On November 3, 1964, President Johnson trounced Barry Goldwater, winning over
60% of the popular vote and taking 486 electoral votes to Goldwater’s 52. While Goldwater
carried all five states of the Deep South (South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and
Louisiana), Johnson won the rest of the South—indeed, Johnson won the rest of the country
except Arizona, Goldwater’s home state. 41 In 1956, Eisenhower carried Virginia, Kentucky,
Tennessee, Florida, Louisiana, and Texas. Goldwater lost all of those except Louisiana. 42
And, the South was where Goldwater did best.
The Aftermath of 1964: Election ’64 and the Black Voter
After the election, Ripon issued a preliminary report followed by the full Election
’64 analysis in January 1965. In preparing Election ’64, Ripon targeted its analytical eye on
the black vote and the South. “The report… includes a great amount of data based on VEP
39
Ripon Society, “Ripon Society Issues National Endorsement of Republican Candidates,” 28 October
1964, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 185.
40
Huebner interview with Kabaservice.
41
James R. Whitson, “1964,” President Elect, http://presidentelect.org/e1964.html.
42
James R. Whitson, “1956,” President Elect, and http://presidentelect.org/e1956.html.
27

statistics,” Gene Marans wrote in a letter on January 11, 1965. VEP, the Voter Education
Project, was a subsidiary of the Southern Regional Council, a black activist group in the
South. Presumably the statistics about black voting on which Ripon focused were pulled
from VEP’s report “Southern Negro Voting Statistics.” 43
The drafting of the report was a collective effort. The minutes from a meeting of
the society on December 7, 1964, note that “[n]early all members of Ripon have worked and
are working on this project.” 44 In its pro-civil rights, anti-Goldwater activism, Ripon was
united.
Election ‘64 pointed to the “implicit racist appeal,” “the consummation of the
Republican National Committee’s Southern strategy” as the most tragic flaw of the
Goldwater campaign. 45 That strategy failed. The big Republican winners in 1964 were those
whom Ripon had endorsed precisely because they represented the opposite of Goldwater
within the GOP: Governors Romney and Chafee and Congressman Mathias. Romney
especially ran an explicitly anti-Goldwater campaign. 46 “Are you supporting Goldwater or
aren’t you,” a man asked Romney on the campaign trail. “You know darn well I’m not!”
was his response. 47 The Republicans who won in 1964 were those who actively distanced
themselves from Goldwater.
In the rest of the country, Republicans saw a “‘reverse coat-tail’ effect.” Maine, for
instance, saw its state legislature flip from a Republican majority of 29 to 5 to a Democratic
43
Wiley A. Branton to J. Eugene Marans, 18 December 1964, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 2; J. Eugene
Marans to Wiley A. Branton, 11 January 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 2.
44
“Summary Minutes,” 7 December 1964.
45
Ripon Society, Election ’64: A Ripon Society Report, ed. Thomas P. Petri (Cambridge: Ripon Society,
1965), 19.
46
Ripon Society, “A New Republican Mandate: A Ripon Society Report and Preliminary Analysis of the
1964 Elections,” 5 November 1964, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 185.
47
Robert Ajemian, “A Trio of G.O.P. Stars Fighting Hard Not to be Buried with Barry,” Life, 30 October
1964, 35.
28

majority of the exact same margin. The GOP’s Congressional strength in the suburbs fell
from a majority of 29 to 17 to a minority of 24 to 22. The Republican percentage of the
black vote also fell tremendously. In Atlanta, Richard Nixon won 58% of the black vote in
1960; Goldwater won 3%. The other cities of both the South and the North saw a similar
backlash. 48 These results were particularly upsetting for Ripon considering that a higher
percentage of Republican Congressmen voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 than did
Democrats. 49 Now that “[m]oderate Republican congressmen… were traded for
segregationists,” Ripon’s plea for leaders with “a commitment to the future” instead of the
past was even more urgent. 50
Election ’64 revealed the practical side to Ripon’s focus on civil rights, an angle that
Ripon would continue to pursue in the future. While Riponers described themselves as
moderates, they were “very Republican [and] partisan,” as Lee Huebner put it. 51 “The
Presidential election of 1964 and its aftermath have obscured one central fact: America
stands on the verge of an exciting new era of politics,” the society argued in From
Disaster to Distinction, its first full-length book. “A new order is coming in American
politics – based upon a new generation and continued growth and concentration of
population.” 52 “The growth areas that Republicans must tap are not obscure,” Ripon
argued. “Geographically they are in the expanding urban centers and suburbs of the North
and West and among the Negroes of the deep South.” 53 There were certain “groups on the
48
“Preliminary Analysis of the 1964 Elections.”
49
R.D. Davis, “Debunking the Big Lie: The Truth About the 1964 Civil Rights Act,” National Minority
Politics 7:11 (November 1995), 37.
50
“Preliminary Analysis of the 1964 Elections”; “Ripon Society Issues National Endorsement of
Republican Candidates,” 28 October 1964.
51
Lee Huebner, Interview with author, 8 September 2009.
52
Ripon Society, From Disaster to Distinction: the Rebirth of the Republican Party (New York: Pocket
Books, 1966), 95. Emphasis in original.
53
Ibid., 112.
29

way up”—the GOP “must fight for the interest of the Negroes, of the youth, of the middle-
class suburbanite, and of the new sophisticated technician,” because “[w]ithout them the
Republican party has no future.” 54 Fighting for civil rights for blacks was not only a moral
concern, but a well-reasoned and calculated political one as well. These dual concerns did
not contradict each other, but rather were mutually reinforcing. To follow Ripon’s thinking,
vigorously supporting civil rights and affiliated federal programs, which was the morally right
thing to do, would attract black and other minority voters as well as moderate Democrats to
the Republican Party, and give the party greater political power and a mandate to further
efforts in the civil rights area.
“Third Force”: the Republican Governors Association
From the outset, Riponers understood that their organization was going to be a small
one. While Jack Saloma and Emil Frankel argued that “[i]f [Ripon] succeeds on a scale
comparable to its British model [the Bow Group] it can play a crucial role in reshaping the
Republican Party and its image,” they knew that Ripon itself was no substitute for larger
party structures. 55 They sought to magnify their impact through influential lenses: mayors,
representatives, senators, governors, and the like. But these political relationships, while
undoubtedly important for the group’s influence and financial solvency, lacked the
compounded multiplying power of the Goldwater-controlled RNC and private organizations
such as the American Conservative Union and John Birch Society.
Ripon’s solution was to promote the new Republican Governors Association as a
“third force” within the party, as a check on Congressional Republicans and the RNC. (It
54 Ibid., 113.
55 “Agenda,” 12 December 1962.
30

might have been more accurate to call it a “fourth force,” since the combination of
conservative groups like the ACU and Birch Society had significant power and influence.)
Ripon presented a research paper—“The Republican Governors’ Association: The Case for
a Third Force”—to Republican governors at their meeting in Denver on December 4 and 5,
1964. Ripon’s targeting of GOP governors made complete sense; as a group, they were
much more moderate than the Congressional and RNC leadership. Nelson Rockefeller of
New York, the national leader of the party’s moderate wing, was the most prominent of the
sixteen members, though Robert Smylie (ID), Mark Hatfield (OR), George Romney (MI),
and William Scranton (PA) were no lightweights. Notably, not a single southern state—not
even a border state—was represented by a Republican governor in December 1964. 56 By
virtue of the Democratic stranglehold of the South,
GOP governors came from generally more liberal regions. As a group, they were highly
palatable to Ripon. But before we get to the specifics of the Third Force paper, we must
understand how the RGA got its start.
Since 1908, the country’s governors have met annually under the banner of the
National Governors Association (NGA). 57 In the early 1960s, the vastly outnumbered
Republicans became more and more frustrated by the Democrats’ grip on the NGA. Not
only did the Democrats move repeatedly—and successfully—to issue statements supporting
President Kennedy’s agenda, but they also stymied Republican efforts to support civil rights.
At the NGA’s Honolulu meeting in June 1961, a “strong Republican civil rights proposal
was disposed of with a vacuous substitute resolution by
56 Ibid.
57 “About the National Governors Association,” National Governors Association,
http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.cdd492add7dd9cf9e8ebb856a11010a0/.
31

[Democratic] Governors Ernest Vandiver of Georgia and Price Daniel of Texas.” 58
At Hershey, Pennsylvania in July 1962, “A republican civil rights resolution, calling for a
pledge by every Governor to make best efforts to advance civil rights in his state, was
filibustered to death by the Southern Democrats, and all civil rights resolutions finally had to
be withdrawn.” 59 At Miami in July 1963, Governor Smylie led the Republicans in a
maneuver that “not only forced the Democrats into a position of opposition to civil rights,
but also boxed them into a situation of favoring a ‘gag’ on all issues coming before the
Conference.” 60 The Democrats then got rid of the Resolutions Committee to prevent any
proclamations on civil rights. At all these meetings, the Democrats had strong support from
the Democratic National Committee (DNC) as well as the White House—Vice President
Johnson attended the Honolulu meeting and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
represented the President at the Hershey conference. 61 The Republicans, on the other hand,
had no organizational support.
At the end of the Miami conference in 1963, the GOP governors formed the RGA,
albeit without a formal structure. According to Ripon, “[c]ivil rights was the immediate
catalyst in 1963”—the Democrat-dominated NGA was stifling GOP attempts to address the
issue, essentially muzzling Republican governors from making a group statement on the
subject. 62 The Republican governors also wanted “to establish concerted action with the
House and Senate party leadership” and saw “the need for more direct contact with the
Republican National Committee.” 63 By coordinating with federal and national party
58
Ripon Society, “The Republican Governors’ Association: The Case for a Third Force,” 4 December
1964, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 187, 3.
59
Ibid., 4.
60
Ibid., 5.
61
Ibid., 3-4.
62
Ibid., 6.
63
Ibid., 6-7.
32

leadership, they hoped to fight against the Democrats’ machine-like control of the NGA and
make their voices heard on the national level. The GOP governors agreed to meet in
Denver in September 1963 in order to work out the organizational details. 64
The RNC, under the direction of Chairman William Miller, whom Goldwater would
pick as his running mate in 1964, was wary of the incipient RGA, filled as it was with
moderates. The RNC was heavily pro-Goldwater and feared a vocally pro-civil rights RGA
would harm Goldwater’s southern strategy. 65 Miller first successfully stopped GOP
Congressmen from sending representatives to Denver, then got his version of the new
organization’s by-laws passed, thereby consolidating the RNC’s control of the RGA. Under
the RGA’s Articles of Association, “[t]he executive committee will constitute an advisory
and liaison group between the Republican Governors and the National Chairman and
through him to the House and Senate Campaign Committees and the Republican State
Chairman’s Association.” 66 All formal communication between the RGA and other party
organizations had to go through Miller and then his successor Dean Burch, a Goldwaterite
from Arizona. Furthermore, the Treasurer of the RNC was given the added job of
Treasurer of the RGA—Miller held the purse strings as well. 67 The RGA, thus, was wholly
subsumed within the RNC.
At the annual NGA meeting in Cleveland in June 1964, the RGA “suffered from
poor organization, dissension, and discouragement.” 68 With Eisenhower, Nixon, and
Goldwater all in attendance at the conference, some of the GOP governors hoped to stage a
64
Ibid., 8.
65
Ibid., 9.
66
“Republican Governors’ Association Articles of Association of September 14, 1963,” reproduced in
“The Republican Governors’ Association: The Case for a Third Force,” 4 December 1964, Ripon Papers,
Box 3: Folder 187, 20.
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid., 12.
33

confrontation with Goldwater on civil rights. Goldwater, however, had no intention of
attending a “summit meeting” with Eisenhower and Nixon, and the RGA’s handling of the
press was abysmal. During a meeting Governor Smylie was holding with the press,
Governor Paul Fannin of Arizona announced that Goldwater would not have time to meet
with the former President and Vice President. 69 Ripon saw Cleveland as a crucial missed
opportunity:
If the Republican governors had been able to use Cleveland as a dramatic display of
coordinated and creative leadership instead of defeatism and incompetence, they
might have had more success in the San Francisco platform fight and in moderating
the nominee’s acceptance speech. With national attention riveted on Cleveland in
the midst of a heated political battle, it would have been advantageous to use the
Conference as a sounding board for lucid, reasoned proposals on civil rights,
extremism, medicare, social security, and similar problems. 70
The RGA’s problems were organizational. The Association had plenty of talent, but forces
within the party were suffocating it.
Ripon’s straightforward proposals for revamping the RGA, presented a month after
Johnson’s trouncing of Goldwater, engaged the Association’s structural problems. The
RGA needed dedicated “professional staff,” financial independence” from the RNC, and the
ability to “communicate directly with Republican Senators and Congressmen.” Research and
adequate preparation were key. “Republican Governors should collectively speak out on
federal-state problems through policy statements and position papers,” the paper argued.
“The Ripon Society is prepared to assist in the preparation of research papers for the
Governors.” 71
Nearly two years later in July 1966, Ripon representatives spoke to the Republican
governors in Los Angeles. The conservative Goldwater menace was still strong, they argued,
69 Ibid., 14.
70 Ibid., 15.
71 Ibid., iv.
34

and possibly stronger than it was in 1964. Looking forward to 1968, Ripon despaired at the
RGA’s failure to follow through with transforming the governors into a potent national
political force. “We want you to make the Republican Governors Association a political
reality,” Ripon told the governors. “Today the country doesn’t sense any ‘team feeling’
among the Republican Governors. More than position papers or campaign schools, as
important as these may be, we would like to see you develop political muscle.” 72 The
election of Ray Bliss as Chairman of the RNC in 1965 (replacing Burch) had taken some
pressure off of GOP governors—Bliss was not a Goldwater lackey and he was instituting
organizational reforms to enhance the RNC’s operations. One of the effects of this,
however, was that there was less of an immediate catalyst for the strengthening of the RGA.
In fact, the RGA stayed submerged within the RNC until 2002, when Congress
passed the McCain-Feingold campaign finance bill. That legislation tightened rules
governing so-called “soft money” contributions from corporations and individuals to the
national parties for the purpose of aiding federal elections. The laws in most states,
however, continued to be much looser in their campaign financing regulations, prompting
the RGA to separate itself from the RNC and form its own distinct legal entity. Before
2002, the RGA was “a subset of the RNC… [and] raised money to the RNSEC”
(Republican National State Elections Committee). The Association “was really the red-
headed step child of the national party,” an RGA official told the author. 73
Ripon’s desire for a strong RGA was political—the governors tended to be more
liberal, and therefore provided somewhat of a bulwark against the conservative movement—
but it was pragmatic as well. Ripon, like the majority of the Republican Party, wanted a new
72 Ripon Society, “Statement of the Ripon Society to the Republican Governors Association Meeting in Los
Angeles July 3-7, 1966,” Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 178, 3.
73 Mike Adams, Interview with author, 22 February 2010.
35

federalism, a revitalization of the country’s traditional decentralized approach to governance,
as opposed to the Democratic trend, begun by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, towards
centralization under the federal bureaucracy in Washington. Empowering the RGA as the
party’s “third force” would significantly enhance the political power of a new federalism by
introducing Republican governors as a potent player on the national political scene.
Filling the “Research Gap”
The Ripon Society’s public endorsement of candidates in the 1964 elections and its
repudiation of Goldwater caught the attention of high-profile politicians. By January 1965,
however, the society was verging on insolvency. “We are overextended, not in ability or
intellectual resources, but in our increasing inability to run a growing organization without
infrastructure,” society President Jack Saloma wrote to Walter Thayer, the President of the
Whitney Communications Corporation, which owned and operated the New York Herald
Tribune, the premier moderate Republican voice in the press. “The momentum of the
Ripon Society cannot be maintained unless the Society acquires a sound financial basis now.”
Uncertainty in the future of party institutions such as the RNC and RGA and the continued
rise of private conservative organizations such as the American Conservative Union and
John Birch Society convinced Saloma that an expansion of Ripon’s resources was vitally
important. Saloma argued that the society could “serve” two possible functions: “either as a
component part of a coordinated Republican structure… or, failing such a coordinated
structure, as an autonomous research unit to help fill the Republican ‘research gap’.” 74 The
so-called “research gap” was a reference to the lack of new, innovative policy ideas within
74 John S. Saloma to Walter N. Thayer, 28 January 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 26.
36

the GOP. With Thayer’s help, Ripon raised enough money in 1965 to expand its operations
and fill the role of “autonomous research unit.” John Price referred to Thayer as “the
secretary-general of the Eastern Republican Establishment,” because of his role in
connecting and managing the different groups and personalities of moderate Republicans. 75
Using his connections, Thayer solicited donations from businessmen and politicians,
including New York’s Senator Jacob Javits and Governor Nelson Rockefeller, though
Rockefeller’s brothers John and Laurance declined to give. 76 Other donors included:
Representative Donald Rumsfeld of Illinois; Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., former Senator from
Massachusetts, Ambassador to the United Nations under Eisenhower, and Nixon’s running
mate in the 1960 presidential election; Governor George Romney of Michigan, who would
run for the Republican nomination for president in 1968; Senator Hugh Scott of
Pennsylvania; and Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor Elliot Richardson. 77 Jock Whitney,
Thayer’s boss at the WCC, and his family donated and continued to be Ripon patron’s into
the 1970s.
In January 1965, Ripon began to publish a newsletter/magazine, the Ripon Forum. 78
Through the Forum, which the society has continued to publish to this day, the society
disseminated policy papers, commentary, and Ripon-related news. In July 1965, Ripon
expanded its subscriber base by sending solicitation letters to former subscribers of the
75 Price interview with Kabaservice.
76 Jacob K. Javits to Walter N. Thayer, 9 April 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 26; Walter N. Thayer to
Christopher T. Bayley, 9 April 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 26; Laurance Rockefeller’s secretary to
Christopher T. Bayley, 30 March 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 26; Sarah [Winner?] to Christopher T.
Bayley, 5 April 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 26.
77 Donald Rumsfeld to the Ripon Society, 9 August 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 7; Henry Cabot
Lodge, Jr. to Christopher T. Bayley, 11 March 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 26; Christopher T.
Bayley to Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., 15 March 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 26; George Romney to
Christopher T. Bayley, 22 April 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 26; Hugh Scott to the Ripon Society, 3
June 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 26; Christopher T. Bayley to Elliot L. Richardson, 6 April 1965,
Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 26.
78 Ripon Forum, 1:1 (January 1965).
37

defunct magazine Advance. 79 Bruce Chapman, the cofounder of Advance, had given Ripon
his mailing list, thereby allowing for the relatively quick formation of the Forum. 80
Many members of the society also worked directly for senators and representatives in
their offices in D.C. Jay Kriegel worked for John Lindsay when he was a Congressman. 81 In
1965, Jack Saloma held a position in the office of Representative Tom Curtis of Missouri. 82
Emil Frankel served as a Legislative Assistant to Senator Jacob Javits of New York in the
late 60s, later becoming his Legislative Director. 83 Doug Bailey was hired by Representative
Brad Morse of Massachusetts in December 1964 to coordinate the Wednesday Group, a
small society of moderate Republican congressmen including “Lindsay, Mathias, Ellsworth,
[and] Tupper.” 84 Through positions like these, Ripon kept up to date on the politics in the
capital, gained experience handling legislation, and pushed the society’s services.
Ripon’s primary activity was the development of policy papers. For instance, in a
five-page document titled “A Republican Civil Rights Platform for 1965,” the society
enumerated 35 policy proposals to strengthen civil rights. “Our civil rights program stresses
action,” they wrote. “Affirmative action must be taken in all parts of the country, on all
levels of private and public activity, to help realize for all persons the promise of the
American dream.” 85 Their proposals stressed federal legislation and action in order to
prevent discrimination on the state and local level. The GOP’s principled belief in the
importance of individualism necessitated federal protection. To Ripon, invoking federalism
79
Christopher T. Bayley to James Carpenter, 4 July 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 160.
80
Auspitz interview with Kabaservice.
81
Marans interview with author.
82
Jack Saloma to Helen [Linsky?], 12 March 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 81; Jack Saloma to
Marianne Magocsi, 13 August 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 81.
83
Emil Frankel, e-mail message to author, 22 March 2010.
84
Bailey interview with Kabaservice.
85
Ripon Society, “A Republican Civil Rights Platform for 1965,” 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 187,
1 and 5.
38

was a thin excuse for a vote against the protection of civil rights. “[W]e recognize that civil
rights is a responsibility not of states and localities alone,” they wrote, “it is a national
problem and a national responsibility.” 86 With 35 policy proposals spread over 8 categories
(voting; public schools; employment; public accommodations; administration of justice;
housing; public facilities and services; and legislative procedures), the paper was a
comprehensive index of progressive Republican policy ideas on civil rights.
Politicians also began to hire Ripon to help them with policy research. In the spring
of 1965, Ripon wrote a research paper on poverty for Representative Peter Frelinghuysen of
New Jersey. 87 Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor Elliot Richardson petitioned Ripon for
“help on legislative research” in April. 88 The biggest project of 1965, however, was not for
an individual politician, but rather was for the RGA.
Federal Tax Revenue Sharing
The RGA did not only endorse “Government for Tomorrow: a proposal for the
unconditional sharing of federal tax revenues with state and local governments”—the
Association also helped to write and edit it. Lee Huebner, who would later become Ripon
President, headed the Ripon research group, which wrote the initial draft before working
closely with Dr. Carl McMurray of the RGA staff and Robert McCall, Smylie’s assistant. 89
The RGA gave Ripon $150 to cover the RGA’s “share of this expense.” 90 First printed in
July 1965, the Ripon /RGA report revived national awareness of the policy proposal, which
86 Ibid., 5.
87 John Price to Al Abrahams, 27 March 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 79.
88 Elliot L. Richardson to J. Eugene Marans, 14 April 1964, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 2; Unsigned to
Elliot L. Richardson, 4 June 1964, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 2.
89 Ripon Society, “Government for Tomorrow: a proposal for the unconditional sharing of federal tax
revenues with state and local governments,” 6 July 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 187, foreword; John
S. Saloma to Robert E. Smylie, 23 May 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 81.
90 Robert E. Smylie to John S. Saloma, 25 October 1966, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 81.
39

had first been brought into the spotlight by Dr. Walter Heller, who was President Johnson’s
chief economic advisor. 91 Bipartisan support had grown for the proposal after it gained
public attention in 1964, and a “special Presidential task force” approved the plan. Both
Johnson and Goldwater had “endorsed the idea in the closing days of the 1964 campaign,”
but Johnson changed his mind in December, and it seemed that the so-called Heller Plan
would die without congressional action. 92
Ripon and the RGA stepped in to give new life to the Heller Plan. State and local
governments have vast responsibilities, the report noted, and because of “rising costs,”
“[o]fficials are constantly preoccupied with fiscal crises.” 93 “Of all revenues, only the
income tax expands quickly with the growing economy,” the paper explained. “Yet only
12% of state and local monies are drawn from this source.” 94 Instead of wasteful,
conditional federal grant programs, unconditional sharing of federal tax revenues—growing
as a result of economic prosperity—would supplement the finances of state and local
governments and allow for the continued distribution of essential government services. 95
The Ripon/RGA proposal displayed great belief in federalism and the “virtues of
state and local government.” “A decision is made more rationally when those who make it
must live directly with its consequence,” they wrote. “Decentralization permits a variety of
values, protecting legitimate minority and regional interests.” 96 Furthermore,
decentralization creates a pseudo-market in policy ideas—each government essentially
competes for residents, and thus novel, workable policies gain credence more quickly than in
91 “Government for Tomorrow: a proposal for the unconditional sharing of federal tax revenues with state
and local governments,” Ripon Papers, 1963-1968, 71.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid., 73.
94 Ibid., 75.
95 Ibid., 77-81.
96 Ibid, 73.
40

a rigid top-down hierarchy of government. 97 The dominating ideology in the paper, if it can
be called an ideology, was federalism, as opposed to states’ rights. More a philosophy than
an interpretation of the Constitution, this policy manifestation of federalism recognized the
importance of government shared between national and local authorities.
The proposal received bipartisan support. Republican Representatives William
Brock (TN) and F. Bradford Morse (MA) sponsored legislation, which would have codified
the proposal, in the House, while Republican Senator Jacob Javits (NY) agitated in the
Senate. Representative Donald Rumsfeld (IL) also expressed interest, as did Republican
Representatives Robert Ellsworth (KS), Tom Curtis (MO), and Al Quie (MN). 98 Robert
Taft, Jr. of the formidable Taft political family, requested and received a draft copy of the
report in May 1965. 99 The RNC received at least 25 copies of the report. 100 But despite the
bill’s Republican patronage, the Senatorial Kennedy brothers, Robert and Teddy, got behind
the plan. 101 The Kennedys could support the plan because it gave the federal government a
role in financing important programs that were best run by state governments, such as
education. When their brother was President, he had fought for federal education grants
and loans for three years with the support of moderate Republican Senators Javits and
Clifford Case (NJ), finally succeeding in getting Congress to pass his program in 1963. 102
97
Ibid., 73-4.
98
Donald Rumsfeld to John S. Saloma, 15 December 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 7; Bill [?] to John
S. Saloma, 29 July 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 81; and John S. Saloma to Marianne Magocsi, 11
August 1965, Box 2: Folder 81.
99
Lee Huebner to Robert Taft, Jr., 21 May 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 7; Robert Taft, Jr. to Lee
Huebner, 25 May 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 7.
100
Saloma to Magocsi, 11 August 1965; John S. Saloma to Ray C. Bliss, 13 July 1965, Ripon Papers, Box
2: Folder 72.
101
“Government for Tomorrow,” Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 187, foreword.
102
Irving Bernstein, Promises Kept: John F. Kennedy’s New Frontier (New York: Oxford University Press,
1991), 230 and 243.
41

