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Supporting Material Vol 1 - Colourful Language

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Objectivist Philosophy<br />

The Law of Identity<br />

In logic, the law of identity states that an object is the<br />

same as itself: A : A. Any reflexive relation upholds the<br />

law of identity. When discussing equality, the fact that<br />

“A is A” is a tautology.<br />

“That everything is necessarily the same with itself<br />

and different from another” is the self-evident first<br />

principle of linguistics, for it governs the designation<br />

or ‘identification’ of individual concepts within any<br />

symbolic language, so as to avoid ambiguity in the<br />

communicating of concepts between the users of that<br />

language. Such a principle is necessary because a<br />

‘symbolic designator’ (name, word, sign, etc.) has no<br />

inherent meaning of its own, but derives its meaning<br />

from a cognizant agent who correlates the given<br />

designator with a conventionally prescribed concept<br />

that has been previously learned and stored in their<br />

memory. To put it another way, the principle (law) of<br />

identity states that although it is permissible to call<br />

the same concept by many different names, words,<br />

signs, etc., a fact that makes it possible for there to be<br />

different languages, it is not permissible, within any<br />

single linguistic group, to call different concepts by the<br />

same designator, else the users of the language will not<br />

know which of the possible concepts they are intended<br />

to call to mind when they encounter that designator.<br />

The exception, that proves the rule, is where we are able<br />

to readily discern which of the different concepts we<br />

are intended to call to mind by the context in which the<br />

designator is used, for example, in the case where the<br />

same word denotes both a noun (a bear) and a verb (to<br />

bear).<br />

History<br />

Parmenides the Eleatic (circa BCE. 490) formulated the<br />

principle Being is (eon emmenai) as the foundation of his<br />

philosophy. Aristotle identifies the principle in Book VII<br />

of the Metaphysics:<br />

Now “why a thing is itself” is a meaningless inquiry<br />

(for—to give meaning to the question ‘why’—the fact<br />

or the existence of the thing must already be evident—<br />

e.g., that the moon is eclipsed—but the fact that a<br />

thing is itself is the single reason and the single cause<br />

to be given in answer to all such questions as why the<br />

man is man, or the musician musical, unless one were to<br />

answer, ‘because each thing is inseparable from itself,<br />

and its being one just meant this.’ This, however, is<br />

common to all things and is a short and easy way with<br />

the question.)<br />

—Metaphysics, Book VII, Part 17<br />

Both Thomas Aquinas (Met. IV., lect. 6) and Duns Scotus<br />

(Quaest. sup. Met. IV., Q. 3) follow Aristotle. Antonius<br />

Andreas, the Spanish disciple of Scotus (d. 1320) argues<br />

that the first place should belong to the principle ‘Every<br />

Being is a Being’ (Omne Ens est Ens, Qq. in Met. IV.,<br />

Q. 4), but the late scholastic writer Francisco Suarez<br />

(Disp. Met. III., § 3) disagreed, also preferring to follow<br />

Aristotle.<br />

Leibniz claimed that the principle of Identity, which<br />

he expresses as ‘Everything is what it is,’ is the first<br />

primitive truth of reason which is affirmative, and the<br />

Principle of contradiction, is the first negative truth<br />

(Nouv. Ess. IV., 2, § i), arguing that “the statement that a<br />

thing is what it is, is prior to the statement that it is not<br />

another thing” (Nouv. Ess. IV.. 7, § 9). Wilhelm Wundt<br />

credits Gottfried Leibniz with the symbolic formulation,<br />

“A is A.<br />

Locke (Essay Concerning Human Understanding IV. vii.<br />

iv. (“Of Maxims”) says:<br />

... whenever the mind with attention considers any<br />

proposition, so as to perceive the two ideas signified by<br />

the terms, and affirmed or denied one of the other to be<br />

the same or different; it is presently and infallibly certain<br />

of the truth of such a proposition; and this equally<br />

whether these propositions be in terms standing for<br />

more general ideas, or such as are less so: e.g. whether<br />

the general idea of Being be affirmed of itself, as in this<br />

proposition, “whatsoever is, is”; or a more particular<br />

idea be affirmed of itself, as “a man is a man”; or,<br />

“whatsoever is white is white” ...

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