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DoDM 5200.45, April 2, 2013 (g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security (subsection 1.4(g)); or 1.4(h)). (h) The development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction (subsection (4) For classification and declassification of nuclear weapon information (i.e., RD and FRD), see References (g) and (l). (5) Pursuant to National Security Decision Directive 189 (Reference (n)), fundamental research not clearly related to the national security shall, to the maximum extent possible, remain unrestricted. However, when control is required for national security reasons, classification is the appropriate mechanism. Refer to Reference (n) and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Memorandum (Reference (o)) for additional guidance. (6) Although information developed by contractors under an independent research and development (IR&D) effort typically does not qualify for classification, it is possible for classified information to be generated by IR&D efforts. This may occur when contractors use properly classified information in their IR&D efforts to explore technological advancements and state-of-the-art improvements. Information that is generated by or results from an IR&D effort and is derived from properly classified information requires derivative classification in accordance with Reference (d). Classification guides developed in accordance with this Manual can be used by contractors as a source of up-to-date classification guidance for information used in or generated by their IR&D efforts. Recognition of such use by developers of classification guides, particularly those addressing leading edge or breakthrough technology, can help to ensure that information related to national security is consistently protected. (7) An OCA determines whether specific information should be classified, using the steps shown in Appendix 1 to this enclosure. These steps may be laid out as a series of questions, as identified in subparagraphs 2.a.(7)(a) through 2.a.(7)(e). OCAs should review the following questions throughout the process: (a) Is the information owned by, produced by or for, or under the control of the U. S. Government? If the answer to this question is no, the information cannot be classified. (b) Does the information fall within one or more of the categories of information identified in sections 1.4(a) through 1.4(h) of Reference (d) or, for nuclear information, meet the criteria in Reference (g)? If the answer to this question is no, the information cannot be classified. If the answer is yes, then the next question applies. (c) Is there a reasonable possibility that the information can be protected from unauthorized disclosure? If the answer is no, the information cannot be classified. If the answer is yes, then the next question applies. 10 ENCLOSURE 2
DoDM 5200.45, April 2, 2013 (d) Can the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to the national security? If the answer is no, the information cannot be classified. If the answer is yes, then the question in subparagraph 2.a.(7)(e) applies. (e) What is the level of damage (i.e., damage, serious damage, or exceptionally grave damage) to the national security expected in the event of an unauthorized disclosure of the information? If the answer to this question is damage, classify the information “Confidential.” If the answer is serious damage, classify it “Secret.” If the answer is exceptionally grave damage, classify the information “Top Secret.” (f) Where there is significant doubt about the need to classify information, it shall not be classified. If there is significant doubt about the appropriate level of classification, the information shall be classified at the lower level. b. When to Declassify. The declassification decision determines how long the information will be protected (i.e., the duration of classification) and is as important as the original classification determination. Information is to be declassified as soon as it no longer meets the requirements for classification. When an item of information is originally classified, the OCA shall establish a specific date or event for declassification of the information based upon its national security sensitivity. The OCA must specify one of the following options, selecting, whenever possible, the option that will result in the shortest duration of classification: (1) A date or independently verifiable event less than 10 years from the date of original classification. (2) A date 10 years from the date of original classification. (3) A date or independently verifiable event greater than 10 and less than 25 years from the date of original classification. (4) A date 25 years from the date of original classification. (5) “50X1-HUM,” designating a duration of up to 75 years, when classifying information that is clearly and demonstrably expected to reveal the identity of a confidential human source or a human intelligence (HUMINT) source. (6) “50X2-WMD,” designating a duration of up to 75 years, when classifying information that is clearly and demonstrably expected to reveal key design concepts of weapons of mass destruction. (7) “25X_” (where “_” is a number 1 through 9) with a date or event, designating a duration of up to 50 years when classifying information that clearly falls within an exemption from automatic declassification at 25 years that has previously been approved by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISACP). See Enclosure 5 of Volume 1 of Reference (f) for further guidance on use of exemptions before citing this duration. 11 ENCLOSURE 2
Page 1 and 2: Department of Defense MANUAL SUBJEC
Page 3 and 4: Enclosures 1. References 2. Procedu
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Page 7 and 8: ENCLOSURE 1 REFERENCES 7 DoDM 5200.
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Page 19 and 20: Questions to Answer: Does applicabl
Page 21 and 22: 1. Is the effort a new generation,
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Page 27 and 28: 10. ASSOCIATIONS 27 DoDM 5200.45, A
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Page 31 and 32: ENCLOSURE 3 CLASSIFYING SPECIFIC TY
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Page 37 and 38: (y) U.S. nuclear programs and facil
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