Revenue sharing would solidify federal aid to the states, allowing for greater spending on
education, among other things.
The newspapers also jumped on the revenue-sharing bandwagon. Writing in the
New York Herald Tribune, Raymond Price argued that the “tax-sharing plan… offers the
GOP a convincing argument to take to the voters.” 103 “The Republican Governors
Association has come to life with an admirable project,” Roscoe Drummond of the
Washington Post wrote. “It isn’t being scared away just because President Johnson once
supported the idea.” 104 The New York Times also covered the release of the report. 105
The revenue sharing report brought the Ripon Society recognition as a group with
serious research capacity and potential. The report also demonstrated Ripon’s dual
commitment to “conservative” federalism and “progressive” causes. “It is progressive in
that it seeks to equip state and local government to deal effectively with massive problems of
urbanization—transportation, education, health, technology—not neglect them,”
Drummond wrote in the Post. “It is conservative in that one of its results would be to arrest
the flow of political power to Washington.” 106 And its proposal had reached the halls of the
Capitol Building. Ripon was still headquartered in Cambridge, but the tiny group was being
heard in Washington.
Ray Bliss and the RNC
One of the people who heard Ripon was RNC Chairman Ray Bliss. After
Goldwater’s defeat, the party was in shambles. Governor Smylie and “other moderate
103 “Government for Tomorrow,” Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 187, foreword.
104 Roscoe Drummond, “Sharing Tax Money,” Washington Post, 18 July 1965, E7.
105 “Tax-Sharing Plan Pressed by G.O.P.,” New York Times, 13 July 1965, 14.
106 Drummond, “Sharing Tax Money.”
42

governors” took the lead on calling for the replacement of the current RNC Chairman, Dean
Burch, who was a Goldwater ally. Burch had taken over from Representative William Miller,
when Goldwater named Miller as his running mate in the 1964 election. With the help of
Donald Ross, a committeeman from Nebraska, Bliss was elected at the RNC meeting in
January 1965. 107
Primarily focused on organization, Bliss managed to hold both conservatives and
moderates within the party. As part of this effort to keep the party together, Bliss and a
senior RNC staffer named Ray Humphreys courted Ripon, and the society was happy to be
told that it was a valued member of the GOP. 108 Humphreys visited the society in
Cambridge, and Saloma met the RNC Research Director and Bliss himself, on separate
occasions. 109 Bliss was immensely important to Ripon, because he represented a “first step”
in taking back the party from the Goldwater conservatives. 110 Bliss was not an ideologue.
“[W]e must first determine and then act upon pertinent issues—issues that are of deepest
concern to most people, issues around which our fellow citizens organize their political
responses,” Bliss told the 13 th Annual Republican Woman’s Conference on April 1, 1965.
“There must be a perceptive presentation of these issues based upon a realistic consideration
of wants and needs rather than as abstract reference to ideological terms.” 111 Bliss’
107 John F. Bibby, “Party Leadership, the Bliss Model, and the Development of the Republican National
Committee,” Politics, Professionalism, and Power, ed. John C. Green (New York: University Press of
America, 1994), 21.
108 Ripon Society Executive Committee to Members of the RNC, 15 January 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2:
Folder 73; Charles M. Lichenstein to Thomas E. Petri, 25 January 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 73.
109 John S. Saloma, “Memorandum on Luncheon with Dr. Arthur Peterson,” 21 April [1965?], Ripon
Papers, Box 2: Folder 73; John S. Saloma to Ray C. Bliss, 26 August 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder
72; Ray C. Bliss to John S. Saloma, 23 September 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 72.
110 “The Republican Response to Defeat,” From Disaster to Distinction, 86.
111 Ray C. Bliss, “The Chairman Speaks: Address by the Honorable Ray C. Bliss Before the 13 th Annual
Republican Woman’s Conference, April 1, 1965,” Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 72.
43

measured, pragmatic approach to party organization and policies ensured that Ripon would
be supported by the national party as part of the expansive coalition.
John Lindsay and the Cornerstone Project
The few elections held in 1965 gave enough fodder for Ripon to release a ten-page
follow-up to Election ’64 titled “A Second Mandate to Republicans: A Ripon Society
Report and Analysis of the 1965 Elections.” Focusing on the few races that happened in
that year, Ripon found some encouraging signs of the success of those who followed the
strategy of moderation the organization preached. John Lindsay’s victory in the New York
City mayoral race was a particularly important race to Ripon. Lindsay defeated his
Democratic opponent as well as a Conservative Party candidate, National Review founder
and stalwart conservative William F. Buckley, in a city with “a 7 to 2 Democratic registration
edge.” Lindsay was able to draw significant black and Puerto Rican support, thereby
highlighting the conclusions drawn by Ripon in Election ’64. 112
Lindsay proved to be an important Ripon ally during the organization’s early years.
After Lindsay’s mayoral election, he worked with Ripon on an ombudsman project for New
York City, as arranged by a staff assistant to the Joint Committee on the Organization of
Congress. 113 The mayor also gave his backing to an ambitious undertaking called the
Cornerstone Project.
In April 1965, the Chairman of the University of Michigan Young Republican Club,
Lyle B. Stewart, initiated a correspondence with Ripon about the YR club’s work on civil
112 Ripon Society, “A Second Mandate to Republicans: A Ripon Society Report and Analysis of the 1965
Elections,” Undated, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 187.
113 Mary McInnis to Robert Behn, 16 December 1966, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 9; John V. Lindsay to
Mary McInnis, 1 December 1966, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 9; Robert Behn to Marry McInnis, 13
December 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 9.
44

ights. Ripon gave them preparatory documentation and advice, and in the fall of that year,
the YRs hosted the Young Republican Leadership and Civil Rights Conferences, at which
Governor Romney spoke. 114 This working partnership between the “group of law students
from the University of Michigan” and Ripon resulted in the Cornerstone Project in the
Bedford-Stuyvesant area of Brooklyn. 115 Over four sessions in June and July 1966, the
project took about 100 young men, both Republicans and Democrats, and put them in the
heart of the ghetto for two weeks. They worked with organizations which did social work
during the day and at night had “panel discussions” on various topics dealing with poverty.
Ripon sought not only to do a little good in a bad neighborhood, but also to help educate
their members on what they were fighting for. 116
China and the Draft
Nineteen-sixty-six also saw the production of major Ripon policy papers on
communist China and conscription. In May, the society released its China paper, arguing
that “both military containment and diplomatic accommodation” were required in dealing
with China. 117 While Ripon deplored China’s outward militarism, the society cautioned
against seeing Vietnam “as a test of Chinese will and power. To be bogged down in
Vietnamese jungles will not necessarily strengthen our capacity to contain Communism in
Asia.” 118 Rather, the United States should pursue a “full normalization of relations,
including an exchange of ambassadors and admission to the United Nations.” 119 Ripon’s
114 David Miller, Jr. to Marianne Magocsi, 29 January 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 93.
115 Robert Behn, “Memorandum: The Cornerstone Project,” 23 May 1966, Ripon papers, Box 2: Folder 93.
116 Cornerstone Project brochure, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 93.
117 “China Today – Containment and Contact,” Ripon Papers, 1963-1968, 177.
118 Ibid., 178.
119 Ibid., 179.
45

promotion of “the shield” and “the olive branch” 120 remarkably foreshadowed the route
pursued by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger towards China in the early 1970s.
In December, the society called for “the Federal Government to eliminate the draft,
to improve the salary, incentives, fringe benefits, and prestige of the military, and to establish
a 2.7 million man volunteer army.” 121 An all-volunteer army was not only possible, but also
preferred over both a lottery and mandatory national service. According to the report,
which was written by Bruce Chapman, the founder of Advance, 122 a volunteer force would
have a smaller turnover rate, thereby saving the military the money and time required to train
new classes of draftees, not to mention the expertise developed by career soldiers.
Furthermore, voluntarism represented an “essentially libertarian” principle, which “attracted
so many immigrants to our shores in the first place”—voluntarism was a quintessentially
American idea. 123 And, as “it unquestionably has been a Democratic Congress that has
stymied reform in recent years and a Democratic President who has manipulated the issue in
ways apparently calculated to prevent thorough debate,” the stage was set for Republicans to
take the lead on the issue. 124
Like its paper on China, Ripon’s proposal for an all-volunteer army foreshadowed
the ending of the draft under Nixon in 1973. 125 Voluntarism became a Republican issue.
Ripon allies Donald Rumsfeld and Tom Curtis pushed voluntarism in the House of
120
Ibid., 181.
121
“Politics and Conscription: a Ripon proposal to replace the draft,” Ripon Papers, 1963-1968, 93.
122
Petri and Marans, “Ripon at Twenty-Five,” 22.
123
Ibid., 105.
124
Ibid.
125
Julian Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security—From World War II to the War
on Terrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 234-5.
46

Representatives in 1967, and Nixon added it as a campaign plank in both 1968 and 1972. 126
On two major foreign policy issues, Ripon was ahead of the game.
Expansion, Reorganization, and an Institutional Role
Nineteen-sixty-six was a year of growth for the Ripon Society. The society started
the year with chapters in Cambridge, New Haven (Yale) and Southern California. In July, a
New York City chapter joined the rolls, and by October there were the seeds of chapters in
D.C., Chicago, and San Francisco. The growth in Ripon necessitated a new organizational
structure. In October, Ripon became a “representative corporation” with a National
Governing Board. Jack Saloma was elected the first President and Lee Huebner the first
Vice President. 127
Though Ripon was growing, it remained a relatively small organization. Yet, it
enjoyed influence disproportionate to its size. The American Conservative Union felt
threatened enough by Ripon that it issued a 31-page analysis of the society. “While the
Ripon Society is small in numbers, its influence is felt at some of the major American
universities,” the ACU found. The conservative organization believed that Ripon’s
influence extended beyond the ivory tower, arguing that Ripon, “as ‘progressive
Republicanism’s’ intellectual elite, will play an important role in narrowing down the field of
liberal candidates for the 1968 GOP presidential nomination.” 128
While the ACU report probably overstated Ripon’s influence within the party, it is
clear evidence that Ripon had carved out a small institutional role for itself in the GOP.
126
Ibid., 209, 217, and 232-3.
127
“News from Ripon Society,” Ripon Forum, 2:5 (July 1966), 5; “Ripon News,” Ripon Forum, 2:7
(October 1966), 6.
128
American Conservative Union, “The Ripon Society,” 1966, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 52, 29.
47

Between December 1962 and December 1966, Riponers turned their society into a sort of
small-scale political research firm, selling their services to moderate Republicans for whom
they “produced papers… that they could use in backing up their positions.” 129 The Forum
gave the society a vehicle, through which they commented on elections and the future of the
GOP, praised and criticized politicians, and presented important policy papers. As 1967
dawned and the next presidential election loomed, the Ripon Society was counted as a
successful and growing voice within the moderate wing of the Republican Party.
129 Marans interview with author.
48

CHAPTER TWO
Maturity and Middle Age, 1967-1974
Nixon, Ford, and the Move to D.C.
The 1968 presidential election was something of a rite of passage for the Ripon
Society. That year, in a way, marked the organization’s graduation. Before 1968, Ripon
managed to ally itself with various Republican politicians, campaigns, and institutions,
produce statements of principle, write position papers under paid contract, and build
political relationships. After Richard Nixon’s election as President of the United States, the
Republican Party had finally retaken the seat of executive power, and several Riponers
received positions in the new administration. But greater influence within Washington and
the White House helped to cause a crisis of leadership within Ripon by taking away so many
of its active members and former officers. Furthermore, the elevation of the GOP as a
whole to a position of power made Ripon’s criticisms of the party now seem disloyal.
Finally, although Nixon supported and helped to bring to fruition certain Ripon proposals,
his election hastened the society’s decline by redirecting the society’s energies toward
Washington and confusing the society’s mission with his own indistinct identification as
neither a moderate nor a conservative.
Still, Ripon’s ideas and members had great influence during the Nixon years. The
White House staff dominated the policy discussion, thereby giving the young Ripon staffers
in the Administration significant influence over domestic policy proposals. Furthermore,
Nixon adopted key Ripon suggestions, such as the negative income tax and federal revenue
sharing, as his own. Finally, Nixon’s domestic agenda was, overall, progressive and reflected
much of the general thinking and posturing that Ripon had espoused since its founding.
49

1968 Primaries
Speculation about who the Republican presidential nominee would be in 1968
started as early as 1966. Three candidates in particular caught Ripon’s eye as well as that of
the Republican Party as a whole: Richard Nixon, George Romney, and Ronald Reagan.
Romney, the moderate Governor of Michigan, who had run an explicitly anti-Goldwater
gubernatorial campaign in 1964, appealed more to Ripon than either Nixon or the
conservative Reagan, who had campaigned for Goldwater in 1964. Nixon was seen as the
“safe ‘unity’” candidate, who had the potential to bring together both wings of the party,
while Reagan was a real threat. 1 “A solid Reagan victory in the most populous state in the
nation would place him in immediate contention for the nomination with Romney and
Nixon,” the Forum predicted in July 1966, when Reagan was campaigning hard to become
governor of California. “He would be a new face, a winner who had overcome the liberal-
conservative Republican split in his state.” 2 While Nixon impressed the GOP faithful with
his tireless campaigning on behalf of Republican candidates in 1964 and 1966, Romney
attracted the attention of influential voices inside the press corps. The Washington Post’s
David Broder even wrote an article in October 1966 comparing Romney to the late
President Kennedy. 3
For most of 1967, however, the society focused most of its energy on producing
policy papers, including two impressive works proposing a negative income tax and a new
strategy for Vietnam. First proposed by the British economist Lady Juliet Rhys-Williams and
seconded by Milton Friedman in his 1962 tract Capitalism and Freedom, the negative
income tax would have supplemented the incomes of families below a certain level through
1 John S. Saloma, “The Dilemmas of Three Factions,” Ripon Forum, 3:1 (January 1967), 5.
2 “The View From Los Angeles: Lengthening shadows on 1968,” Ripon Forum, 2:5 (July 1966), 2.
3 David S. Broder, “Can Rommey Do a JFK?” Washington Post, 9 October 1966, E1.
50

direct federal payments. 4 The proposed system would have provided incentives for poor
families to “move up the income scale until they can begin to pay positive taxes,” according
to the Ripon research paper on the topic, which the society released in April 1967. “For
example, suppose the standard income for a family of four is $5,500, and the tax rate is
50%,” the paper’s authors John Topping and Duncan Foley explained. “If the family earns
nothing, it gets $2,750 (50% of $5,500). If it earns $1,000, it gets $2,250 from the Negative
Income tax, and has a total income of $3,250, $500 more than before.” 5 The essential idea
was that while the government actually would provide more to the poor, it would also use
market forces to encourage the poorest to climb the economic ladder. The negative income
tax was a self-empowerment idea that highlighted the power of individuals as a refreshing
contrast to the Democratic welfare bureaucracy. In essence, the negative income tax
proposal was an early variation of welfare reform.
Ripon was also concerned about the Vietnam War, which was an issue of growing
national and electoral importance. Building upon their opposition to the draft, in October
Ripon released “The Realities of Vietnam,” a report by Christopher Beal and Lee Auspitz
that repudiated President Johnson’s Americanization of the war. The proposal sought an
end to escalation and the implementation of a so-called “confederal strategy,” which would
give power to local leaders loyal to South Vietnam and the United States and included
financial and material aid “to areas not under direct American military control.” 6 The
confederal strategy aimed to minimize American military presence and increase aid, thereby
4 Specifically, in Friedman’s book see chapter 12, “The Alleviation of Poverty,” 190-5. Rhys-Williams
wrote a book entirely devoted to domestic goals, taxation, and incentives. Milton Friedman, Wealth and
Poverty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Lady Rhys-Williams, Taxation and Incentive (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1953).
5 John R. Topping, Jr. and Duncan K. Foley, “The Negative Income Tax,” Ripon Papers, 1963-1968, 127.
6 Christopher Beal and Josiah Lee Auspitz, “Realities of Vietnam,” Ripon Papers, 1963-1968, 196.
51

creating a confederation of localities that did not feel threatened by the American military,
yet stayed loyal to the United States because they received tangible benefits.
In turning against the President on Vietnam, Ripon charged that “President Johnson
has had little vision to spare for the real constituency of his Vietnam policy: the generation
of men who are expected to fight the war and live with the results.” 7 Most Riponers were
young enough to be drafted. Looking forward to the next year’s presidential election, they
concluded that “[i]t remains for a new administration, undeluded and free to act, to adopt a
confederal strategy.” 8
Republican leaders publicized the report as the basis for a new Republican strategy
on Vietnam. Romney said the paper was “highly perceptive.” General James Gavin, a critic
of the Johnson Administration’s prosecution of the war, called it “a brilliant analysis.” 9
Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania commended the paper on the Senate floor: “The Ripon
research paper [on Vietnam] is an excellent and thoughtful proposal.” Senator Clifford Case
told the Senate that “I have made reference to the Ripon Society paper because I hope to
make that the basis of a good many discussions about what goes on in Vietnam.” 10 The war
would be a major issue in 1968, and Ripon placed itself in the camp calling for a general
withdrawal of American forces from combat zones.
Ripon also continued to produce policy papers for politicians. For instance, between
August and December 1967, Ripon produced five detailed, substantial research memos for
Massachusetts Governor John Volpe on “Automation and Technology,” “Senior Citizens,”
7 Ibid., 183.
8 Ibid., 202.
9 David Broder, “GOP Group Asks New Vietnam Policy,” Washington Post, 4 October 1967, A12.
10 Clifford Case and Hugh Scott, Congressional Record, 9 October 1967, S14407.
52

“Increasing Job Opportunities for the Urban Poor,” “Crime,” and “Housing.” 11 Volpe’s use
of Ripon’s research services most likely was a result of Ripon’s relationship with Elliot
Richardson, who had been Volpe’s Lieutenant Governor from 1965-66 and was the state’s
Attorney General in 1967. The paper on job opportunities supported the implementation of
a federal tax credit for “vocational education… [and] training expenses.” Such a tweak of
the tax system would “utilize private enterprise in an attempt to implement society’s broad
goals.” 12 On housing, Ripon suggested that home ownership was a central concern as it had
“psychological value” and encouraged “respect for property [and] community
responsibility.” Citing the “need to involve private enterprise in an initiative rather than [as
a] subsidiary (to government) capacity,” the housing report suggested that the federal
government should institute a program that helped local organizations renovate houses. 13
Furthermore, a Home Ownership Loan Fund, “financed by debentures sold on the open
market, but guaranteed by the Federal Government, would finance the sale of the
[renovated] houses.” 14 These proposals pre-dated and foreshadowed conservative
Republican appeals to tax credits, vocational training, and the value of home ownership,
policies which are even today central to Republican domestic initiatives.
The implosion of Romney’s fledgling campaign in the fall of 1967 brought the
upcoming election into the spotlight. George Gilder was sending reports to Ripon from
within the Romney camp, and things did not look good for a man touted a year earlier as the
second coming of JFK. In late October 1967, Gilder told Bruce Chapman that Romney’s
11
Ripon Society, “Automation and Technology,” August 1967, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 189; Ripon
Society, “Senior Citizens,” September 1967, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 189; Ripon Society, “Increasing
Job Opportunities for the Urban Poor,” October 1967, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 189; Ripon Society,
“Crime,” October 1967, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 189; and Ripon Society, “Housing,” December 1967,
Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 189.
12
“Increasing Job Opportunities,” 7.
13
“Housing,” 10.
14
Ibid., 11.
53

udget had just been halved, and this was before he even declared himself a candidate. 15
Much like his son, Mitt, 40 years later, Romney had a tendency to make verbal gaffes, which
resulted in bad media coverage. In September 1967, he told the press that the military and
Johnson Administration “diplomats” had given him “the greatest brainwashing that anybody
can get” during a 1965 trip to Vietnam. 16 The comment turned into a media fracas.
Another governor, who was with Romney on the trip, told the Washington Post’s David
Broder that he noticed “no evidence of any brainwashing.” 17 Romney never fully recovered
from that gaffe, and withdrew early from the contest in February 1968. 18
Romney’s decline created an opening for other potential moderate Republican
candidates. “I am personally more convinced than ever,” Chapman wrote to Tim Petri after
Gilder reported Romney’s financial troubles, “that the only hope of the moderates is to get
Romney out of the Race – and NAR [Nelson Rockefeller] or someone – into it before New
Hampshire. We can’t afford to wait until after a Nixon win in N.H.” 19 That month, Bob
Behn and Timothy Brown discussed the possible dark horse candidacy of moderate
Republican Pete McCloskey, a first-term anti-Vietnam War representative from California. 20
“I could not agree with you more when you suggest that Mr. McNamara [Johnson’s
Secretary of Defense, a Republican] would make an excellent president,” Tim Petri wrote to
a friend in February 1968. “So would John Lindsay or [Johnson’s Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare] John Gardner or [civil rights activist] J. Irwin Miller or General
15
Bruce Chapman to Thomas E. Petri, 29 October 1967, Ripon Papers, Box 11: Folder 5.
16
Gould, Grand Old Party, 373.
17
David Broder, “Romney Charges LBJ Brainwashes the People,” Washington Post, 7 September 1967,
A1.
18
Gould, Grand Old Party, 373.
19
Chapman to Petri, 29 October 1967.
20
Robert Behn to Timothy Brown, 20 October 1967, Ripon Papers, Box 7: Behn Correspondence; Timothy
Brown to Robert Behn, 25 October 1967, Ripon Papers, Box 7: Behn Correspondence.
54

