Supporting Material Vol 1 - Colourful Language
Supporting Material Vol 1 - Colourful Language
Supporting Material Vol 1 - Colourful Language
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Objectivist Philosophy<br />
The Law of Identity<br />
In logic, the law of identity states that an object is the<br />
same as itself: A : A. Any reflexive relation upholds the<br />
law of identity. When discussing equality, the fact that<br />
“A is A” is a tautology.<br />
“That everything is necessarily the same with itself<br />
and different from another” is the self-evident first<br />
principle of linguistics, for it governs the designation<br />
or ‘identification’ of individual concepts within any<br />
symbolic language, so as to avoid ambiguity in the<br />
communicating of concepts between the users of that<br />
language. Such a principle is necessary because a<br />
‘symbolic designator’ (name, word, sign, etc.) has no<br />
inherent meaning of its own, but derives its meaning<br />
from a cognizant agent who correlates the given<br />
designator with a conventionally prescribed concept<br />
that has been previously learned and stored in their<br />
memory. To put it another way, the principle (law) of<br />
identity states that although it is permissible to call<br />
the same concept by many different names, words,<br />
signs, etc., a fact that makes it possible for there to be<br />
different languages, it is not permissible, within any<br />
single linguistic group, to call different concepts by the<br />
same designator, else the users of the language will not<br />
know which of the possible concepts they are intended<br />
to call to mind when they encounter that designator.<br />
The exception, that proves the rule, is where we are able<br />
to readily discern which of the different concepts we<br />
are intended to call to mind by the context in which the<br />
designator is used, for example, in the case where the<br />
same word denotes both a noun (a bear) and a verb (to<br />
bear).<br />
History<br />
Parmenides the Eleatic (circa BCE. 490) formulated the<br />
principle Being is (eon emmenai) as the foundation of his<br />
philosophy. Aristotle identifies the principle in Book VII<br />
of the Metaphysics:<br />
Now “why a thing is itself” is a meaningless inquiry<br />
(for—to give meaning to the question ‘why’—the fact<br />
or the existence of the thing must already be evident—<br />
e.g., that the moon is eclipsed—but the fact that a<br />
thing is itself is the single reason and the single cause<br />
to be given in answer to all such questions as why the<br />
man is man, or the musician musical, unless one were to<br />
answer, ‘because each thing is inseparable from itself,<br />
and its being one just meant this.’ This, however, is<br />
common to all things and is a short and easy way with<br />
the question.)<br />
—Metaphysics, Book VII, Part 17<br />
Both Thomas Aquinas (Met. IV., lect. 6) and Duns Scotus<br />
(Quaest. sup. Met. IV., Q. 3) follow Aristotle. Antonius<br />
Andreas, the Spanish disciple of Scotus (d. 1320) argues<br />
that the first place should belong to the principle ‘Every<br />
Being is a Being’ (Omne Ens est Ens, Qq. in Met. IV.,<br />
Q. 4), but the late scholastic writer Francisco Suarez<br />
(Disp. Met. III., § 3) disagreed, also preferring to follow<br />
Aristotle.<br />
Leibniz claimed that the principle of Identity, which<br />
he expresses as ‘Everything is what it is,’ is the first<br />
primitive truth of reason which is affirmative, and the<br />
Principle of contradiction, is the first negative truth<br />
(Nouv. Ess. IV., 2, § i), arguing that “the statement that a<br />
thing is what it is, is prior to the statement that it is not<br />
another thing” (Nouv. Ess. IV.. 7, § 9). Wilhelm Wundt<br />
credits Gottfried Leibniz with the symbolic formulation,<br />
“A is A.<br />
Locke (Essay Concerning Human Understanding IV. vii.<br />
iv. (“Of Maxims”) says:<br />
... whenever the mind with attention considers any<br />
proposition, so as to perceive the two ideas signified by<br />
the terms, and affirmed or denied one of the other to be<br />
the same or different; it is presently and infallibly certain<br />
of the truth of such a proposition; and this equally<br />
whether these propositions be in terms standing for<br />
more general ideas, or such as are less so: e.g. whether<br />
the general idea of Being be affirmed of itself, as in this<br />
proposition, “whatsoever is, is”; or a more particular<br />
idea be affirmed of itself, as “a man is a man”; or,<br />
“whatsoever is white is white” ...