Gavin or a number of others.” 21 But the most obvious moderate candidate was Nelson
Rockefeller, who had run in 1964 and had the money to challenge Nixon.
And, Rockefeller did indeed receive the most support from Riponers. John Price,
Tanya Melich, Peter Wallison, and Mike Brewer, who had joined Ripon while at Harvard
Law in the mid-1960s, 22 worked in his delegate operation, while Bobbie Greene (who would
later become Bobbie Kilberg after she married Bill Kilberg in 1970) worked in the domestic
policy research group. Bruce Rabb, Jonathan Moore, and Howard Gillette also worked on
the Rockefeller campaign. 23 Rabb had been part of the Advance team. 24 Gillette got
involved with Ripon while he was a graduate student at Yale in late 1966. 25
Nixon, however, did not give up on the moderate vote and purposefully courted
Ripon. In preparation for his 1968 presidential race, Nixon’s aides sought Ripon’s research
services. As Ripon Research Director Bob Behn described to Raymond Price, for $2000 the
society could supply research memos, which “puts a premium on hard facts, dramatic
illustrations, new ideas and useful concepts.” Behn also assured Price that they “can do
major, in-depth research projects…. We can write speeches. We can do very short quick
fact sheets.” 26 Nixon’s aide and speechwriter Pat Buchanan went on to solicit at least two
projects: one on labor-management relations and a request “to select brief and colorful
anecdotal stories for use in speeches, short quotations which make a specific point with
regard to an issue, and phrases… that by themselves can sum up an issue and make it one
21
Thomas E. Petri to John F. Ahearne, 20 February 1968, Ripon Papers, Box 9: Folder 1.
22
Michael Brewer, Interview with author, 10 October 2009.
23
Price interview with Kabaservice; Melich interview Kabaservice; Bobbie Kilberg, e-mail messages to
author, 24 and 26 March 2010.
24
Auspitz interview with Kabaservice.
25
Howard Gillette, Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 2 November 2006.
26
Robert Behn to Raymond K. Price, 16 May 1967, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 16.
55

that people will remember.” 27 Buchanan liked the piece on labor-management relations so
much that he summoned the author, Bill Kilberg, to New York and offered him a job on the
Nixon campaign, a position that Kilberg accepted. Lee Huebner would also later join the
Nixon team during the general election. 28
Waiting in the shadows behind the preferred Rockefeller, generally acceptable Nixon,
and defunct Romney was Ronald Reagan. In the fall of 1967, Ripon sent Mike Smith, the
society’s former Executive Secretary, to California to investigate Governor Reagan up close
and write a report on him. “At the time, Ripon was very unnerved by the chatter that was
going around that Reagan would be a comely vice presidential candidate under either Nixon
or Romney or Rockefeller in 1968,” Smith recalled. 29 Reminding himself not to be a
“hatchet man,” Smith spent October and November 1967 researching, resulting in a 24-page
profile that was eventually published in June 1968. 30 Smith noted Reagan’s skill in
communication and the similarity of his stances on foreign policy to Goldwater’s. Reagan,
Smith wrote, “wins his audience with a masterful arsenal of well-turned phrases and
humorous quips that simultaneously make his point as well as any amount of lecturing
could.” His beliefs in foreign policy were “bold, simplistic, straight-forward, and expressing
a dangerous faith in military solutions and in the wisdom of military leadership.” All in all,
Smith painted a picture of a formidable politician who could appeal to both conservatives
and moderates. 31 Around that time, Reagan spoke at Yale University and met with the New
Haven Ripon chapter while he was there. “We had prepared a series of fairly hostile
27
Patrick J. Buchanan to Thomas E. Petri, 13 December 1967, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 16; Thomas E.
Petri to Patrick J. Buchanan, 20 November 1967, Ripon Papers, 7: Behn Correspondence.
28
Huebner interview with Kabaservice.
29
Mike Smith, Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 12 February 2007.
30
Ibid.
31
Michael C. Smith, “Here is the Rest of Him: A Report on Ronald Reagan as Governor of California,”
June 1968, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 190.
56

questions for Reagan and, to the surprise of most of us, he hit each of them out of the
park,” Bobbie Kilberg remembered. “We may not have agreed with many of his answers but
he was articulate, specific, and thoughtful.” 32 Reagan was a threat precisely because he was
so good, and Ripon was the first moderate group to identify the danger he represented.
In the end, neither Rockefeller nor Reagan could defeat Nixon. “There was a kind
of game of chicken going on between Reagan and Rockefeller,” Riponer Lee Auspitz
remembered, “in that both of them felt they could individually stop Nixon, but neither
wanted to have their fingerprints on the knife in Nixon’s back; each wanted to inherit
Nixon’s support.” 33 Even though Romney had withdrawn from the race in February,
Rockefeller did not jump in. In fact, 9 days after he won 10.8% of the vote in New
Hampshire primary to Nixon’s 77.6%, Rockefeller announced that he would not run. 34 But
on April 30, on the day he won the Massachusetts primary, Rockefeller proclaimed himself a
candidate. 35 But Rockefeller never recovered from his initial announcement that he was not
running, and Reagan’s entrance at the convention was too little, too late. Of the 13
primaries that pledged delegates, Nixon won 9. Rockefeller only won Massachusetts; Reagan
only won California; Governor John Rhodes claimed his home state of Ohio; and a Nixon-
Rockefeller unity ticket triumphed in D.C. 36 Rockefeller’s back-and-forth on whether to run
paralleled the 1964 primaries, when George Romney led people to believe that he would
make the jump, but then decided against it. It also reflected the perennial failure of
Republican moderates and liberals to organize sufficiently and to pursue the presidency with
32 Bobbie Kilberg, e-mail message to author, 29 March 2010.
33 Auspitz interview with Kabaservice.
34 Rhodes Cook, United States Presidential Primary Elections, 1968-1996 (Washington: CQ Press, 2000),
464; Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician, 1962-1972 (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1989), 145-6.
35 Ambrose, Nixon, 153.
36 Cook, Presidential Primary, 14-5.
57

anywhere near the zeal needed. Rockefeller did not have his heart in it; Nixon had been
preparing for four years. And, Nixon rolled through the primaries.
The Republican National Convention in Miami in August awarded Nixon the
nomination on the first ballot. 37 Huebner was there as the official Ripon representative, but
he was not the only Riponer in attendance. 38 John Price, Tanya Melich, Bobbie Greene, and
Howard Gillette were there as part of the Rockefeller operation. 39 Greene was in the hotel
suite where Rockefeller watched the roll call vote. 40 But not all of Ripon was wholly
consumed by the convention. In that same month, the society released two influential
essays, which it called “the Urban Papers.” 41
The Urban Papers
Building upon the papers Ripon produced for Massachusetts Governor Volpe the
previous year, the society released papers on “social services” and jobs in August 1968. The
social services paper suggested the creation “of a national network of neighborhood
information centers,” which would “serve as an information clearinghouse for virtually all
public and private social services.” 42 The idea was to streamline service distribution, while
“taking power from urban political machines,” which controlled the availability of
information, and encouraging the utilization of private companies by placing their services
on the same level and availability of those provided by the government. 43
37 Ambrose, Nixon, 170.
38 Huebner interview with Kabaservice.
39 Gillette interview with Kabaservice; Price interview with Kabaservice; Melich interview with
Kabaservice; Bobbie Kilberg, e-mail message to author, 26 March 2010.
40 Bobbie Kilberg, e-mail message to author, 26 March 2010.
41 “The Conditions for Self-Help,” Ripon Papers, 144.
42 Ibid., 145.
43 Ibid., 148.
58

The jobs paper promoted the use of tax credits and governmentally reinforced
investment in development. Ripon suggested that the federal government provide tax
credits to companies which opened or updated facilities in poor urban areas and to
companies that hire the “hardcore unemployed” (the long-term unemployed). 44 The society
also supported Senator Jacob Javits’ proposal for a Domestic Development Bank, which
would provide loans to businesses in poor urban areas, thereby “rectify[ing] the fundamental
lack of commercial credit for the black business community.” 45 The paper also
recommended that federal efforts give special attention “to promoting the formation of joint
ventures between major corporations and poverty area businessmen.” 46
The Urban Papers expanded upon the recommendations laid out in the Volpe
papers, holding strong to the central idea of empowerment and the utilization of market
forces to help underprivileged people and areas, what Ripon referred to as “the conditions
for self-help.” 47 Fundamentally, Ripon saw these proposals as a coherent and viable
alternative to Democratic solutions. In their eyes, the Democrats wanted to keep the status
quo or establish cumbersome new bureaucracies to distribute aid. Republicans could offer
new solutions, which encouraged the development of private industry within poorer
communities through tweaks of free market forces, backed up by the power of the federal
government in conjunction with small and large private businesses. Though Ripon
presented and promoted these ideas as “moderate,” they were very similar to the
44 Ibid., 150-1.
45 Ibid., 151.
46 Ibid., 153.
47 Ibid., 144.
59

“conservative” Republican policy proposals of later decades. New York Representative Jack
Kemp, in particular, later became a prime supporter of closely analogous policies. 48
1968 General Election
After the Republican National Convention, some of the Rockefeller Riponers moved
to the Nixon campaign. Walter Thayer, a strong Rockefeller supporter who switched his
allegiance to Nixon after the convention, recruited Price to the Nixon team as well. 49 John
McClaughry, who was part of the Advance team in D.C., worked on black empowerment
out of the campaign’s New York City headquarters. 50 Lee Huebner, who had worked for
Nixon in 1964, but stayed out of the primary campaign, joined up. 51
Still, many Riponer were wary of Nixon. McClaughry said that he “detested Nixon,”
even though he toiled on the campaign. 52 Doug Bailey, cofounder of the political consulting
firm Bailey-Deardourff, had worked on the foreign policy research team in Rockefeller’s
1964 run. When the Nixon campaign called in 1968, he emphatically turned them down.
“Richard Nixon was a bad person,” Bailey said. “I’d had the chance to vote for him in 1956
and I didn’t. I didn’t vote for him in 1960 either. Why would I work for him in 1968?” 53
(In 1956, Bailey was stationed in Germany as part of the Army and did not vote. In 1960, he
voted for Kennedy.) 54 Despite Nixon’s overtures to the society, Ripon generally remained
ambivalent towards him up until the Watergate scandal in 1974. His courting of the group
48
Kemp was a strong proponent of what he called “enterprise zones.” In fact, the New York Times claimed
he was “the first lawmaker to popularize” the idea. David E. Rosenbaum, “A Passion for Ideas: Jack
French Kemp,” New York Times, 11 August 1996, 1.
49
Price interview with Kabaservice.
50
John McClaughry, Interviews with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 15 and 29 November 2009.
51
Huebner interview with Kabaservice.
52
Ibid.
53
Bailey interview with Kabaservice.
54
Douglas Bailey, e-mail message to author, 29 March 2010.
60

was appealing, but it was transparently part of a coalition strategy, and the conservative
influence on Nixon was worrisome to Ripon.
Nixon barely defeated Vice President Hubert Humphrey, who had received the
nomination after Johnson withdrew and Robert Kennedy was assassinated during the
primaries. On the day of the election, both the Washington Post and New York Times ran
stories depicting the race as a toss-up. “Total Uncertainty Marks Eve of Voting,” the Post
announced; “Lack of an electoral Victory for Anyone Held Possible,” the Times claimed. 55
Nixon’s margin in the popular vote was small—he had 43.4% of the total to Humphrey’s
42.3%, a difference of fewer than a million votes—but he won 301 electoral votes to
Humphrey’s 191 and the segregationist Alabama Governor George Wallace’s 46. 56
After the election, Ripon produced Lessons of Victory, in which Bob Behn, the
principal author, dissected the 1968 election, restating and expanding upon the society’s
argument about election strategy and the future of the Republican Party. In short, a
southern-dominated strategy that ignored blacks, other minorities, and youths might prevail
in the short-term, but was a death wish in the long run. Nixon and his campaign led by John
Mitchell, Behn argued, so feared the anti-war activists and southern reactionaries, that he did
not really campaign on anything at all. “The noncommunicative nature of the slogan
[“Nixon’s the One”] was, of course, the fundamental reason for its selection,” Behn wrote,
“for it said nothing that could offend any voter, took no position with which anyone could
disagree.” 57 Nixon’s “secret plan” to relieve the nation of its commitment in Vietnam is
emblematic of the “noncampaign” as Ripon termed it. While Nixon did not go so far as to
55 David Broder, “Humphrey Surge Clouds Nixon Bid In Election Today,” Washington Post, 5 November
1968, A1; Tom Wicker, “Nation Will Vote Today; Close Presidential Race Predicted in Late Polls,” New
York Times, 5 November 1968, 1.
56 James R. Whitson, “1968,” President Elect, http://presidentelect.org/e1968.html.
57 Ripon Society, The Lessons of Victory (New York: Dial Press, 1969), 5.
61

oppose desegregation, he did make law-and-order a central part of his campaign, appealing
to voters who feared the race riots and college uprisings of the last few years. Ripon viewed
this as a negative campaign. “The tragedy of 1968 was that it was the perfect time for a wise
and experienced man to seize the imagination of an American public hungry for strong
leadership,” Behn deplored. “It was clear then that a bold campaign and sweeping mandate
would establish him in unarguable terms as President of all of the people. But those who
planned Nixon’s campaign sold him short. They underrated his potential.” 58
Lessons of Victory was emblematic of Ripon’s overall ambivalence towards Nixon:
he had the potential to be a truly national, moderate leader, but his electoral fears, cemented
in his presidential defeat in 1960, haunted him. Kevin Phillips’ famous (or infamous) The
Emerging Republican Majority, published the same year, served as a counterweight to
Lessons of Victory and added to Ripon’s wariness when it came to Nixon. 59 But despite
this caution, more than a few Riponers wound up working in the Nixon Administration.
Into the Nixon Administration
After eight years, the Republican Party was back in the White House, though the
Democrats still controlled the Senate with 57 seats to the Republicans’ 43 and dominated
the House with a 51-vote margin, 243 to 192. 60 At least 15 Ripon members worked in the
Nixon Administration, and Nixon appointed Ripon allies George Romney as Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development, John Volpe as Secretary of Transportation, Donald
58 Ibid., 33.
59 Kevin Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1969).
60 “Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present,” United States Senate,
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm; “Party Divisions of the
House of Representatives (1789 to Present),” United States House of Representatives, Office of the Clerk,
http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/partyDiv.html.
62

Rumsfeld to lead the Office of Economic Opportunity, and Elliot Richardson as Under
Secretary of State. 61 (Richardson would ultimately serve as Secretary in four different Cabinet
level departments under Nixon and Ford.) Democrat Daniel Patrick Moynihan, whom
Nixon brought it to head his Urban Affairs Council, hired four Riponers, including John
Price, who in December 1969 would take over from Moynihan; the Council on Executive
Organization took three; Lee Huebner was appointed a speechwriter with the title of White
House Staff Assistant to the President; Nixon aide John Ehrlichman hired Jamie Humes as
an aide; Bobbie Greene, a White House Fellow, was assigned to the Office of the Staff
Secretary and then later moved to the Domestic Policy Council; Bill Kilberg, also a White
House Fellow, went into the Department of Labor, where he would eventually be appointed
Solicitor of Labor in 1973 at the age of 26, at the time the youngest person ever to hold a
subcabinet position. (The Solicitor ranks only behind the Secretary and Deputy Secretary.)
Attorney General John Mitchell hired David C. Miller as an assistant, while Frank
Shakespeare, the director of the United States Information Agency, hired William
Matuszeski; Steve Herbits served on the Presidential Commission on an All-Volunteer Force
(the Gates Commission); and John Topping worked for the Office of Minority Business
Enterprise. 62 For such a young and small organization, Ripon managed to secure quite a
large collection of conspicuous junior positions. Nixon consciously sought to bring
moderates into the administration, especially in the domestic sphere, as part of his strategy of
unifying the Republican Party around himself.
61 Kabaservice, “Ripon and the First Year of the Nixon Administration (1969),” 31-2.
62 Kabaservice, “Ripon and the First Year of the Nixon Administration (1969),” 1-2; Bobbie Kilberg, email
to author, 24 March 2010; William J. Kilberg P.C.,” Gibson Dunn,
http://www.gibsondunn.com/Lawyers/wkilberg; Topping interview with author; “14a Eliot Street,” Ripon
Forum, 5:12 (December 1969), 27.
63

With some of Ripon’s top talent and officers going into the administration and other
longtime officers resigning to build careers and families, a new group took over the major
positions within the society. Auspitz replaced Huebner as president; Huebner had taken the
job after Saloma resigned in 1967. Peter Wallison became the Chairman of the National
Governing Board, Christopher Bayley became Chairman of the Executive Committee, and
Howard Gillette took over as Vice President. 63 By 1968, Ripon was a small, but growing
organization with semi-autonomous chapters in Cambridge, New York, New Haven, Los
Angeles, Seattle, Chicago, and Dallas. New chapters in New Jersey and Pittsburgh formed
during Nixon’s first term. Most significantly, the society opened a chapter in D.C., an early
sign of the society’s eventual descent into the capital’s quagmire-like political scene. 64
However, growth was making the organization financially unstable. The group’s budget
more than doubled between 1967 and 1968 from $46,000 to $115,000, and while the
society’s magazine, the Ripon Forum, saw a 50% increase in paid circulation, the overall
financial situation was ominous. 65
With an enlarged organization and connections in the administration, the Forum’s
new editor A. Douglas Matthews was confident that the society’s “discussions of policy
proposals will be increasingly influential with a Republican in the White House. Signs are
that our magazine has become an important bridge between the world of ideas and the
world of power.” 66 Jack Saloma, however, issued a warning from his new home in San
Francisco: “If the Nixon Administration absorbs the best Ripon talent and the Society
becomes in effect an arm of the Administration, we’ve lost our most important function –
63
Kabaservice, “Ripon and the First Year of the Nixon Administration (1969),” 2-3.
64
Ibid., 6.
65
Ibid., 7.
66
A. Douglas Matthews to J. Harvie Wilkinson III, 8 September 1969, Ripon Papers, Box 13.
64

independent thought and criticism.” 67 The Nixon Administration soon earned both the
Ripon Society’s praise and ire.
Early Ambivalence Towards Nixon
Nixon encouraged Ripon by adopting two of their key domestic policy proposals as
part of his New Federalism program. In an August 8, 1969, speech to the country outlining
his domestic agenda, Nixon announced that he sought to replace welfare with a negative
income tax, which he termed the Family Assistance Program. “What I am proposing is that
the Federal Government build a foundation under the income of every American family
with dependent children that cannot care for itself,” Nixon said. 68 Riponer Chris DeMuth
worked on the negative income tax proposal as a staffer on Moynihan’s Urban Affairs
Council. 69 Nixon also endorsed the sharing of federal tax revenues, for which Ripon had
proclaimed its support back in July 1965. “We can no longer have effective government at
any level unless we have it at all levels,” the President declared. “There is too much to be
done for the cities to do it alone, for Washington to do it alone, or for the States to do it
alone.” 70 Lee Huebner, who had led the Ripon research group on revenue sharing, took
responsibility for most of the administration’s statements on the proposal. 71 Ripon’s two
major domestic policy proposals had made it into the heart of Nixon’s domestic agenda.
The height of Ripon influence with Nixon came on December 16, 1969, when six
Riponers met with Nixon in the Oval Office to discuss youth issues for an hour. The report
67
Howard L. Reiter, “Ripon: Left Spur to the GOP,” Nation, 17 February 1969.
68
Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs,” 8 August 1969, Nixon Library
Foundation,
http://www.nixonlibraryfoundation.org/clientuploads/directory/archive/1969_pdf_files/1969_0324.pdf, 4.
69
Chris DeMuth, Interview with author, 11 October 2009.
70 Nixon, “Domestic Programs,” 7.
71 Huebner interview with Kabaservice.
65

combined a number of policy proposals relating to youth, including abolishing the draft and
changing the voting age to 18. Overall, the report reflected the society’s JFK-inspired belief
in the contributions young people could make to the nation. The discussion was heartening
for the society, as the President assigned an aide to coordinate Ripon activities and research
with the Administration. 72
Yet, all was not rosy between Ripon and the administration. On the same day in
January 1970 that the President congratulated the society on its seventh birthday (Huebner
actually drafted the statement), 73 Attorney General Mitchell called the society a group of
“little juvenile delinquents” on the CBS Evening News. In the Forum, the society had
accused Mitchell of politicizing law enforcement, and suggested that he should “resign as
Attorney General or assume the more traditional political position of Postmaster General.” 74
Ripon also opposed Nixon’s anti-ballistic missile (ABM) program, Safeguard, 75 and
implicitly criticized his approach to Vietnam by supporting the Moratorium to End the War
in Vietnam, a large nationwide demonstration on October 15, 1969, as well as antiwar bills
written by moderate Republicans Senator Charles Goodell of New York and Representative
Pete McCloskey of California. 76
Ripon’s most effective mobilization of anti-administration activity came while the
Senate considered the President’s nomination of Judge G. Harrold Carswell to the Supreme
Court. When Associate Justice Abe Fortas resigned in 1969 as a result of a scandal, Nixon
first nominated Judge Clement F. Haynsworth to replace him. After the tireless campaigning
72
Kabaservice, “Ripon and the First Year of the Nixon Administration (1969),” 65-70.
73
Huebner interview with Kabaservice.
74
“Mitchell Depicts Ripon Society as ‘Little Juvenile Delinquents,’” New York Times, 18 January 1970, 24;
Huebner interview with Kabaservice.
75
“Beyond the First 100 Days,” Ripon Forum, 5:5 (May 1969), 21.
76
“Ripon and the First Year of the Nixon Administration (1969),” 53.
66

of Democrat Indiana Senator Birch Bayh among others, the Senate rejected Haynsworth. 77
On January 19, 1970, Nixon nominated Carswell, a conservative Floridian whose positions
on race were judged much worse than Haynsworth’s by many. 78 Riponer John Topping,
who was then Counsel to the Office of Minority Business Enterprise, believed Nixon saw
the Haynsworth rejection as a direct challenge to him. Nixon thought “I need to stick it to
them,” Topping surmised. “I can’t lose twice in a row.” 79 Topping was suspicious of
Carswell’s record on race issues, and, as a lawyer, believed that his judgeship was mediocre at
best. Even though he was a Nixon Administration official, he “quietly organized for the
Ripon Society a resistance effort.” 80 John Adler, a New York lawyer and friend of Ripon
founder Gene Marans, connected Ripon with a group of Columbia Law School students,
who were researching Carswell’s record. 81 We were “trying to establish that he was one of
the least cited judges by the [Supreme] Court, his opinions were shorter—a lot of different
reasons—to the extent you could establish that he was subpar, independent of the civil
rights issue,” Topping remembered. 82 The Ripon-Columbia effort aimed at showing that
Carswell was simply mediocre, and it succeeded.
Ripon took the lead on releasing the findings to the media. At a press conference in
D.C. on March 5, they announced “that of Carswell’s eighty-four published decisions nearly
sixty per cent had been reversed, or more than twice the average rate of the other judges in
the Fifth Circuit District Courts.” 83 “Carswell lacks either the intellectual stature or the
judicial impartiality to qualify for a place on our nation’s highest court,” the Ripon press
77
Richard Harris, Decision (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1971), 10-11.
78
Carroll Kilpatrick, “Floridian Picked for High Court,” Washington Post, 20 January 1970, A1.
79
Topping interview with author.
80
Ibid.
81
Topping interview with author; Harris, Decision, 101.
82
Topping interview with author.
83
Harris, Decision, 101.
67

elease charged. 84 Topping’s handwritten notes from the time suggest that he coordinated
with Ripon in order to convince enough Republican senators to vote against Carswell. 85
While Ripon was crucial to Carswell’s downfall, it was conservative Republican Senator
Roman Hruska from Nebraska, who accidentally put the last nail in the coffin. “Even if he
were mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers,” Hruska said to a
reporter just outside the Senate chamber on March 16, the first day of debate on the
nomination. “They are entitled to a little representation, aren’t they, and a little chance? We
can’t have all Brandeises and Frankfurters and Cardozos and stuff like that there.” 86 All
three justices to whom he referred—Brandeis, Frankfurter, and Cardozo—were Jews.
Carswell’s nomination was defeated by a vote of 45 to 51 on April 8, 1970. 87
Nixon’s next nominee for the Fortas seat was Harry Blackmun, who would author
the Court’s majority opinion in Roe v. Wade. To the conservative movement, which
adopted a severe anti-abortion stand as the decade progressed, the Carswell defeat was
emblematic of the problems moderates created. In this case, giving an inch on Carswell’s
nomination resulted in losing a mile on the question of abortion. In later decades,
conservative Republicans weeded moderates out of the party, because they saw them as a
real threat. Ripon’s role in the Carswell defeat, therefore, arguably heightened intra-party
partisanship between moderates and conservatives.
84
Ripon Society, “The Case Against Carswell,” March 1970, Ripon Papers, Box 17: Folder 15.
85
John Topping, Personal papers, 1970.
86
Harris, Decision, 110.
87
Congressional Record, 8 April 1970, S10769.
68

Domestic Policy Successes
In the latter months of 1969 and in 1970, Nixon followed through on several
progressive domestic policies, on which Riponers within the administration worked. As a
whole, these initiatives displayed Nixon’s tendency to “deal with real issues not by opposing
federal solutions but by incorporating Republican principles,” as Bill Kilberg put it. 88 And,
this was the pragmatic approach to governance the Ripon Society had promoted since its
founding.
In late 1969, Nixon outmaneuvered union leader George Meany, President of the
AFL-CIO, in desegregating construction unions under the Philadelphia Plan, on which Bill
Kilberg, a Riponer who was a White House Fellow in the Labor Department, had worked.
The proposal hurt whatever support Nixon had from union members—a constituency he
admired as “the character of this country”—but he went ahead with lobbying Congress on
the measure. 89 After the House of Representatives voted to uphold the Philadelphia Plan,
Nixon sent a message of congratulations to Congress, saying, “There is no civil right more
central to the American system than the right of equal opportunity.” 90
In 1970, Nixon sent his Indian Message to Congress and signed the Occupational
Safety and Health Act. On July 8, Nixon announced that the federal government would
continue to extend the native tribes of the United States the right to self-determination
without the “termination” of federal aid. The idea was to balance the two in order to
maintain tribal sovereignty and provide badly needed assistance, while helping to build tribal
infrastructure in order to “reject the suffocating pattern of paternalism.” The message also
88 Bill Kilberg, e-mail message to author, 27 March 2010.
89 Ambrose, Nixon, 474.
90 Richard Nixon, “Statement About Congressional Action on the Philadelphia Plan,” 23 December 1969,
American Presidency Project, University of California at Santa Barbara,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2382.
69

included support for a bill pending before Congress that returned the sacred Blue Lake and
its surrounding lands to the Taos Pueblo Indians in New Mexico. 91 The message was
originally going to be released as a fact sheet, until a congressional relations staffer stopped
Riponer Bobbie Greene, who was the project manager on Indian issues, outside the press
office, her arms full with copies of the fact sheet. Democratic Senator Clint Anderson of
New Mexico had called and threatened to oppose the ABM Treaty if the provision on the
Taos Pueblo was included, the staffer said. The sheet could not be released to the press.
Nixon rebuffed Anderson and elevated the fact sheet to the level of a special message to
Congress. Greene and Lee Huebner drafted the Indian Message over the July 4 th weekend.
And on July 8, Nixon met with tribal leaders in the Cabinet Room in the White House along
with Vice President Agnew and several Cabinet secretaries and top policy officials. 92
Nixon’s gambit paid off: the New York Times ran a story on the Cabinet Room meeting on
the front page, and the Taos Pueblo got their land back. 93
An increase in public attention paid to job-related injuries pushed Nixon to support
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), also known as the Williams-
Steiger Act after the bill’s bipartisan cosponsors Democratic Senator Harrison Williams and
Republican Representative Bill Steiger, who would be a main participant in two subsequent
Ripon-related initiatives. OSHA, which Nixon signed into law in December 1970, created a
new agency in the Department of Labor, whose responsibility was “to set and enforce
91
Richard Nixon, “Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs,” 8 July 1970, American Presidency
Project, University of California at Santa Barbara,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2573.
92
Bobbie Kilberg, e-mail message to author, 27 March 2010.
93
James M. Naugton, “President Urges Wider Indian Role in Aid for Tribes,” New York Times, 9 July
1970, 1.
70

workplace safety and health standards.” 94 To counteract the obvious expansion of federal
power which OSHA represented, the bill included a provision which allowed individual
states to set and enforce their own standards. 95 Bill Kilberg worked on OSHA as well. 96
These three policy successes are not often remembered, but they illustrate the Ripon-
esque approach to domestic policies that Nixon took during his first term. On civil rights,
he supported federal action in order to ensure equal opportunity. On Indian policy, he laid
out a plan to integrate native tribes into the federal system without forcing assimilation. On
work safety standards, he saw the practical need for federal action, yet allowed states to
voluntarily set their own standards. On these smaller issues, Nixon’s New Federalism
mirrored Ripon’s own philosophy.
Instead of Revolution
In 1971, Ripon published its second to last book, Instead of Revolution, a collection
of thirteen essays focusing on America’s youth and youth policy. The book was an
“outgrowth and adaptation” of the youth paper, which Ripon had presented to President
Nixon in December 1969. 97 The book’s title by itself clearly conveys Ripon’s message: we
are young and idealistic with a transformative view of America, yet we are not radicals—we
want to work with the system and through the system, especially the free market, to break
down the barriers surrounding economic and social improvement. Yet, by 1971, most
Riponers were not as young or as idealistic as they used to be. Nineteen-sixty-four, even
1968, was a long time ago in political terms. The civil rights issue had morphed into
94
Susan Hall Fleming, “OSHA at 30: Three Decades of Progress in Occupational Safety and Health,” Job
Safety & Health Quarterly, 12:3 (Spring 2001), 24.
95
Bill Kilberg, e-mail message to author, 27 March 2010.
96
Ibid.
97
Ripon Society, Instead of Revolution (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1971), v.
71

arguments over busing and affirmative action, and in so doing started to lose its power as a
unifying issue. Expansion, drift, and the loss of key people to government and other jobs
was taking its toll on the society. The society began to falter administratively in 1969 when
its representatives met with Nixon over the youth paper: Auspitz, the society’s third
president, was on a leave of absence to work in the administration, and Howard Gillette had
yet to take over officially; finances were a never-ending issue; and there was a general lack of
participation from those outside of the society’s headquarters in Cambridge. 98 And, as 1971
came to a close, the editor of the Forum was about to expose a rift within the Ripon Society
and the Republican Party as a whole.
Gilder’s Daycare Editorial
George Gilder had been an editor even before Ripon existed. David Rockefeller,
brother of Nelson and Gilder’s father’s roommate in college, became a kind of surrogate
father to George after his father died during World War II. Rockefeller mentored Gilder,
who essentially grew up within the walls of the Liberal Republican Establishment. 99 While at
Harvard University in 1960, Gilder co-founded Advance, a magazine on politics, with Bruce
Chapman. After the magazine folded in 1964, Chapman joined the Ripon Society. Gilder
joined Evelyn F. Ellis as co-editor of the Forum on the July 1971 issue, and Gilder produced
a minor stir with that very same issue. “H.L. Mencken once described Presidential politics as
the quest of ‘boobs’ for ‘boobissimus’ — the superlative boob,” Gilder wrote in his first
editorial. “And in all partisan candor, we must admit that the Democratic array excells [sic]
98
Kabaservice, “Ripon and the First Year of the Nixon Administration (1969),” 63-4.
99
Larissa MacFarquhar, “The Gilder Effect,” in The New Gilded Age, ed. David Remnick (New York:
Random House, 2000), 116.
72

in boobissimus potential any Republican offering since 1964.” 100 Referring to a whole slate
of potential Democratic nominees as “boobs” angered some readers, causing at least one
man to disaffiliate from Ripon. In replying to the disgruntled reader, Ellis, Gilder’s co-
editor, assured him that Gilder did not receive approval for the piece from either Ripon’s
National Governing Board or National Executive Committee, and that everyone was
disappointed in the editorial. 101
Then, in January 1972, Gilder dropped a bomb-shell with an editorial applauding
Nixon’s veto of a federal daycare bill. The bill, according to Time, “was a good deal more
ambitious than a federal babysitting service.” Under the Democrat-sponsored program,
poorer families would receive the service for free, while families above a set income level
would have to pay. Furthermore, the “child-care centers would be run by local ‘prime
sponsors’—cities, towns, counties or even such groups as Indian tribal councils.” 102 On the
surface, the bill seemed to be a Ripon-like idea—progressive, but also promoting
decentralized government. Gilder disagreed. “President Nixon’s veto… was eminently
justified,” Gilder argued, on fiscal and moral grounds. Nixon’s alternative plan would
provide such services for poor mothers, who “are most likely to have an urgent need to
work.” According to Gilder, “it is quite possible that the new federal program, by making
families less dependent on a male provider, would contribute to the familial disintegration
already promoted for years under federal welfare laws.” 103
Gilder’s editorial shocked many within the society by implicitly arguing that a
woman’s proper place was in the home. Promoting working mothers, Gilder suggested,
100 “Editorial: The Lightweight Brigade,” Ripon Forum, 8:7 (July 1971), 3.
101 Evelyn Ellis to Joseph P. Wells, 8 July 1971, Ripon Papers, Box 23: Folder 6.
102 “The Nation: Child Care Veto,” Time, 20 December 1971,
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,878957,00.html.
103 “Editorial: The Daycare Veto,” Ripon Forum, 8:1 (January 1972), 3-4.
73

would lead to the breakdown of the family unit. “That blew everybody’s minds,” said
Howard Gillette, who was then president of the society. “We were just at the point where
we were finally adapting to the modern era and having women officers, and here Gilder
came out with his war on women.” 104 Huebner called it a “real sort of scandal.” 105 The
Forum’s next issue later that month included a piece describing opposition to the editorial,
including much from within the organization itself. “A significant proportion of the Ripon
National Governing Board under the leadership of Executive Committee Chairman Patricia
Goldman on January 5 dissented,” the magazine noted. “Several active Ripon members,
including Goldman, Pamela Curtis and Bobbi Greene Kilberg [sic] had lobbied for the bill.”
Goldman worked for the Wednesday Group on Capitol Hill, and was instrumental in the
back-and-forth between the society and members of Congress. 106 And those four were not
the only ones:
Several members of the Ripon chapter in Pittsburgh, led by National Executive
Committee member Leah Thayer, were said to be incensed by the FORUM stance,
since the chapter had worked hard in 1970 for Jo Anne Evans Gardner, a daycare
supporter….
Also opposing sections of the editorial were members of the leadership of
the New York Chapter, including Ripon Finance Chairman Peter Wallison, and
Minneapolis City Council and Ripon Chapter President John Cairns. 107
The February issue contained a lengthy point-counterpoint between Virginia Kerr, a daycare
activist, and Gilder, as well as a letter of protest from Ripon’s New York chapter, which
Tanya Melich, a self-styled “Republican feminist” had a role in drafting. 108
By 1972, Ripon was no longer a boys club; in fact, it had only been so for a few
years. As coeducation spread through the nation’s universities in the late 1960s and early
104 Gillette interview with Kabaservice.
105 Huebner interview with Kabaservice.
106 Patricia Goldman, Interview with author, 9 October 2009.
107 “Daycare Edit Stirs Dispute,” Ripon Forum, 8:2 (15 January 1972), 4.
108 Tanya Melich, The Republican War Against Women (New York: Bantam, 1996), 27-8.
74

1970s, Ripon also experienced an influx of women members, many of whom were active in
the feminist movement and strongly supported feminist issues. The increase in female
influence was not limited to Ripon. Fourteen women served in the House of
Representatives during the 93 rd Congress (1973-75). Furthermore, 13 blacks were in the
House and Ed Brooke served in the Senate. 109 These two statistics reflect the changing
nature of the domestic policy debate: segregation was less of a concern, while feminist issues
were rising in importance.
Gilder continued as Forum editor through September, and Dick Behn (brother of
Robert Behn) took over for the October issue. Bruce Chapman has said that “George
didn’t get fired.” 110 Whether he was fired or left of his own volition, Gilder played a crucial
role in Ripon’s development by exposing nascent divisions within Ripon and the moderate
Republican movement as a whole over developing women’s rights issues such as abortion.
As the daycare brouhaha was erupting, the Supreme Court’s decision nationally legalizing
abortion was still a full year away. That year, however, Congress passed the Equal Rights
Amendment to the Constitution, and conservative activist Phyllis Schlafly launched her
STOP ERA campaign, which successfully stopped the ratification of the amendment. 111
Feminist issues were on the rise, and Ripon was not prepared to adapt.
A Ripon President?
As Richard Nixon’s first term came to a close, the President looked more and more
like a Riponer on many issues. In February 1972, Nixon visited China, an important first
109 Julian E. Zelizer, On Capitol Hill: The Struggle to Reform Congress and Its Consequences, 1948-2000
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 97
110 Chapman interview with Kabaservice.
111 Sean Wilentz, Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008 (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 93-5.
75

step in the recognition of the communist country, which Ripon had endorsed back in
1966. 112 In May 1972, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks resulted in Nixon’s declaration
that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed on a treaty curtailing ABMs—Ripon
had spoken out against the development of the Safeguard ABM system earlier in the term. 113
And in October 1972, Nixon signed the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972
outside of Independence Hall in Philadelphia—federal tax revenue sharing with the states
was now the law of the land. 114 In addition to these breakthroughs and the Philadelphia
Plan, the Indian Message, and OSHA, Nixon created the Environmental Protection Agency
in 1970, on which Riponer Chris DeMuth worked, and ordered the full enforcement of
President Johnson’s Executive Orders 11246 and 11375, which outlawed discrimination by
federal contractors and compelled them to “take affirmative action to ensure that applicants
are employed… without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 115
Through both the New Federalism and détente, much of Ripon’s agenda was adopted by
the President.
Furthermore, the more conservative high-ranking officials had come to accept the
presence of Riponers and other moderates in the administration. At first, H.R. Haldeman,
Nixon’s Chief of Staff, and Pat Buchanan, Nixon’s chief speechwriter, were suspicious of
the moderates on the White House staff. After Ripon went public with its criticism of
Carswell, Nixon’s nominee to the Supreme Court, Buchanan demanded that the Riponers in
the administration “denounce our former group,” in the words of Lee Huebner. The
Riponers countered by arguing that all the staffers who belonged to conservative groups,
112 Ambrose, Nixon, 512.
113 Ibid., 441-2.
114 “Revenue Sharing Becomes Law,” Revenue Sharing Bulletin, 1:1 (November 1972), 1.
115 DeMuth interview with author; National Archives, “Executive Order 11246--Equal employment
opportunity,” Federal Register, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executiveorder/11246.html.
76

which heavily criticized many of the administration’s domestic proposals, should have to do
the same. Haldeman called off the hunt. 116
Riponers had unusual influence on the formation on domestic policy, because of the
administration’s organizational focus on the White House, according to Bobbie Kilberg (née
Greene). Riponers who worked on domestic policy—such as those at the Urban Affairs
Council, Domestic Policy Council, Office of Minority Business Enterprise, etc.—worked
directly on policy proposals and speeches, and therefore had influence disproportionate to
their youth. Ehrlichman, especially, looked out for Greene and others on his Domestic
Policy Council staff. 117
Yet, despite all the President did to elevate their agenda to the national stage, Ripon
as a whole still viewed Nixon with ambivalence. He supported many of their policies, but he
seemed to do so for purely political reasons. There was a general sense, not uncommon to
Ripon, that they did not know the true Richard Nixon.
1972 Election
For the Ripon Society, the 1972 election cycle was as much about a lawsuit as it was
about candidates and issues. In November 1971, Ripon filed a suit in the federal D.C.
Circuit Court challenging “the Republican Party’s convention delegate apportionment
formula.” The problem, as the society saw it, was that too few young people, women, and
minorities had been represented at previous conventions. Their solution was to even out the
delegate representation among the states; for the 1972 convention, “the eight most populous
116 Huebner interview with Kabaservice.
117 Bobbie Kilberg, e-mail to author, 27 March 2010.
77

states, with 48.7 per cent of the population, only [received] 37 per cent of the delegates.” 118
Though the suit would only affect the 1976 convention and beyond, it quickly became an
important issue heading towards the 1972 convention in Miami. The society won a victory
in the District Court in April 1972; the court declared unconstitutional a provision that
provided bonus delegates to each state which elected “Republican candidate or candidates
for President, governor, senator or a majority of the U.S. House seats… without regard to
the population of Republican voting strength in the state.” 119 At the convention, a
resolution was passed which “call[ed] for a new committee to study the party rules with the
goal of further opening the selection process to greater participation by women, youth, racial
and ethnic minorities and the elderly.” 120 The convention also told “Republican state parties
to ‘endeavor’ to obtain equal representation for men and women to the 1976 national
convention, an action that many of the women active in party affairs regard as a mandate,”
according to Lou Cannon of the Washington Post. 121 Despite the court ruling, however,
the convention voted against repealing the delegate bonuses. 122
The delegate fight, which would continue through the 1976 election cycle, rebranded
the Ripon Society in the eyes of many Republicans. Since the group’s inception,
conservatives had viewed the society with a wary eye. The American Conservative Union, in
particular, perceived Ripon as a threat, as shown by its critical report on the society. 123 Yet,
while Ripon had a strong record of criticizing the Republican Party for its policy proposals,
118
Philip A. McCombs, “Ripon Society’s Suit Seeks Reform for ’76,” Washington Post, 7 December 1971,
A3.
119
“Ripon Wins Suits on Delegate Formula,” Ripon Forum, 8:9 (May 1972), 3.
120
Robert J. Huckshorn and John F. Bibby, “National Party Rules and Delegate Selection in the Republican
Party,” American Political Science Association, 16:4 (Autumn 1983), 658.
121
Lou Cannon, “Delegate Fight Stirs Old Animosities, Hints New Ones,” Washington Post, 20 August
1972, A4.
122
Lou Cannon, “Reformers to be Back,” Washington Post, 28 August 1972, A21.
123
American Conservative Union, “The Ripon Society.”
78

electoral strategy, and even its hierarchy (the report on the RGA), the group had never
before attempted to attack directly the party infrastructure. There was a strong “reform
coalition,” as the political historian Julian Zelizer has called it, dating back to the late 1950s,
but that coalition was primarily Democratic in makeup. 124 Republicans tended to see intra-
GOP reforms as efforts to strengthen the northeastern establishment’s hold on the party.
The lawsuit and the fight at the convention, therefore, looked to many like, at best, an
attempt by the moderate wing of the party to, through the courts, usurp the conventional
process, retake the party machinery, and reverse the hard-earned gains of grassroots
conservatives, and at worst, an act of outright sabotage intended to help the Democrats.
Though there was some truth to the former suspicion, the latter was completely false.
Nevertheless, the continuing fight over delegates did much to discredit the Ripon Society as
a constructive partner within the Republican Party.
As in previous elections, Ripon did not endorse anyone until after the conventions.
The society, however, promoted the long-shot attempt by anti-Vietnam Representative Pete
McCloskey of California to unseat Nixon as the party’s presidential nominee and advocated
the replacement of Vice President Spiro Agnew on Nixon’s ticket.
An unofficial poll of Forum subscribers taken between January and February 1972
showed that 94% of those who voted for Nixon in 1968 (Group A) believed he would be
renominated, while 95% of those who did not vote for him in 1968 (Group B) also believed
he would be renominated. In Group A, 17.5% viewed Nixon as the person “most worthy of
your enthusiasm and support,” with 9% going to McCloskey and Rockefeller each. Of
Group B, 18.5% checked McCloskey for that question, while Nixon was tied with
Democratic presidential hopeful Senator Ed Muskie with 4%. In Group A, 66% approved
124 Zelizer, “Seizing Power,” 108-9.
79

of Nixon’s Vietnam policy and 70% of those approvers liked his implementation. In Group
B, only 35% approved of Nixon’s Vietnam policy and 63% of those approvers liked his
implementation. In Group A, 49% wanted black Massachusetts Senator Ed Brooke to be
the vice presidential candidate, 17% preferred Rockefeller, and only 4% supported the
current Vice President, Spiro Agnew (who tied with Reagan and Treasury Secretary John
Connally, then a registered Democrat). In Group B, 59% wanted Brooke and 18% favored
Rockefeller; no other figure garnered more than 2% support. 125 This poll showed three
things: (1) Nixon was going to cruise to the nomination; (2) those who were adamantly
against the war disliked Nixon and were attracted to McCloskey; and (3) moderates
overwhelmingly wanted Agnew replaced, and Brooke was the most favored replacement.
McCloskey’s short-lived presidential campaign in New Hampshire—the first state to
vote in the primary process—received favorable attention from Ripon. At least one Ripon
officer, Mike Brewer, the Chairman of the National Governing Board, resigned from Ripon
in order to go work on McCloskey’s campaign in June 1971. 126 “Congressman Pete
McCloskey’s Presidential primary campaign and Republican youth drive has overcome its
immediate financial crisis,” the Forum reported enthusiastically in October 1971, “plowed
through the blizzard of its own unfortunate press releases, and laid the groundwork for a
breakthrough in New Hampshire when the real snow falls this winter.” 127 In March 1971,
the Forum “regret[ted] Congressman McCloskey’s decision to drop out of active contention
in the presidential primaries” after losing New Hampshire to Nixon by nearly 50 points.
125 “Ripon Poll Results,” Ripon Forum, 8:9 (May 1972), 18-9.
126 Michael F. Brewer to Charles Percy, 14 June 1971, Ripon Papers: Box 14.
127 “McCloskey Focuses on New Hampshire,” Ripon Forum, 7:14 (15 October 1971), 1.
80

The article offered him praise for his stances on Vietnam and “truth in government.” 128
Ripon never endorsed McCloskey outright and did not believe he would or could win, but it
was clear that the society viewed his campaign favorably for the light it shined on Vietnam.
Despite Ripon’s efforts, a campaign to draft Brooke as a replacement for Agnew on
the ticket went nowhere. Auspitz, a former president of the society, helped put together a
write-in campaign for Brooke in New Hampshire, while Brooke maintained he only wanted
to run for reelection to the Senate and asked the write-in campaign, according to the Forum,
to “cease and desist in their efforts in his behalf.” 129 John Mitchell, who resigned his
position as Attorney General to run Nixon’s reelection campaign, ran a write-in campaign
for Agnew in order to head off the efforts for Brooke. It worked: Agnew received 47,000
votes to Brooke’s 8,000. 130
With Brooke’s non-candidacy effectively defeated, Riponers began to speculate
loudly about John Connally, who had stepped down as Treasury Secretary in June to run the
Democrats for Nixon effort. Writing in the July issue of the Forum, Tim Petri argued that
Connally would be a “greater asset… than any other,” would be “a more effective Vice
President,” and was “of Presidential calibre [sic].” 131 George Gilder noted, however, that
Connally would “function chiefly as a dramatic symbol of an ascendant strategy of Southern
realignment,” and in the “northern industrial states and California… a Nixon-Connally
tandem might be successfully depicted as a ticket of big money Protestant hawks.” Gilder
warned that “[i]n the atmosphere of ITT [Nixon political fundraising scandal] and the Bay of
128 “McCloskey’s Challenge,” Ripon Forum, 8:6 (15 March 1972), 1; “Past New Hampshire Primary
Election Results,” Primary: New Hampshire, http://www.primarynewhampshire.com/new-hampshireprimary-past-results.php.
129 “Brooke V.P. Write-in Announced,” Ripon Forum, 8:4 (15 February 1972), 4.
130 “Agnew, Peabody Score in VP Races,” Ripon Forum, 8:6 (15 March 1972), 3.
131 Thomas E. Petri, “The Case for Connally,” Ripon Forum, 8:13 (July 1972), 3.
81

Pigs at the Watergate, such charges might even give McGovern some momentum.” 132 This
argument was superfluous; Nixon chose to keep Agnew.
Nixon was nominated on August 23, 1972, and Ripon duly endorsed him in their
September issue of the Forum. “Differences between the Ripon Society and the Nixon
Administration during its first term of office have been frequent and severe,” the editorial
acknowledged. Nevertheless, the society still chose to endorse him:
There is no doubt in our minds that the Nixon Administration could have fashioned
a more positive record over the last four years… particularly in the domestic sphere.
But there is no doubt in our minds, either, that the President’s statesmanship abroad
and his goals for the new American Revolution can provide the foundations for a
truly progressive second term.
We therefore urge progressive Republicans to put aside their past differences
with the Administration and to work for the President’s re-election. 133
In particular, the Ripon organization outside of the Administration “deplored” the
“perpetuation of the divisive war policy in Vietnam,” the southern strategy, the conservative
Supreme Court nominations, and the stance against busing to realize school integration. 134
The endorsement, therefore, was controversial. At least one National Governing Board
member, Ken Kaiserman, resigned from the society over the decision. In general, Riponers
within the Nixon Administration believed the President accomplished a lot during his first
term, while those outside the Administration were more wary of his record. But given the
choice between the Democratic nominee, George McGovern, and Nixon, most of the
society stuck with the President.
132 George Gilder, “Connally’s Phase III,” Ripon Forum, 8:13 (July 1972), 7.
133 “Progressives and the President,” Ripon Forum, 8:18 (September 1972), 3.
134 Ibid.
82

Nixon destroyed McGovern, winning over 60% of the popular vote and 520
electoral votes to McGovern’s 17 and the Libertarian candidate’s 1. 135 As the Watergate
scandal unraveled in 1973, however, Ripon found itself repudiating the President.
Watergate
In October 1973, the Ripon Society released its final book, Jaws of Victory: The
Game-Plan Politics of 1972, the Crisis of the Republican Party, and the Future of the
Constitution. The 357-page study of the 1972 election was written by Clifford W. Brown,
Jr. in conjunction with several other academics and Ripon members. (Brown was an
Assistant Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York at Albany.) 136 It
contained a whole chapter devoted to Watergate. “On the surface it should not be
surprising that anyone who looks at politics primarily in strategic terms should behave as the
Watergate conspirators did,” the chapter authors, Gregg Rushford and Brown, wrote.
“After all, if winning is the supreme strategic objective, then why should any tactic that
contributes to winning not be desirable and permissible?” The Watergate scandal was “just
one of the more spectacular examples of the ‘new politics,’ of the new patterns of strategic
politics that are beginning to prevail in modern America.” 137
“The adversary process,” which Brown, Bob Behn, and Lee Auspitz praised as the
foundation of “our constitutional order,” fostered these “excesses of strategic thinking.” 138
They argued that the answer to the problem was not to weaken the presidency, but rather to
strengthen it, and Congress as well, in addition to clearly defining the separation of powers.
135 James R. Whitson, “1972,” President Elect, http://presidentelect.org/e1972.html.
136 Ripon Society and Clifford W. Brown, Jr., Jaws of Victory (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), jacket flap.
137 Brown, Jaws of Victory, 90.
138 Ibid., 351.
83

Brown, Behn, and Auspitz argued for “a step backward,” away from the inter- and intra-
institutional tensions created by the sharing of powers, and towards a more defined
government with increased weight given to state and local governments, which would have
to be improved upon to work effectively. 139 The failure, according to Jaws of Victory, was a
systemic one that did not just fall on the shoulders of Ehrlichman or Haldeman or Nixon
himself, but on the type of politics Ripon had been arguing against for years.
Since its founding, the Ripon Society had pleaded for leaders, who would lead the
Republican Party and society as a whole forward based on intelligent, progressive ideas. Yes,
they also sought to avoid the adoption by the GOP of an electoral strategy that exploited the
anti-civil rights backlash in the South. But, Ripon wanted ideas to shape electoral politics,
not politics to shape ideas. The Watergate scandal seemed to confirm that, despite their best
efforts, politics had become all-consuming. Furthermore, it confirmed the suspicions of
many within the society that Nixon could not be trusted.
Ripon had called upon Nixon and his administration to tell the truth about
Watergate as early as November 1, 1972. In an “editorial note” titled “For an Open
Presidency,” the Forum argued that “[p]ublic confidence in the President, in the federal
government, and in the Republican Party demands that President Nixon personally direct his
staff to disclose their involvement in the secret campaign activities.” 140 In April 1973, the
Forum charged that it was not the Republican Party that was responsible for Watergate, but
the “New Majority Party,” led by Nixon and Haldeman, that sought to place the President
above either party and was “responsible for… the indifference to integrity that pervades
139 Ibid., 352-3.
140 “For an Open Presidency,” Ripon Forum, 8:21 (1 November 1972), 4.
84

official statements from the White House.” 141 The Forum’s critique continued throughout
the year, with critical editorials or articles in June, July, August, and November. 142 In the
November article, Ripon President Ronald Speed suggested that “[i]mpeachment
proceedings may provide the only avenue by which President Nixon and the Congress can
negotiate a working agreement to conduct the affairs of government in the coming
months.” 143 Watergate hovered in the background throughout 1974, coloring Ripon’s
coverage and commentary of nearly everything. “The FORUM has deliberately not taken an
editorial stand on the impeachment — to urge Congress to decide once way or another,”
Dick Behn wrote in an August issue that was released six days after Nixon’s resignation.
“We have believed that it is inappropriate to tell representatives and senators how to
vote.” 144
Watergate had the unfortunate consequence of overshadowing Nixon’s true
achievements in both domestic and foreign policy, some of which occurred in his aborted
second term. For instance, Nixon finally followed through on his 1968 and 1972 campaign
pledge to end the draft by colluding with Congress to let it expire in 1973. 145 None of these
accomplishments, however, could save Nixon. On August 8, 1974, five years to the day
after he announced his support for a negative income tax and revenue sharing before
Congress, President Richard Nixon resigned. 146
141
“Editorial,” Ripon Forum, 9:8 (15 April 1973), 2.
142
“Editorial,” Ripon Forum, 9:11 (June 1973), 4; Tanya Melich, “National Security,” Ripon Forum, 9:14
(15 July 1973), 1; Robert G. Stewart, “To Resign,” Ripon Forum, 9:14 (15 July 1973), 4; Robert
Donaldson, “Or Not To,” Ripon Forum, 9:14 (15 July 1973), 5; Robert Behn, “White House and the Way
of the Whigs,” Ripon Forum, 9:15 (15 August 1973), 1-2; Ronald Speed, “Impeachment,” Ripon Forum,
9:20 (November 1973), 5.
143
Speed, “Impeachment,” Forum, 5.
144
Dick Behn, “Law and Order,” Ripon Forum, 10:16 (15 August 1974), 5.
145
Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy, 234-5.
146
Richard Nixon, “Resignation Address to the Nation,” 8 August 1974, American Rhetoric,
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/richardnixonresignationspeech.html.
85

Ripon’s Decline Through the Ford Administration
For the Ripon Society, the Watergate period was one of organizational decline. Jaws
of Victory was the last book that Ripon would publish—a symbol of the end of Ripon’s
institutional role as a moderate quasi-think tank. The society moved its headquarters to
Washington in time for the September 1973 issue of the Forum, though their publishing arm
did not come down to the nation’s capital until later that year. 147 The move to D.C.—first
taken in spirit in 1969—was now complete.
Ripon’s officers were still diverse. In the May 1974 Ripon elections, John Cairns,
who had signed the New York chapter’s repudiation of Gilder’s daycare editorial, was
elected President, while Tanya Melich was elected Chairperson of the National Governing
Board. Richard Rahn, who had been national Executive Director, D.C. chapter President,
and national Managing Director and would be influential in promoting supply-side
economics, was the new Finance Chair. 148 More than a decade old, however, Ripon lacked
the vigor of its youthful beginning and was integrated into the D.C. culture which it had
pointedly spurned for so long.
Riponers and Ripon allies were still represented in the Ford Administration, and the
society as a whole viewed him as a true moderate; the society, which had viewed Nixon with
such ambivalence, wholeheartedly embraced Ford. Nixon had appointed Bill Kilberg as
Solicitor of the Department of Labor in 1973, and he remained there through the Ford
Administration. Bobbie Kilberg, who had left the Nixon White House in 1971 after serving
in the Office of the Staff Secretary and the Domestic Policy Council, returned as Associate
147 The September issue is the first to locate the society headquarters in D.C. and issues later in the year
switch back and forth between locating the Forum in Cambridge and D.C.
148 Ripon Society, “Ripon Election Announcements,” May 1974, Tanya Melich Papers, University
Libraries, University at Albany, State University of New York, Series V: Box 6: Folder 2; Steve
Livengood, Interviews with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 1 and 29 March 2009.
86

Counsel to President Ford. 149 Peter Wallison, who had served on the Council on Executive
Organization, became Counsel to the new Vice President, Nelson Rockefeller. 150 Ford
appointed Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, eventually making him Chief of Staff
and then Secretary of Defense.
Yet, many had left. Elliot Richardson resigned as Attorney General when Nixon
ordered him to fire the prosecutor who was investigating Watergate (Ford would bring him
back as Commerce Secretary in 1976). George Romney left the Cabinet at the beginning of
Nixon’s second term and John Volpe left his post as Transportation Secretary in 1973 to
become Ambassador to Italy. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the Democratic ally of Ripon, had
also taken an ambassadorship, this one in India, in 1973. John Price took over the Urban
Affairs Council after Moynihan left. Chris DeMuth had left the UAC to attend law school in
1970; Tim Petri also departed the same year from his position as the Director of Crime
Studies on the Council on Effective Organization. 151 Lee Huebner, who had risen to second
in command on the speechwriting staff, left in January 1974. 152
The Ripon Society was in a state of decline and drift. The election of Richard Nixon
in 1968 brought some Riponers into power, but it also made Ripon’s criticism of Nixon and
the party look disloyal. Expansion combined with a new generation of officers crippled the
ad hoc system of governance and production which had worked so well during the society’s
first five years. The apparent solution to this problem—moving Ripon headquarters to
D.C.—only exacerbated Ripon’s problems by placing the organization within the
community it had always criticized. Changing times and changing issues exposed Ripon’s
149 “William J. Kilberg P.C.,” Gibson Dunn.
150 Peter Wallison, Interview with University of Virginia’s Miller Center of Public Affairs, 28-9 October
2003, Ronald Reagan Oral History Project, 5.
151 American Enterprise Institute, “Chris DeMuth,” Scholars & Fellows, http://www.aei.org/scholar/11.
152 Huebner interview with Kabaservice.
87

fragile unity, and a president who was neither conservative nor moderate, Richard Nixon,
trapped Ripon in a state of inertia with no movement leader to support and no outright
villain to oppose.
88

CHAPTER THREE
Old Age and Rebirth, 1975-1982
Organizational Drift, Reagan, and Supply Side Economics
In the latter half of the 1970s, the Ripon Society drifted along, a shell of the
organization it was in 1969, until a man named Rick Kessler came along in 1981 and began
to transform the society. The society’s continued decline was a result of chronic problems:
clipped, ineffective leadership; lack of an operating vision and institutional role; and the
divisions exposed by the rise of feminist politics and issues. The support of many Riponers
for John Anderson’s unrealistic independent campaign in 1980 was, in retrospect, a fitting
coda. At the same time, however, the new movement championing supply-side economics
had captured the imagination and talents of a few Riponers and indirectly extended the
society’s influence. Furthermore, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, New York
Representative Jack Kemp promoted self-empowerment proposals, which closely reflected
Ripon ideas from the 1960s. After Rick Kessler took over the society’s presidency and
Representative Jim Leach was elected Chairman, Ripon moved decisively in a new direction,
appealing to lobbyists for financial support in exchange for a new program of conferences
and networking events. By the end of 1982, it was clear that the Ripon Society had entered a
new phase.
1976 Election
For the second presidential election in a row, Ripon found itself fighting a battle of
procedures with the Republican Party. At the 1972 Republican convention in Miami, a
resolution was passed to explore ways to increase the number of youth, women, and
89

minority delegates at future conventions. The Rule 29 Committee, named after the
resolution (Rule 29(b)) was chaired by Representative Bill Steiger of Wisconsin, who was
important for the passage of OSHA and would be integral to the reduction of the capital
gains tax in 1978. Meeting from 1973-4, the committee encouraged states to actively seek
more representation in their delegations of “women, minorities, ethnic groups, young
people, and senior citizens,” but “there was to be no quota system and… proposals were not
to be binding on state parties.” 1 The Rule 29 Committee was more a fight over women in
the party than minorities, reflecting a general change in focus in the 1970s from civil rights
to feminist issues. Tanya Melich lobbied RNC members to vote for the committee’s
proposals. 2 When the RNC nixed the part of the committee’s report that would have
obliged the state parties “to file reports outlining their positive actions” and called upon the
RNC “to review and comment on them,” Ripon women reacted angrily. 3 Bobbie Kilberg, a
member of the National Women’s Political Caucus, said at the time that the RNC managed
to “emasculate whatever little was left” of “compromise” in the proposal. 4 In his 1973 book
Sexual Suicide, George Gilder charged that the feminist movement, which had found a
partial home in Ripon, was a “betrayal of the civil rights movement.” 5 But Gilder’s view of
betrayal was atypical, and it is clear that Ripon largely embraced Republican feminist politics.
Meanwhile, the society was still suing the RNC, claiming the allocation of bonus
delegates was unconstitutional. Ripon claimed “that the 1976 Formula overweights the West
and South at the expense of the North,” calling the allocation plan a form of “invidious
1 Huckshorn and Bibby, “National Party Rules and Delegate Selection in the Republican Party,” 659.
2 Tanya Melich to Richard Rosenbaum, 25 February 1975, Tanya Melich Papers, Series V: Box 6: Folder 3.
3 Huckshorn and Bibby, “National Party Rules and Delegate Selection in the Republican Party,” 659;
4 Lou Cannon, “GOP Right Dilutes Minority Appeal Program,” Washington Post, 7 March 1975, A5.
5 George F. Gilder, Sexual Suicide (New York: Quadrangle, 1973), v.
90

discrimination against millions of Republicans to preserve their power to dictate the result of
the 1976 Convention.” Therefore, “judicial intervention [is] essential.” 6
In hearings on the Rule 29 Committee proposals, former Ripon president Lee
Auspitz testified on Democratic attempts to force voters to register as either a Democrat or
Republican, which would have been a boon for the Democrats in the post-Watergate era. In
response to a comment Auspitz made about “fears of state party leadership that an increase
in Republican strength will upset control of party machinery,” former RNC Chairman Ray
Bliss, who had gotten along well with the society in the 1960s, replied that “such ‘bad
publicity’ statements had ‘always irritated him about Ripon.’” 7 Even ostensible Ripon
sympathizers had had enough of Ripon’s crusade against the party. It is one thing to
criticize party policies and electoral strategy; it is another to challenge the infrastructure itself.
“My feeling was that it was a mistake to have committed so much of Ripon’s energies
toward the delegate suit,” said Steve Livengood, who was Ripon Executive Director from
1976 to 1980. Livengood continued:
The delegate suit was the wrong tactic, because it offended everybody. It was an
assertion of judicial power…. It offended the whole Republican establishment and
gave us a bad name. We had no power base. And that was the whole problem all
the way along: these were people from Harvard looking down on America. 8
Livengood was from Kansas and when he was a graduate student in history at Emory
University in Atlanta, he wrote for the Forum, before coming to D.C. 9 Ripon was now part
of the D.C. scene, but the GOP establishment still viewed the group as a collection of
outsiders. No longer were they the successful “little juvenile delinquents” of early 1970; now
they were a dysfunctional and disorganized thorn in the side of the Republican Party.
6 “The Ripon Suit,” Ripon Forum, 9:21 (15 November 1973), 1.
7 “Rule 29,” Ripon Forum, 10:11 (1 June 1974), 2.
8 Livengood interview with Kabaservice.
9 Ibid.
91

Throughout 1975, the Forum, under the editorship of Dick Behn, was obsessed with
the threat of a primary challenge against President Ford by Ronald Reagan. Behn dismissed
Reagan as “wishy washy,” characterizing him as reluctant to take responsibility for
conservatives criticisms of President Ford, yet still eager for attention. 10 In August 1975,
Behn claimed that “Hurricane Ronnie is being quickly downgraded in its storm status.” 11
Yet, the Forum followed Reagan and his supporters with avid attention throughout the year,
suggesting that he might run on a third-party ticket with segregationist George Wallace of
Alabama, and taking every opportunity to argue that Ford, as the sitting president, was a
stronger candidate. 12 In a meek admission that a Reagan primary challenge might be more
than a pipedream, Behn suggested that “perhaps the challenge of a vigorous primary
campaign is what the emaciated GOP needs.” 13
The Republican Party got a primary campaign whether or not it needed one. Reagan
joined the race, and despite the natural advantage Ford enjoyed as the incumbent, Reagan’s
candidacy was not a fantasy. “Reagan should have won New Hampshire,” the first primary
in the nation, according to the historian Sean Wilentz. “It was the most conservative of the
New England states, and its elections often turned on intensely personal, small-town
campaigning.” 14 Dick Behn agreed, writing in the October 1975 Forum that “New
Hampshire is a snake pit for President Ford.” 15 But Reagan had slipped up in the fall, when
he revealed a plan “to cut federal spending by $90 billion, balance the budget, and cut
personal income taxes to an average of 23 percent—all by transferring authority from the
10
Dick Behn, “Where’s Ronald Reagan’s Horse,” Ripon Forum, 11:6 (15 March 1975), 1.
11
Dick Behn, “The Callaway Connection,” Ripon Forum, 11:16 (15 August 1975), 1.
12
“Duly Noted: Reagan,” Ripon Forum, 11:1 (1 January 1975), 3.
13
Dick Behn, “Ford Versus Reagan: See Them in New Hampshire,” Ripon Forum, 11:8 (15 April 1975), 2.
14
Wilentz, Age of Reagan, 65.
15
Dick Behn, “Campaign Strategy in the Snake Pit,” Ripon Forum, 11:20 (15 October 1975), 1.
92

federal government to the states.” 16 In December 1975, Behn predicted that Reagan’s
proposal was “bound to spark endless controversy.” 17 In fact, Reagan’s plan was repudiated
by both the president of the New Hampshire state Senate and the speaker of the state House
of Representatives—New Hampshire’s citizens enjoyed no state income tax, something
which was certain to change if a proposal like Reagan’s was ever enacted. 18
On January 27, Ford won New Hampshire, but barely. Ripon described the result as
the “absence of disaster, not the presence of victory” for both campaigns—no one won, but
no one lost either. Despite the technical victory for Ford, the Forum sounded a despondent
note—the Supreme Court had just rejected the society’s petition to hear an appeal on the
delegate apportionment suit, which earlier had been rebuffed by the Court of Appeals for
D.C. They saw the approaching primaries—weighted so that smaller, more conservative
states received more delegates than if the allocation was based purely on population—as “a
stacked deck” for Reagan. 19
Throughout the campaign, the President found himself trying to appease the party’s
conservative wing—a strategy of “accommodation” according to Ripon. 20 “President
Ford’s theology these days sounds unrefreshingly like Reagan’s,” Dick Behn wrote in
January 1976. “His comments on government spending, abortion, school prayer, busing,
and economic policy seem to place Ford and Reagan uncomfortably in the same pew.” 21
And by March, Ford was backpedaling on foreign policy as well, announcing on the stump
that “We are going to forget the use of the word détente.” 22
16 Wilentz, Age of Reagan, 65.
17 Dick Behn, “Will Peking Play in Peoria?” Ripon Forum, 11:23 (1 December 1975), 1.
18 Dick Behn, “The $90 Billion Man Story,” Ripon Forum, 12:2 (15 January 1976), 1.
19 “New Hampshire and the Constitution,” Ripon Forum, 12:5 (1 March 1976), 1.
20 “Politics: The Presidency,” Ripon Forum, 11:21 (1 September 1975), 5.
21 Dick Behn, “The Presidential Pulpit,” Ripon Forum, 12:4 (15 January 1976), 4.
22 Wilentz, Age of Reagan, 64.
93

But the next big contest, the March 9 th Florida primary, showed that Ford’s strategy
of positioning himself to the right might have been a wrong move, at least on domestic
policy. Reagan campaigned in the Sunshine State on overhauling Social Security, a position
that did not resonate at all with Florida’s numerous elderly voters. Ford, who “condemned
Reagan’s plan as foolish and risky,” won. 23 The Forum argued that this “demonstrated the
bankruptcy of Howard ‘Bo’ Callaway’s strategy of ‘preempting’ the nomination by
undermining Reagan’s conservative support.” 24 The magnitude of Reagan’s defeat in New
Hampshire and Florida, as well as Massachusetts and Vermont on March 2 and Illinois on
March 16, was large. “Pundits speculated that he would have to drop out,” the historian
Julian Zelizer has noted. “By March, most of Reagan’s staff was working without pay.” 25
Reagan was losing primaries in which the focus was on domestic issues. The moderate tack
of Nixon and Ford’s domestic policies was not enough of a sticking point with the
Republican electorate.
In North Carolina, however, Reagan ran on the Panama Canal. President Ford was
negotiating a treaty with the Panamanians to give the American-financed canal to the
country in which it resided. Reagan famously told campaign crowds that “We bought it. We
paid for it, and General Torrijos should be told we are going to keep it.” 26 Reagan went on
to win North Carolina on March 23, and started a comeback that led all the way to the
convention in Kansas City. Along the way, Ford continued his shift to the right on foreign
policy issues, and managed to win the nomination, but only by 117 votes out of 2,257.
23 Ibid., 66.
24 “Politics: The Presidency,” Ripon Forum, 12:6 (15 March 1976), 3.
25 Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy, 267.
26 Ibid., 268.
94

Reagan’s announcement of moderate Pennsylvania Senator Richard Schweiker as his
running mate upset many conservatives and contributed to Ford’s victory. 27
Ford was able to mollify some conservatives by naming a former Congressman from
Kansas and RNC Chairman, Bob Dole, as his running mate. Dole did not fit Ripon’s call
for “a progressive republican who can attract northern Democratic and independent voters.”
Ironically, the Forum said that Schweiker fit the mold perfectly, but he had signed on to
Reagan before the convention. 28 Throughout the summer, some within the GOP suggested
that Ford pick former Texas Governor and Nixon Treasury Secretary John Connally. The
Forum argued against Connally, saying he was too conservative and too close to the publicly
despised Richard Nixon. 29 The officers of the D.C. chapter of the society, however, wrote
to President Ford in support of Connally. 30 The society was split on the idea of a
conservative Vice President.
Where was Nelson Rockefeller through all of this? After withdrawing himself from
the reelection race on Ford’s behest in November 1975, he essentially played no part in the
campaign. After the announcement of his withdrawal, the Forum praised him and expressed
disappointment that he would not serve in President Ford’s potential second term. 31 Yet,
Dick Behn criticized Rockefeller two months later. “For too long, Rockefeller has held
tenaciously onto his position as pastor emeritus of the progressive flock, preventing more
committed, less divisive politicians from rallying progressive enthusiasm,” Behn wrote. “For
a decade and a half, Rockefeller has told the progressive congregation that they needed him,
while doing little to organize the congregation, preach new homilies, or attract new
27
Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy, 267-70; Wilentz, Age of Reagan, 66-8.
28
“Ford, Si; Connally, No,” Ripon Forum, 12:15 (1 August 1976), 2.
29
Ibid, 1.
30
Waring Patridge, Steven Saunders, and Kathleen McDonald to Gerald Ford, 11 August 1976, White
House Central Files Name File, Box 2665, “Ripon Society,” Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
31
“Editorial Points: The Administration and the City,” Ripon Forum, 11:22 (15 November 1975), 1.
95

converts.” 32 The Ripon Society and the moderate Republican movement were experiencing
similar dilemmas: without strong, focused, and determined leadership, they were floundering
in the wilderness without direction, identified purpose, or organizational means.
Yet, the society did not think that the greater progressive Republican movement was
dead. And, as Reagan discovered in the New Hampshire and Florida primaries, Republicans
had yet to move decisively in favor of conservative domestic policies. It was on foreign
issues that Reagan did well. Ripon, however, was overconfident in moderate
Republicanism’s prospects. “The nomination of Ronald Reagan was the conservative’s
improbable dream for 1976,” the Forum claimed after the Kansas City convention.
“Looking backward in 1980, conservatives may wonder how they came so close.” 33 But,
Reagan’s victory over President Carter in 1980 would make this analysis look silly.
Organizational Decline
From the mid-1970s until the early 1980s, the Ripon Society was an organizational
muddle. The last significant Ripon publication was The Jaws of Victory in 1973, and in
September 1974 the society stopped publishing the Forum in typeset, presumably for
financial reasons. Ripon never had solid financial footing, but the mid-70s saw the
disappearance of any steady funding. Even the Whitney family of the Whitney
Communications Corporation, which owned the New York Herald Tribune before it folded
and the International Herald Tribune, gave less (though Jock Whitney did give $4000 to the
New York chapter in 1975). 34 The Whitneys’ group of donors also was not giving like they
32
Dick Behn, “The Presidential Pulpit,” Forum, 4.
33
“Where Do Conservatives Go From Here?” Ripon Forum, 12:17 (1 September 1976), 1.
34
Lewis Bart Stone to John Hay Whitney, 21 February 1975, Tanya Melich Papers, Series 5: Box 6: Folder
9.
96

used to. In January 1975, the society had to take out a $17,000 loan to pay its debts, and by
March, the society’s budget had been reduced by 40%. 35 It appears that at least three times
in the 1970s, Ripon held auctions in order to raise money. The auction items included a
drawing by Elliot Richardson and a pen signed by President Ford. 36
In order to alleviate their money problems and help to redefine the society’s mission,
charter member Gene Marans had the idea to establish a Political Action Committee (called
the New Leadership Fund) and an educational operation that would qualify for tax-exempt
501(c)(3) status (called the Ripon Educational Fund), thus enabling the organization to
accept double donations and also support moderate candidates in a visible way. But the
fundraising was a disaster. “You know, moderates give moderately,” Livengood explained.
A fundraising firm run by Democrats and hired by the society did not come through. “I
think their lists were wrong, the message was wrong, it was utterly uncoordinated,”
Livengood said, “and as far as I was concerned they were utterly incompetent.” 37
The Ripon office at 1609 Connecticut Avenue in D.C. was across the hall from an
outcall service, according to Livengood, who was one of the society’s Executive Directors in
the late 1970s. “They would sometimes use it as an incall service and put the mattresses in
the hallway,” Livengood recalled. 38 (It just so happens that the author actually spent last
summer working at 1609 Connecticut Ave. There was no outcall service by 2009.) The
society lacked sustained, coherent leadership, as numerous officers and directors came and
went, some of them incompetent. “No one knew what they were doing, and the office
35 Josie Cuevas to National Executive Committee, 30 January 1975, Tanya Melich Papers, Series 5: Box 6:
Folder 3; Richard W. Rahn to William A. M. Burden, 6 March 1975, Ripon Papers, Box 23.
36 Jeannette Smyth, “A Famous Doodle and Some Guffaws,” Washington Post, 25 October 1973, E1;
“Ripon Reception and political auction at the home of Teresa and John Heinz III,” 12 May 1975, Ford
Papers; Gwen A. Anderson to Susan Whitten, 27 May 1976, Ford Papers.
37 Livengood interview with Kabaservice.
38 Ibid.
97

operations were completely inefficient, so the whole thing was coming apart,” Livengood
recalled. 39
When John Topping took over as President in 1978 (he left early in 1980), the
society turned around somewhat. Topping moved Ripon into his law office, which had
much nicer accommodations, and restored the Forum to a typeset format, even adding color
covers and black-and-white photographs. 40
But, Ripon had changed permanently. A New York Times article on the New
Leadership Fund in the spring of 1977 ended with an apt summary: “The program
represents a new departure for the society, the 2,500 members of which, in 14 chapters, have
been largely devoted in the past to research and issue analysis from the progressive
Republican point of view but are now venturing into more direct political action.” 41 The
number of “members” was greatly inflated and in fact probably corresponded to the number
of subscribers to the Forum. The society was almost completely D.C.-based by the time of
Jimmy Carter’s inauguration. In April 1975, the Los Angeles and Seattle Ripon chapters
were defunct, and four more were decaying. 42 With a greater emphasis on the inside-the-
beltway political scene, Ripon chapters were less and less needed or relevant to the
organization. “The D.C. chapter and the national organization were almost synonymous,”
Steve Livengood remembered. 43 Since 1973, Ripon had been floundering. The New
Leadership Fund and the Ripon Educational Fund, though lacking in money, at least gave
the organization some direction during the Carter years. Overall, Ripon’s problems reflected
the general state of moderate Republicanism: down, but not defeated.
39
Ibid.
40
Livengood interview with Kabaservice; Ripon Forum, 15 (1979).
41
Warren Weaver, Jr., “G.O.P. Liberal Group Opens a Fund Drive,” New York Times, 1 April 1977, 13.
42
Ripon Society, “Minutes of National Executive Committee Meeting,” 18 April 1975, Tanya Melich
Papers, Series 5: Box 6: Folder 4.
43
Livengood interview with Kabaservice.
98

Supply-Side and the 1978 Capital Gains Tax Cut
One of the most interesting accomplishments associated with Riponers was not
directly connected to the society itself. The Investment Incentive Act of 1978 was
championed on Capitol Hill by Congressman Bill Steiger of Wisconsin—so much so, in fact,
that it became known as the Steiger Amendment. Steiger, who had come into close contact
with Ripon through his chairmanship of the Rule 29 Committee, argued that the capital
gains tax should be halved in order to encourage greater business investment and thereby
boost the economy. His pushing, along with significant lobbying from extra-governmental
groups, resulted in a reduction from 49% to 28% in the capital gains tax as part of the
Revenue Act of 1978. 44 A Ripon favorite, Steiger died suddenly from a heart attack in
December 1978, a month after the bill passed. Tim Petri, a founding Riponer and the
society’s first Executive Director, succeeded Steiger and still holds his seat today. 45 (Petri
represents Wisconsin’s 6 th District, which includes the town of Ripon.) 46 In the January
1979 Forum, Ripon saluted Steiger, saying he did “the seemingly impossible, he routed the
Carter Administration to achieve changes in the tax law to encourage investment and
entrepreneurship.” 47
The capital gains tax reduction is often cited as the first victory for proponents of
supply-side economics. Although Arthur Laffer claims that the theory has roots in the
works of earlier economic theorists as far back as the 14 th century Ibn Khaldun, the supply-
side movement can safely be said to date to when Laffer drew his famous curve for then-
44 Geoffrey Kabaservice, “William Steiger: Supply-Side and Conscience,” FrumForum, 17 March 2009,
http://www.frumforum.com/william-steiger-supply-side-and-conscience.
45 Citizens for Petri to “Dear Friends,” 16 January 1979, Walter Thayer Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential
Library, Series 2: Box 4: Folder 9; Walter Thayer to ?, 18 January 1979, Thayer Papers, Series 2: Box 4:
Folder 9; “Petri Survives Labor Blitz to Hold Steiger Seat,” Ripon Forum, 15:4 (May 1979), 15.
46 Thomas E. Petri, Interview with author, 19 November 2009.
47 “William A. Steiger,” Ripon Forum, 15:1 (January 1979), 2.
99

Deputy Chief of Staff Dick Cheney (and not Donald Rumsfeld as was inaccurately reported
for decades). 48 Laffer was the ideological father of supply-side. After receiving his
undergraduate degree in economics from Yale, Laffer got his MBA from Stanford. Then the
Dean of the Faculty at the University of Chicago, George Shultz, brought Laffer to Chicago
to teach economics in the shadow of conservative economist Milton Friedman. When
President Nixon appointed Shultz the Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
Shultz brought Laffer along as the office’s chief economist. 49 In 1974, when Laffer met
with Cheney, supply-side was still in its infancy. Laffer apparently liked to draw his curve on
napkins—a former Riponer named Richard Rahn has a napkin on which Laffer drew a copy
of his curve in 1976. 50
Rahn had been President of the Ripon chapter in D.C. and was the society’s Finance
Chair and Executive Director in the early 1970s. In 1978, Rahn, who had a Ph.D. in
economics from Columbia University, was the Executive Director of the American Council
for Capital Formation (ACCF). 51 He and his deputy, Mark Bloomfield, another Riponer,
worked closely with Ed Zschau of the American Electronics Association (AEA) in lobbying
Congress for the reduction in capital gains tax. 52 (Zschau is currently a Professor at
Princeton University). In 1973, Rahn met Congressman Jack Kemp, who would become a
prime supporter of supply-side in Congress. Through ACCF, Rahn met Laffer and the two
split duties—Laffer formulated a supply-side theoretical model and Rahn handled
48 Arthur Laffer, “The Laffer Curve: Past, Present, and Future,” Heritage Foundation, 1 June 2004,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2004/06/The-Laffer-Curve-Past-Present-and-Future; Jude
Wanniski, Yorktown Patriot, 14 June 2005, http://www.yorktownpatriot.com/printer_78.shtml.
49 Blumenthal, Counter-Establishment, 160-1.
50 Richard Rahn, e-mail message to author, 18 March 2010.
51 Richard Rahn, Interview with author, 8 September 2009.
52 Ed Zschau, Interview with author, 23 February 2010.
100

fundraising for the lobbying organization. 53 Steve Livengood accurately characterized Rahn
as “Mr. Supply-Side.” 54
A 1980 study by Henry C. Kenski of the University of Arizona showed that the
Revenue Act of 1978 was “supported by a broad coalition of moderate and conservative
Democrats uniting with Republicans.” 55 Nevertheless, Rahn argued that the capital gains tax
cut “probably would never have happened if it hadn’t been for the existence of Ripon.” 56
Not only was there a confluence of Ripon talent that helped elevate supply-side theory and
lobby for its implementation (George Gilder, in addition to Rahn and Bloomfield, played a
big role after 1978), but there was arguably a connection between supply-side and Ripon’s
earlier support of a negative income tax and other proposals, which were based on
incentives. Chris DeMuth, who worked for Daniel Patrick Moynihan in the Nixon White
House and had a hand in drafting Nixon’s negative income tax proposal, said that the
negative income tax “led us to think a lot about incentives, and incentives at the margin.”
DeMuth conceded that
there was a distinctly political component to supply side economics that had nothing
to do with any Ripon heritage, and it was a little bit different from just the marginal
effects on supply and demand. So I can imagine people saying, ‘Oh, God, ’78, you
know, Ripon didn’t have anything to do with it,’ but it actually did. There was a core
idea there that grew off in some other directions in response to the [economic
conditions] of the time [1978]. 57
Since 1973, the country had endured stagflation, the painful combination of a stagnant
economy and high inflation. 58 In November 1978, when Congress passed the Revenue Act,
53
Rahn interview with author.
54
Livengood interview with Kabaservice.
55
Henry C. Kenski, “Partisanship and Ideology in the Revenue Act of 1978,” Policy Studies Journal, 9:1
(Autumn 1980), 80.
56
Rahn interview with author.
57
DeMuth interview with author.
58
Wilentz, Age of Reagan, 35.
101

the one-month inflation rate was 7.82%. 59 Support for a new approach that highlighted
incentives was higher as a result of the economy.
Not all Riponers agree with DeMuth’s assessment of supply-side’s genetic
relationship to the negative income tax and other Ripon proposals, and it would be
presumptive without further inquiry to claim that most agreed. Patricia Goldman said that
she did not see a real connection between Ripon’s policy work in the late 1960s and early
1970s and supply-side. “I think that came out of Richard [Rahn],” she said. 60 Mike Brewer
said that supply-side was not “inconsistent” with Ripon’s policies, because “it goes back to
how you structure your incentives.” Yet he saw a difference between the “micro”
incentivizing approach of a negative income tax and the “macro” approach of supply-side:
“The micro side of it is, if you have a choice between a government program with a
top-down bureaucracy in Washington and all that, or can you use the tax code to
incentivize people to behave in a certain way…. And there’s ultimately a war
between the supply-side and that because the supply-siders would say no, don’t
micro manage the tax code. The supply side people would say you have to…
minimize the adverse consequences of taxes by having the broadest possible base
and the lowest possible rates.” 61
A broad comparison of the negative income tax and supply-side results in many similarities,
but a more in-depth investigation reveals conceptual differences. They share a focus on
incentives, but do so at different levels of the economy. It is consistent, therefore, for some
Riponers to have supported both a negative income tax and supply-side, while others
embraced only the former.
The Ripon Society was not directly associated with the capital gains tax cut; it did not
have an official role in developing the legislation or pushing it through. But at this point in
59 Federal Reserve Bank of Dalls, “Trimmed Mean PCE Inflation Rates,”
http://www.dallasfed.org/data/data/pcetrim.tab.htm.
60 Goldman interview with author.
61 Brewer interview with author.
102

Ripon’s history, the society was not contributing much real substance to the policy debate.
Riponers Richard Rahn and Mark Bloomfield and Ripon ally Bill Steiger took an idea that
was well within the confines of what the Ripon of the late 1960s would have supported and
vigorously lobbied for it. In February 1979, the Forum praised Rahn and Bloomfield,
claiming that Bloomfield co-wrote the Steiger Amendment with Steiger himself and that
“Ripon again defied the political oddsmakers by helping secure a rollback of capital gains
taxes.” 62 Whether the tax cut would have happened without Ripon is eminently debatable.
What is not is that some Riponers were closely involved with the cut and that it was wholly
consistent and justifiable for Rahn and Bloomfield, as Riponers, to support the cut, at least
in their own eyes.
Jack Kemp and Empowerment
One of the earliest Congressional supporters of supply-side was New York
Representative and former professional football star, Jack Kemp. But, Kemp did not limit
himself to arguing for a broad-based cut in income taxes. Concerned by urban poverty, he
sought to target the power of incentives on revitalizing the nation’s cities. “The public
sector can help by providing a tax and regulatory climate that is more favorable to business
creation and expansion in the cities—a climate that eases investors’ fears and somewhat
smooths [sic] the federal, state, and local regulatory obstacle course,” Kemp wrote in 1979.
“It also requires efforts to ease the tax burden on income from job-creating investments.” 63
Kemp did not want to get rid of the social safety net, but instead incentivize people to rise
out of it. “[W]e must draw people out of the net by expanding attractive opportunities in the
62 “Ripon Annual Report for 1978,” Ripon Forum, 15:2 (February 1979), 5.
63 Jack Kemp, An American Renaissance: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 94.
103

private sector,” Kemp argued. “A vibrant economy can afford to leave the safety net in
place and at the same time ensure that the net is as empty as possible.” 64
In the early 1980s, Kemp ran with the idea, cosponsoring the Urban Jobs and
Enterprise Zone Act with Democratic Representative Robert Garcia, also from New York.
The bill would allow federal and state governments to designate a city or area as an
“enterprise zone,” with the city’s permission, if it was significantly poorer than the national
average on appropriate indexes (unemployment, etc.). Businesses and employees in the zone
would receive tax credits in some instances and lower tax rates in others. 65
Kemp’s “enterprise zone” idea closely resembles Ripon’s contract work for
Governor Volpe in 1967 and the Urban Papers of 1968. In both of those instances, the
society argued for tax credits, among other things, as a means of creating the “conditions for
self-help” in poverty-stricken urban areas. Now, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, self-
identified conservative Republicans picked up the empowerment idea and combined it with
supply-side, creating a formidable and coherent economic program for the nation. These
domestic policy proposals had clear roots in moderate Republicanism and the Ripon Society
in particular.
1980 Election
Supply-side economics, nourished with the help of Riponers, found a home in the
1980 presidential campaign of Ronald Reagan. Arthur Laffer and Jack Kemp, along with
Laffer associate Jude Wanniski, convinced Reagan of the theory’s merits. 66 Yet, despite his
acceptance of a theory that the contemporary Ripon Society seemed to endorse, the society
64 Ibid., 79.
65 “Main Provisions of the Kemp-Garcia Bill,” Congressional Digest, 1 March 1982, 72-75 and 96.
66 Wilentz, Age of Reagan, 121.
104

was not sold on Reagan, who had been a symbol of the conservative wing of the party for
too long and was Ford’s rival for the nomination in 1976.
Throughout 1979, the Forum focused its attention on three Republican candidates:
Reagan, John Connally, and John Anderson, a Congressman from Illinois. Three feature
articles in the October, November, and December issues of the Forum reflect how Ripon
viewed the primary election. In October, an article explored the nascent stage of Reagan’s
candidacy. 67 In November, the Forum featured Connally and his focus on Middle Eastern
policy. 68 December’s issue included an article titled “John Anderson: A Dark Horse Who
Could Pull Off The Upset of The Century.” The article, which was given more prominence
than the other two with its earlier page placement, was unsigned, giving it the stamp of the
Ripon as a whole, while the others had named authors. 69 By December 1979, Anderson was
the favorite candidate of the Ripon Society.
Earlier in the year, it appeared to Ripon that the fight would be between Reagan and
Connally, but the emergence of Anderson as a possible candidate grabbed the society’s
attention. In the spring of 1979, the Forum reported that “[i]n the last two months the star
of the Republican presidential stage has been Texan John Connally,” whom they described
as “a spicy blend of constitutional radicalism, macho politics and chutzpah.” 70 In the same
issue, the society argued that Reagan was losing conservative support to Congressman Philip
Crane of Illinois, just one of multiple “increasing signs of vulnerability.” 71 Connally and
Reagan were the two standouts. Yet, as early as February 1979, the society had its eye on
67
Bumper Gammon and E. Scott Royce, “Ronald Reagan: Leading Man or Final Act?” Ripon Forum, 15:7
(October 1979), 13-4.
68
John C. Topping, Jr., “John Connally’s Big Political Gamble: A New U.S. Policy for the Middle East,”
Ripon Forum, 15:8 (November 1979), 6-7.
69
“John B. Anderson: A Dark Horse Who Could Pull Off The Upset of The Century,” Ripon Forum, 15:9
(December 1979), 4-5.
70
“Washington, Lincoln, FDR and Connally?” Ripon Forum, 15:3 (March/April 1979), 4.
71
“Reagan Lead Dwindling,” Ripon Forum, 15:3 (March/April 1979), 7.
105

Anderson, a moderate as opposed to the movement conservative Reagan and the quixotic
Connally. In that month’s issue of the Forum, Anderson wrote an article that extolled the
type of pragmatic, moderate Republicanism that Ripon had advocated since its founding.
Proclaiming “the patent inadequacy of traditional Democratic remedies,” he called for
Republicans “to present forward-looking approaches in education, health, civil rights,
rebuilding our cities, reforming civil service and welfare, and streamlining our defense
budget.” 72
Although the Forum covered other candidates, Anderson received most of its
attention over the summer. The lead editorial in the July/August issue argued that only
three men had the potential to head off what looked like a formidable candidacy by Ted
Kennedy, who was well-positioned to challenge President Carter for the Democratic
nomination the next year: Anderson, Pennsylvania Governor Richard Thornburgh, and
Illinois Governor James Thompson. And, the society noted, “only Anderson seems
determined to press his candidacy.” 73 In that same issue, three Riponers wrote articles
promoting the primary candidacies of Anderson, Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker of
Tennessee, and George Bush, who had held a plethora of governmental positions. 74 Yet, the
article supporting Anderson was written by John Topping, then the national President of
Ripon. The Ripon leadership was already leaning towards Anderson.
As 1980 began, Riponers were spread out among the various Republican contenders’
campaigns. Bill Weld was chairman of Crane’s Massachusetts campaign; Ted Vlamis was
working for the Dole effort in Iowa; founding member Doug Bailey was high up in the
72 John B. Anderson, “The Future of the GOP,” Ripon Forum, 15:2 (February 1979), 24.
73 “The Kennedy Factor,” Ripon Forum, 15:6 (July/August 1979), 6.
74 John C. Topping, “John B. Anderson for President,” Ripon Forum, 15:6 (July/August 1979), 11-2;
William Ehrig, “Howard Baker for President,” Ripon Forum, 15:6 (July/August 1979), 12-3; and Kathleen
McDonald, “George Bush for President,” Ripon Forum, 15:6 (July/August), 14.
106

Baker camp; August Fromuth led Connally’s New Hampshire campaign; John McClaughry
was a speechwriter on the Reagan campaign; Bush had the services of Dick Salvatierra, the
national Vice President, and Sandy Thompson, who had been a Managing Director. 75 Bill
and Bobbie Kilberg also served on Bush’s finance committee. 76 But Anderson employed
the most Riponers, at least twenty in some capacity or another, including Topping and
former Ripon President Howard Gillette, as well as other former officers. 77 In general, the
society thought Reagan “was not very substantive” while Anderson was “very cerebral and
very issue oriented,” according to Peter Baugher, who was chair of the New Haven Ripon
chapter while at Yale Law School in the early 1970s and chairman of the National Governing
Board in the latter part of the decade. Baugher and his wife were closely involved in
Anderson’s Illinois effort. 78 Topping even resigned his position as Ripon president in order
to concentrate on the Anderson campaign. 79 Topping, however, left the campaign in April
and returned to Ripon as editor of the Forum. Soon after Topping departed the Anderson
campaign, it became clear that Reagan would be the GOP nominee, and Anderson decided
to run an independent campaign. 80 Several Riponers, including Topping, Livengood, and
Tanya Melich, went to the GOP convention in Detroit in July, where Livengood and a few
others helped a dismal effort, which failed, to rally support for Anderson despite his status as
an independent candidate actively campaigning against the Republican ticket. 81 After flirting
75
“Ripon RoundUp,” Ripon Forum, 16:1 (January 1980), 6; McClaughry interview with Kabaservice.
76
Bill Kilberg, e-mail message to author, 23 March 2010.
77
“Ripon RoundUp,” Ripon Forum, 16:1 (January 1980), 6.
78
Peter Baugher, Interview with author, 1 April 2010.
79
“Ripon RoundUp,” Ripon Forum, 16:3 (March/April 1980), 11; John C. Topping, Jr., “A Word from the
Editor,” Ripon Forum, 16:4 (May/June/July 1980), 2.
80
Frank Smallwood, The Other Candidates: Third Parties in Presidential Elections (Hanover: University
Press of New England, 1983), 226.
81
Livengood interview with Kabaservice.
107

with the idea of a co-presidency with Gerald Ford, Reagan chose George Bush, who had
been the favorite of the GOP establishment, as his running mate. 82
Under Topping’s editorship, the Forum predicted that Carter would finish third
behind Reagan and Anderson. An editorial even suggested that Carter should not be invited
to presidential debates because his “inclusion… could deflect voters attention from the more
serious candidates.” 83 This was a bold statement—Carter may have been doing badly in the
polls, but he was still the incumbent President. Reagan wanted to include Anderson in the
presidential debates, but Carter would not agree to that arrangement, and Reagan and
Anderson debated once before Reagan succumbed to debating Carter without the
independent candidate. 84 The final election results looked nothing like Topping’s
predictions. “Barring some international crisis that redounds to his benefit,” Topping had
written during the summer, “Jimmy Carter, even if he wins his party’s Presidential
nomination, is likely to finish third in the popular vote and a very poor third in the electoral
college, perhaps carrying only two or three Southern states.” 85 But the prediction proved
ridiculous. Reagan won with 50.8% of the popular vote to Carter’s 41% and Anderson’s
6.6%. Reagan won 44 states; Carter won 6 states and the District of Columbia; Anderson
did not win a single state. 86 A study done in the aftermath of the election found that
Anderson’s “appeal remained largely restricted to the ‘young, liberal, well-educated, white
and affluent’”—in other words, Riponers and those like them. 87 Reagan, on the other hand,
82
Wilentz, Age of Reagan, 120.
83
“Should Jimmy Carter Be Included in the Presidential Debates?” Ripon Forum, 16:4 (May/June/July), 2.
84
Wilentz, Age of Reagan, 123.
85
John C. Topping, Jr., “1980 Presidential Outlook,” Ripon Forum, 16:4 (May/June/July 1980), 15.
86
James R. Whitson, “1980,” President Elect, http://presidentelect.org/e1980.html.
87
Gerald M. Pomper, “The Presidential Election,” The Election of 1980: Reports and Interpretations, ed.
Marlene Michels Pomper (Chatham: Chatham House), 84.
108

“won with fairly similar margins almost everywhere,” suggesting a broad appeal across
traditional geographical and demographic barriers. 88
Topping’s misjudgment of the political landscape in the summer is understandable—
though Anderson’s poll numbers would steadily decline, they hit 20% at one point. Yet,
Topping’s analysis still was a manifestation of how out of touch the Ripon Society had
become with the direction of American politics in 1980. As is now fairly clear in hindsight,
Reagan’s election ushered in an era of conservative dominance, in which Democratic
politicians had to package themselves as centrists to be successful nationally and the
Republican Party as a whole shifted to the right. Ripon’s championing of John Anderson,
who left the GOP, was a sign that moderate Republicanism was fading as a national power.
In a way, the deaths of Bill Steiger in December 1978 and Nelson Rockefeller in January
1979 symbolize the end of one era and the beginning of another. Steiger’s death turned him
into a symbol, almost a martyr, for supply-siders. Columnist George Will praised Steiger for
his work on “liberating the nation’s productive energies, including energy in the form of
capital and, where possible, supplanting coercion with incentives.” 89 The Washington
Post’s news coverage also made the capital gains tax cut central to his obituary. 90 The
passing of these two figures marked the end of moderate dominance of the Republican
establishment and the realization that conservatives were in control of the GOP. The
moderates were out, and the conservatives were in.
Yet, it’s not that simple. As we have seen (and will see again), a few Riponers were
closely involved with promoting supply-side, and many more supported or were intrigued by
the theory. Also, empowerment policy proposals were gaining credence in the GOP.
88 Pomper, 67.
89 George F. Will, “Politics—As Steiger Practiced It,” Washington Post, 7 December 1978, A23.
90 J. Y. Smith, “Rep. W.A. Steiger Dies; Backed Tax Cuts,” Washington Post, 5 December 1978, C8.
109

Furthermore, some Riponers served in the Reagan Administration. Peter Wallison was the
General Counsel of the Treasury Department and then became Counsel to the President. 91
John McClaughry, who was a speechwriter on the campaign and managed liaison efforts
with “governors, state legislatures, and mayors” during the transition, was appointed Senior
Policy Advisor in the Office of Policy Development and headed the Cabinet Council on
Food and Agriculture in the administration. 92 John Topping volunteered for the transition,
helping the Office of Presidential Personnel. 93 Richard Rahn became Vice President and
Chief Economist at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 94 Bruce Chapman led the Census
Bureau from 1981-83 and then was a Deputy Assistant to President Reagan while serving as
Director of the Office of Planning and Evaluation. 95 It is not so much that these Riponers
were converted as issues and politics changed. In the 1960s, civil rights unified Ripon; in
the 1970s, feminist politics began to divide them; in the late 1970s and early 1980s, supply-
side took over the economic policy debate. As the times changed, so did Riponers.
Supply-Side and the 1981 Tax Cuts
The second major accomplishment of the supply-side movement was the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, also known as Kemp-Roth after its chief proponents,
Representative Jack Kemp of New York and Senator William Roth of Delaware. Kemp and
Roth had sponsored a similar proposal in 1978, which they put forward as an amendment to
the Revenue Act. It failed in both the House and Senate, at least partially because “in a
91 Wallison interview with Miller Center.
92 McClaughry interview with Kabaservice; Ethan Allen Institute, “Staff and Directors of the Institute,”
http://www.ethanallen.org/aboutus/dir.html.
93 John Topping, e-mail message to author, 17 March 2010.
94 Cato Institute, “Richard W. Rahn,” http://www.cato.org/people/richard-rahn.
95 Discovery Institute, “Bruce Chapman, President,” http://www.discovery.org/p/7.
110

period of high inflation… it enabled Democratic politicians and an overwhelming majority
of economists to declare it highly inflationary and unable to generate the tax revenues
expected by its supporters,” according to a study by Henry C. Kenski. 96 The 1981 bill cut
income taxes by 25% phased in over three years and capital gains taxes by 40%. 97 While
Reagan’s advisers were not all in support of the cuts, he himself was certain, 98 and the
Revenue Act of 1978 provided a legislative foundation on which to build the new
reductions. Supply-siders were able to argue that the cut in the capital gains tax, which was
relatively modest compared to the scope of the 1981 bill, had significantly increased federal
revenues from capital gains—something about which they themselves were surprised. “I
had greatly underestimated the amount of increase they had, and that the ’78 capital gains
tax cut set the stage for the ’81 through ’83 Reagan tax cuts,” Richard Rahn said. As Vice
President and Chief Economist at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Rahn was an important
public voice in favor of the bill.
George Gilder, who left Ripon after the daycare editorial in 1972 raised the ire of
many within the society, became a prime intellectual supporter and promoter of supply-side.
Gilder’s 1981 book, Wealth and Poverty, is “sort of a Bible of Reaganomics,” as Rahn
described it. Gilder—who thanked Riponers Mike Brewer, Chris DeMuth, Lee Auspitz,
Bruce Chapman, John Topping, Richard Rahn, and Mark Bloomfield in his preface for their
help—argued eloquently that the “source of the gifts of capitalism is the supply side of the
economy.” 99 Drawing not only from economics, but also from sociology, political science,
and philosophy, Gilder crafted a coherent argument that in time has come to be seen as one
96
Kenski, “Partisanship and Ideology in the Revenue Act of 1978,” 76.
97
Wilentz, Age of Reagan, 143.
98
Ibid., 140.
99
George F. Gilder, Wealth and Poverty (New York: Basic Books, 1981), xi and 28.
111

of, if not the, defining works in support of supply-side. The book’s impact on the passage
of the 1981 tax cut is unknowable. 100 David Stockman, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, liked the book and gave it out to many people, according to John
McClaughry. 101 Writing in the Forum in August 1981, John Topping said that Wealth and
Poverty “provides a devastating critique of the prevailing economic wisdom and social
philosophy of the past generation” and that a “true test of supply side economics would
require far more radical cuts in tax rates than” what the 1981 bill would in fact deliver. 102
Steve Livengood recalled being “skeptical of the concept” before reading Gilder’s book;
after perusing it, “we all supported him.” Overall, “the Ripon Society was heavily in support
of the concept of supply side economics.” 103 What is undeniable is that Gilder’s book had
great influence in proceeding years.
Rick Kessler and Ripon’s Transformation
The election of 1980 had taken a heavy toll on an already teetering Ripon
organization. John Topping’s resignation in April of that year after less than two years at the
helm accentuated the leadership difficulties the society was experiencing, especially since
both the organization’s Vice President, Dick Salvatierra, and Executive Director, Steve
Livengood, were active in primary campaigns. Ripon did not even produce the Forum
regularly in 1980, because the election distracted its officers and the society was practically
100 Wealth and Poverty came out in early 1981—news articles mention it by February of that year—so it
conceivably could have convinced some Representatives and Senators to vote for the tax cuts. An example
of a newspaper article on the book: Henry Allen, “George Gilder and the Capitalists’ Creed,” Washington
Post, 18 February 1981, B1.
101 McClaughry interview with Kabaservice.
102 John C. Topping, “The First Six Months,” Ripon Forum, 12:2 (August 1981), 6 and 7.
103 Livengood interview with Kabaservice.
112

oke. 104 “I was leaving my paycheck in the Ripon account so that the other checks didn’t
bounce,” Livengood recalled. 105 And even when the society did publish the Forum, it was
not on a monthly basis and it always came out late, a trend that started before the election.
For instance, the Princeton University library received the January 1979 Forum on February
23, 1979, over a month late. 106 And, with an admitted lack of money, the New Leadership
Fund and the Ripon Educational Fund must also have been struggling.
In 1981, Rick Kessler, a veteran of the Anderson campaign, took over as Ripon
Executive Director, and Representative Jim Leach of Iowa was elected Chairman. 107
Kessler, who served on the Reagan Inaugural Committee, reinvigorated the organization’s
fundraising, while Leach pushed the society to have a greater focus on foreign policy issues,
especially support for a ban on the testing of, and an overall freeze on construction of,
nuclear weapons. 108 In 1982, Ripon teamed up with the Bow Group, the conceptual father
of Ripon, in putting on a transatlantic conference in D.C. By chance taking place during the
height of Britain’s Falklands crisis in April, the conference featured speeches by Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger and Senators and Representatives, such as Leach, Tim Petri, and
Jack Kemp. A self-professed “Anglophile,” Leach informed the group that “British policy
on the Falklands” was more popular in the United States than “American policy towards El
Salvador.” 109 The conference was an important step in building American public and
104
John C. Topping, Jr., “A Word from the Editor,” Forum, 2.
105
Livengood interview with Kabaservice.
106
Cover, Ripon Forum, 15:1 (January 1979), 1. The library stamped the date of reception on the front
cover.
107
“419 New Jersey Avenue,” Ripon Forum, 17:2 (August 1981), 10; Jim Leach, “A Moderate Manifesto,”
Ripon Forum, 17:3 (October/November 1981), 11; and “419 New Jersey Avenue,” 17:3
(October/November 1981), 14.
108
“419 New Jersey Avenue,” Ripon Forum, 17:2 (August 1981), 10; Jim Leach, Interview with author, 15
March 2010.
109
Leach interview with author; Barr, The Bow Group, 180.
113

Congressional support for the British over the Argentineans. 110 That conference was
followed by others throughout the decade with both the British and Germans. These
conferences were conspicuous examples of Ripon’s new direction under Kessler, who stayed
with the organization until 2009.
Today, the Ripon Society primarily hosts breakfasts and lunches with Senators and
Representatives so that the society’s members can interact with lawmakers in an intimate
and unofficial setting. The Forum is still published, though on a bimonthly or quarterly
basis. The society has a small paid staff of five with an office in downtown D.C. 111
Without Kessler, it is questionable whether Ripon would have survived at all. He
brought a distinct vision for the group, and rebuilt the society in that image using his
contacts in D.C. A symbolic sign of the society’s new focus was its move in 1981 to offices
on New Jersey Avenue, “just a block down from the Capitol.” 112 Jim Conzelman, the
society’s current President, described the organization Kessler built in favorable terms.
They try to break down the barriers of Congress and get real conversations going between
Ripon members and Senators and Representatives, Conzelman said. Conzelman also is
beginning a concerted effort to recruit young Hill staffers to the society. 113
Not everyone agrees with the more upbeat assessment of Kessler’s impact. Gene
Marans, a founding Riponer, said that, under Kessler’s leadership, Ripon turned into a
“lobbyist trade association.” 114 Steve Livengood was more critical, accusing the society
under Kessler in the 1980s of “cross[ing] all kinds of lines. 80% of what they did was
illegal.” According to Livengood, on the way to one of the transatlantic conferences, Kessler
110
Barr, 180.
111
Jim Conzelman, Interview with author, 16 March 2010; Lou Zickar, e-mail message to author, 19 March
2010.
112
“419 New Jersey Avenue,” Ripon Forum, 17:2 (August 1981), 11.
113
Conzelman interview with author.
114
Marans interview with author.
114

gave “first class tickets to his clients, and the other people were sitting in coach.” However,
it was not until they had to raise the price of attending that “the conferences became events
exclusively for lobbyists and their clients,” Livengood recalled. 115 Kessler himself is a
lobbyist with his own firm, Kessler & Associates. In 2006, a group called Public Citizen
accused Ripon of “skirting congressional ethics rules that forbid lobbyists from paying for
congressional travel.” Public Citizen claimed that Ripon paid for senators and
representatives to travel to events, where Ripon members, who are mostly lobbyists, would
get “unbridled access.” The society, however, denied the accusation, saying that they “don’t
allow any lobbying” at their events. 116
Both sides of this debate do agree, however, on one point. As Conzelman said,
“Rick [Kessler] was the catalyst for the group, because, for the most part, the Ripon Society
had died.” 117 Whether the group which Kessler raised from the ashes of the old society is
useful or not is a question beyond the scope of this thesis. What is readily apparent,
however, is that Kessler’s Ripon Society is diametrically different from the Ripon Society of
the 1960s. Whereas the early society focused on policies first from the locus of Cambridge
and then from within Washington, the society as it is today is much more a part of the
inside-the-beltway culture and has not even come close to resembling a think tank for twenty
years. In 1981, the Ripon Society received a new lease on life. But Ripon as it was in the
late 1960s and early 1970s never returned.
115
Livengood interview with Kabaservice.
116
Thomas B. Edsall, “Lobbyists Help Fund Ripon Society Travel,” Washington Post, 23 January 2006,
A4.
117
Conzelman interview with author.
115

In July 1983, Jack Saloma, Ripon founder and the society’s first president, died from
AIDS. 118 In a way, his passing symbolized the end of the Ripon Society.
118 Elsa Dixler, “Acknowledgments,” in John S. Saloma’s Ominous Politics (New York: Hill and Wang,
1984). Ominous Politics was published posthumously.
116

EPILOGUE
At a panel discussion and dinner at the posh Metropolitan Club in D.C. in January
2010, I sat at a table with five early members of the Ripon Society: Emil Frankel, Gene
Marans, Lee Huebner, Bill Kilberg, and Peter Wallison. The panel’s topic was the future of
the Republican Party—a fitting subject, considering the five men had spent much of the
middle and latter part of the 1960s worrying, talking, and writing about the future of the
party. After the dinner ended, I stood talking with Frankel, who had been across the table
from me and out of conversation distance. It was Frankel who had spent time as a graduate
student in England and came back with the idea to form a society based on the model of the
Bow Group. The Ripon Society, he told me, was a “failure.”
In many objective, measurable ways, Ripon did fail. Except for improved relations
with China, for which President Nixon and Henry Kissinger deserve full credit, and the
ending of the draft, none of Ripon’s major policy proposals ever became lasting law.
Congress never passed bills codifying a negative income tax, though Nixon publicly
supported the proposal. Nixon did sign a revenue sharing bill in 1972, but Reagan oversaw
the end of the program in 1986. 1 Neither President Johnson nor Nixon adopted the
confederal strategy for Vietnam, and the war dragged on until 1973. The RNC firmly
rebuffed Ripon’s efforts both to change the way the party allocated delegates to the national
conventions and to encourage more minority and women delegates.
The society argued until it was hoarse against the GOP’s adoption of a “southern
strategy,” claiming that the party could never challenge the Democrats for true national
1 PBS, “Domestic Politics: Richard M. Nixon, 37 th President,”
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/presidents/37_nixon/nixon_domestic.html.
117

dominance without the support of minorities and southern moderates. As it happened,
Nixon successfully blended the southern strategy with an appeal to the moderate northern
wing of the GOP, and over the past 45 years, the party has seen its center of gravity move
south. In the 40 years between 1969 and 2009, the country had a Republican president 70%
of the time. Congress remained Democratic until the 1994 midterm elections flipped both
houses to the GOP. Only after the 2006 elections did the Democrats regain both houses. 2
It is clear that the southern strategy worked. Ripon’s electoral predictions were, for the
most part, wrong.
And as a whole, the Republican Party took a rightward turn. The demise of the
northeast wing of the party, which Nelson Rockefeller had symbolized for so long, was a
running story surrounding the 2006 and 2008 elections. In 2008, Christopher Shays of
Connecticut, the last Republican member of the House of Representative from New
England, traditionally a bastion of moderate Republicanism, was defeated. 3 “I’d deluded
myself,” Riponer Tanya Melich wrote about the 1992 Republican National Convention in
Houston.
The tacit approval of the President of the United States was being used to shatter the
nation’s tranquility, to tear away at its Constitution, to shackle women, and to stifle
dissent—all in the cause of winning elections. George Bush and the other leaders of
the Republican party were to blame for giving respectability and power to this
movement of hate, this sickness of the soul. And I too was to blame. They’d
encouraged this firestorm and I’d gone along. I’d let cleverness overwhelm good
sense. I’d not been willing to let go, to leave the party of my roots, my ambition, my
life’s work, my dreams. I’d been wrong, very wrong. 4
The rise of the social conservative movement—dominated by evangelicalism, opposition to
abortion, and, more recently, a campaign to block states from legalizing gay marriage—still
2
“Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present”; “Party Divisions of the House of Representatives (1789 to
Present).”
3
Hernandez, “Northeast Republicans Lose Precious Ground in Washington.”
4
Melich, Republican War Against Women, xi.
118

angers Melich and many other Riponers, especially women, who see the conservative
movement as an activist war on women’s rights and, in some ways, a repudiation of small
government federalism. Some others, despaired at the perceived militarism of Reagan’s
administration and shocked by what they believed to be the negative implications of supply-
side economics, were drawn to the center-left approach of Bill Clinton and the Democratic
Leadership Council. The “compassionate conservatism” that George W. Bush proclaimed
during the 2000 campaign pleased many Riponers, although his presidency turned just as
many off.
Still, some Riponers had a hand in forging the new politics of the right. George
Gilder pioneered the backlash to the feminist movement with Sexual Suicide, and Wealth
and Poverty established a philosophical foundation for the supply-side theory, which
Richard Rahn had helped formulate. Even some of Ripon’s anti-conservative
accomplishments helped move the party to the right. For instance, by assisting the effort to
block Nixon’s nomination of G. Harrold Carswell, Ripon indirectly aided the emergence of
the abortion debate—the seat Carswell would have occupied was then taken by Harry
Blackmun, who authored the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade.
Most Riponers are probably still registered Republicans, whether or not they have
moved to the right ideologically. In fact, Riponers were represented in both the Bush ‘41
and Bush ‘43 administrations. 5 Tim Petri still represents the Wisconsin district in which he
was elected after Bill Steiger’s death. Bill and Bobbie Kilberg have become active party
fundraisers. Bruce Chapman leads the Discovery Institute, which is at the forefront of those
5 Bobbie Kilberg headed the Office of Public Liaison in the Bush ’41 Administration. Emil Frankel was
Assistant Secretary for Transportation Policy in the Department of Transportation from 2002 to 2005.
“Emil H. Frankel, Director of Transportation Policy, Bipartisan Policy Center,” National Journal,
http://transportation.nationaljournal.com/contributors/EFrankel.php.
119

arguing in favor of intelligent design. Rahn, who was married to Reagan speechwriter Peggy
Noonan and now is at the Cato Institute, continues to be influential among economic
conservatives, and people still read Gilder’s Wealth and Poverty. Peter Wallison, who was
Counsel to Vice President Rockefeller, has created an intellectual niche for himself at the
American Enterprise Institute as a critic of certain financial regulations. The list goes on.
What can we make of this? While Ripon did help, albeit indirectly, to formulate
some of the new policy stances of the Reagan Revolution, it is important to remember that
women’s rights issues and supply-side came out of the 1970s. Ripon’s “moderatism” (or
“liberalism” or “progressivism”) was formed in the crucible of the 1960s debate over civil
rights for blacks. The new social issues and supply-side, on the other hand, gained public
attention through the rise of the feminist movement and the terror of stagflation,
respectively. When these issues came to the forefront—and the politics of segregation
began to withdraw—inherent differences of opinion within Ripon became visible. This is
not to say that Riponers did not change their opinions about some things. Rather, it is
entirely consistent for both Tanya Melich and Peter Wallison, for example, to start with
Ripon and end up where they have.
Part of the reason this diaspora is consistent with Riponism is that the society lost its
vision, mission, and vitality after Richard Nixon’s election in 1968—the society never
established a clear set of principles in response to the new issues emerging out of the 1970s,
and its defining features were, therefore, indelibly linked to the mid-1960s. “As a practical
matter, Ripon lost its dynamism when its founders wandered off into their professional
lives,” Gene Marans said. “There was not a follow-up generation of activists who would
120

advise Lindsay, Baker, Dirksen, and Scott, and take on Ripon initiative.” 6 After Nixon’s
victory in 1968, many of the organization’s early leaders went into the new administration;
others, like Jack Saloma, had already left to pursue other things. The contract work Ripon
did in the mid-1960s for moderate politicians ceased. Ripon had been united by its
members’ support for civil rights. As the issue morphed into the realm of busing and
affirmative action, Riponers began to disagree with each other as to the right policies. And,
as the party increasingly embraced the conservative backlash, a viable moderate Republican
position on these new issues looked bleaker and bleaker.
As Nixon moved into the White House—the first time the Republican Party held the
reins of either the executive, Senate, or House of Representatives since Eisenhower left
office in 1959—a quandary arose: how did Ripon, often a critic of the party to which it
professed loyalty, fit into the institutional structure? The group’s whole purpose, beyond
vigorous support for civil rights, was to restore the Republican Party as the party of
pragmatic, goal-driven ideas. Before Nixon’s election, the society focused as much attention
outside of Washington as critiquing the politicking within the capital. With Nixon in the
White House, the focus understandably shifted to D.C. But that did not mean a place at the
table. Many Riponers did come into the administration as part of Nixon’s attempt to fold
the party’s wings around himself. But a group of relatively young, idealistic outsiders
coming to town with their Ivy League ideas and pretensions was not a resume for quick
induction into the Washington fraternity. Thus, Nixon adopted the society’s ideas on
revenue sharing and the negative income tax, while Attorney General Mitchell felt free to
deride the group as “little juvenile delinquents.” The society’s suit against the RNC over
delegate apportionment and its strenuous support of the Rule 29 Committee’s
6 Marans interview with author.
121

ecommendation to encourage more women and minority delegates further strengthened the
image among some of the party faithful of Ripon as, in today’s parlance, Republicans in
name only. Without their outsider status, the loss of which was cemented by the national
society’s move to Washington in 1973, and without a robust presence within the city, Ripon
no longer was an effective vehicle for and producer of fresh, new ideas and approaches.
Ripon’s foundation as a youth organization also cannot be discounted. “[T]he
Kennedy mystique helped define the group, because it was this idea of Republicans should
appeal to young people, to intellectuals, to the campuses,” Lee Huebner said. 7 “It is difficult
to say how much President Kennedy meant to young people. The first ‘young’ President
since Theodore Roosevelt, he was certainly the first to make them feel like a part of the
country,” William Wessels wrote in the Forum in the spring of 1966. “[Kennedy] gave them
a chance to make something other than a military contribution to society,” Wessels
explained. 8 But by the 1970s, even though Riponers were still relatively young in
comparison to the political movers in Washington, youth was starting to slip away from
most of the active members. They were starting careers and families, and thereby losing the
“dynamism,” as Marans’ put it, that had characterized the society’s first five or so years.
This contributed to a major “deficiency in Ripon,” which Marans identified—namely, “that
it did not have enough sustained leadership at the top.” 9
With the rise of new policy issues, the shift of focus to D.C., the loss of youth as a
motivating and energizing factor, and the lack of strong, sustained leadership, the society
drifted along. As neither a pure moderate nor a pure conservative, Nixon lacked the ability
to reinvigorate the group either in support of or opposition to his presidency. Ford was an
7 Huebner interview with author.
8 “The Young Americans,” The Ripon Papers, 15.
9 Marans interview with author.
122

underwhelming personality—the society was more caught up with worry over the
enthusiasm surrounding “Hurricane Ronnie.” And during the Carter Administration, the
society’s financial situation finally caused an unsuccessful organizational reshuffling with the
establishment of the New Leadership Fund and the Ripon Educational Fund. It was not
until Rick Kessler took the reins that the society began to recover, though in a much
different direction from the way it started. Kessler’s vision and long leadership allowed him
to reshape the organization.
In some ways, Ripon’s drift and decline during the 1970s reflected the greater trend
of moderate Republicanism. After 1968, the movement lacked a long-term national leader,
since Rockefeller’s status was diminished. Similar to how Ripon experienced a revolving
door of presidents and directors, moderate Republicans jumped from politician to politician,
be he Ed Brooke, Pete McCloskey, Gerald Ford, or John Anderson. Just as Ripon
chronically lacked money, moderate Republican politicians found it difficult to fundraise as
well as their conservative counterparts, and conservative think tanks bathed in funds. Worst
of all, the movement lacked the dynamism of the conservatives. Though the society as an
entity supported the Revenue Act of 1978, it was Reagan that picked up the idea and ran
with it at the national level; the conservatives adopted the ideas mantle.
In the end, however, Ripon and the greater moderate Republican movement made
two significant, if subtle, contributions to the Republican ascendancy, which Reagan and his
two presidential elections symbolized. First, Ripon’s forceful support for civil rights paved
the way for the conservatives’ appeal to middle-of-the-road voters by helping to remove the
stigma of Goldwater’s vote against the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Reagan’s personal image,
personality, and proposals should not be discounted, but neither should the fact that Reagan
123

first came onto the political scene as a spokesman for Barry Goldwater in 1964. Important
work was done to undo the damage Goldwater had on the Republican brand.
Second, the Ripon Society paved the way for the conservative Republican ideas
revolution through its strong work on domestic policies in the 1960s and from within the
Nixon Administration in the early 1970s. The non-social domestic policies of the
Republican Party under Reagan and since have heavily depended on the idea of personal
responsibility. The idea of tweaking market forces in order to incentivize and motivate
greater productivity goes back to Ripon’s proposals for a negative income tax and urban
revitalization. Supply-side economics and Jack Kemp’s “enterprise zone” proposal
depended heavily on themes espoused by Ripon. In fact, empowerment schemes cut across
traditional liberal/conservative dividing lines as the bipartisan support for a negative income
tax showed. But it was Ripon and Richard Nixon, who brought the idea back. In many
ways, Ripon pre-dated the major conservative think tanks. Yes, AEI and the Hoover
Institute existed long before Ripon was even a thought in Emil Frankel’s head. But the
society was expounding, disseminating, and popularizing policies which stressed
decentralization and empowerment before the conservative think tanks rose to prominence
in the 1970s. “One position paper seemed to inspire another,” Tim Petri and Gene Marans
wrote on the occasion of Ripon’s 25 th anniversary, “as scholars discovered there was a
receptive Republican audience for their ideas and analysis and a group willing to help them
organize and present their work simply and clearly.” 10 Through the 1960s and 1970s, Ripon
stood “for freedom and equality for all persons before the law [and] for economic
development and for individual opportunity.” 11 “The Ripon Forum was a great outlet for
10 Petri and Marans, “Ripon at Twenty-Five,” 22.
11 Ibid., 21.
124

policy papers and for conferences,” Peter Baugher recalled. “[And] these were all people
who were committed to the Republican Party.” 12
In Ominous Politics, a book published in 1984 after his death, Jack Saloma wrote,
“Nixon hired several key Riponites for policy and speechwriting positions in the White
House as a symbolic gesture to counterbalance his conservative appointments.” 13 Yet, what
Saloma did not fully understand was that, by centralizing the Executive Branch around the
Office of the President, Nixon gave his young staffers, many of them Riponers, significant
influence over domestic policy. Other Riponers, who served in departments, also had a
hand in crafting policy. Nixon’s domestic successes turned the Republican Party into an
active, policy-oriented party, a mantle which conservative Republicans took up. And, even
then, Riponers were sometimes closely involved with the formulation and promotion of
innovative policies, such as supply-side. Ripon did not ascribe to Reagan’s argument that
“government is the problem,” but it did undergird much of the policy framework of the
Reagan era.
The Republican ascendancy truly was conservative. But it is important to remember
the role that moderate Republicans like the Ripon Society played in removing the stigma of
Goldwater’s vote against the Civil Rights Act of 1964, promoting policies of self-
empowerment, and challenging the right wing to update its ideas for the current era. In his
memoir, Reflections of a Radical Moderate, Elliot Richardson wrote, “[W]hile
Washington’s history has not been uneventful, its hardest-fought struggles have been over
purposes and policies rather than power.” 14 For about a decade, between December 1962
and the end of Nixon’s first term in office, Ripon was deeply involved in those struggles.
12 Baugher interview with author.
13 Saloma, Ominous Politics, 97-8.
14 Elliot Richardson, Reflections of a Radical Moderate (New York: Pantheon, 1996), 4.
125

And, during the next decade, as conservatives decisively took control of the Republican
Party, Ripon’s ideas found new life in the policy proposals of the conservative movement
against which the society had fought for so long. As the GOP continues its rightward drift,
we should recall the forgotten and remember how the Ripon Society, a group of young,
moderate policy wonks, had a hand in the shaping of the modern Republican Party.
126

Primary Sources
Books
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Friedman, Milton. Wealth and Poverty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.
Gilder, George F. Sexual Suicide. New York: Quadrangle, 1973.
Gilder, George F. Wealth and Poverty. New York: Basic Books, 1981.
Goldwater, Barry. Conscience of a Conservative. Sheperdsville: Victor, 1960.
Huebner, Lee W. and Thomas E. Petri, eds. The Ripon Papers, 1963-68. Washington:
National Press, 1968.
Kemp, Jack. An American Renaissance: A Strategy for the 1980s. New York: Harper &
Row, 1979.
Kirk, Russell. The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana. Chicago: H. Regnery,
1953.
Melich, Tanya. The Republican War Against Women. New York: Bantam, 1996.
Phillips, Kevin. The Emerging Republican Majority. New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1969.
Rhys-Williams, Lady. Taxation and Incentive. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953.
Richardson, Elliot. Reflections of a Radical Moderate. New York: Pantheon, 1996.
Ripon Society. Election ’64: A Ripon Society Report. Edited by Thomas E. Petri.
Cambridge: Ripon Society, 1965.
Ripon Society. From Disaster to Distinction. Edited by Thomas E. Petri. New York: Pocket
Books 1966.
Ripon Society. Instead of Revolution. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1971.
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Interviews & E-Mails
Adams, Mike. Interview with author. 22 February 2010.
Auspitz, J. Lee. Interview with Geoffrey Kabaserivce. 21 October 2006.
Bailey, Douglas. E-mail message to author. 29 March 2010.
Bailey, Douglas. Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice. 22 March 2007.
Baugher, Peter. Interview with author. 1 April 2010.
Brewer, Michael. Interview with author. 10 October 2009.
Chapman, Bruce. Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice. 8 December 2009.
Conzelman, Jim. Interview with author. 16 March 2010.
DeMuth, Chris. Interview with author. 11 October 2009.
Frankel, Emil. E-mail message to author. 22 March 2010.
Frankel, Emil. Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice. 23 June 2007.
Gillette, Howard. Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice. 2 November 2006.
Goldman, Patricia. Interview with author. 9 October 2009.
Huebner, Lee. Interview with author. 8 September 2009.
Huebner, Lee. Interviews with Geoffrey Kabaservice. 11 April 2007 and 24 November 2009.
Kilberg, Bill. E-mail messages to author. 23 and 27 March 2010.
Kilberg, Bobbie. E-mail messages to author. 24, 26, 27 and 29 March 2010 and 1 April 2010.
Leach, Jim. Interview with author. 15 March 2010.
Livengood, Steve. Interviews with Geoffrey Kabaservice. 1 and 29 March 2009.
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McClaughry, John. Interviews with Geoffrey Kabaservice. 15 and 29 November 2009.
Melich, Tanya. Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice. 13 February 2007.
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Petri, Thomas E. Interview with author. 19 November 2009.
Price, John. Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice. 20 July 2007.
Rahn, Richard. E-mail message to author. 18 March 2010.
Rahn, Richard. Interview with author. 8 September 2009.
Smith, Mike. Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice. 12 February 2007.
Topping, John. E-mail message to author. 17 March 2010.
Topping, John. Interview with author. 6 November 2009.
Wallison, Peter. E-mail to author. 2 April 2010.
Wallison, Peter. Interview with University of Virginia’s Miller Center of Public Affairs. 28-9
October 2003. Ronald Reagan Oral History Project.
Zickar, Lou. E-mail message to author. 19 March 2010.
Zschau, Ed. Interview with author. 23 February 2010.
Manuscript Collections
Melich, Tanya M. Papers. University Libraries, University at Albany, State University of
New York.
Cuevas, Josie to National Executive Committee. 30 January 1975. Series 5: Box 6: Folder 3.
Melich, Tanya to Richard Rosenbaum. 25 February 1975. Series V: Box 6: Folder 3.
Ripon Society. “Ripon Election Announcements.” May 1974. Series 5: Box 6: Folder 2.
Ripon Society. “Minutes of National Executive Committee Meeting.” 18 April 1975. Series
5: Box 6: Folder 4.
Stone, Lewis Bart to John Hay Whitney. 21 February 1975. Series 5: Box 6: Folder 9.
Ripon Society Papers, Carl A. Kroch Library, Cornell University
American Conservative Union. “The Ripon Society.” 1966. Box 1: Folder 52.
129

Bayley, Christopher T. to Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. 15 March 1965. Box 1: Folder 26.
Bayley, Christopher T. to Elliot L. Richardson. 6 April 1965. Box 1: Folder 26.
Bayley, Christopher T. to James Carpenter. 4 July 1965. Box 3: Folder 160
Bayley, Christopher T. to Richard M. Nixon. 16 July 1965. Box 1: Folder 26.
Behn, Robert. “Memorandum: The Cornerstone Project.” 23 May 1966. Box 2: Folder 93.
Behn, Robert to Mary McInnis. 13 December 1965. Box 1: Folder 9.
Behn, Robert to Raymond K. Price. 16 May 1967. Box 1: Folder 16.
Behn, Robert to Timothy Brown. 20 October 1967. Box 7: Behn Correspondence.
Bill [?] to John S. Saloma. 29 July 1965. Box 2: Folder 81.
Bliss, Ray C.. “The Chairman Speaks: Address by the Honorable Ray C. Bliss Before the 13 th
Annual Republican Woman’s Conference, April 1, 1965.” Box 2: Folder 72.
Bliss, Ray C. to John S. Saloma. 23 September 1965. Box 2: Folder 72.
Branton, Wiley A. to J. Eugene Marans. 18 December 1964. Box 1: Folder 2.
Brewer, Michael F. to Charles Percy. 14 June 1971. Box 14.
Brown, Timothy to Robert Behn. 25 October 1967. Box 7: Behn Correspondence.
Buchanan, Patrick J. to Thomas E. Petri. 13 December 1967. Box 1: Folder 16.
Chapman, Bruce to J. Eugene Marans. 16 January 1963. Box 1: Folder 1.
Chapman, Bruce to Thomas E. Petri. 29 October 1967. Box 11: Folder 5.
Cornerstone Project brochure. Box 2: Folder 93.
Ellis, Evelyn to Joseph P. Wells. 8 July 1971. Box 23: Folder 6.
Eisenhower, Dwight D. to Walter Thayer. 23 January 1964. Box 3: Folder 177.
Huebner, Lee to Robert Taft, Jr. 21 May 1965. Box 1: Folder 7.
Javits, Jacob K. to Walter N. Thayer. 9 April 1965. Box 1: Folder 26.
Lichenstein, Charles M. to Thomas E. Petri. 25 January 1965. Box 2: Folder 73.
130

Lindsay, John V. to Mary McInnis. 1 December 1966. Box 1: Folder 9.
Lodge, Henry Cabot Jr. to Christopher T. Bayley. 11 March 1965. Box 1: Folder 26.
Marans, J. Eugene to Wiley A. Branton. 11 January 1965. Box 1: Folder 2.
Matthews, A. Douglas to J. Harvie Wilkinson III. 8 September 1969. Box 13.
McInnis, Mary to Robert Behn. 16 December 1966. Box 1: Folder 9.
Michel, Robert H. to John S. Saloma, 7 July 1964. Box 1: Folder 2.
Miller, David Jr. to Marianne Magocsi. 29 January 1965. Box 2: Folder 93.
Petri, Thomas E. to John F. Ahearne. 20 February 1968. Box 9: Folder 1.
Petri, Thomas E. to Patrick J. Buchanan. 20 November 1967. 7: Behn Correspondence.
Price, John R. to Al Abrahams. 27 March 1965. Box 2: Folder 79.
Rahn, Richard W. to William A. M. Burden. 6 March 1975. Box 23.
Republican Governors Association. “Republican Governors’ Association Articles of
Association of September 14, 1963.” reproduced in “The Republican Governors’
Association: The Case for a Third Force,” p. 20, 4 December 1964, Box 3: Folder
187.
Richardson, Elliot L. to J. Eugene Marans. 14 April 1964. Box 1: Folder 2.
Ripon Society. “Agenda, Dinner Meeting at the Harvard Faculty Club.” 12 December 1962.
Box 1: Folder 28.
Ripon Society. “Automation and Technology.” August 1967. Box 3: Folder 189.
Ripon Society. “The Case Against Carswell.” March 1970. Box 17: Folder 15.
Ripon Society. “Crime.” October 1967. Box 3: Folder 189.
Ripon Society. “Government for Tomorrow: a proposal for the unconditional sharing of
federal tax revenues with state and local governments.” 6 July 1965. Box 3: Folder
187.
Ripon Society. “Housing.” December 1967. Box 3: Folder 189.
Ripon Society. “Increasing Job Opportunities for the Urban Poor.” October 1967. Box 3:
Folder 189.
131

Ripon Society. “A New Republican Mandate: A Ripon Society Report and Preliminary
Analysis of the 1964 Elections.” 5 November 1964. Box 3: Folder 185.
Ripon Society. “A Republican Civil Rights Platform for 1965.” 1965. Box 3: Folder 187.
Ripon Society. “The Republican Governors’ Association: The Case for a Third Force.” 4
December 1964. Box 3: Folder 187.
Ripon Society. “Ripon Society Issues National Endorsement of Republican Candidates.” 28
October 1964. Box 3: Folder 185.
Ripon Society. “A Second Mandate to Republicans: A Ripon Society Report and Analysis of
the 1965 Elections.” 1965. Box 3: Folder 187.
Ripon Society. “Senior Citizens.” September 1967. Box 3: Folder 189.
Ripon Society. “Statement of the Ripon Society to the Republican Governors Association
Meeting in Los Angeles July 3-7, 1966.” Box 3: Folder 178.
Ripon Society. “Summary Minutes, Dinner, Business, and Discussion Meeting.” 7 December
1964. Box 1: Folder 28.
Ripon Society. “Summary Minutes, Dinner Meeting at the Harvard Faculty Club.” 12
December 1962. Box 1: Folder 28.
Ripon Society Executive Committee to Members of the RNC. 15 January 1965. Box 2:
Folder 73.
Romney, George. “Statement by Governor Romney for Use in Ripon Society Brochure.”
Undated. Box 3: Folder 177.
Romney, George to Christopher T. Bayley. 22 April 1965. Box 1: Folder 26.
Rumsfeld, Donald to John S. Saloma. 15 December 1965. Box 1: Folder 7.
Rumsfeld, Donald to the Ripon Society. 9 August 1965. Box 1: Folder 7.
Saloma, John S. “Memorandum on Luncheon with Dr. Arthur Peterson.” 21 April [1965?].
Box 2: Folder 73.
Saloma, John S. to Helen [Linsky?]. 12 March 1965. Box 2: Folder 81.
Saloma, John S. to Marianne Magocsi. 11 August 1965. Box 2: Folder 181.
Saloma, John S. to Marianne Magocsi. 13 August 1965. Box 2: Folder 81.
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Saloma, John S. to Ray C. Bliss. 13 July 1965. Box 2: Folder 72.
Saloma, John S. to Ray C. Bliss. 26 August 1965. Box 2: Folder 72.
Saloma, John S. to Robert E. Smylie. 23 May 1965. Box 2: Folder 81.
Saloma, John S. to Walter N. Thayer. 28 January 1965. Box 1: Folder 26.
Sarah [Winner?] to Christopher T. Bayley. 5 April 1965. Box 1: Folder 26.
Scott, Hugh to John R. Price. 19 April 1965. Box 1: Folder 7.
Scott, Hugh to the Ripon Society. 3 June 1965. Box 1: Folder 26.
Secretary for Laurance Rockefeller to Christopher T. Bayley. 30 March 1965. Box 1: Folder
26.
Smith, Michael C. “Here is the Rest of Him: A Report on Ronald Reagan as Governor of
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“Politics: The Presidency.” 12:6 (15 March 1976).
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